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ABSTRACT 
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Given that a quoting author is first a reader of a text and on the presupposition that 
communication is both cooperative and dialogical, this study considers quotation from a 
fresh perspective. Our thesis is that, in many cases, T quotation of the OT promotes 
transformation on the lifeworld/worldview level by evoking theological tradition.  
The first part of the study unpacks the elements of this hypothesis, including: 
intertextuality and the function of quotation; types of “context”; the author/text/reader 
interaction and the implied author/reader construct; textual tradition and the relationship 
of Story to lifeworld/worldview and theology; the evoking of Story and activation of 
mutual context via quotation; and the resulting transformation of lifeworld/worldview, 
theology and Story. The methodology we create to explore the transformational nature 
of quotation frames these elements within a model of communicative interaction based 
on speech-act theory. Our action model includes the illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts of the implied author as well as the illocutionary effect of understanding and the 
associated perlocutionary effects (responses of belief and/or action) of the implied 
reader. By holding the author, reader and text in creative tension, we present meaning as 
cooperative, thus bridging the chasm between authorial intention and reader response. 
We distinguish three reader roles: (i) an Independent reader ignores the illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts, (ii) an Analyst achieves the illocutionary response 
(understanding) but is either unwilling or unable to respond with an associated 
perlocutionary effect, and (iii) an Envisager understands the illocutionary act and also 
responds with an associated perlocutionary effect. Perlocution thus reveals the 
transformational response of the implied reader as well as the implied author’s 
intentions for lifeworld/worldview, Story and theology. Making a perlocutionary 
response associated with the illocution means that an empirical reader moves beyond 
understanding to transformation.  
To evaluate the purposes of NT authors and readers in communicative 
interaction with regard to a specific quotation, we first determine the contribution of the 
quoted passage and its co-text to lifeworld/worldview, theology and Story and assess 
what it would mean to be an Envisaging reader of the quoted text. Then we determine 
whether the NT author uses the quotation to transform the lifeworld/worldview, 
theology and Story of the NT audience by evoking the theological Story-lines of the 
source text.  
Our examples and case studies come from the OT Psalms. The first case study is 
the quotation of Psalm 115:1a LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13. We investigate the claim that 
Paul takes this verse “out of context” and we also consider the contention that Paul 
reads the psalm messianically. In the second case study, we examine the 
transformational efforts of various NT authors who quote Psalm 110:1.
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CHAPTER 1 
ITRODUCTIO1 
That the Jewish Scriptures (OT2) and the New Testament (NT) are related is evidenced 
by the frequency with which references, and in particular quotations, from the former 
are found in the latter. The nature of this relationship has been much discussed. Richard 
Hays groups the questions that have been asked about the use of the OT into five 
categories, including: which books and passages are quoted by NT authors and what 
form of the text was used, how NT exegesis relates to that of rabbinic Judaism (midrash 
or pesher) or to early Christian exegetical traditions, and whether the NT authors “use 
the Old Testament with exegetical-theological integrity, or … rifle it for prooftexts and 
twist its meaning.”3 Although Hays suggested over 20 years ago that, at least with 
regard to Paul, these questions “have been either answered in full or played out to a 
dead end,”4 the question of whether the NT authors quote the OT with “exegetical-
theological integrity” continues to be debated, re-fueled in part by Hays’ own literary 
intertextual approach. 
In this regard, interesting questions concerning quotation include: the function 
of a particular quotation; whether the main function of quotation is to offer proof via an 
appeal to authority; and what role is played by the context, co-text and original meaning 
of a source text in a receptor text. Given that a quoting author is first a reader of a text, 
an issue which underlies these questions is whether the author, reader or text is the locus 
of “meaning.” Some discussions assume adversarial or “power” relationships between 
the quoted author/text, the quoting author/text and the audience of the quoting 
author/text.5 In some cases, these discussions are based on the premise that the quoting 
author uses the quoted material without regard for its original meaning.6 
                                                           
1 All italic, bold and uppercase type is original to the author quoted, unless otherwise noted. 
Also, unless otherwise noted, all Scripture references herein are to the NRSV. 
2 Our use of this term is not intended to imply anything about the canonical status of the 
Jewish/Hebrew Scriptures at the time of the NT writings. 
3 See R. B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989), 9-10; quote is from p. 9. He explores Paul’s work, but his conclusions are valid for all NT authors. 
4 Hays, Echoes, 9. More recently, and from a somewhat different perspective, D. L. Bock 
identifies four different approaches taken by evangelical scholars to the use of the OT in the NT 
(“Evangelicals and the Use of the Old Testament in the New, Part 1,” in Rightly Divided: Readings in 
Biblical Hermeneutics, ed. R. B. Zuck [Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1996]). 
5 We explore some of these in chapter 2. 
6 The original impetus for this study was a comment of M. D. Hooker concerning the use of the 
OT by NT authors: “Often one is left exclaiming: whatever the passage from the Old Testament 
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Our presupposition instead is that communication, including quotation, tends to 
be cooperative or dialogical.7 Therefore, we find it profitable to consider quotation from 
a fresh perspective. Our thesis is that, in many cases, T quotation of the OT promotes 
transformation on the lifeworld/worldview level by evoking theological tradition.  
In each of the next four chapters, we develop various aspects of this hypothesis 
and, in the process, create a new methodology to explore quotation. In chapter 2, we 
explore intertextuality, and more specifically explicit quotation, from a functional 
perspective, i.e., what does quotation do? After analyzing pertinent linguistic and 
literary theories of quotation, we conclude that quotation does not serve primarily as a 
proof via an appeal to authority or to establish the primacy of the quoter in a power 
relationship. Rather, a key function of quotation is to evoke Story and, specifically, 
theological tradition.8 Our discussion of quotation thus raises the issues of theological 
tradition, the relationship between the old and new contexts of the quotation and the 
interaction between author and reader.  
At the beginning of chapter 3, we take up the latter topic, using the construct of 
the implied author and reader to frame the communicative efforts of the empirical 
author and reader.9 This construct makes it possible to determine authorial intention, as 
revealed by the implied author, without requiring retrieval of the motivation of the 
empirical author. Identifying the implied reader makes it possible to determine intended 
reader response. Thus, determining what would be fully successful communication is 
independent of knowing how any empirical reader actually responds. 
We then lay the groundwork for our development of the concept of Story by 
examining “context,” first outlining the various types of context (socio-historical and 
literary context plus linguistic conventions) and then presenting “mutual context” as the 
subset of context shared by author and reader. Quotation activates (and perhaps first 
creates) mutual context. Because of the foundational nature of Hays’ work, we conclude 
chapter 3 by interacting with his arguments concerning intertextuality and context in 
Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul. 
We develop the concept of theological tradition in chapter 4. After first defining 
“tradition,” we critique works by four ground-breaking scholars who, building to some 
                                                                                                                                                                          
originally meant, it certainly was not this!” (“Beyond the Things that are Written? Saint Paul’s Use of 
Scripture,” TS 27, no. 3 [April 1981]: 295).  
7 For this, we rely on Gadamer, Stuhlmacher, R. Hays, N. T. Wright, Snodgrass, Thiselton, etc. 
8 We capitalize “Story” to indicate it is not limited to narrative genre. 
9 Key resources here are Booth, Chatman, Walhout, Lanser, Wolterstorff, etc. 
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extent on Hays’ work, have explored how a specific NT author makes use of OT 
tradition.10 After exploring narrative genre (i.e., “story”), we demonstrate that non-
narrative material such as the OT Psalms has the capacity to make a substantial 
contribution to the tradition mediated by texts. To recognize the contribution of non-
narrative material, we call this textual tradition “Story” rather than “story.” 
A key next step is to develop the relationship of Story to lifeworld/worldview 
and theology. A lifeworld is the world in which a communicative community shares 
mutual context, including worldview. “Worldview” encompasses four interrelated 
elements: Story, symbols, praxis, and the basic questions and answers of human 
existence.11 The basic questions and answers deal with the existence and nature of a 
divine being and the relationship of that deity to humanity; taken together the basic 
questions and answers comprise “theology.” Theology not only asks questions about 
God and humanity’s relationship to God, it answers them with Story. Since, by our 
definition, those who share a lifeworld share a worldview (and vice versa), lifeworld is 
created, sustained and modified by Story and the theology it imparts.  
With most of the “pieces” of our model in place, we conclude chapter 4 by 
integrating those already developed. In the case of NT quotation of the OT, the mutual 
context activated by the quotation of an element of Story presents theology. Therefore, 
in our model, quotation stands at the lifeworld intersection of Story and theology. The 
evoking of an element of Story via quotation has the potential to transform (realign or 
subvert/re-create) Story, lifeworld/worldview and the corresponding theology.  
To determine what transformation is intended and how transformation is 
accomplished, in chapter 5 we create an “action model” of the communication of 
meaning based on pragmatics, specifically speech-act theory (SAT).12 In our action 
model, we include both the illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts of the implied 
author as well as those perlocutionary effects (responses) of the implied reader 
associated with the illocution. In broad categories, these associated perlocutionary 
                                                           
10 These scholars are Keesmaat, R. Watts, Pao and J. R. Wagner.  
11 See N. T. Wright, The ew Testament and the People of God, vol. 1 of Christian Origins and 
the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 38.  
12 Our model has its roots in K. J. Vanhoozer’s “action model of meaning” (see Is There a 
Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge [Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1998], 369-378). 
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responses are either of belief or action. Transformation occurs when communicative 
interaction is fully successful on both the illocutionary and perlocutionary levels.13   
By taking the innovative step of including perlocution in the communication of 
meaning, we are able to creatively distinguish three roles for an empirical reader: (i) the 
locutionary14 role of “Independent,” (ii) the illocutionary role of “Analyst” and (iii) the 
perlocutionary role of “Envisager.”15 In brief, an Independent reader creates new 
meaning using the words or phrases of the locution without regard for the original 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. An Analyst is a cooperative reader who achieves 
the illocutionary response of understanding (the sole illocutionary effect) but is either 
unwilling or unable to respond with an associated perlocutionary effect. An Envisager 
not only understands the illocutionary act of the implied author but also responds with 
an associated perlocutionary effect.16 It is the Envisaging reader who steps fully into the 
role of the implied reader. 
Thus, incorporating the often overlooked and sometimes unhelpfully defined 
speech-act element of perlocution into our model and hierarchy of reader roles is 
critical. The intended perlocutionary response of the implied reader, as it corresponds to 
the perlocutionary intention of the implied author, signals the implied author’s 
transformative intention for Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview. Therefore, the 
perlocutionary response of the implied reader sets the standard for the response of the 
empirical reader. It is by responding at the perlocutionary level (Envisaging) that an 
empirical reader moves beyond understanding to transformation.17 In responding with 
an associated perlocutionary effect, the Envisaging reader “completes the circuit” 
required for successfully transformative communicative interaction.  
                                                           
13 Many pragmaticists call perlocution “interaction” rather than “communication.” For this 
reason, we use “communicative interaction” to indicate that illocution and perlocution both play a role. 
14 We use the term “locution” to refer to Searle’s predicating and referring acts, taken together, 
rather than to Austin’s locutionary act. 
15 Since the construct of implied author/reader does not apply to a speech situation, in the case of 
NT speakers (e.g., Jesus or Peter), we name “Envisaging” those hearers who respond as an implied reader 
would to the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of the speaker. 
16 The distinction between “Analyst” and “Envisager” is not the same as G. Steiner’s distinction 
between “critic” and “reader.” For Steiner, “criticism labors to transcend relation” and a “critic” is “a 
‘counterstater’ and rival to the work” (“‘Critic’/‘Reader,’” LH 10, no. 3 [Spring 1979]: 437, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/468921 [accessed June 19, 2009]). A “reader,” on the other hand, “attempts to 
negate the space between the text and himself. … The reader strives for fusion with the text via 
internalization” (443). Our “Analyst” and “Envisager” are different levels of Steiner’s “reader.” 
17 Although illocutionary acts do alter the mutual context of the empirical author and reader, our 
primary interest is the transformation of belief and/or action that is the perlocutionary response associated 
with the illocution.  
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Throughout chapter five, we link our action model to quotation by recognizing 
that a quoting speaker/author is always first a hearer/reader of the quoted speech or text 
and/or an intervening interpretive tradition and thus has assumed one of the reader roles 
vis-à-vis that text and/or interpretive tradition. A NT author may not always read the 
OT or an intervening interpretation as an Envisager. However, via quotation an implied 
NT author calls for a response of belief or action intended to transform the current Story 
and related theological lifeworld/worldview of the NT audience. We not only can assess 
what transformation is intended but also can evaluate whether a NT author read a 
passage of the OT as an Envisager by determining whether the theological Story-lines 
of that passage are evoked via the quotation.  
To close chapter five, we put our action model into our Story/lifeworld 
framework by defining related groups of speech acts (SAs) as speech-act complexes 
(SACs). The illocutionary act type of the core SA of the SAC can be considered the 
illocutionary act type of that SAC. Other SAs in the SAC, which may be of different 
illocutionary act types, play a supporting role. Identifying not only the illocutionary act 
type of the various SAs of a SAC but also the illocutionary act type of the SAC allows 
us to use SAT, originally constructed at the sentence level, at the discourse level of our 
Story/lifeworld framework.  
The final step in constructing a methodology is its use. Rather than applying our 
action model to one NT book or the work of one author, we take our examples from a 
common OT source text, the Psalms. Studying quotations from texts outside the 
narrative genre allows us to draw stronger conclusions concerning how quotation 
evokes Story and theological tradition to call for reader transformation.  
Examples of NT Psalms quotations are used in the first part of this study as 
illustrations. In the second part, we present two case studies. We introduce these in 
chapter 6, where we evaluate what role the Psalms generally may have played in the 
lifeworld and Story of the people of Yahweh and how familiar various groups within 
the early Church may have been with the Psalms.  
In that chapter, we also consolidate our methodological development by 
summarizing the steps we take in performing our case studies. Our first step is to 
evaluate the source text of the quotation to determine what the quoted passage, as set 
within its co-text, contributes to Story, theology, worldview and lifeworld via the 
illocution and perlocution of its speech acts as they are addressed to the implied reader 
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by the implied author. We also consider what can be surmised or is implied concerning 
the socio-historical context as well as what interpretations of that passage may have 
been current in the mid-1st century CE. We then determine what it would mean to be an 
Envisaging reader of the quoted text or an intervening interpretation.  
Turning to the NT, we consider the passage containing the Psalm quotation, 
determining its illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions and the associated 
perlocutionary response of belief or action which would be made by the implied reader 
and therefore, by definition, the Envisaging empirical reader. We then consider what 
elements of the theological OT Story-line are evoked by the quotation. Putting this 
together, we determine (i) what role the quotation plays in the intended transformation 
of the existing Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview of the empirical NT audience 
and (ii) whether the NT author read the OT text (or interpretation) as an Envisager. 
Our first case study (chapter 7) is the quotation of Psalm 115:1a LXX in 2 
Corinthians 4:13. Recent criticism argues that the sense in which Paul uses this verse “is 
so far removed from the original context as to raise questions about Paul’s reliability as 
an interpreter,”18 in other words, using our terminology, that Paul does not read the 
quoted passage as an Envisager. Other scholars believe Paul reads the psalm 
messianically.19 In our first case study, we use our methodology to investigate the 
validity of these various claims. We determine that the called-for transformation is 
consistent with Paul reading Psalm 115:1a LXX as an Envisager. 
The second case study is the quotation of Psalm 110:1 in the Synoptic Gospels, 
Acts, 1 Corinthians and Hebrews. Choosing this OT passage allows us to examine the 
role of a single non-narrative quotation across the transformational efforts of various 
NT speakers/authors and audiences20 and to refute the claim that “most application” of 
Psalm 110 to Jesus “in the NT requires it to be understood in a way that would not 
correspond to its meaning in any OT context.”21 
Some caveats are necessary. First, any model offers only  
partial access to the truth, the truth as viewed within a particular framework and 
for particular purposes; and it provides orientation for a particular interpretative 
practice. … No model should claim to offer a comprehensive description of 
                                                           
18 C. D. Stanley, Arguing with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of Paul (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2004), 100. In chapter 7, we explore other scholarship which makes similar claims. 
19 We present some of this scholarship in chapter 7. 
20 In some cases, a multi-layered analysis is required. 
21 J. E. Goldingay, Psalms 90-150, vol. 3 of Psalms (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 
292. 
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reality, and each may retain its heuristic usefulness even where anomalies and 
complexities are detected of which it has taken no account.22  
Other methodologies offer insight into various aspects of quotation; we do not attempt 
either to synthesize or to replace all other theories or models. Second, although our 
model sheds helpful light on NT quotation, we do not claim either that the evoking of 
tradition is a relevant framework for all quotation or that all NT authors in every case 
read the passages they quote as Envisagers. Each quotation must be evaluated on its 
own merits.  
However, by including perlocution and especially perlocutionary effect, 
incorporating the construct of the implied author/reader, and considering Envisaging 
readers as distinct from Analysts, our model holds the author, reader and text in creative 
tension, transcending the false dichotomy between meaning as authorial intention 
versus reader response and linking quotation as the evoking of Story (textual tradition) 
to lifeworld/worldview transformation. This offers a new and valuable perspective on 
quotation and provides the opportunity to gain new insight into the purposes of NT 
authors and readers in communicative interaction.
                                                           
22 F. Watson, Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 8. 
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CHAPTER 2 
QUOTATIO 
Quotation and Intertextuality 
The term “intertextualité” was coined by Julia Kristeva, whose concern was “with 
establishing the manner in which a text is constructed out of already existent discourse. 
Authors do not create their texts from their own original minds, but rather compile them 
from pre-existent texts.”1 For Kristeva and some who have followed her, including 
Roland Barthes, “text” includes all of what might be described as “culture,” covering 
such topics as architecture, art and “the dominant relations of production and the socio-
political context.”2 As Barthes describes it, text is “a tissue of quotations drawn from the 
innumerable centres of culture.”3 
Although we primarily use “text” in its more common linguistic sense,4 we 
agree that “the writer is a reader of texts (in the broadest sense) before s/he is a creator 
of texts, and therefore the work of art is inevitably shot through with references, 
quotations and influences of every kind.”5 Not only is a writer first a reader of texts, 
theories of intertextuality highlight the reader in other ways. Gerard Luttikhuisen 
helpfully notes that “intertextuality plays a significant role not only in the production of 
texts but also in their reception. In fact, the information of the text cannot be 
comprehended unless we relate it to what we remember from texts heard or read before. 
In other words, meaning is assigned to the text in the light of what we know from other 
texts.”6 More broadly, according to Steve Moyise, “Texts do not present themselves to 
                                                           
1 G. Allen, Intertextuality (London: Routledge, 2000), 35. For a discussion of Kristeva and her 
predecessor, Mikhail Bakhtin, see M. Pfister, “Konzepte der Intertextualität,” in Intertextualität: Formen, 
Funktionen, anglistische Fallstudien, ed. U. Broich and M. Pfister (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1985). 
2 J. Still and M. Worton, “Introduction,” in Intertextuality: Theories and Practices, ed. M. 
Worton and J. Still (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 1. As C. B. Hays notes, “when 
Kristeva speaks of a text, she is not referring merely to literary texts but to historical and social contexts” 
(“Echoes of the Ancient Near East? Intertextuality and the Comparative Study of the Old Testament,” in 
The Word Leaps the Gap: Essays on Scripture and Theology in Honor of Richard B. Hays, ed. J. R. 
Wagner, C. K. Rowe, and A. K. Grieb [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008], 42).   
3 R. Barthes, Image, Music, Text, trans. S. Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 146. “For 
Barthes as for Derrida, ‘nothing exists outside the text’” where “text” is “the intertextual” (G. Allen, 74). 
4 Generally, by “text,” we mean any speech or writing. By “intertext,” we refer to any use 
(quotation, allusion or echo) of an earlier text. 
5 Still and Worton, 1. For Pfister also, “der Autor immer zugleich auch Leser ist” (21).  
6 G. Luttikhuisen, “Intertextual References in Readers’ Responses to the Apocryphon of John,” 
in Intertextuality in Biblical Writings: Essays in Honour of Bas van Iersel, ed. S. Draisma (Kampen: Kok, 
1989), 117. “What is produced at the moment of reading is due to the cross-fertilisation of the packaged 
textual material (say, a book) by all the texts which the reader brings to it” (Still and Worton, 1-2).  
  10 
readers as transparent packages of meaning; readers have to do something in order to 
interpret them. Intertextuality suggests that what they do is relate them to other 
intertexts, which might be actual texts or, more generally, events, cultural phenomena, 
or personal experiences and commitments.”7 In the case of the NT, one of these “texts” 
is the events of the life, death, resurrection and exaltation of Jesus Christ. 
The reader’s experience can have an impact on two other fronts. First, “the 
reader’s experience of some practice or theory unknown to the author may lead to a 
fresh interpretation.”8 Such “practice or theory” includes instances of intervening 
interpretation of a text.9 In the examples we consider of Psalms quotations in the NT, at 
a minimum, the original text has been interpreted by the Septuagint. In some instances, 
there also are Jewish interpretations in the Qumran documents and other pre-Christian 
sources. Plus, not only do NT authors filter their presentation of OT texts through their 
understanding of the Christ event, in some cases, there may be intervening NT 
interpretation of an OT text by other NT speakers or authors.  
The second possibility is that the reader may not know every text the author 
knows. To avoid having to determine whether a NT hearer/reader would recognize the 
quoted material, we take most of our examples, including the case studies, from marked 
quotations, that is, “those introduced by an explicit quotation formula, such as ‘as it is 
written.’”10 With explicit quotation, it is certain both that the quoting author was a 
reader of the quoted text and/or an interpretation thereof and that the author intends the 
reader to understand that these words come from a source text.11  
                                                           
7 S. Moyise, “Latency and Respect for Context: A Response to Mitchell Kim,” in Paul and 
Scripture: Extending the Conversation, ed. C. D. Stanley (Atlanta: SBL, 2012), 134. 
8 Still and Worton, 2. 
9 As M. Fishbane points out, “it makes all the difference—all and not some—whether a specific 
traditum has been reused or annotated; or whether, on the contrary, it either contains independent reflexes 
of common idioms or comments which are original to the particular composition or teaching” (Biblical 
Interpretation in Ancient Israel [Oxford: Clarendon, 1985], 13). 
10 Stanley, Arguing, 47. This is the first of Stanley’s categories of quotation. His second is “those 
accompanied by a clear interpretive gloss (e.g., 1 Cor 15:27)” (Ibid.). This category covers 1 Cor 15:25, 
which we analyze in chapter 8. 
11 See S. Moyise, “Intertextuality and the Study of the Old Testament in the New Testament,” in 
The Old Testament in the ew Testament: Essays in Honour of J. L. orth, ed. S. Moyise (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 19. As B. L. Tanner notes, “Quotation is an author-generated 
intertextuality, placed purposefully for a specific effect or effects” (The Book of Psalms Through the Lens 
of Intertextuality [New York: Peter Lang, 2001], 6). 
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Intertextuality is not an interpretive method. Rather, it is “a theory (or group of 
theories) concerning the production of meaning.”12 Some link it irrevocably to 
poststructuralism,13 although we do not adopt that perspective here since “an 
intertextuality that locates meaning in an infinite matrix of possible influences is unable 
to say anything specific about a text.”14 Rather, we find “intertextuality” helpful because 
it highlights “the importance of considering the relation between the new context and 
the old in interpreting allusion and citation.”15 Additionally, we value its focus on the 
role of the reader. In terms of the five types of intertextuality identified by Moyise, we 
are interested in the reader-oriented types, i.e., the narrative-frame, dialogical and 
“postmodern,”16 although our goal is to hold them in creative tension rather than 
considering them as discrete entities.  
We have several times referred to “meaning” and its production. Before turning 
to quotation per se, we want to give a brief introduction to the methodology we will 
develop to determine how “meaning” is produced. 
The Production of Meaning 
The arguments of poststructuralists such as Kristeva and Barthes are in part a response 
to the structuralist insistence that stable meaning can be created and discovered.17 Thus, 
                                                           
12 S. Moyise, “Intertextuality and Historical Approaches to the Use of Scripture in the New 
Testament,” VeEc 26, no. 2 (2005): 447, http://www.ve.org.za/index.php/VE/article/viewFile/235/185 
(accessed June 28, 2012). 
13 For example, T. R. Hatina criticizes R. Hays’ use of the word “intertextuality” since it “is 
certainly not accompanied by a commitment to the poststructuralist framework” (“Intertextuality and 
Historical Criticism in New Testament Studies: Is There a Relationship?,” BibInt 7, no. 1 [January 1999]: 
36).  
14 Moyise, “Intertextuality and Historical Approaches,” 457. 
15 I. Paul, “The Use of the Old Testament in Revelation 12,” in Moyise, 259. R. L. Brawley 
points out that “by the criteria of intertextuality, … the question is no longer how faithful the repetition is 
to the original. Rather, a reference to an old text locates the modern interpreter in a tensive ambience of 
echoes between the two texts, and the question is how the two texts reverberate with each other” (Text to 
Text Pours Forth Speech: Voices of Scripture in Luke-Acts [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1995], 8). Space constraints mean we can only assess the impact of the quotation on the interpretation of 
the source text within the NT passage being analyzed. 
16 See S. Moyise, “Intertextuality and Biblical Studies: A Review,” VeEc 23, no. 2 (2002). In a 
later work, Moyise identifies three approaches to Paul’s quotations: intertextual, narrative and rhetorical 
(Paul and Scripture: Studying the ew Testament Use of the Old Testament [Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2010], 111-125). Herein, we do not explore interpretive techniques like midrash, which 
belong to Moyise’s “exegetical” type. Nor do we deal with “intertextual echo” although we believe that 
with modification our methodology could be used to study unmarked references such as allusion and 
echo. However, it would complicate our analysis to establish a process to identify such intertexts. 
17 See G. Allen, 69, and S. Alkier, “Intertextuality and the Semiotics of Biblical Texts,” in 
Reading the Bible Intertextually, ed. R. B. Hays, S. Alkier, and L. A. Huizenga (Waco: Baylor University 
Press, 2009), 4. For Barthes’ and Derrida’s opposition to “structuralist assertions of textual unity and 
closure,” see T. K. Beal, “Ideology and Intertextuality: Surplus of Meaning and Controlling the Means of 
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in any discussion of intertextuality, context and the author/reader relationship, 
“meaning” is a key term, which calls for careful definition. We base our definition of 
“meaning” on Kevin Vanhoozer’s action model, in which meaning is “a three-
dimensional communicative action, with form and matter (propositional content), 
energy and trajectory (illocutionary force), and teleology or final purpose 
(perlocutionary effect).”18 These dimensions are elements of a single SA.  
Of these elements, the last two are the most critical in our model. An 
illocutionary act can be classified as one of five different types (Assertive, Directive, 
Expressive, Commissive and Declaration), depending on the illocutionary force with 
which the content is presented. The sole intended illocutionary effect (response of the 
hearer/reader) is understanding. Illocutionary acts necessarily have perlocutionary acts 
associated with them. A perlocutionary act is an act of a speaker/author that correlates 
to a perlocutionary effect (response) of belief and/or action by the hearer/reader. 
Our action model holds the three dimensions of meaning in creative tension and, 
at the levels of the illocution and the perlocution, gives a cooperative role to both the 
author and the reader in the interactive communication of meaning. We develop our 
action model further in chapter 5. In the remainder of this chapter, we consider theories 
or models of the function or purpose of quotation.  
The Function of Quotation 
The traditional approaches to evaluating OT quotations in the NT can be categorized 
according to the criteria of (i) quantity, i.e., which OT books and passages are quoted 
most often by which NT authors and which introductory formulae are used; (ii) 
“quality,” i.e. fidelity to either the MT, a version of the LXX or another source text; and 
(iii) interpretive method.19 Scholars also evaluate OT quotations on the basis of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Production,” in Reading between Texts: Intertextuality and the Hebrew Bible, ed. D. N. Fewell 
(Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1992), 27.  
Poststructuralism is not a monolithic concept. According to C. Hays, “the author and the world 
of the text’s production mattered to Bakhtin, and apparently to Kristeva as well” (29). However, Barthes 
“is famous for announcing the ‘death of the Author,’” (G. Allen, 74); for him, “the intertextual process is 
centered in the reader” (B. Tanner, 34; emphasis added).  
18 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 218. 
19 For a helpful categorization of some studies which fall into the last category, see W. M. 
Swartley, Israel’s Scripture Traditions and the Synoptic Gospels: Story Shaping Story (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1994), 10-21. 
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strength of the intertextual link (explicit quotation, allusion or “echo”)20 and, recently, 
purpose or function.  
With regard to the latter—the “why” of quotation—Christopher Stanley has 
offered an intriguing proposal; he argues that “Paul wrote his letters not to lay out a set 
of theological beliefs, but to motivate specific first-century Christians to believe and/or 
act (or stop believing or acting) in particular ways.”21 He follows this with the broader 
idea that “rhetorical speech is … audience-centered speech; its purpose is to promote 
action on the part of the audience, not merely to communicate the ideas of a 
speaker/author.”22 In Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s classic work on 
rhetoric, they also present a general goal of argumentation as “obtaining the adherence 
of the audience.”23 Wolfgang Motsch and Renate Pasch point out that “der Erfolg des 
Sprechers, die Realisierung seines Ziels durch den Hörer, hängt vor allem dann, … wie 
es dem Sprecher gelingt, den Hörer positiv zu motivieren.”24  
Since quotations are part of an author’s persuasive effort and thus are “are meant 
to affect an audience,”25 quotation not only reflects culture (or “lifeworld”),26 it changes 
it. Speech and text have the potential to transform the Story they evoke and the 
                                                           
20 For example, H. M. Shires divides “quotations” into three classes; the third includes unmarked 
allusions (Finding the Old Testament in the ew [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974]). R. Hays 
distinguishes three types of linguistic intertextuality: “Quotation, allusion, and echo may be seen as points 
along a spectrum of intertextual reference, moving from the explicit to the subliminal” (Echoes, 23). 
21 Stanley, Arguing, 3. 
22 Ibid., 16. Stanley starts with K. Burke’s definition of rhetoric as “the use of words by human 
agents to form attitudes or induce actions in other human agents” (Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives [New 
York: Prentice-Hall, 1950], 41, as quoted by Stanley, Arguing, 12n8). For G. A. Kennedy also, “the 
writers of the books of the New Testament had a message to convey and sought to persuade an audience 
to believe it or to believe it more profoundly” (ew Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical 
Criticism [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984], 3). However, we base our 
methodology on pragmatics rather than Kennedy’s “discipline of rhetoric.” 
23 C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The ew Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. 
J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 163.  
24 W. Motsch and R. Pasch “Illokutive Handlungen,” in Satz, Text, sprachliche Handlung, ed. 
W. Motsch (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1987), 74.  
25 Stanley, Arguing, 3. Stanley notes that little is said about quotation in rhetorical theories and 
that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s index lists only four references (12). Although they describe the 
“normal role” of quotation as “backing up a statement with the weight of authority,” they add that in other 
circumstances it can be regarded as “a figure relating to communion” with the audience (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 177). Similarly, per M. Schneider, “the decisive question for an intertextual reading” is 
“Why was the citation brought in here, and what effect is thereby made possible?” (“How Does God Act? 
Intertextual Readings of 1 Corinthians 10,” in Hays, Alkier, and Huizenga, 40). We argue in chapter 5 
that being audience-centered and communicating authorial ideas are not mutually exclusive but are 
instead two complementary aspects of meaning. Additionally, we distinguish between authorial intention 
(as communicated via an author’s SAs) and authorial motive.  
26 We briefly discussed “culture” above. A shared lifeworld and its corresponding worldview 
“reside at a very deep level, underlying the character and culture of an entire people” (D. K. Naugle, 
Worldview: The History of a Concept [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 150, regarding worldviews).  
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lifeworld they represent and also other Stories and lifeworlds with which they interact. 
We discuss Story, lifeworld and worldview in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4. 
Unfortunately, Stanley does not take full advantage of this promising start. 
Instead, he unduly narrows his focus, bypassing all theories of how quotations affect an 
audience other than appeal to authority.27 Not only does he overlook other possible 
functions of quotation, he takes the appeal to authority to an extreme, arguing that the 
function of almost all quotation is to establish the primacy of the speaker in a power 
relationship.28 This is a notion he takes from one of the models of quotation he 
examines, that of Gillian Lane-Mercier. We address this below when we consider 
specific theories of quotation. 
For now, we note that others also find quotation to be primarily an appeal to 
authority. For Timothy Berkley, it is “characteristic of Paul’s use of quotations” that a 
quotation “serves the separate rhetorical function of a proof-text offering supporting 
authority for Paul’s conclusion.”29 A. T. Hanson makes a similar argument: “One might 
well ask: If it is not for proof, why does Paul quote Scripture here?”30 Jeremy Punt 
believes Paul “invoked (both directly and indirectly) the Scriptures of Israel as an 
authoritative source. … In polemical contexts, he used Scripture as a final court of 
appeal, since it was for him sacred—proceeding from God—and thus had ultimate 
authority.”31 Concerning the Synoptic Gospels, Willard Swartley avers that “to varying 
degrees the authors/narrators cite specific OT texts to document the authority of the 
tradition. The tradition lives by the Scripture, and citation therefrom conveys 
authoritative word in the presentation of the narrative.”32 In her study of Hebrews, 
                                                           
27 Even where quotation is “used to illustrate or exemplify a point made by a speaker,” Stanley 
feels “the argument from authority is not far from the surface, since the very act of quotation implies that 
the source of the quotation is respected by the intended audience” (Arguing, 14).  
28 According to Stanley, “even quotations that look like innocent ornamental devices can be 
heavily ‘power-coded’ when taken from an authoritative source, since they inevitably add an aura of 
respectability to the speaker/author’s pronouncements” (Arguing, 14). S. F. Sanborn believes that for 
Stanley “when someone quotes another passage, either it means the same identical thing it meant in the 
quoted text or it means something not envisioned in the original text” (review of Arguing with Scripture: 
The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of Paul, by Christopher D. Stanley, Kerux 23, no. 2 [September 
2008]:76). Since the former is impossible, Stanley concludes that a quoter uses the material of another 
“for his own power purposes” (Ibid.). But, as Sanborn points out, this either/or position is invalid (Ibid.). 
29 T. W. Berkley, From a Broken Covenant to Circumcision of the Heart: Pauline Intertextual 
Exegesis in Romans 2:17-29 (Atlanta: SBL, 2000), 139.  
30 A. T. Hanson, Studies in Paul’s Technique and Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 
157; cf. 147. 
31 J. Punt, “Paul and Postcolonial Hermeneutics: Marginality and/in Early Biblical 
Interpretation,” in As It is Written: Studying Paul’s Use of Scripture, ed. S. E. Porter and C. D. Stanley 
(Atlanta: SBL, 2008), 269.  
32 Swartley, 291. 
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Cynthia Long Westfall argues that “quotations generally supply support material or 
proofs.”33 From the perspective of ancient rhetoric, Burton Mack takes the position that 
“the purpose of the citation was to show that other recognized authorities had come to 
the same conclusion or rendered a similar judgment on the same issue.”34 
However, we concur with Anthony Thiselton that “the Old Testament was not 
simply invoked as a ‘support’ or a ‘proof’ in the context of polemical debate for a 
message which had been understood independently of it.”35 Thomas Hatina also 
acknowledges that scriptural quotations have other functions than use as “proof-texts or 
analogies.”36 We combine these ideas with Stanley’s thought that quotation can help 
persuade an audience to believe and/or act (or stop believing or acting) in particular 
ways37 in constructing our methodology.  
In the remainder of this chapter, we put a theoretical foundation under our 
understanding of the function of quotation by engaging with a variety of theories of 
quotation, some from the field of linguistics and others which take a literary approach.38 
Of particular interest are: (i) the functions of quotation presented, and (ii) what these 
theories consider to be the relationship between the quoted author and audience and the 
quoting author (once a reader) and audience. 
                                                           
33 C. L. Westfall, A Discourse Analysis of the Letter to the Hebrews: The Relationship between 
Form and Meaning (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 92. 
34 B. L. Mack, Rhetoric and the ew Testament (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 46. J. D. H. 
Amador finds most citations and non-technical proofs to be “newly invented proofs, often either created 
or uniquely interpreted to supply authority and legitimation for the new social formations and 
experimentations taking place” (Academic Constraints in Rhetorical Criticism of the ew Testament: 
An Introduction to a Rhetoric of Power [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999], 146). 
35 A. C. Thiselton, ew Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming 
Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 150; italics omitted. With regard to 1 Corinthians, J. 
P. Heil argues that “Paul’s use of scripture … does not merely inform his listeners but performs a 
rhetorical strategy aimed at persuading and transforming them in various ways” (The Rhetorical Role of 
Scripture in 1 Corinthians [Atlanta: SBL, 2005], 5). 
36 T. R. Hatina, In Search of a Context: The Function of Scripture in Mark’s arrative (London: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 158.  
37 See p. 13 and n21 above.  
38 Although Stanley is to be commended for bringing scholarship from other disciplines to bear 
upon NT quotation, it is difficult to understand why he considers the four models he reviews in Arguing 
“the most important” theories put forward in recent years “to explain how quotations ‘work’ as part of a 
literary communication” (Arguing, 24). Two of the papers were written in 1974 and 1982. Both linguistic 
models he considers, the “dramaturgical” theory of linguist/semanticist A. Wierzbicka (“The Semantics 
of Direct and Indirect Discourse,” PIL 7 [1974]: 267-307) and the demonstration theory of H. H. Clark 
and R. J. Gerrig (“Quotations as Demonstrations,” Language 66, no. 4 [December 1990]: 764-805, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/414729 [accessed December 6, 2012]), primarily concern conversation, not 
literary communication. Plus, Wierzbicka’s work is now rarely cited. A decade ago, F. Récanati described 
both Wierzbicka’s and Clark and Gerrig’s theories as providing “a general account of quotation as 
simulation” (“Open Quotation,” Mind, n.s., 110, no. 439 [July 2001]: 652, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
3093651 [accessed August 11, 2012]), but in a recent collection of papers on linguistic and philosophical 
aspects of quotation Wierzbicka’s work is not mentioned (see E. Brendel, J. Meibauer, and M. Steinbach, 
eds., Understanding Quotation [Berlin: de Gruyter Mouton, 2011]). 
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Linguistic Theories of Quotation 
Much linguistic work concerning quotation has been from a semantic perspective. 
Semantic theories of quotations focus on three questions: (i) “In a quotation, what does 
the referring?,” (ii) “How do quotations refer?,” i.e., to what linguistic category do 
quotations belong?, and (iii) “What do quotations refer to?”39 Our interest is not in these 
semantic questions but rather in the pragmatics of quotation, that is, what quotations do. 
One influential pragmatic theory of quotation is the “demonstration” theory of 
psycholinguists Herbert Clark and Richard Gerrig.40 
Quotation as Demonstration 
For Clark and Gerrig, the author-reader relationship begins with the quoting author as 
hearer/reader of the quoted text; they consider quotation to be “a demonstration of what 
a person did in saying something.”41 For them, direct quotation is “non-serious,” that is, 
the speaker takes “responsibility only for presenting the quoted matter. … The 
responsibility for the depicted aspects themselves belongs to the source speaker. So 
with quotations speakers can partly or wholly detach themselves from what they 
depict.”42 This is similar to Anna Wierzbicka’s notion that a direct quoter is not a 
“samesayer” with the original speaker, i.e., the quoter does not commit to the same view 
as the original speaker and make the same assertion.43  
Even if one agrees that direct quotation is non-serious, that does not mean the 
source text is privileged over the receptor text. Nor is Stanley correct that Clark and 
                                                           
39 H. Cappelen and E. Lepore, “Quotation,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2012 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/quotation (accessed June 11, 2012).  
40 Cappelen and Lepore do not include demonstration theories among the “five kinds of theories 
of quotation that have been central to the discussion of quotation” (“Quotation” §3) although they discuss 
them briefly under the topic of Mixed Quotation, i.e., a combination of direct and indirect quotation (Ibid. 
§4; see also their “Varieties of Quotation,” Mind, n.s., 106, no. 423 (July 1997): 429, http://www.jstor. 
org/stable/2254459 (accessed February 23, 2013); and “Varieties of Quotation Revisited,” Belgian 
Journal of Linguistics 17, no. 1 (2003): 51, http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bjl.17.04cap (accessed June 12, 
2012). D. Tannen’s description of direct vs. indirect quotation is helpful here: “‘Direct quotation’ is 
commonly understood to apply when another’s utterance is framed as dialogue in the other’s voice. … 
‘Indirect quotation’ (or ‘indirect discourse’ or ‘speech’) is commonly understood to apply when another’s 
speech is paraphrased in the current speaker’s voice” (Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery 
in Conversational Discourse, 2nd ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 102).  
41 Clark and Gerrig, 769. They use “demonstrate” in “its everyday sense of ‘illustrate by 
exemplification’” rather than in its “technical linguistic sense of ‘point to’ or ‘indicate’” (764, 764n2). 
42 Ibid., 792. This is different from indirect quotation or “description,” since “when speakers 
describe, they take responsibility for their wording” (Ibid.).  
43 See Wierzbicka, 286-287. We are not convinced that direct quoters are never samesayers or 
that direct quotations are always non-serious. See, for example, linguists M. Johnson and E. Lepore who 
argue that “direct quotations are neither demonstrations nor selective depictions nor non-serious actions” 
(“Misrepresenting Misrepresentation,” in Brendel, Meibauer, and Steinbach, 247). 
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Gerrig’s theory leads to the insight that “quotations lead the audience into a mediated 
encounter with the original text where a second, more powerful voice speaks on behalf 
of the quoting author” and that, therefore, with biblical quotations, the audience is 
brought “into the presence of God, who is shown standing firmly on the side of the 
speaker.”44 Clark and Gerrig claim neither that the original speaker is a “more powerful 
voice” nor that in quotation the original speaker “speaks on behalf of the quoting 
author.”45 The latter claim leaves no room for irony, other forms of parody or 
subversion. It cannot accommodate quotations such as the devil’s quotation of Psalm 
91:11-12 during the temptation of Jesus (Matt 4:6, Luke 4:10-11). Following Stanley 
here would cause one to argue that this quotation shows God to be speaking on behalf 
of the devil!46 Instead, Clark and Gerrig’s model requires the quoting author to provide 
sufficient context to enable his or her audience to “hear” the original text. In Matthew 
4:6, the devil’s use of the psalmist’s words does not consider the relevant co-text of the 
source text, i.e., Psalm 91:9-10. Using terminology we expand upon in chapter 5, the 
devil is both reading the source text as an “Independent” and has produced a “defective” 
SA. 
A useful feature of Clark and Gerrig’s theory for our purposes is that it implies 
the relevance of context by stressing the presence of the shared background required for 
“solidarity” in interpretation.47 In chapter 3, we present the existence of mutual context 
as critical to our model. Direct quotation activates (perhaps first creating) mutual 
                                                           
44 Stanley, Arguing, 32. Nor do we agree with Stanley that Wierzbicka’s theory suggests “an 
author who quotes from Scripture temporarily lays aside his or her own speech and allows the biblical 
text to speak directly to the audience. In this way the members of the audience are enabled (in theory) to 
hear for themselves what the quoting author heard in an earlier encounter with the biblical text” (26). 
“Allowing the biblical text to speak directly to the audience” and “enabling the audience to hear what the 
quoting author heard” are not necessarily identical. 
45 Stanley’s claim is incompatible with direct quotation as non-serious action and with a second 
idea he attempts to derive from Clark and Gerrig: that quotations can “insulate” a speaker “from negative 
reactions to certain parts of the message” (Arguing, 32). Clark and Gerrig’s examples of dissociation of 
responsibility are not relevant to NT quotation (cf. 792-793). Nor do they imply a quoting author can self-
insulate from all quotation decisions. Certainly a quoting author is not insulated from a quotation decision 
that is recognized as misleading. 
46 Since this quotation is a direct object clause appearing after a verb of perception, modern 
translators take ὅτι here to introduce direct discourse. See D. B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the 
Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the ew Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 454-458. But this 
is not an instance in which the quoter demonstrates what the original speaker did in saying something. 
The devil is not demonstrating what the psalmist was doing with his speech but rather is using the 
psalmist’s words manipulatively to tempt Jesus into disobedience. 
47 “When speakers demonstrate only a snippet of an event, they tacitly assume that their 
addressees share the right background to interpret it the same way they do” (Clark and Gerrig, 793). We 
rely on Clark’s well-known work on common ground in chapter 3.  
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context so that hearers/readers understand a speaker/author’s communicative intent, 
whether or not agreement/adherence ensues.48  
Clark and Gerrig also make a link to SAT. However, they omit perlocution in 
their list of “the selective aspects of the referents that demonstration can depict,” which 
limits the value of their model for us.49 
François Récanati, who bases his arguments on Clark’s work,50 points 
demonstration theories in a new direction with his observation that for open quotation 
“the demonstration may serve a number of purposes, which can only be determined on a 
pragmatic basis.”51 Rather than delve into the technical distinctions between open, 
closed and mixed quotation, we look further into linguistic theories of quotation by 
exploring the work of linguist Deborah Tannen, whose research interests include 
discourse studies, pragmatics and sociolinguistics.  
Involvement and Joint Production 
An important element of Tannen’s work is “involvement,” which occurs in our model 
as both illocutionary and perlocutionary effect. A key involvement strategy is repetition, 
defined as “ways that meaning is created by the recurrence and recontextualization of 
words and phrases in discourse.”52 Involvement develops as repetition, which 
encompasses quotation, “bonds participants to the discourse and to each other, linking 
individual speakers in a conversation and in relationships.”53 Ultimately, quotation is “a 
supremely social act: by appropriating each other’s utterances, speakers are bound 
together in a community of words.”54 We develop the concepts of “a community of 
words” and of interactional relationships in chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
Although Tannen argues that “even seemingly direct quotation is really 
‘constructed dialogue,’ that is, primarily the creation of the speaker rather than the party 
                                                           
48 The word “activate” comes from G. Brown and G. Yule, Discourse Analysis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 75. Stanley restricts solidarity to situations where both parties are 
familiar with the original text (cf. Arguing, 31-32); we argue that quotation can be used to create mutual 
context even when the hearer/reader is not familiar with the source text. 
49 Clark and Gerrig believe “most quotations depict illocutionary acts, including the propositions 
expressed, and treat the other acts as supportive or incidental” (779; cf. 775).  
50 Both Clark and Gerrig and H. H. Clark, Using Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
51 Récanati, “Quotation,” 665.  
52 Tannen, Voices, 9. For her, repetition is intertextuality, “the insight that meaning in language 
results from a complex of relationships linking items within a discourse and linking current to prior 
instances of language” (Ibid.). 
53 Ibid., 61.  
54 Ibid., 132. 
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quoted,”55 in all situations, the meaning of the utterance still “resonates with association 
with its reported context, in keeping with Bakhtin’s sense of polyphony.”56 Further, 
since “the only way we can make sense of the world is to see the connections between 
things, and between present things and things we have experienced before or hear 
about,”57 for Tannen, there is a relationship—albeit perhaps not an equal partnership—
between the reporting speech and its context and the reported speech and its context.  
Her thoughts concerning the partnership between the speaker and listener set the 
stage for our discussion of the roles of the author and reader in the coming chapters: 
Listening … is an active not a passive enterprise, requiring interpretation 
comparable to that required in speaking, and speaking entails simultaneously 
projecting the act of listening: In Bakhtin’s sense, all language use is dialogic. 
The theoretical perspective I have in mind is referred to by some as the 
notion that conversation is “a joint production.”58 
In summary, Tannen’s theory introduces us to the concepts of involvement, 
communicative interaction, the relationship of reported to reporting context and the role 
of both speaker/author and hearer/reader in “joint production.” We address these in 
coming chapters. Our next step, however, is to explore further the relationship between 
reported and reporting speech by evaluating the work of three noted professors of 
literature who take a literary approach to quotation.  
Literary Theories of Quotation 
Strategies of “Humanist Imitation” 
For Thomas Greene, a work’s intertextuality is “the structural presence within it of 
elements from earlier works. Since a literary text that draws nothing from its 
predecessors is inconceivable, intertextuality is a universal literary constant.”59 Using 
Renaissance poems as examples, he outlines “four strategies of humanist imitation”: 
                                                           
55 Ibid., 103. “The words have ceased to be those of the speaker to whom they are attributed, 
having been appropriated by the speaker who is repeating them” (105). This is similar to Sternberg’s 
theory (see below), although Tannen does not reference his work. 
56 Ibid., 104-105.  
57 D. Tannen, “What’s in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying Expectations,” in Framing 
in Discourse, ed. D. Tannen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 14-15. In chapter 4, we apply 
this to evoking tradition. 
58 Tannen, Voices, 27. This also pertains to written communication; all understanding requires 
“active interpretation, not passive reception” (103).  
59 T. M. Greene, The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 16. 
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• The reproductive or sacramental “celebrates an enshrined primary text by 
rehearsing it liturgically”; 
• The eclectic or exploitative “treats all traditions as stockpiles to be drawn 
upon ostensibly at random” so that in it “allusions, echoes, phrases, and 
images from a large number of authors jostle each other indifferently”;  
• In the heuristic, having advertised “their derivation from the subtexts they 
carry with them,” the imitations “proceed to distance themselves from the 
subtexts and force us to recognize the poetic distance traversed”;  
• The dialectical leaves “room for a two-way current of mutual criticism 
between authors and between eras.”60 
Hays introduces Greene’s typology in the final chapter of his seminal work 
Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, arguing that Greene’s “categories can be 
applied analogically to any text that performs intertextual reflection.”61 Other than 
Galatians, which Hays names heuristic, and a few scattered spots of eclectic reading 
strategy, Hays finds Paul’s intertextuality to be primarily of Greene’s “dialectical” 
type.62 This dovetails with our interest in the dialogical nature of quotation.63 
The other literary theories we explore focus on the locus of power in the 
relationship between the quoted and quoting authors. 
Power in Quotation  
At the heart of Meir Sternberg’s theory of quotation is that “whatever the surface 
similarity, the recontextualized inset structurally diverges from the original; whatever 
the formal autonomy conferred by directness, the inset is communicatively subordinated 
to the [new] frame” and “the perspectives of the global speaker and his audience are 
super-imposed on those of the original participants.”64 “This effectually plays into the 
                                                           
60 Ibid., 38, 39, 40 and 45, respectively. 
61 R. Hays, Echoes, 174. 
62 Ibid., 174-178. Hays abandons his view of the eclectic category as “allusions to various texts 
and traditions” (173) when he calls 1 Cor 9:8-10 and Rom 10:18 eclectic because “there is no indication 
that Paul has wrestled seriously with the [single] texts from which the citations are drawn” (175).  
63 As S. Moyise points out, various scholars describe “the interaction between the connotations” 
a quotation “(may) bring with it and its role or function in the new work” as “dialogical, dialectical, or 
intertextual” (“Quotations,” in Porter and Stanley, 28 and 28n27). For our purposes, it is not necessary to 
distinguish between the first two terms although “intertextual” is a broader category. 
64 M. Sternberg, “Proteus in Quotation-Land: Mimesis and the Forms of Reported Discourse,” 
PT 3, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 131, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1772069 (accessed July 19, 2006). For 
Sternberg, all quotation involves “manifold shifts, if not reversals, of the original meaning and 
significance. … However accurate the wording of the quotation and however pure the quoter’s motives, 
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hands of quoters interested in drastic and yet unobtrusive manipulation: ironists, 
parodists, polemicists, not to mention subtle liars.”65 According to Sternberg, “to quote 
is to mediate, to mediate is to frame, and to frame is to interfere and exploit.”66 
Stanley concludes from Sternberg’s argument both that “it is the context of 
quotation, not the original context, from which the audience obtains the necessary clues 
for interpreting the work” and that the meaning an author “expects his audience to get 
from the quoted material … may or may not correspond to its ‘original meaning.’”67 We 
discuss context in the following chapter but point out here that although the co-text is 
generally important to determining the “meaning” of a text, it does not follow that the 
original “meaning” of a quotation plays no role in understanding the receptor text.68  
Sternberg, Tannen and Stefan Morawski (see below) are all sources for Lane-
Mercier’s “power” theory.69 Based on Tannen, Lane-Mercier argues that reported 
speech is “linked to a specifically pragmatic dimension centered upon the production of 
participatory perlocutionary effects” in the quoter’s audience.70 However, Lane-Mercier 
admits she goes “beyond Tannen’s conclusions, in order to stress the fact that … the 
recontextualization automatically performed by the quoter is accompanied by the 
implicit subordination of the cited utterance.”71 For her, all quotation “represents an 
unavowed attempt to exert control over the other. … In sum, reported speech relies on a 
strategy centered on the metaphorical death of the quotee, whose utterance, apparently 
intact, has nonetheless been decontextualized, severed from its ‘origin’, and subsumed 
                                                                                                                                                                          
tearing a piece of discourse from its original habitat and reconstructing it within a new network of 
relations cannot but interfere with its effect” (108).  
65 Ibid., 130, where he calls “verbatim citation … a shrewd rhetorical weapon.” 
66 Ibid., 145.  
67 Stanley, Arguing, 29 and 29n32.  
68 In a later work, M. Sternberg hints at the value of the socio-historical context of the quoted 
text: “The remembrance of the past devolves on the present and determines the future” (The Poetics of 
Biblical arrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading, First Midland Book ed., 
[Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987], 31). 
69 Stanley calls Lane-Mercier’s model “the parodic approach” because she argues that “if … one 
accepts the existence of a parodic space within which quotation as play is permitted to flourish, … it 
follows that quotation as play becomes the prototype of reported speech” (G. Lane-Mercier, “Quotation 
as a Discursive Strategy,” Kodikas/Code 14, no. 3/4 [1991]: 203). Her other category is proof: “The act of 
quoting from a text considered to be authoritative … is … equated with the performing of an act of 
authority or, at the very least, with a display of erudition that only the learned few possess” (201). 
70 Ibid., 204. “Quotation is to be construed as an integral component of the discourse of the 
quoter, designed above all to encourage listener participation” (Ibid.). 
71 Ibid., 205. For Tannen, “seemingly direct quotation is … primarily the creation of the speaker 
rather than the party quoted” (Voices, 103); Lane-Mercier replaces “primarily” with “automatically” 
(204). Although Lane-Mercier notes that “whether the locus of ‘power’ be conventionally situated in the 
quotee or in the quoter, the presence of the other can never be entirely erradicated” [sic] (211), she 
acknowledges neither any authority of the quotee nor any stability of meaning. 
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by the utterance of the quoter.”72 Quotation is thus “a discursive strategy designed to 
manipulate the listener and, as such, to program the listener’s response.”73 Like 
Sternberg, for Lane-Mercier, the quoter has and uses the power in quotation.  
A focus on power relationships, and especially the manipulation of both the 
source text and the audience by the quoter, is a theme of Stanley’s work.74 Stanley 
argues that “Paul assumed a stance of social and ideological dominance/power over his 
intended audience, a dominance for which he claimed divine support”75 and that, “like 
other Jews,” he “believed that a quotation from the holy text should close off all debate 
on a subject.”76 For him, Lane-Mercier’s insistence that quotations are inevitably 
manipulative “can help us look beyond the apparent innocence of Paul’s appeals to 
Scripture in order to ask questions about his underlying motives.”77  
Others make similar arguments. Punt finds “the Scriptures functioned as the 
authorizing agent for Paul’s own efforts to retain his authority and power within the 
Corinthian church, providing the mainstay for his rhetoric of power.”78 For Graham 
Shaw, flattery is “the initial stage of manipulation. … Thus what looks like a free offer 
becomes a means of control. Paul dazzles his readers by the splendour of their status, 
and thus reconciles them to submitting to the authority of the man who has conferred it 
upon them.”79 Concerning the New Testament more broadly, J. D. H. Amador, who 
equates persuasion to a “power engagement,” goes so far as to aver that “there is an 
                                                           
72 Lane-Mercier, 206. Hatina presents Barthes’ view of intertextuality as similar: “The entire 
agenda of displacing traditional structures, even if they are merely viewed as relative instead of 
contradictory, can be reduced to a struggle for power and authority” (Search, 31). 
73 Lane-Mercier, 207; cf. 205.  
74 “At the heart of the quotation process is a covert attempt by the quoting author to assert power 
over both the source text and the audience” (Stanley, Arguing, 34). For Mack, “early Christian rhetoric is 
packed with stock proofs, strategies, and references to the traditional final topics. The trick was to 
manipulate these in support of their own propositions. … Thus the challenge for early Christians was to 
(mis)use conventional modes of conviction in the attempt to articulate a new and distinctive ethos” (38). 
75 Stanley, Arguing, 171. He sees it as “perhaps no accident that all of Paul’s explicit quotations 
appear in letters to churches in which power relationships were being contested” (36; cf. 88, 92, 122, 178, 
182). For Sanborn, Stanley’s research is guided by modern rhetorical theory which posits “speakers are 
engaged in power relationships” rather than attempting “to discover truth and persuade others of it” (76). 
76 Stanley, Arguing, 173; cf. 13, 59. For further discussion of quotation as “closing a debate,” see 
p. 73 below, especially n129. 
77 Stanley, Arguing, 36-37. At several points, Stanley moderates Lane-Mercier’s position. For 
example, he notes that “not all quotations are meant to be taken seriously” (36). But he gives no clue as to 
how to determine which quotations are in which category.  
78 Punt, “Paul,” 286. 
79 G. Shaw, The Cost of Authority: Manipulation and Freedom in the ew Testament, First 
Fortress Press ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 31. This assumes Paul’s description of his readers’ 
status does not correspond to reality.  
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element of violence in ‘persuasion’ as an activity of imposing one’s own ‘point of view’ 
upon another.”80 Many scholars do not find such arguments compelling. 
Brian Abasciano uses Stanley’s own words to make the strong counter-argument 
that if Paul “were to misuse Scripture, ‘a reader familiar with the original text would 
invariably have raised questions about the validity of Paul’s interpretation. Questions of 
this sort would have impeded rather than advanced Paul’s rhetorical purposes.’”81 In this 
regard, Stanley’s view of Paul’s audiences as irrevocably characterized by their 
individual initial level of familiarity with Scripture without consideration of their 
communal interaction is short-sighted. As J. Ross Wagner highlights, “Stanley himself 
curiously gives pride of place to the least competent hearers imaginable.”82 Not only 
does Stanley’s theory of audience competence presume individual rather than group 
reading, it is founded on a modern suspicion of expertise. Instead, in Paul’s socio-
cultural context, the less informed audience would have expected the “informed” 
audience to have mediated Paul’s “meaning” to them. Abasciano says it well: 
It is highly unlikely that Paul would aim his biblical quotations mainly at the 
scripturally ignorant, intentionally playing fast and loose with Scripture, when 
the very people who would control the reading and interpretation of Paul’s letter 
would have been those who by Stanley’s own admission could have assessed 
Paul’s interpretation and impeded his rhetorical purposes. It is far more likely 
that Paul would have taken special account of the scripturally learned in his 
audiences and attempt to craft his biblical argumentation so as to be convincing 
to those who were familiar with the original contexts of his quotations.83  
Furthermore, “power” arguments overlook the fact that “participants’ agreement 
may be held to play a role with respect to what is to count as being (objectively) the 
case when matters of right, entitlement, obligation, authority etc. are at issue. … 
Authority does not exist apart from its recognition by relevant social participants.”84 The 
                                                           
80 Amador, 51, 58. Shaw also believes “the oppressive use of authority derives from the 
determination to perpetuate a position of power which is threatened by an instability it cannot ultimately 
evade. … Self-perpetuating authority can defend itself from dissolution only by oppression, and the New 
Testament contains many examples of that ruthless self-defence at work” (17). We disagree with an 
understanding of “‘persuasion’ in terms of sanctioned acts of power/violence” (Amador, 299). Nor do we 
agree that “power is at play in every … attempt at persuasion” (Ibid., 86). 
81 B. J. Abasciano, “Diamonds in the Rough: A Reply to Christopher Stanley Concerning the 
Reader Competency of Paul’s Original Audiences,” ovT 49, no. 2 (April 2007): 172; quote is from C. D. 
Stanley, “‘Pearls before Swine’: Did Paul’s Audiences Understand His Biblical Quotations?” ovT 41, 
no. 2 (April 1999): 140. 
82 J. R. Wagner, Heralds of the Good ews: Isaiah and Paul “In Concert” in the Letter to the 
Romans (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 34n121. We present a different categorization of readers in chapter 5. 
83 Abasciano, 172. 
84 M. Sbisà, “Speech Acts in Context,” Language & Communication 22, no. 4 (October 2002): 
430, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00018-6 (accessed September 18, 2012). E. Castelli 
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OT would only be an “authority” for the former pagans among Paul’s audience to the 
extent they accepted it as such. 
Additionally, “power is not coterminous with violence.”85 Elizabeth Castelli 
points out that Paul  
does not possess any special physical means to coerce people to relate to him in 
a certain way; and he has no state apparatus (police or military) to ensure 
compliance. Nor obviously would I argue that he actively coerces people against 
their conscious wills to place themselves in a subordinate relationship to him. 
Rather he is attempting to persuade them by two simultaneous means—rhetoric 
and personal authority.86 
Finally, there are strong ethical counter-arguments; a variety of scholars have 
pointed out that an oppressive “rhetoric of power” is inconsistent with the relationally 
transformative message of Scripture. For Rikk Watts, the major flaw  
in Stanley’s rhetorical model is … his implicit subordination of Paul’s Christ-
centered and cruciform ethic to the need to impose his authority. Nothing, it 
seems to me, could be further from the truth. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, 
and the language of “belief” is its focus. It is in being persuaded (cf. Acts 17:4; 
18:13; 26:28; Gal 1:10; 2 Cor 5:11) that one is saved.87  
Watts adds that “to seek to use Scripture as a covert means of establishing his personal 
authority seems … totally out of character for one [Paul] who counted all such privilege 
as dung that he might gain Christ.”88  
More generally, for Clarence Walhout, “the ethical foundation of human action” 
lies in “the mutually dependent relationships of the self and the other.”89 Kathy 
Ehrensperger relates this to the role of Scripture:   
To live in the realm of this God means to be in a relationship for which the 
renunciation of power in the sense of domination is constitutive. … The 
character of the relationship and of the dimension of authority and power within 
it are inseparably intertwined. … Thus, although the Scriptures are credited with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
correctly notes that “all actors in a power relationship possess a critical access to agency. The ascendant 
figure in a power relationship does not act on the passive, subordinate figure. Although power 
relationships are asymmetrical, they do not render the subordinate actor without the possibility for action” 
(Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power [Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991], 44). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 123. 
87 R. E. Watts, “In Need of a Second Touch? Why Paul’s Readers Are Not Pigs on Legs: A 
Rejoinder to Chris Stanley’s ‘Pearls before Swine’ and Other Related Works” (paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the SBL, New Orleans, LA, November 22, 2009).  
88 Ibid. 
89 C. Walhout, “Narrative Hermeneutics,” in The Promise of Hermeneutics, by R. Lundin, C. 
Walhout, and A. Thiselton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 123. For him, all 
actions, presumably including speech and text acts, have ethical implications (cf. 119-120). 
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many divergent roles in the Second Temple period, to attribute to them some 
force of coercion or dominating power seems unwarranted and inappropriate.90  
In the NT, “power” is not “dominating power” but “transformative power.”91 
Trust is a necessary component of such power: “For transformative power to be power 
at all, to have an effect on the ‘weaker’ agent at all, trust is constitutive of its very 
existence. Trust must be seen as absolutely essential to the establishment and 
continuation of a truly empowering relation.”92 Along with this comes “respect for the 
otherness of the other,” which “offers a close parallel to love (agapē) in the New 
Testament.”93 This is the “power” generally wielded by Jesus and the NT authors.94 
Thus, we reject the idea that either the quoted or quoting context or the author or 
the reader “controls” the other. Instead, we adopt a hermeneutics of cooperation. This 
means that even in situations where power—or the lack of it—may have a role, we deny 
that quoting is necessarily exploitative or that Jesus or the NT authors use quotations in 
deceitful manipulation. Further, we hold that applying the concept of quotation as a 
“power play” to any NT author is unhelpful if it leads us to question—or even to 
attempt to ascertain—an author’s motives.95  
In summary, although Stanley has opened a door to new approaches to the study 
of quotation, by taking Paul’s primary purpose in quoting as the consolidation and 
                                                           
90 K. Ehrensperger, “Paul and the Authority of Scripture: A Feminist Perception,” in Porter and 
Stanley, 311-312. She notes that in the wake of “Max Weber’s writings about power, theories of power in 
the social sciences focused significantly on power as power-over someone—and more specifically on 
power as domination. … Domination, then, is perceived as the ability of an agent to limit the options and 
choices of others. The means to achieve such domination is through the exercise of force, coercion, or by 
securing the compliance of the subordinates” (Paul and the Dynamics of Power: Communication and 
Interaction in the Early Christ-Movement [London: T&T Clark, 2007], 20).   
91 According to Ehrensperger, “the aim of transformative power is to render itself obsolete by 
means of empowering the subordinate” (Dynamics, 27). 
92 Ibid., 29. “In order for the exercise of power to be empowering, the use of coercion, force, or 
violence must be ruled out” (Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 299). 
93 A. Thiselton, “Communicative Interaction and Promise in Interdisciplinary, Biblical, and 
Theological Hermeneutics,” in Lundin, Walhout, and Thiselton, 221. 
94 R. Watts points out that “Paul’s discourse is not about domination precisely because his vision 
of transformation is predicated on exactly the opposite, namely trust. And that trust is in a God whose 
exercise of power is the very antithesis of domination. To suggest that Paul resorts to the very thing his 
whole life, often at great personal cost, repudiates, is … out of step with Paul” (“In Need”). Similarly, M. 
Strom argues Paul did not focus on personal power/status but rather “led his communities into a new 
process of framing their identities and purposes. It was a profoundly relational strategy, crafted in the 
moment to demonstrate what it meant to choose the well-being of others in imitation of the dying and 
rising of Christ” (Reframing Paul: Conversations in Grace and Community [Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity, 2000], 194). Along these lines, A. C. Thiselton believes “Paul sees his apostleship not as an 
instrument of power but as a call to become a transparent agency through whom the crucified and raised 
Christ becomes portrayed through lifestyle, thought, and utterance”( The First Epistle to the Corinthians: 
A Commentary on the Greek Text [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle, Paternoster, 2000], 45). 
95 We discuss the difference between authorial intention and authorial motivation in chapter 5. 
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manipulation of a power position via an appeal to authority, he leaves what is beyond 
that door unexplored. Stanley “ignores the various rhetorical ways in which an appeal to 
authority can be construed, much less the other (sometimes more likely) rhetorical 
moves in which Paul engages (e.g. narrative posturing or world-projecting).”96 To 
explore other moves which can be made via quotation, such as “world-projecting,” we 
turn to the work of philosopher Stefan Morawski.97 
The Maintenance of Cultural Continuity 
Kristeva’s work on intertextuality was “set against the prevailing standard of literary 
theory,” which “stressed the autonomy of a text and … valued the originality of an 
author’s work as the mark of success. Evidence of influence, then, was seen as a 
negative factor in literary evaluation.”98 Similar stress on author creativity is a focus of 
Morawski’s work on quotation; he is dismissive of quotation in comparison with the 
creativity of “art.” He believes “philosophy, scholarship and all traditional institutions 
and their attendant ideologies submit to its [quotation’s] incursions,” while art “resists 
its pressure” so that the artist “proffers his OWN vision.”99  
Morawski defines textual quotation as “the literal reproduction of a verbal text 
… wherein what is reproduced forms an integral part of some work and can easily be 
detached from the new whole in which it is incorporated.”100 Although his typology of 
four functions of quotation bears some similarity to Greene’s, his approach is colored 
                                                           
96 D. Lincicum, review of Arguing with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of 
Paul, by Christopher D. Stanley, JETS 49, no. 2 (June 2006): 430.  
97 In a footnote in his final chapter, Stanley mentions Morawski’s “frequently cited article” and 
lists Morawski’s four common reasons for quotation (Arguing, 173n4). But since Stanley gives no further 
details and offers no discussion, it is hard to understand on what basis he concludes that “obviously, this 
list is too broad and generic to be of much use when applied to the letters of Paul” (Ibid.). 
98 B. Tanner, 6. We find “influence” in its agent-related sense, that is, “whereby people act in a 
causal manner on other people” (Hatina, “Intertextuality,” 38), to be helpful as we consider both the 
function of quotation and the communication of meaning. For discussion of the relationship of influence 
and intertextuality, see Hatina, “Intertextuality,” and J. Clayton and E. Rothstein, eds., Influence and 
Intertextuality in Literary History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), especially the essays 
by Clayton and Rothstein, Clayton, T. Rajan, and S. S. Friedman. 
99 S. Morawski, “The Basic Functions of Quotation,” in Sign, Language, Culture, ed. A. J. 
Greimas et al. (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), 704. For him, quotation is a choice between “innovation and 
the duplication of canonized exemplars” and the appeal to authority is “a device for ducking independent 
thought” (691, 692). Although he would include OT quotation as an appeal to authority, we reject the 
notion that Jesus and the NT authors are “ducking independent thought” and do not characterize their use 
of quotation as evidence of “intellectual torpor and emotional-ritual assiduity” (692-693). 
100 Ibid., 691, where he adds that quotation is “not so much separate, as separable.” 
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by his view of quotation and his typology lacks a function comparable to Greene’s 
dialectical category.101 Therefore, we do not use Morawski’s typology. 
However, his broader view of quotation as evoking tradition is valuable. For 
Morawski, quotation is “a component element of the stock of culture, anchoring the 
present to time past.”102 Tradition can be not only “continued” but also “breached” via 
quotation.103 This option is particularly relevant for NT quotation where an intervening 
interpretation of the OT may be in view. In general, Morawski argues that  
the situations which prompt literal reference to an original …. can be summed 
up simply as MAINTENANCE OF CULTURAL CONTINUITY. It is after all 
striking how strictly connected quotation is with a sense of traditions. … Over 
and above this, the quotation is a sign of an increasingly alert discernment of 
questions and answers recurring in human history.104  
In chapter 4, we look at this from a different perspective, giving the name 
“theology” to certain of the “questions and answers recurring in human history” and 
considering quotation to play a role in posing and answering those questions. 
In biblical studies, the concept of quotation functioning as a link to tradition was 
described over 50 years ago by J. A. E. van Dodewaard and C. H. Dodd. We conclude 
our discussion of quotation by evaluating their contributions and that of Lars Hartman. 
Quotation as a Link to Tradition 
Van Dodewaard lists three motives for quotation. The first is an appeal to a recognized 
authority; the second is using someone else’s engaging way of making a point. Thirdly, 
“il est loisible de citer un seul mot ou une seule phrase, non seulement à cause de la 
                                                           
101 Like Greene’s sacramental function, with Morawski’s appeal to authority, the quoter does 
not produce a personal opinion. Morawski’s erudite function, in which quotations “serve as evidence” 
(694) as the quoter endorses or rebuts the quoted author’s views (695), approximates Greene’s heuristic 
function. Similar to Greene’s eclectic function, Morawski’s ornament function “is an intellectual conceit 
which sometimes makes no pretence even of accuracy. …The quote may be taken out of context or be 
marginal to the author’s views” (695). However, Morawski’s stimulative-amplificatory function, in which 
the quoter is an “investigator” for whom quotations “act either as a kind of ‘surgical appliance’ doing 
duty for a part of his own argument, or as a springboard for speculations in the same vein, or finally as a 
reinforcement of the terms in which he poses his problem or the answer which he advances” (694), does 
not correspond to Greene’s dialectical type. Both Morawski’s ornament and stimulative-amplificatory 
functions resemble quotation as described by Sternberg, Lane-Mercier and, to a lesser extent, Tannen and 
Stanley, in their emphasis on the priority of the quoter. Although Stanley’s concept of an appeal to 
authority is not the same as Morawski’s, Stanley agrees with Morawski that there is no need for 
substantiation with an appeal to authority. For Stanley, the appeal to authority is the substantiation. 
102 Morawski, 704.  
103 With quotation considered diachronically, “there takes place a winnowing of the past,” and, at 
the extreme, “a quotation dredged up from the past or extracted from contemporary records embalming 
the past can be simply an indictment of the author cited” (Ibid., 692). 
104 Ibid., 691. For him, this is a spurning of art and innovation.  
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signification restreinte de cette phrase ou de cet mot, mais pour évoquer du même coup 
tout le contexte, toute l’histoire, l’événement même, durant lequel ce mot a été 
prononcé.”105 Taking the Gospel of Matthew as his example, van Dodewaard considers 
the third motive particularly applicable to both the words of Matthew and those of Jesus 
which Matthew reports.  
Both van Dodewaard’s argument that “tout le contexte, toute l’histoire, 
l’événement même” is evoked with quotation and C. H. Dodd’s similar contention that 
with regard to certain “fundamental passages,” one of which is Psalm 110, “the total 
context … is in view, and is the basis of the argument”106 are stronger claims than we 
make here. Although we agree that quotation evokes tradition/Story, we do not assert 
that the entire context of the source text is necessarily in view.107 We prefer Hartman’s 
less rigorous suggestion that in those situations where “the tradition, common to author 
and reader” permitted an “evocative” function, “the context of a passage quoted or 
alluded to was somehow evoked in the process of communication.”108 To determine 
what of the original context is in view, each quotation must be evaluated individually. 
Furthermore, like Hartman, we do not limit the evoking of context to Dodd’s 
“fundamental passages.” As Morawski argues, “the quotation is never dragged in … 
from passages which are of little significance.”109 Prominence is created even with 
unique quotations, such as Psalm 115:1 LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13; all quotations can 
be expected to be significant for understanding a discourse.110  
Hartman also makes the point that “we ought not to forget how far the OT 
quoted was an interpreted OT.”111 Every OT source text was read and interpreted by 
                                                           
105 J. A. E. van Dodewaard, “La force évocatrice de la citation: Mise en lumière en prenant pour 
base l’Évangile de S. Matthieu,” Bib 36 (1955): 484. For him, “les moindres allusions elles-mêmes 
avaient le pouvoir d’évoquer tout un monde à la pensée des auditeurs et des lecteurs” (485-486). 
106 Van Dodewaard, 484; C. H. Dodd, According to the Scriptures: The Sub-Structure of ew 
Testament Theology (London: Nisbet, 1952), 126. Dodd feels segments from these passages were quoted 
“rather as pointers to the whole context than as constituting testimonies in and for themselves” (126). 
107 In some cases, the immediate literary context (“co-text”) is indispensable to determining the 
meaning of a text. We discuss co-text and other types of context in chapter 3. 
108 L. Hartman, “Scriptural Exegesis in the Gospel of St. Matthew and the Problem of 
Communication,” in L’Évangile selon Matthieu: Rédaction et théologie, ed. M. Didier (Gembloux: 
Duculot, 1972), 151-152. As H. F. Plett puts it, “Der Zitat-Kontext bildet dabei das backgrounding, das 
Zitat selbst das foregrounding” (“Sprachliche Konstituenten einer intertextuellen Poetik,” in Broich and 
Pfister, 86). We name “foregrounding” the “activation of mutual context” and consider it in chapter 3. 
109 Morawski, 695. 
110 As R. E. Ciampa notes, “Authors have ways of indicating which intertextual relationships are 
of particular significance for understanding their discourses. This may well be one of the key roles of 
citation and allusion in a discourse” (“Scriptural Language and Ideas,” in Porter and Stanley, 41n3). 
111 Hartman, 135; cf. Still and Worton, 1. Even the act of recording a speech involves a measure 
of interpretation. 
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many readers in the centuries since it was originally spoken and subsequently written, 
and an interpretation may be what is evoked by a NT speaker/author. Although Hartman 
believes that “in spite of Qumran, Rabbinic traditions, Philo etc., … we do not know 
enough to be able to tell with certainty whether or not a quotation has a special nuance 
of meaning because of an interpretative tradition behind it,”112 we can at a minimum 
debate the likelihood of several alternatives. This is important in our case studies. 
In this regard, as we pointed out in our evaluation of Morawski’s theory, a NT 
speaker/author does not always evoke tradition to agree with or revitalize it; quotation 
may evoke tradition to signal a break with it (subversion).113 We discuss various types of 
transformation in chapter 4. In any event, we expect the interpretation of the OT by a 
NT author to reflect the intervening Christ event. 
Conclusion 
Our exploration of intertextuality and quotation in this chapter has established that 
instead of a power-motivated appeal to authority, biblical quotation can be viewed as 
evoking tradition in order to create or activate the mutual context of the author and 
reader, thereby encouraging readers “to believe and/or act (or stop believing or acting) 
in particular ways.”114 Therefore, important to our methodology are: a dialogical 
author/reader relationship, the importance of context (and especially co-text), an 
understanding of textual tradition, and the ability of quotation to support reader 
transformation. In chapter 3, we explore both the author/reader relationship and the 
topic of (mutual) context. 
                                                           
112 Hartman, 135. 
113 R. B. Hays and J. B. Green also suggest that “engagement with the OT might be parodic, 
repeating an old pattern or echoing ancient metaphors to signal difference at the very heart of similarity” 
(“The Use of the Old Testament by New Testament Writers,” in Hearing the ew Testament: Strategies 
for Interpretation, ed. J. B. Green [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995], 229). This 
would include the literary technique of irony, which may be behind the decision of both Matthew and 
Luke to include the devil’s quotation of Ps 91:11-12 in their accounts of the temptation. See p. 17 above. 
114 Stanley, Arguing, 3.  
  30 
CHAPTER 3 
COTEXT AD THE AUTHOR/READER RELATIOSHIP 
We have determined that quotation can evoke tradition, including literary tradition, 
which we call Story.1 In turn, tradition/Story is part of the mutual context of the author 
and reader.2 Therefore, evoking elements of Story via quotation activates3 (and perhaps 
first creates) aspects of mutual context. We continue our discussion of the function of 
quotation with a more detailed look at mutual context and its activation, beginning by 
clarifying what we mean by “author” and “reader.” 
Empirical and Implied Author and Reader4 
According to Seymour Chatman, the author and reader each entail “three different 
personages. On the sending end are the empirical author, the implied author, and the 
narrator (if any); on the receiving end, the empirical audience (listener, reader, viewer), 
the implied audience, and the narratee” (if any).5 Chatman, who credits Wayne Booth 
with the concepts “implied author” and “implied reader,” presents this diagram:6 
Narrative Text 
Real Author    Implied Author  (Narrator)  (Narratee)  Implied Reader     Real Reader 
The diagram demonstrates that “only the implied author and implied reader are 
immanent to a narrative, the narrator and narratee are optional (parentheses). The real 
author and real reader are outside the narrative transaction as such, though, of course, 
                                                           
1 We capitalize “Story” to indicate we do not limit literary tradition to narrative genre. We define 
Story further in chapter 4. Note that although our concern is primarily with the textual tradition 
transmitted by Scripture, we also recognize oral literature as tradition.  
2 Although for convenience we refer to the “author” and “reader,” our discussion of context 
applies equally to a speaker and hearer. A major difference is that since a reader’s response is not as 
immediate, mutual context generally changes more slowly with written text.  
3 J.-M. Heimerdinger gives a metaphorical explanation: “An entity is activated to the extent that 
it is ‘lit up’ in the consciousness of the hearer” (Topic, Focus and Foreground in Ancient Hebrew 
arratives [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999], 129).  
4 Scholars use “real,” “actual” or “historical” as well as “empirical,” and “ideal” or “model” as 
well as “implied.” For our purpose, these terms are interchangeable.  
5 S. Chatman, Story and Discourse: arrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1978), 28. See also S. S. Lanser, The arrative Act: Point of View in Prose Fiction 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 117-118.  
6 Chatman, Story, 151.  
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indispensable to it in an ultimate practical sense.”7 The communication of the empirical 
author and reader takes place “only through their implied counterparts.”8 
Although Chatman, Booth and others who use this model are primarily 
concerned with narrative criticism, the construct also has validity in non-narrative 
genres, including the biblical epistles and the Psalms, both of which are of concern to 
this study.9 We describe and evaluate the implied author/reader construct below and 
follow this with a discussion of the narrator and narratee or “listener.” 
The Implied Author and Reader 
Booth defines the “implied author” as the “second self” the empirical author creates in 
the literary work.10 It is the implied author “who has chosen, consciously or 
unconsciously (so any given reader will infer), every detail, every quality, that is found 
in the work or implied by its silences.”11 Furthermore, the implied author “is someone 
with whose beliefs on all subjects I must largely agree if I am to enjoy his work.”12 
The implied author is constructed by the empirical author and “reconstructed by 
the reader from the narrative.”13 This reconstruction may be assisted by certain literary 
strategies, including “the reliability or unreliability of the narrator; pacing …; the 
knowledge/ignorance contour …; focus …; evaluation …; the use of symbols and of 
allusions to things and events which occur outside the projected world; and the 
expression of beliefs concerning the actual world.”14 The implied author also can be 
revealed through “conventional or formulaic phrasing, genealogical catalogs, and the 
use of hyperbole and careful documentation” as well as “less obvious structural patterns 
involving beginnings and endings, uses of metaphor, symbol, and allusion, sequences of 
events, and chronological ordering.”15  
                                                           
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid., 31.  
9 See the discussion of Story as more than narrative genre in the following chapter. 
10 W. C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 
429; cf. 137-138, 151.  
11 Booth, Fiction, 429; cf. Chatman, Story, 148. 
12 Booth, Fiction, 137, referring to the novel. 
13 Chatman, Story, 148. After selecting the audience, “the rhetor ‘must’ then construct her/his 
argumentative appeals with this audience in mind. In order for argumentation to take place at all, much 
less be effective, s/he ‘must’ adapt him/herself to the audience whom s/he has selected. In other words, 
the rhetor becomes a construction of the audience” (Amador, 68). 
14 C. Walhout, “Texts and Actions,” in The Responsibility of Hermeneutics, by R. Lundin, A. 
Thiselton, and C. Walhout (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Exeter: Paternoster, 1985), 64, with reference to N. 
Wolterstorff, Art in Action: Toward a Christian Aesthetic (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 139-142. 
15 Walhout, “Texts,” 73. 
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The empirical author constructs not only the implied author but also the implied 
reader—”the audience presupposed by the narrative itself.”16 The implied reader is the 
one “actual readers must encounter as they encounter the text. The discourse is thus 
addressed to a readership which it creates itself. … The historical reader must, in a 
sense, read ‘through’ this textual construct.”17 The identity of the implied reader thus is 
inferred primarily from the reconstruction of the implied author.  
The implied reader can “elucidate” facts suggested by the text and “discern the 
presence and force of irony, the meaning of metaphors, the suggestions borne by 
emphasis, the presence of ambiguity (double entendre).”18 The implied reader “‘falls 
for’ the implied author’s traps; he is surprised by unexpected reversals in the discourse, 
led astray and brought back onto the right path by the implied author.”19 Furthermore, 
the implied reader “can be found as much in the text’s silences as in its overt appeals.”20 
Where the text is silent about a fact, we infer “that members of the ‘authorial audience’ 
already know it” and “what the author feels no need to mention, of the values the story 
depends on, tells us who he thinks we are before we start to read.”21  
As an example of the use of the implied author/reader construct, we consider the 
interpretation of Psalm 51. Although Psalm 51 is introduced as a psalm “of David” and 
the superscription gives details relating to David’s life, David does not need to be 
considered to be the empirical author of the psalm in order to understand it. Rather, we 
can learn a great deal about the implied author from an analysis of the text. First, there 
is no protestation of innocence. The psalmist has sinned and admits his guilt (vv 2-4), 
which leads to the penitence so movingly expressed in the psalm. Second, the psalmist 
understands Yahweh judges sin. In v 4c-d, the passage quoted in Romans 3:4, the 
psalmist acknowledges Yahweh is justified when Yahweh “speaks” and that Yahweh’s 
judgments are just. The psalmist’s fervent plea for Yahweh to forgive his sins implies 
                                                           
16 Chatman, Story, 150; cf. Booth, Fiction, 138. 
17 Lanser, Act, 116.  
18 N. Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 116. 
19 D. Tovey, arrative Art and Act in the Fourth Gospel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1997), 25-26. 
20 Booth, Fiction, 423. M. Turner notes that “if speakers and writers leave much unexpressed, 
that … means that the speaker/writer assumes his addressees share with him a presupposition pool” 
(“Historical Criticism and Theological Hermeneutics of the New Testament,” in Between Two Horizons: 
Spanning ew Testament Studies and Systematic Theology, ed. J. B. Green and M. Turner [Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2000], 49). Turner’s “presupposition pool” is part of our “mutual context” (see n64 below). 
21 Booth, Fiction, 423. What is known of the socio-historical context can be important. An 
unmentioned event may not yet have occurred either in history or from the temporal perspective of the 
implied author (the “implied date”). 
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that the psalmist believes Yahweh has the ability to forgive sin and may do so even 
where disobedience has been great.  
The psalmist presents several reasons designed to motivate Yahweh to perform 
the desired action of forgiveness.22 One is Yahweh’s own character, in particular, 
Yahweh’s covenant loving-kindness [ חדס ] and the greatness of Yahweh’s compassion 
[םחר]. The implicit argument is that Yahweh’s essential being includes forgiveness. In 
addition, the psalmist offers praise, sacrifice and correct teaching so that other sinners 
may also return to Yahweh (vv 13, 14c, 15b and 19). This is not a claim to Yahweh’s 
forgiveness but rather a commitment to being in future right relationship with Yahweh. 
From this characterization of the implied author, we conclude that in this instance the 
implied reader understands Yahweh’s character as well as what behavior both pleases 
Yahweh and evidences being in right relationship with Yahweh.  
The Narrator and the Listeners 
All Scriptural texts not only have an implied author, they contain some narratorial 
presence. One generally important consideration is the reliability of the narrator. A 
reliable narrator “speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is 
to say, the implied author’s norms).”23 Where the narrator is reliable, which we hold to 
be the case in our case study examples, understanding the narrator is a way to discover 
the views of the implied author.  
The correspondence between the narrator and the listeners24 is less 
straightforward than the relationship between the implied author and implied reader. 
One category of listener is “participants,” which includes both direct addressees and 
side participants (those taking part but currently not directly addressed).25 The other 
category of listener is non-participants or “overhearers,” that is, those “who have no 
rights or responsibilities” in the conversation.26 Overhearers are either “‘bystanders,’ 
…who are openly present but not part of the conversation” or “‘eavesdroppers’ … who 
listen in without the speaker’s awareness.”27 
                                                           
22 Contra M. E. Tate, who argues Psalm 51 contains “no motivational appeal to God for action” 
(Psalms 51-100 [Dallas: Word Books, 1990], 8). 
23 Booth, Fiction, 158-159. Determining that a narrator is reliable does not imply the narrative is 
non-fiction. In any case, our interest is not in the historical veracity of Scripture but rather in the 
transformation the various NT speakers/authors attempt to accomplish in their audiences.  
24 We use Booth’s term (see Fiction, 423) here since it is broader than “narratee.” 
25 This terminology comes from H. Clark, 14. For him, the speaker is also a participant. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
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The existence of listeners of various types is a “device by which the implied 
author informs the real reader how to perform as implied reader.”28 Therefore, in 
identifying the implied reader it may be helpful to analyze what types of listeners are 
present at the episode and discourse levels, although the implied reader may or may not 
be identified with the direct addressee or with any of the other listeners.29 We keep this 
in mind as we consider the identity of the implied reader both in those Psalms passages 
where the direct addressee is Yahweh and in those NT passages where a speaker 
directly addresses one audience while the implied NT author addresses a different 
group. Further, although Paul’s arguments are ostensibly directed to his formerly pagan 
converts, we must take into account the possibility that they also may be indirectly 
aimed at groups of overhearers, that is, at his opponents and/or Jewish Christians.30 
To look ahead several chapters, it is the implied author to whom we refer in 
discussing the illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions of the speech acts of 
Scripture. Since the implied author is presented to us via the text, it is not necessary to 
retrieve the empirical author’s personal history or motives to understand the “authorial” 
speech-act intentions.31 The more complete the presentation of the implied author and of 
the Story and the “lifeworld”32 inhabited by the implied author, the less necessary extra-
textual historical reconstruction of the empirical author becomes.  
Additionally, we define the terms in our action model relating to the “reader”—
particularly perlocutionary effects or responses—in terms of the implied reader and an 
empirical reader’s relationship to the implied reader. As is true for the implied author, 
identifying the implied reader does not require discovering either the historical identity 
or the “mind” of any empirical audience.33 But identifying the implied author and 
                                                           
28 Chatman, Story, 150. Although he refers to narratees, this applies to all listeners. 
29 As J. T. Reed notes, “Just as the spokesperson may not be the source of a message, the 
recipient may not be the target of address” (“Modern Linguistics and the New Testament: A Basic Guide 
to Theory, Terminology, and Literature,” in Approaches to ew Testament Study, ed. S. E. Porter and D. 
Tombs [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995], 236). 
30 J. R. Wagner suggests these two groups are the targets of some of Paul’s writing (Heralds, 35-
36). Another possibility could be overhearers representing the Roman Empire. 
31 “Positing an implied author inhibits the overhasty assumption that the reader has direct access 
through the fictional text to the real author’s intentions and ideology. It does not deny the existence of 
important connections between the text’s and the real author’s views” (S. Chatman, Coming to Terms: 
The Rhetoric of arrative in Fiction and Film [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990], 76). But these 
connections do not include authorial motivation, which often cannot (and need not) be determined even if 
the empirical author’s identity is known. We discuss this further in chapter 5. 
32 In a “lifeworld,” a “communicative community” shares mutual context (see chapter 4). 
33 The empirical reader is “is immeasurably complex and largely unknown” (Booth, Fiction, 
428). The implied author/reader construct obviates Hatina’s concern: “If the recovery of the author’s 
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implied reader within their literary context often does require at least certain minimal 
assumptions about the context. We turn to this topic next. 
Context 
Stanley believes “Paul often quotes from Scripture in a way that bears little evident 
relation to the apparent sense of the original passage” and that “we should be careful 
about assuming that Paul was aware of the ‘original context’ of every passage that he 
cites in his letters.”34 Further, he argues against the modern scholarly assumptions that 
Paul “expected his audiences to refer back to the original context of his quotations” and 
that his audiences would have been capable of doing so.35 
This raises the question of defining context. According to communication 
theorist Em Griffin, “context” is not simply “just a sentence, or even the situation in 
which the word is spoken. Context is the whole field of experience connected with an 
event.”36 It includes “the various factors one has to take into consideration together with 
the text in order to understand the author’s intention. Any number of circumstances or 
contexts might be relevant to this task: historical, linguistic, literary, canonical, 
sociological, and so forth.”37 From this, it is clear that context is a “prodigiously elastic 
term.”38 We need to be precise about how we use “context” since we want to link it to 
quotation and, ultimately, meaning. Thus, we employ three categories: socio-historical 
context, literary context (“co-text”) and linguistic conventions. 
Socio-Historical Context 
The original socio-historical context encompasses more than the situation that brings 
the speaker/author and first audience together. For example, Francis Watson speaks 
sweepingly of the “institutional continuum (educational, ecclesial, or whatever) which 
functions as the comprehensive context within which author, text and readers are 
comprised.”39 Similarly, for linguist Richard Ohmann, the use of language is embedded 
                                                                                                                                                                          
intention is difficult, if not impossible to ascertain, as modem literary criticism points out, then how much 
more difficult is the recovery of what is in the mind of the audience?” (Search, 339). 
34 Stanley, Arguing, 53, 54. 
35 Ibid., 54-55.  
36 E. Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 
58.  
37 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 250. The actual context of the empirical author may be different from 
the implied context of the implied author and implied reader. By “context,” we refer to the latter. 
38 J. B. Green, “Context,” in DTIB, 130.  
39 Watson, Text, 100, adding that “this institutional continuum is characterized by the 
phenomenon of ‘tradition’: author and intended readers are conscious of participating in a tradition which 
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in the broad spectrum of historical relationships so that “to participate in discourse is to 
set in motion one’s whole awareness of institutions, social ties, obligations, 
responsibilities, manners, rituals, ceremonies.”40  
Locating a text within its socio-historical context can add clarity and richness to 
an analysis. Ben Meyer notes that “by moving from the description of the common 
sense of a past age to an explanatory grasp precisely pinpointing that age’s insights and 
oversights, values and biases, the interpreter would no longer find himself surprised by 
his own findings; for he would have entered, more consciously and securely than he 
might have thought possible, into the writer’s world of meaning.”41 We attempt to read 
both our example quotations and the Psalms from which they were taken “against the 
horizons of their own, particular sociohistorical environment,” and we use the socio-
historical clues available to us.42 At a minimum, events or traditions described by or 
alluded to in the text are relevant elements of the socio-historical context. 
However, even when “a reconstruction of the stream of life, life-world, or extra-
linguistic context which surrounds a text is indispensable to understanding its 
meaning,”43 it is not sufficient for such an understanding.44 And, in general, full socio-
historical re-construction is neither necessary nor possible.45 As the historical and 
cultural distance widens between the production/original reading and subsequent 
readings of the text, later readers may find it difficult to retrieve the original socio-
historical context. Thus, the socio-historical context of many texts, including the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
mediates the historical and/or geographical distance that separates them and brings them into a certain 
proximity to one another.” We discuss tradition in the following chapter.  
40 R. Ohmann, “Speech, Literature, and the Space Between,” LH 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1972): 50-
51; quote is from p. 51, http://www.jstor.org/stable/468491 (accessed March 28, 2008). 
41 B. F. Meyer, Critical Realism and the ew Testament (Allison Park, PA: Pickwick 
Publications, 1989), 11. Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology, Seabury Paperback ed. (London: 
Seabury, 1979), 168 and chapter 10. 
42 J. Green, “Context,” 131. Historical and literary approaches “are by no means mutually 
exclusive; indeed, the most illuminating exegesis employs them together in a complementary fashion” 
(Hays and Green, 230). We do not want to neglect any tool which enriches an analysis.  
43 Thiselton, ew Horizons, 560; italics omitted. This is true especially for linguistic conventions 
(see below). 
44 Q. Skinner makes this argument and also presents the potential value of knowing the social 
context (cf. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8, no. 1 [1969]: 
39-49).  
45 For Thiselton, “it would be a mistake to conclude that no understanding is possible without 
historical reconstruction” (ew Horizons, 266). According to F. J. Moloney, “difficulties are created by 
the speculative reconstruction of the world behind the text (sometimes called a ‘diachronic’ analysis of 
the text). Recent scholarship focuses upon the world in the text (sometimes called a ‘synchronic’ analysis 
of the text) and how it addresses the world in front of the text” (The Gospel of Mark: A Commentary 
[Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002], 9). 
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Psalms, can be established only quite broadly.46 A socio-historical gap can even exist 
between the producer of a text and his or her original audience. Such would be the case 
for Paul and any of his audience who came to Christianity from paganism. In that 
situation, quotation may have been employed as a way to bridge the gap.47 We discuss 
this below with regard to mutual context. 
In general, we are less concerned with the particular historical events that led to 
the composition of a psalm than we are with the Story which formed and grounded the 
lives of the author and the original audience and is expressed through the construct of 
the implied author and reader. Where possible, however, we identify elements of the 
socio-historical context made available or assumed by the implied author in order to 
support our reconstruction of the implied author and reader and to determine how the 
text contributed to the development of Story.  
Our second category of “context” is the literary setting or “co-text.”48 
Literary Context (Co-Text) 
Paul Ricoeur argues cogently that “a text is more than a linear succession of sentences. 
It is a cumulative, holistic process.”49 Peter Cotterell and Max Turner define the literary 
context as “the contribution of all the other parts of the text to that part under immediate 
consideration.”50 The co-text can include a variety of surrounding textual segments 
(words, phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, pericopes, discourses, books, etc.) and 
their related intertexts.  
Co-text is often critical to determining meaning. As Hans-Georg Gadamer 
reminds us, the process of “construal” of a sentence is “governed by an expectation of 
                                                           
46 Many Psalms do not identify the historical situation which prompted them. Even with biblical 
narrative, often “both the actual author and the original situation of communication must be very 
tentatively reconstructed historically” (H. C. White, “Introduction: Speech Act Theory and Literary 
Criticism,” Semeia 41 [1988]: 11). Thus, contra G. W. Stroup, it is not always true that “Christian faith 
and Scripture refer to historical events” (The Promise of arrative Theology: Recovering the Gospel in 
the Church [Atlanta: John Knox, 1981], 144).  
47 This is less likely to have been the intended function of allusion or echo since in those 
situations the presence of material from a previous source is not highlighted. 
48 Brown and Yule (46) attribute this term to M. A. K. Halliday. See Halliday, Language as 
Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning (Baltimore: University Park Press, 
1978), 133. 
49 P. Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text,” in 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, ed. and trans. J. 
B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de 
l’Homme, 1981), 212.  
50 P. Cotterell and M. Turner, Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation [Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity, 1989], 72. In our model, this includes both a SA set within a SAC as well as the relationship 
of a SAC to the broader discourse. (See chapter 5). 
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meaning that follows from the context of what has gone before.”51 In situations where 
the sentence or utterance is “multivocal,” it is the co-text that tells the audience which 
of various possible speech acts the speaker/author intends.52  
Unlike socio-historical context, which may be difficult to retrieve, generally 
some co-text is available to us. But to understand the text and its co-text requires some 
knowledge of the linguistic conventions which governed the creation of the implied 
reader by the implied author. As an element of culture, linguistic convention bridges 
socio-historical context and co-text and, therefore, warrants our attention.53  
Linguistic Conventions 
Roger Fowler defines a convention as “something shared by people” and reminds us 
that “language is social and conventional both in its origin and in the rules which 
govern the practices of speaking and writing.”54 Teun van Dijk also points out that 
“language systems are CONVENTIONAL systems. Not only do they regulate 
interaction, but their categories and rules have developed under the influence of the 
structure of interaction in society.”55 Linguistic conventions are necessarily relatively 
stable; “we can only communicate with one another if we assume that the meanings of 
signs do not vary substantially from person to person and from day to day.”56 An author 
“can write meaningfully only within the possibilities provided by the systems of 
conventions which define the culture.”57 
Literary conventions play a role in the creation of an implied author and reader. 
Calling literature “highly conventional,” Susan Lanser adds that “the rules and 
expectations governing the production and reception of a work of art are as much a part 
                                                           
51 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, rev. ed., trans. rev. J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 291. 
52 See W. P. Alston, Illocutionary Acts & Sentence Meaning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2000), 248. R. E. Longacre reminds us of “the natural function of context in resolving most ambiguities” 
(The Grammar of Discourse, 2nd ed. [New York: Plenum Press, 1996], 1).  
53 Socio-historical context plus linguistic convention forms Thiselton’s “background” (see ew 
Horizons, 46), a term he takes from J. R. Searle, who defines it as “the biological and cultural resources” 
necessary for the speaker to form an intention (Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], 143). Since we are not interested in biological capacity 
and we wish to include the reader/hearer, we prefer the term “mutual context.”  
54 R. Fowler, Linguistic Criticism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 40. 
55 T. A. van Dijk, Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse 
(London: Longman, 1977), 167. 
56 Fowler, Criticism, 41. 
57 R. Fowler, Linguistics and the ovel, new ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 125. “Even the 
most revolutionary thinker must speak—and think—in the language of his day” (W. S. Campbell, “The 
Contribution of Traditions to Paul’s Theology: A Response to C. J. Roetzel,” in 1 & 2 Corinthians, ed. D. 
M. Hay, vol. 2 of Pauline Theology [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993], 236). 
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of textual structure as the words on the page.”58 This is true for all texts, including 
biblical texts, even in situations where conventions are flouted as a rhetorical device.  
Literary conventions are also key to a reader’s identification of the implied 
author and reader. Empirical readers “bring not just their ‘personal’ attitudes and 
experiences to the work of art, but also sets of linguistic and historical conventions 
which govern the production of meaning in the text.”59 In his study of biblical narrative, 
Robert Alter concludes that “a COHERENT READING of any art work … requires 
some detailed awareness of the grid of conventions upon which, and against which, the 
individual work operates.”60 “Communicative competence” describes the situation 
where the author and the reader are mutually aware of and able to use the linguistic 
conventions that pertain to their communicative situation.61 
In addition to quotation, a linguistic convention with which we are concerned is 
figurative language, i.e., those expressions which “associate a concept with a pictorial 
or analogous representation of its meaning in order to add richness to the statement.”62 
Our interest in figurative language is primarily in metaphor, which we discuss in greater 
detail in the examples where it is found. 
Mutual Context and Cooperative Communication 
“Mutual context” is the shared and evolving accumulation of these three types of 
context.63 It includes “an encyclopedic understanding of the shared social world 
(including its linguistic and rhetorical conventions) as well as the specific ‘context’ of 
                                                           
58 Lanser, Act, 46. 
59 Ibid., 54. 
60 R. Alter, The Art of Biblical arrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 47. For a linguist’s 
perspective, see G. Yule, Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 47. According to Alter, 
“one of the chief difficulties we encounter as modern readers in perceiving the artistry of biblical 
narrative is precisely that we have lost most of the keys to the conventions out of which it was shaped” 
(47). Thiselton is correct that we can never become the original audience or recover “the life-world or 
creative vision that gave rise to the text” (“Communicative Interaction,” 201). Although these factors 
make it more difficult for today’s empirical reader to “find” the implied reader, that level of readership 
remains the standard for fully successful interactive communication. (See chapter 5).  
61 See Fowler, Criticism, 248. 
62 G. R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical 
Interpretation, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2006), 122. 
63 Lonergan links the process of history to context: “As the process advances, the context within 
which events are to be understood keeps enlarging. As the context enlarges, perspectives shift” (192). 
Gadamer puts it this way: “Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out 
of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion” (303). We 
prefer “mutual context” to “horizon.” Although for Gadamer, “the horizon is the range of vision that 
includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (301; emphasis added), in English, 
the horizon is the junction of the earth and sky, that is, the farthest we can see. As R. W. Funk puts it, “A 
horizon represents the limits of a system of meaning, of a world” (The Poetics of Biblical arrative 
[Sonoma, CA: Polebridge, 1988], 291). 
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the communication,” which, in turn, includes both “information constituted from the 
situative context … as well as the new information from the completed part of the 
discourse itself.”64 Some mutual context is critical to communication: “No text of any 
kind would be comprehensible without considerable shared context and background.”65 
Since the individual contexts of the empirical author/speaker and reader/hearer are 
different and in different situations overlap to different degrees,66 in every situation 
sufficient mutual context must be available or created to permit communication. 
This requires a cooperative effort from both an empirical author and reader.67 An 
empirical author must understand the intended empirical audience in order to 
appropriately construct the implied author and implied reader, who, by definition, share 
mutual context. An empirical author must make “special efforts to insure that the 
transmission adequately incorporate his intended meaning and that it meet in advance 
                                                           
64 This is Cotterell and Turner’s description of the “Presupposition Pool” (49, cf. 90). We also 
incorporate into “mutual context” Turner’s thought that when “pragmatics speaks of ‘presupposition 
pools,’ it is not driving us back to the hidden psychology of the author or reader, but to things that are 
known by speaker and hearer, writer and reader, because they are conventional to the society of dialogue 
partners, or because they are situational elements shared by them. The content of ‘presupposition pools’ is 
thus a matter of what is in the public context of a speaker’s utterance, and so may be taken to count as 
part of the utterance meaning” (Turner, “Criticism,” 50). 
The similar concept of “common ground” is attributed to R. C. Stalnaker: “Presuppositions are 
what is taken by the speaker to be the COMMON GROUND of the participants in the conversation, what 
is treated as their COMMON KNOWLEDGE or MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE” (“Assertion,” in 
Pragmatics, ed. Peter Cole [New York: Academic Press, 1978], 321). Mutual/common knowledge is a 
very strong requirement; thus, many pragmaticists adopt less stringent criteria. K. Bach and R. M. 
Harnish use “Mutual Contextual Beliefs” because beliefs “need not be true in order to figure in the 
speaker’s intention and the hearer’s inference” (Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts [Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1979], 5). D. Sperber and D. Wilson also “see the mutual-knowledge hypothesis as 
untenable” (Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Blackwell, 1995], 21) and refer 
instead to “mutual manifestness” (41). Instead of these technical terms, we use “mutual context” to refer 
to information, events, experiences, etc. available to both the speaker/author and audience. 
65 Tannen, Voices, 37. “We assume the common knowledge of the respectively indicated world 
between us and our conversation partner, and we must do that in order to be able [sic] say more than one 
sentence per day” (S. Alkier, “New Testament Studies on the Basis of Categorical Semiotics,” in Hays, 
Alkier, and Huizenga, 232). See Brown and Yule for a description of the assumptions made by an author 
and reader in successful communication (cf. 206-207). 
66 Cf. van Dijk, 210. In addition to “horizon” (see n63), we also avoid Gadamer’s term “fusion” 
even though K. J. Vanhoozer finds evidence that Gadamer “would resist equating a ‘fusion’ of horizons 
with an ‘assimilation’ of horizons” (“Discourse on Matter: Hermeneutics and the ‘Miracle’ of 
Understanding,” in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, ed. K. J. Vanhoozer, J. K. A. Smith, and B. E. 
Benson [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006], 34n83).  
67 Social psychologist W. Reich believes that for pragmatics, e.g., SAT, “the structure of 
communicative exchanges, and that of individual communicative acts, might reflect their evolutionary-
functional roots in social cooperation” (“The Cooperative Nature of Communicative Acts,” JPrag 43, no. 
5 [April 2011]: 1350, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2010.10.024 [accessed September 10, 2012]). 
W. C. Booth correctly points out that “at every point the author depends on inferences about what his 
reader will likely assume or know—about both his factual knowledge and his experience of literature. 
And the reader depends on inferences about what the author could assume” (A Rhetoric of Irony 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974], 99-100). 
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the foreseeable receivers’ foreseeable problems in construing it.”68 More generally, the 
empirical author “must take account of which interpretations we are likely to put on his 
words; he must, in that way and for that reason, take expected audience reaction into 
account.”69 “Taking expected audience reaction into account” is a function of 
understanding the context within which the audience operates—social, cultural, 
linguistic, literary, etc. To be successful in communication, the empirical author must 
create an implied reader the empirical audience is capable of becoming. Regarding the 
biblical authors/speakers, Thiselton notes that “both Jesus and Paul, as well as the 
author of Luke-Acts, allow their material, vocabulary, and mode of communication to 
take account of the nature of the audience whom they are addressing.”70 
The reader also assumes responsibilities.71 “The intrinsically appropriate stance 
of the interpreter is not doubt nor scepticism nor suspicion, but goodwill, empathy, the 
readiness to find truth, common understanding, agreement”; the reader must approach 
the text with “an antecedent stance of openness, receptiveness, empathy vis-à-vis his 
[the author’s] word.”72 Taking such a stance has been variously called a hermeneutic of 
“consent,” “trust,” “love” or “hearing”73; we call it a hermeneutic of cooperation.74 In 
                                                           
68 Meyer, Critical Realism, 19. “Nothing the writer does can be finally understood in isolation 
from his effort to make it all accessible to someone else—his peers, himself as imagined reader, his 
audience” (Booth, Fiction, 397). “Der Erfolg des Sprechers davon abhängt, ob auch der Hörer die 
illokutive Absicht des Sprechers versteht und ob er in der Lage ist, die gewünschte Reaktion zu 
vollziehen” (Motsch and Pasch, 73).  
69 N. Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 199. “Speakers organize what they want to say in 
accordance with who they’re talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances” (Yule, 3). Motsch 
and Pasch also speak of “die Fähigkeit des Hörers, das fundamentale Ziel … zu realisieren” (75). See also 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 19-20. 
70 Thiselton, ew Horizons, 273. 
71 The role of a reader of a text is different from that of a hearer of speech. With speech, “the 
initiative lies entirely with the speaker, and the hearer may receive his or her communication 
involuntarily or even unwillingly. Where A writes to B about x, however, the initiative is more evenly 
distributed between author and reader. One chooses to read or not to read; one does not read involuntarily 
or against one’s will” (Watson, Text, 100). 
72 Meyer, Critical Realism, 22. “An openness to be willing to listen, to see the other person’s 
point of view, and to be changed, characterizes any hermeneutically sensitive reading of texts” (Thiselton, 
ew Horizons, 33). 
73 See, respectively, P. Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation of 
Scripture, trans. R. A. Harrisville (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977); R. B. Hays, “Salvation by Trust? 
Reading the Bible Faithfully,” ChrCent 114, no. 7 (February 26, 1997); N. T. Wright, TPG, 32-64; K. 
Snodgrass, “Reading to Hear: A Hermeneutics of Hearing,” HBT 24, no. 1 (June 2002). For an overview 
of Stuhlmacher’s hermeneutic and its sources, including Barth and Gadamer, see R. Sohns, Verstehen als 
Zwiesprache: Hermeneutische Entwürfe in Exegese und Religionspädagogik (Münster: LIT, 2002), 13-
85. Stuhlmacher refers to “consent” (Einverständnis) and “hearing” (Vernehmen); the latter involves 
“nicht bloβ ein Einverständnis mit dem Text, sondern auch mit der Tradition” (Sohns, 22). This, however, 
is the “tradition” of the Christian church, not the OT textual tradition. Stuhlmacher also takes 
“‘Vernehmen’ als Alternativbegriff zu ‘Verstehen’” (Sohns, 20) whereas we use “understanding” to refer 
to the intended illocutionary effect. 
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the vocabulary of this study, it is important for empirical readers to be willing to think 
within the framework of the implied author’s lifeworld75—to be addressed by the 
implied author and to attempt to respond as the implied reader would.76  
Although cooperative empirical readers must be prepared for the text to tell them 
something,77 “cooperation” is not a giving up of self or identity. Cooperative empirical 
readers do not transpose themselves “into the author’s mind”; rather, they try to 
transpose themselves “into the perspective within which he [the empirical author] has 
formed his views,”78 i.e., the perspective of the implied author. Nor does “cooperation” 
mean an empirical reader unquestioningly comes to live in the lifeworld presented by 
the text and adopts its worldview.79 Cooperation is not an abdication of critical thinking. 
The empirical reader may be either unwilling or unable to be an implied reader at the 
perlocutionary level.80 Using Stanley’s argument as his example, Watts relates 
cooperative yet critical reading to quotation:  
It is hard to imagine those who were skeptical of Paul’s argument being as easily 
persuaded as Stanley suggests. Already undaunted by his personal authority—
this being precisely why according to Stanley Paul must resort to Scripture—
                                                                                                                                                                          
74 Reich refers to some recent studies in biology, evolutionary psychology and anthropology 
which show that “humans are an extraordinarily cooperative species” and “how deeply cooperation with 
conspecifics is built into human nature” (1349). W. Iser notes that every reader strives “even if 
unconsciously, to fit everything together in a consistent pattern” (The Implied Reader: Patterns of 
Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett, Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed. [Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978], 283). 
75 See Thiselton, ew Horizons, 562, although his reference is to the empirical author’s 
lifeworld. From a reader’s perspective, “if we fail to transpose ourselves into the historical horizon from 
which the traditionary text speaks, we will misunderstand the significance of what it has to say to us” 
(Gadamer, 302). We discuss lifeworld and worldview in the following chapter. 
76 See Chatman, Story, 150. This requirement applies to all readers. Thus, “for today’s readers 
this construct, the implied reader, works as a system of guidelines for their reading process” (B. van 
Iersel, “The Sun, Moon, and Stars of Mark 13,24-25 in Greco-Roman Reading,” Bib 77, no.1 [1996]: 86). 
Although van Iersel believes that “the image of the original audience is likewise no more than a construct 
of today’s analyst” (86), this is not the case. Rather, the implied reader is a construct of the implied author 
as mediated by the text. If today’s readers read cooperatively, they discover the implied reader rather than 
the image or mind of the original audience. 
77 This comes from Gadamer, who adds that “we cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning 
about the thing if we want to understand the meaning of another. Of course this does not mean that when 
we listen to someone or read a book we must forget all our fore-meanings concerning the content and all 
our own ideas. All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text” (271). 
Snodgrass makes the important point that “humility is part of a hermeneutics of hearing; it seeks to know 
rather than professes to know” (28). 
78 Gadamer, 292.  
79 “When someone thinks historically, he comes to understand the meaning of what has been 
handed down without necessarily agreeing with it or seeing himself in it” (Ibid., 302). 
80 Even if the empirical reader refuses “his projected role at some ultimate level, … such refusal 
does not contradict the imaginative or ‘as if’ acceptance of implied readership necessary to the 
elementary comprehension of the narrative” (Chatman, Story, 150).  
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how likely are they simply to take his word without checking to see if said 
citation does indeed support the view they are resisting?81  
Communicative cooperation does not require that mutual context be either 
complete or completely activated. Only certain elements of mutual context are relevant 
in any given communicative situation. A reader pays attention to those elements which 
are highlighted in some way, such as by being explicitly quoted. By evoking one or 
several elements of Story via quotation, an author can create or activate mutual context. 
The Activation of Mutual Context by Quotation 
There are two situational possibilities for the relationship of quotation to mutual 
context. For those empirical authors and audiences for whom the quoted matter is part 
of their individual contexts, an explicit quotation activates the relevant contextual 
elements.82 In situations where the quoted material is not known by the audience, an 
explicit quotation adds that material to mutual context and simultaneously activates it. 
In either case, by evoking Story and thereby activating elements of mutual context, 
explicit quotation creates a dialog with the original text, drawing attention to its themes, 
or Story-lines.83 This is true even in the common situation where the quotation is not the 
peak of the discourse but is rather a step in the progress towards a climax or peak.84 
Our final question regarding context is the extent to which mutual context is 
activated by quotation. In saying that explicit quotation generally activates the thematic 
tradition of the mutual context, we reject the notion that quotation is “atomistic,” i.e., 
that there is “no regard for the original context.”85 However, this does not mean that the 
original historical situation that called forth the source text is necessarily in view.86 If, 
for example, one takes Psalm 51 to have been prompted by David’s remorse over his sin 
with Bathsheba, as the superscription indicates, we would not consider Paul’s use of 
                                                           
81 Watts, “In Need.” 
82 “Speakers do, of course, remind each other of knowledge which they share, in order to make 
that knowledge part of the activated context of discourse” (Brown and Yule, 65).  
83 While not specifically mentioning quotation, Fowler argues that any “attention-catching” 
device potentially signals thematization (Criticism, 83).  
84 Longacre finds a peak even in “hortatory” discourse, such as NT epistles, where “the struggle 
is to convince the hearers of the soundness of the advice and to launch them on the course of conduct 
advocated or to discourage them from a course of conduct which is being proscribed” (84).  
85 Cf. Hatina, Search, 158. “Atomistic” quotation is evidence of “Independent” reading (see 
chapter 5) and is quotation as a form of play (see chapter 2). 
86 S. Moyise correctly points out that “allusions and quotations are always out of context to some 
degree because they have been loosed from their original linguistic and historical moorings,” i.e., their 
socio-historical and linguistic contexts (“The Use of Analogy in Biblical Studies,” Anvil 18, no. 1 [2001]: 
33-34, http://www.biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/anvil/18-1_moyise.pdf [accessed April 18, 2011]). 
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Psalm 51:4 in Romans 3:4 to be “atomistic” just because Paul is not concerned with the 
David-Bathsheba incident. Nor do we consider a quotation to be taken “out of context” 
simply because the NT author applies it to a new referent, such as something said or 
written about the Jews in the OT and now applied to the Church or about Yahweh and 
now applied to Jesus.87  
Nor is the purpose of explicit quotation always to call into the reader’s mind 
every detail of the literary context of the source text, especially if one considers the co-
text to be the entire OT or even an entire psalm.88 Although we hold that for all explicit 
quotation that “some connotations or associations will carry over from previous 
contexts” since “if this were not the case, then the concept of quotation would be 
‘sense-less,’”89 how much of context is in view differs in various situations. In some 
cases, following Clark’s notion that “contributors project the most economical evidence 
they think they need for current purposes,” a brief reference, particularly to an opening, 
peak or topic verse, may point to the broader source text.90 Brevity may also foster 
involvement.91 But whether an OT passage is a shorthand which evokes the literary or 
                                                           
87 Although S. Moyise considers the opposite of “fixed meaning” to be the application of words 
concerning one person to a different person (cf. Jesus and Scripture: Studying the ew Testament Use of 
the Old Testament [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011], 119; and “Does the NT Quote the OT Out Of 
Context?,” Anvil 11, no. 2 [1994], 138, 141), our action model does not tie meaning to a single referent. 
This is contra, for example, R. T. Mead, who argues that Jesus “thoroughly disregards” the historical OT 
situation with his allusion to Ps 62:12 in Matt 16:27, where “instead of God, the Son of man … will 
requite each man his activities” (“A Dissenting Opinion about Respect for Context in Old Testament 
Quotations,” TS 10, no. 2 [January 1964]: 281). But even if ἀποδώσει in Matt 16:27 is taken to refer to 
the Son of Man rather than to τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ (the immediately preceding singular noun), this may be 
an attempt by Matthew or Jesus to identify Jesus with the “Lord” of Ps 62:12 and thereby implicitly claim 
divinity for Jesus. 
88 Contra Shires, who claims “every quotation or allusion may presuppose both its immediate 
context and its relation to the entire Hebrew tradition” (32-33). Even if the latter statement could be 
demonstrated generally, in individual cases the relationship to at least some elements of the tradition 
would be so faint as to be, for all practical purposes, undetectable. Nor do we agree that with quotation 
the entire co-text “is in view, and is the basis of the argument” (Dodd, 126, with regard to certain 
“fundamental passages,” one of which is Ps 110). Referring to Dodd and others, P. Doble claims that 
“what in the text of the New Testament appear to be citations or allusions, are, in fact, markers, or 
signals, or headlines which call into play a larger, whole [literary] context” (“Something Greater than 
Solomon: An Approach to Stephen’s Speech,” in Moyise, 190-191; emphasis added). A similar overly 
broad claim is made by Pfister, who avers that “mit dem pointiert ausgewählten Detail wird der 
Gesamtkontext abgerufen, dem es entstammt, mit dem knappen Zitat wird der ganze Prätext in die neue 
Sinnkonstitution einbezogen” (29). 
89 S. Moyise, Evoking Scripture: Seeing the Old Testament in the ew [London: T&T Clark, 
2008], 20. As Plett notes, “Wo keine einzige Gemeinsamkeit existiert, läβt sich keine Beziehung 
herstellen” (“Konstituenten,” 93). However, “Hatina has demonstrated that we should not move from this 
commonsense observation to much larger claims that a quotation necessarily evokes all of its surrounding 
context” (Moyise, Evoking, 20). 
90 H. Clark, 250. Since the cost of communication includes processing time, “participants try to 
minimize total joint processing time. Other things being equal, the briefer the evidence, the better” (Ibid.).  
91 According to Tannen, “the necessity of filling in unstated information has long been regarded 
as a crucial part of literary discourse. … This makes discourse effective because the more work readers or 
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socio-historical context more broadly must be considered on a case-by-case basis. We 
do not assume maximal context (i.e., that a quotation references all of the work quoted, 
the entire OT or even a specific tradition, such as the Exodus or an intervening 
interpretation) unless there are clear indications from the verse which contains the 
quotation or its co-text that more of the literary or socio-historical context is in view.92  
Furthermore, although in general, we agree with Hatina’s caution that “the 
literary context in which the quotation is embedded must be the final arbiter”93 and with 
George Savran’s similar thought that the significance of both alterations to quoted 
material and of verbatim repetition, “can be assessed only in light of the context in 
which the quotation is placed,”94 we hold to the notion of quotation as “dialogical.” By 
this we mean that there is a complex and dynamic relationship between the quoted text 
and the quoting text, such that “the context and connotations of the original are not 
entirely left behind, but are brought to bear (positively or negatively) in the reading of 
the citation or allusion.”95 Therefore, in our case studies, we examine sufficient co-text 
                                                                                                                                                                          
hearers do to supply meaning, the deeper their understanding and the greater their sense of involvement 
with both text and author” (Voices, 37). See also Iser concerning the “gaps” in texts which allow the 
reader to “experience the text as a reality” (Implied Reader, 40). 
92 Hatina, Search, 161. In Jesus and Scripture, Moyise uses “maximalist” and “minimalist” (and 
“moderate”) to refer to various views concerning the accuracy with which the Gospel authors recorded 
Jesus’ use of Scripture (cf. 7-10). 
93 Hatina, Search, 161. Although “both contexts are important,” Hatina believes one should 
begin with the receptor text in order to avoid “a forced transference of meaning” (2, 160). We instead 
begin with the source text so that we are not influenced in our reading of that text by the receptor text. 
94 G. W. Savran, Telling and Retelling: Quotation in Biblical arrative (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988), 36. Moyise points out that although allusions and quotations “often evoke 
something of the old context, their meaning is now largely determined by the role and function they have 
in their new context” (“Use,” 34). 
95 I. Paul, 258; emphasis added. For Savran, “although the quoted words take on meaning 
ascribed to them by their new context, they still retain some autonomy as identifiable prior direct speech, 
which carries within it some of the sense of its original context” (110-111). Moyise avers “it is probably 
best to seek the ‘meaning’ or ‘significance’ of a quotation in the interaction between the connotations it 
(may) bring with it and its role or function in the new work” (“Quotations,” 28). As Plett points out, 
“Indem der rezipient im Leseakt den abwesenden Prätext-Kontext des Zitats mitvergegenwärtigt, schafft 
er zusätzliche Konnotationen des ihm vorliegenden Textes” (“Konstituenten,” 82). Here we disagree with 
C. A. Evans, who believes “the NT writers were rarely concerned with the question of what … the text 
originally meant” (“The Function of the Old Testament in the New,” in Introducing ew Testament 
Interpretation, ed. S. McKnight [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989], 193). In general, we reject those 
“postmodern understandings of intertextuality, which … contend that later references to earlier texts 
interact in such a way that new meanings are produced that are completely unlinked and dislodged from 
the originally intended meaning of the earlier text” (G. K. Beale, A ew Testament Biblical Theology: 
The Unfolding of the Old Testament in the ew [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011], 3). Such 
readings are “Independent” (see chapter 5). Instead, we follow R. E. Watts in assuming the NT authors 
are “not unaware of the original contexts and contemporary understandings of Israel’s scriptures and that 
these often provide hermeneutical clues as to the significance of the surrounding New Testament 
material” (“The Psalms in Mark’s Gospel,” in The Psalms in the ew Testament, ed. S. Moyise and M. J. 
J. Menken [London: T&T Clark, 2004], 25). 
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to permit an understanding of the function of the quoted passage in the source and 
receptor texts and to determine what that passage contributes to Story in each case. 
One example of a dialogical approach to intertextuality is that of Hays, who 
finds that Paul works “to bring Scripture and gospel into a mutually interpretive 
relation.”96 Because Hays links intertextuality and context to tradition/Story and 
theology as well as to the creation of meaning, we lead into chapter 4 by evaluating his 
seminal work, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul.97 
Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul by Richard B. Hays 
Hays approaches “the task of interpretation … by reading the letters as literary texts 
shaped by complex intertextual relations with Scripture.”98 Rather than “seeing 
quotations and allusions as subsidiary to Paul’s main arguments, Hays sees letters like 
Romans, Galatians and Corinthians as an ongoing conversation with Scripture,”99 a 
conversation set against the backdrop of the changes in the socio-historical context 
brought about by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.100 
Taking an inductive literary-intertextual approach, Hays considers the 
“rhetorical and semantic effects” of “poetic allusions.”101 Reminiscent of Lane-
Mercier’s description of quotation as “play,”102 Hays claims an interest in quotation as 
“an act of figuration, establishing a metaphorical resonance between drama and life.”103  
                                                           
96 Hays, Echoes, 176. 
97 Others of Hays’ works, including his 1983 dissertation, have also informed this study.  
98 Hays, Echoes, xi. Israel’s Scripture is the “single great textual precursor” which created the 
symbolic field within which “Paul repeatedly situates his discourse” (15).   
99 Moyise, Evoking, 1. 
100 The impact of the Christ-event demonstrates why texts “always demand and generate new 
interpretation” (Hays, Echoes, 4).  
101 Ibid., 19. Moyise notes that “what is different in Hays’s analysis is that he does not present 
this as yet another proof text for Paul’s gospel; rather he turns to literature and poetry to describe the 
subtle effects of such echoes” (Paul, 112). Some criticize Hays for paying too little attention to the 
historical-critical method. According to H. Hübner, “Seine bewuβt angesprochene Abwertung der 
Methode gegenüber der—in der Tat unverzichtbaren!—Sensibilität bringt ihn z. T. um die Früchte seines 
eigenen so verheiβungsvollen neuen Ansatzes” (“Intertextualität—die hermeneutische Strategie des 
Paulus,” TLZ 116, no. 12 [December 1991], 895). On the one hand, this criticism seems to demand too 
much from Hays’ methodology. On the other, it is not entirely accurate. Although Hays admits history is 
not his main interest, he acknowledges that “attention to intertextuality … compels respect for diachronic 
concerns” and he correctly claims his “treatment of Paul … is not ahistorical” (Echoes, xii). 
102 See chapter 2. 
103 Hays, Echoes, 33. Using J. Hollander’s The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton 
and After as a model for reading Paul’s intertextual allusions leads Hays to argue that “Paul’s citations of 
Scripture often function not as proofs but as tropes; they generate new meanings by linking the earlier 
text (Scripture) to the later (Paul’s discourse) in such a way as to produce unexpected correspondences, 
correspondences that suggest more than they assert” (24). He finds it “unimaginative” that commentators 
“ascribe to Paul’s intertextual tropes a literal assertive weight that they cannot and should not bear” (175). 
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However, Hays also holds to “a single key hermeneutical axiom: that there is an 
authentic analogy—though not a simple identity—between what the text meant and 
what it means.”104 He believes Paul uses “the rhetorical figure of metalepsis, a device 
that requires the reader to interpret a citation or allusion by recalling aspects of the 
original context that are not explicitly quoted.”105 This happens at different levels.  
The first level is the obvious connection between a quotation and its OT co-text. 
For example, with regard to Paul’s use of Psalm 51 in Romans 3, Hays believes “no 
reader familiar with the psalter could possibly fail to hear the resonance of the psalm’s 
unquoted verses with the themes of Romans 3. Rather than spelling out all the 
connections, Paul opts for metaphorical understatement, allowing this well-known 
psalm’s echoes to sound subliminally beneath the overt argument.”106 Similarly, 
regarding Romans 15:7-13, which contains quotations from various OT texts, including 
Psalms 18:49 and 117:1, Hays argues that “even here … where the significance of the 
[OT] passages for Paul’s case is evident, we will miss important intertextual echoes if 
we ignore the loci from which the quotations originate.”107 
Craig Evans raises the question of whether Hays sufficiently considers to what 
extent Paul interacts with Jewish interpretive tradition. For Evans, “it would be more 
accurate to speak of the echoes of interpreted Scripture in the letters of Paul.”108 Paul 
                                                           
104 Ibid., 27.  
105 R. B. Hays, “Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul: Abstract,” in Paul and the Scriptures 
of Israel, ed. C. A. Evans and J. A. Sanders (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 43.  
106 Hays, Echoes, 49. He elaborates: “The point made explicitly by Paul’s citation of Ps. 51:4 is 
that Scripture proclaims the justice of God’s judgment. The point made implicitly is that Psalm 51 … 
models the appropriate human posture before this righteous God: not challenging his just sentence of 
condemnation but repenting and acknowledging desperate need” (50). Whether or not Hays sees these 
connections as intentional is unclear. On the one hand, he presents Paul as making deliberate choices; on 
the other, he finds “little evidence in Romans to suggest these structural parallels are deliberately crafted 
by Paul” (49). Also confusing is his reference to Paul’s use of Ps 51:4 in Rom 3 as adducing “a prooftext” 
(48). Later, he calls prooftexting a “pejorative label” and describes it as the appropriation of OT language 
“with minimal attention to the integrity of the semiotic universe of the precursor” (175). Since these 
comments contradict his thoughts about the connection between this quotation and its OT co-text, it 
seems he uses “prooftext” somewhat injudiciously with regard to Rom 3. 
107 Ibid., 71. See also Hays’ thoughts regarding Paul’s echo of Ps 97:2 LXX in Rom 1:16-17 
(36). He makes a stronger argument concerning the allusion to Ps 143 in Rom 3:20, which anticipates 
“the next turn in the argument,” and thus bridges “paragraphs that are often read in disjunction from one 
another” (52). This allusion is key to Hays’ view of Rom 3:21 as “the climax of a continuous discussion 
that goes back at least to the beginning of the chapter, or indeed all the way back to Rom. 1:16-17” (52). 
108 C. A. Evans, “Listening for Echoes of Interpreted Scripture,” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 50; 
emphasis added. However, J. C. Beker’s criticism of Hays for not providing “a more detailed critique of 
the shortcomings of the pesher and midrashic methods” (“Echoes and Intertextuality: On the Role of 
Scripture in Paul’s Theology,” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 65) is invalid. Hays argues correctly that 
“Paul’s own hermeneutical practices are sufficiently different from theirs [the pesherists and midrashists] 
to demand independent investigation” (“On the Rebound: A Response to Critiques of Echoes of Scripture 
in the Letters of Paul,” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 87).  
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and other NT authors did not approach the Scriptures of Israel tabula rasa; they may 
have been interacting with interpretations of an OT text. We consider this sometimes 
overlooked issue in our case studies. 
Hays’ second level of connection between a quotation and its OT co-text are 
situations where the pertinence of the Scripture Paul adduces  
is not immediately evident. In some cases the logic of the quotation depends on 
a preexisting conceptual/theological structure, presupposed by Paul and his 
intended readers but not explained in the text. The convention of reading the 
lament psalms as prophetic anticipations of the Messiah’s suffering provides a 
good illustration of this phenomenon (e.g., Rom. 15:3, quoting Ps. 68:10 
LXX).109  
The weakest level of connection includes instances in which “dissonances 
between the sacred texts and Paul’s rendering of them” create an “undeniable gap 
between the ‘original sense’ of the Old Testament texts and Paul’s interpretation, even 
in cases where the citations are in verbatim agreement with the LXX.”110 For example, 
in two instances, including the citation of Psalm 19:4 in Romans 10:18, Hays finds “no 
indication that Paul has wrestled seriously with the texts from which the citations are 
drawn. He has simply appropriated their language to lend rhetorical force to his own 
discourse, with minimal attention to the integrity of the semiotic universe of the 
precursor.”111  
This example points to a tension in Hays’ understanding of Paul’s interpretive 
method. On one hand, Hays concludes that Paul “seems to have leaped—in moments of 
metaphorical insight—to intuitive apprehensions of the meanings of texts without the 
aid or encumbrance of systematic reflection about his own hermeneutics.”112 Only 
slightly more tamely, he also contends Paul believed the proper reading of Israel’s 
sacred texts was Paul’s own reappropriation of them and that Paul’s interpretive 
practice presupposes “the legitimacy of innovative readings that disclose truth 
previously latent in Scripture.”113 Furthermore, Hays argues that “Paul’s readings of 
Scripture are not constrained by a historical scrupulousness about the original meaning 
                                                           
109 Hays, Echoes, 87. 
110 Ibid., 6. He calls some of Paul’s wording changes deliberate “manipulations” which “should 
not be explained away by appealing to some hypothetical textual tradition not otherwise attested or by 
saying that Paul was just quoting from memory” (147). Rather, Paul works to achieve a desired reading 
by “tinkering with the text” (67, cf. 80-81, 112-113, 147, 153, 160). 
111 Ibid., 175. We evaluate J. R. Wagner’s arguments concerning this quotation in chapter 4.  
112 Ibid., 161.  
113 Ibid., 2, 4.  
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of the text,” and he is adamant that “for Paul, original intention is not a primary 
hermeneutical concern.”114 Such remarks lead to James Scott’s charge that Hays 
presents Paul as “basically an idiosyncratic reader of the Old Testament with some 
Christian presuppositions and a few hermeneutical constraints.”115  
On the other hand, Hays acknowledges that if Paul’s readings of Scripture were 
predominantly of the “eclectic” type represented by the citation of Psalm 19:4 in 
Romans 10:18, “his discourse would lose much of its gravity.”116 Rather, Hays believes 
Paul’s intertextuality is primarily of Greene’s “dialectical” type: “Paul’s great struggle 
is not a struggle to assert his own authority over Scripture; it is, rather, a dialectical 
struggle to maintain the integrity of his proclamation in relation to Scripture and the 
integrity of Scripture in relation to that proclamation, to justify his startling claims 
about what the God of Israel had elected to do in Jesus Christ.”117 Hays adds that while 
Paul was “undergoing a profound disjuncture with his own religious tradition,” he 
“insistently sought to show that his proclamation of the gospel was grounded in the 
witness of Israel’s sacred texts” and that “fundamental to Paul’s whole theological 
project is the claim that his gospel represents the authentic fulfillment of God’s 
revelation to Israel.”118 This dialectical perspective is the direction we take here. 
A final point which deserves comment is the issue of “meaning.” Hays gives 
five possibilities for the “intertextual fusion that generates new meaning”: (i) Paul’s 
mind, (ii) the letter’s original readers, (iii) the text, (iv) any personal act of reading, and 
(v) a community of interpretation.119 Although Hays claims the “working method” of 
                                                           
114 Ibid., 156. In addition to “intuitive” and “innovative,” other terms Hays applies in Echoes to 
Paul’s treatment of the OT include: “revisionary” (67, 81, 120), “casual audacity” (68), “adducing 
prooftexts” (68, 82, 87) “subversive” (79, 111), “outrageous” (82, 157), “fanciful” (97, 140), “whimsical” 
(165), “novel” (155), and “daring” (129). Not all of these seem complimentary. In many of them, 
quotation is presented as “play.” 
115 J. M. Scott, “‘For as Many as are of Works of the Law are under a Curse’ (Galatians 3.10),” 
in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 191n18. 
116 Hays, Echoes, 175; cf. 174-178. For Hays’ apparent modification of Greene’s “eclectic” 
category, see chapter 2 n62. 
117 Ibid., 158-159.  
118 Ibid., 2, 60. In response to W. S. Green’s criticism (“Doing the Text’s Work for It: Richard 
Hays on Paul’s Use of Scripture,” in Evans and Sanders, Paul, 63), Hays agrees his work “might 
occasionally overstate the case for continuity” (“Rebound,” 93). Moyise summarizes Hays’ understanding 
of Paul’s theme as “God’s purpose to raise up a worldwide community of people who confess his 
sovereignty and manifest his justice” and argues that this theme makes continuity between Paul’s thought 
and the OT “more easily discernible” (The Old Testament in the ew: An Introduction [London: 
Continuum, 2001], 135). 
119 Hays, Echoes, 26. The last of these includes all communities of reader/interpreters subsequent 
to the original readers. Thus, the tradition evoked by quotation may involve the interpretation of 
subsequent reading communities. We discuss this in chapter 4 and the case studies. 
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his book is an attempt to hold all five options “together in creative tension,”120 in his 
concluding chapter he privileges reading communities as the locus of meaning since 
“texts have meaning only as they are read and used by communities of readers.”121 
However, the original author and readers and the text do play a strong supporting role: 
“Claims about intertextual meaning effects are strongest where it can credibly be 
demonstrated that they occur within the literary structure of the text and that they can 
plausibly be ascribed to the intention of the author and the competence of the original 
readers.”122 Thus, Hays can claim, “I fail to fall in line with the currently fashionable 
skepticism about the stability of meaning in texts.”123 
Inspired by a desire to maintain Hays’ “creative tension” and his thought that 
“Scripture really does retain its own voice and power to challenge and shape Paul’s 
unfolding discourse,”124 in chapter 5 we develop a theory of interactive communication 
based in linguistic pragmatics, in which “meaning” is co-created by the author and 
reader through the construct of the implied author and reader as mediated by the text. 
We also create a typology of readers in connection with this model of meaning. 
With regard to Paul’s allusion to Psalm 143:2 in Romans 3:20, Hays contends 
that “the psalm is not adduced as a proof for Paul’s assertion, but his assertion echoes 
the psalm, activating Israel’s canonical memory.”125 This thought bridges our move to 
chapter 4, in which we explore how an author uses quotation to evoke elements of 
textual tradition or “Story,” thus activating its “Story-lines” or theological themes.
                                                           
120 Ibid., 27. This leads D. B. Martin to ask “how Hays intends to enjoy such diverse bedfellows 
as E. D. Hirsch, Jr. (authorial intention), T. S. Eliot (the text itself), and Stanley Fish (community of 
interpretation and reader-response) all at the same time” (review of Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of 
Paul, by Richard B. Hays, MoTh 7, no. 3 [April 1991], 291). Martin concludes that “Hays’s rhetoric … is 
New Critical” (291). We do not agree with Martin’s assessment. 
121 Hays, Echoes, 189. This constraint apparently does not apply to Paul, whose readings are 
“abidingly valid figurations” (187), despite being revisionary, subversive, outrageous, etc. (see n114). 
However, Hays also argues that “recognizing the metaphorical character of the intertextual relation will 
prevent us from literalizing or absolutizing Paul’s reading” and adds that “Paul’s own example would 
lead us to expect that the community, under the guidance of the Spirit, will remain open to fresh readings 
of the same text, through which God will continue to speak” (186-187; emphasis added). Although there 
is much to admire about Hays’ work, this conclusion is difficult.  
122 Ibid., 28. The hermeneutical conventions of Hays’ interpretive community include the 
conviction that “a proposed interpretation must be justified with reference to evidence provided both by 
the text’s rhetorical structure and by what can be known through critical investigation about the author 
and original readers” (Ibid.) 
123 Hays, “Rebound,” 81.  
124 Ibid., 83. 
125 Hays, Echoes, 51. By “story” Hays means the Christ-story, which he considers the narrative 
substructure underlying Paul’s writings. We find an “older” level of substructure—as did Jesus and the 
NT authors—in the ongoing Story of God’s people as developed in the OT and interpretations thereof. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TRADITIO, STORY, LIFEWORLD AD THEOLOGY 
Tradition and Story 
Tradition is “anything in the heritage from the past that is delivered down to the present 
and can contribute to the makeup of the new ethos.”1 It “provides for cultural continuity 
and cohesion by preserving the authoritative memories of the past”2 and “delivers the 
framework—intellectual, historical, religious, hermeneutical—needed for a new event 
or word to be meaningful.”3 In the NT, it is the Jesus event which tradition—both the 
OT and intervening interpretation4—makes meaningful.5 At the same time, the Jesus 
event reshapes tradition as it moves into the future.6 
In chapter 3, we argued that by evoking textual tradition or “Story,” quotation 
activates mutual context. In this chapter, we explore how evoking Story and activating 
mutual context transforms lifeworld/ worldview, theology (the basic questions and 
answers), and, ultimately, Story itself. These relationships are not linear but rather 
simultaneously multi-dimensional and interwoven. Lifeworld, Story, theology and 
worldview are both the basis for and the outcome of human action.  
We begin by examining the ground-breaking work of four scholars who take a 
possible function of intertextuality to be the activation of textual tradition.7 Our goal is to 
evaluate how their thoughts on quotation, intertextuality, context and tradition coincide 
with our developing methodology. 
                                                           
1 D. A. Knight, “Introduction: Tradition and Theology,” in Tradition and Theology in the Old 
Testament, ed. D. A. Knight (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), 2. 
2 M. Fishbane, “Torah and Tradition,” in Knight, 286.  
3 D. A. Knight, “Revelation through Tradition,” in Knight, 165. 
4 This concept—although not all of the terminology—comes from J. Barr, The Concept of 
Biblical Theology: An Old Testament Perspective (Minneapolis, Fortress, 1999), 280. We construe 
“intervening interpretation” quite loosely and investigate apocryphal, Qumranian and other 
intertestamental Jewish textual traditions in our case studies. 
5 “Jesus’ story is told within the structure and language of Israel’s faith story. Israel’s story 
shapes Jesus’ story, as presented in the Synoptics. Indeed, the OT is a precondition for the Synoptics’ 
story of Jesus” (Swartley, 282).  
6 See chapter 3 and the case studies. 
7 Three of these works (Keesmaat, R. Watts and Pao) are foundational to a study of the NT use 
of OT tradition. We add J. R. Wagner to demonstrate that “tradition” is not limited to the Exodus/New 
Exodus. Although N. T. Wright’s worldview theory also is important to our model, we reserve it for our 
discussion of “Story” and of the connection between worldview, story/Story and theology (below). 
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Four Works on “Tradition” 
Paul’s Use of the Exodus Tradition 
Like Hays, Sylvia Keesmaat takes intertextuality as her methodological basis. As she 
observes, “There has been a welcome shift in the discussion in such a way that Israel’s 
scriptures are understood less as an ‘authority’ to which the New Testament writers 
were appealing and more as a major component of the symbolic world within which 
they were thinking.”8 This aligns with our thoughts about quotation evoking tradition 
rather than serving a power relationship via an appeal to authority. We also agree that 
intertextuality can produce tension in tradition since intertextuality “both ‘disrupts’ and 
‘regenerates’ a given textual tradition” and is therefore “one means by which a tradition 
is transformed and revivified for a new context and situation.”9 Her categories of 
tension resolution are “(1) alienation, or an abandonment of the tradition; (2) reversion, 
or fidelity to the tradition unchanged; and (3) transformation of the tradition.”10 We 
create a different typology of transformation below. 
Keesmaat defines tradition as “those events, stories, rituals and symbols that 
shape the collective identity of a community, that are passed down in a community from 
generation to generation and that are rooted in the foundational past of that 
community.”11 Although we concur that “the power of a story to create a world and 
shape reality for people is clear,”12 her notion of the “foundational” past is overly 
narrow. For her, “the exodus tradition came to express all that was contained in Israelite 
historical understanding; it was the tradition, the story which embodied the past, present 
and future of the Israelites.”13 Although Jonathan Whitlock’s criticism that “at its 
weakest” Keesmaat’s study “becomes a prisoner of its own conceit, relating images and 
language back to the exodus which are better explained otherwise and thus obscuring 
                                                           
8 S. C. Keesmaat, Paul and His Story: (Re)Interpreting the Exodus Tradition (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 31-32. 
9 Ibid., 51. Paul “was struggling with the question of what it meant to serve God in Jesus Christ 
and was doing so in fundamental continuity with the traditions and scriptures of his people, Israel. 
However, the invasive action of God in Jesus Christ introduced a new element into the story, an 
unexpected twist in the plot, which meant that Paul’s dialogue with Scripture involved a transformation 
and reappropriation of the tradition for the new communities which had come into being in Jesus Christ. 
… The tradition has been transformed in such a way that it is revivified” (233). 
10 Ibid., 20; cf. 33.  
11 Ibid., 17. 
12 Ibid., 326. I. W. Scott places Keesmaat’s work among the recent “full-blooded treatments of 
Paul’s thought using narrative as a central structural feature” (Implicit Epistemology in the Letters of 
Paul: Story, Experience & the Spirit [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006], 96n3).  
13 Keesmaat, 36. W. Harrelson makes a similar argument (“Life, Faith, and the Emergence of 
Tradition,” in Knight, 20).  
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rather than elucidating Paul’s meaning”14 is overly harsh, it is true that she does not 
generally consider the possibility “that Paul could in many cases be referring to 
prophetic writings without consciously intending to invoke the exodus story.”15 
Although Keesmaat broadens her concept of the tradition in her conclusion,16 her use of 
the Exodus as the structural feature behind Paul’s letters is too restrictive. 
An example is Paul’s quotation of Psalm 44:2217 in Romans 8:36. This is the 
only explicit quotation in Romans 8:18-39, a passage to which Keesmaat devotes an 
entire chapter. She links the Exodus to Romans 8 on the basis of the echo she finds 
there of a “central lament” from Jeremiah 11:18-12:6 along with the thought she takes 
from Walter Brueggemann that all “subsequent laments in Israel rely upon and appeal 
to the paradigmatic beginnings of Exodus 2.”18 The “paradigmatic” lament is Exodus 
2:23b-25, in which the Israelites “groan” under their slavery, raise a cry for help to 
Yahweh, who then hears, remembers the covenant and responds. But not only is this at 
most a proto-lament in form,19 to claim on this basis that all biblical laments refer to the 
Exodus is unjustified. Although Keesmaat’s thoughts about tradition and the response to 
tradition are helpful, we do not follow her in connecting all OT quotation to the Exodus. 
Furthermore, Keesmaat not only argues that all Paul’s quotations refer to the 
Exodus, she posits a co-textually maximalist view of those references. For her, Paul “is 
evoking a whole intertextual matrix, a larger narrative world made up of the whole 
                                                           
14 J. Whitlock, review of Paul and His Story: (Re)Interpreting the Exodus Tradition, by Sylvia 
C. Keesmaat, Review of Biblical Literature (January 22, 2001), http://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/444_ 
351. pdf (accessed March 2, 2011). He believes only two of the images in Rom 8:14-17 “which Keesmaat 
traces back to the exodus tradition … are plausibly taken from there directly. For the others the 
connection is a stretch.” Moyise finds Keesmaat’s argument concerning Rom 8:18-39 more compelling, 
since the themes she finds in this passage, namely “adoption, being led by the Spirit, crying out to God as 
father, suffering, inheritance and glory … are all themes associated with the exodus story. She freely 
admits that Israel’s story has ended in ‘an unexpected way’ and so one cannot simply stress continuity 
between new and old in an uncritical way. But it is the story that governs the shape of Paul’s use of the 
Old Testament” (“Use,” 40). However, the story Keesmaat refers to in her concluding chapter is “the 
basic story of the righteous God who called Abraham, promised him many descendants and the 
inheritance of the whole world, revealed God’s nature in the exodus and God’s faithfulness throughout 
Israel’s history and in the new exodus in Christ” (Keesmaat, 237; emphasis added). This Story is broader 
than the Exodus. 
15 Whitlock.  
16 See n14.  
17 Keesmaat mistakenly identifies this quotation as Ps 44:2, not 44:22, on p. 130 and in the Index 
of References (p. 266). She discusses Ps 44:22 quite briefly and gives no explanation as to why Paul does 
not quote Jer 11:19a if it is Jeremiah’s lament Paul has in mind.   
18 Keesmaat, 129, quoting W. Brueggemann, Israel’s Praise: Doxology vs Idolatry and Ideology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 141.  
19 According to C. Westermann, as a Lament of the People, Ps 44 contains five elements: 
address, lament, confession of trust or assurance of being heard, petition and vow of praise (Praise and 
Lament in the Psalms, trans. K. R. Krim and R. N. Soulen [Atlanta: John Knox, 1981], 52). Only the 
lament and petition elements are found in Exodus 2. 
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exodus story, from bondage and suffering in Egypt, to the wanderings and rebellion in 
the wilderness, to the inheritance of the promised land.”20 Although we agree that 
quotation can and often does point to a broader context, we find Keesmaat’s 
understanding of not only quotations but even allusions and echoes as evoking “the 
whole world” of the text to be too sweeping.21 Rather, we believe that what and how 
much of Story is evoked by quotation must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.22  
Mark’s Use of the Isaianic New Exodus 
In his ground-breaking work Isaiah’s ew Exodus in Mark, Rikk Watts focuses on 
Mark’s use of the Exodus theme as transformed by Isaiah’s prophetic vision into the 
promise of the Isaianic New Exodus (INE). In line with our argument, he finds some 
OT texts are appealed to “because they invoke, within an ideologically schematised 
memory of Israel’s history, some aspect of Yahweh and Israel’s historical relationship 
to which that text bears witness.”23  
Watts’ methodology is based on “the relationship between a community’s 
founding moment and ideology’s role in maintaining social cohesion.”24 For Watts, 
ideology is not content, i.e., “what the group understands about the world”; rather, it is 
the “lens through which the world is understood.”25 Of particular interest is his proposal 
that ideology creates a community’s unique identity and “provides the interpretive 
framework through which a given community both understands and shapes its internal 
relations, its history and its environment; that is, ideology provides a total world 
view.”26 This is similar to our concept of worldview. However, unlike N. T. Wright, 
                                                           
20 Keesmaat, 218.  
21 “Texts exist in certain contexts, therefore, in alluding to or echoing a specific text the whole 
world of that text is evoked” (Ibid., 51). 
22 “Only study of the texts in question can show the way in which the contexts interrelate” (I. 
Paul, 259). 
23 R. E. Watts, Isaiah’s ew Exodus in Mark, rev. ed. (1997; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2000), 50. In at least one instance (the quotation of Isa 29), Hatina argues Watts mistakenly 
considers that the quotation “acquires its meaning from the Isaian literary context … and not Mark” 
(Search, 252). This criticism seems unfounded although admittedly Watts’ interest is not in exploring the 
dialogical nature of the two texts/contexts. See chapter 3 for a discussion of Hatina’s insistence that the 
receptor text is the final arbiter of meaning. 
24 R. Watts, IE, 28.  
25 Ibid., 40. Watts does not consider “ideology” to be a pejorative term. This differs from most 
understandings as represented by H. F. Plett’s consideration of an “ideological” quotation as one where 
the “claim to authority is not questioned at all” (“Intertextualities,” in Intertextuality, ed. H. F. Plett 
[Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991], 13). 
26 R. Watts, IE, 377; cf. 36. For Watts, “the convictions and energies of the founding moment 
become the ‘overall’ interpretative schema for the group not only for internal interaction but also for its 
understanding of history, and indeed the whole world” (39). 
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Watts does not link worldview/ideology with theology. Since this link is critical to our 
model, we rely more heavily on Wright’s work (see below). 
Watts’ belief that all other concerns, motifs and OT themes in Mark are 
“presented within the larger literary and theological theme” of the INE27 causes him to 
stretch the INE to cover quite a bit of territory. For him, the INE reflects the schema of 
the first Exodus, e.g., “deliverance, journey, and arrival in Jerusalem” as “delineated 
further with their attendant motifs of, for example, Yahweh as warrior and shepherd,” 
Yahweh as king and servant, the return of Yahweh’s actual presence, and the Messiah.28 
Watts may extend the INE theme beyond its natural boundaries in his treatment 
of Jesus’ use of Psalm 118:22-23 in the Parable of the Wicked Tenants (Mark 12:10-
11).29 According to Watts, Psalm 118:22-23 “functions as the ‘capstone’ to the story”; 
he concludes that “we may have here intimations that the Markan Jesus sees himself as 
the one who fulfils the NE hope of Isaiah 2:2 and 56:7 (cf. 11:16).”30 But if the Psalm 
                                                           
27 Ibid., 4.  
28 Ibid., 43; cf. 80, 90, 119-120, 347. Although “Israel’s view of her history … seems … to be 
structured around several major events or periods: Creation, Patriarchs, Exodus-Conquest, Monarchy, 
Exile, Return, with the culmination to be found in some sort of expectation of a greater restoration,” 
Watts argues these events “tend to be described in ways which bring out their continuity with the 
concerns, themes, and trajectories of the founding moment” (41), that is, the Exodus. His primary interest, 
however, is in Isaiah’s interpretation of that founding moment. Further, despite claiming that he does not 
propose “that every appeal to the OT necessarily functions in this way” (51), he does not mention any 
Markan OT reference that functions in any other way. Even his suggestions for future research concern 
whether other OT motifs have “consilience” with the INE theory (388). 
29 Another example is Mark 14:62. Since this verse is climactic in the narrative (see chapter 8), it 
is interesting that Watts finds only “possible” allusions to Isa 50 and 53 in the co-text (Mark 14:58, 60 
and 61) (Ibid., 364). 
30 Ibid., 344-345, 346. Space precludes us from investigating Watts’ claims that (i) Ps 118 
focuses particularly “on the Temple as the goal of the eschatological new exodus” and (ii) “Mark’s 
unselfconscious messianic application within a new exodus framework, suggests that Psalm 118 was 
already understood along these lines” (“The Psalms,” 30-31; cf. 35). With regard to the latter, see B. 
Witherington, III, who argues that “there was early Jewish messianic interpretation of Ps. 118:25-26 
referring it to the final Davidide and the redemption wrought by him” (The Gospel of Mark: A Socio- 
Rhetorical Commentary [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 310). J. Marcus adds that older scholars (for 
example, Strack-Billerbeck, Kommentar zum neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch, and Jeremias) 
“assert that a messianic understanding of Ps 118:26 was already present in the Judaism of Jesus’ time. 
This is possible, since the NT passages that use Ps 118:26 … assume rather than argue for a messianic 
interpretation, and other NT and early Christian passages (Mark 12:10; Acts 4:11; 1 Pet 2:7; Barn. 6:4; 
Acts of Peter 24) reveal a tendency to read Psalm 118 Christologically” (Mark 8-16: A ew Translation 
with Introduction and Commentary [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009], 774-775). However, 
Marcus concludes that “the Jewish texts cited by Jeremias et al. (b. Pesaḥ. 118a; Pes. Rab. 31:6; Midrash 
Psalms; etc.) are later than the NT period and prove only that the Hallel psalms were read 
eschatologically, not messianically” (Ibid., 775). For Witherington, too, it is “not at all clear that we are 
to think the crowds understood that all this symbolized that Jesus was the Messiah; not least because 
Jesus is not conforming to the expectations of the warrior messianic figure of Pss. Sol. 17-18 and other 
early Jewish texts (b. Sanh. 98a)” (Mark, 310, referring to Mark 11:9). On the other hand, in an earlier 
work Marcus suggests that behind Mark’s citation of Ps 118 in Mark 12:10-11 may be “Jewish exegetical 
traditions interpreting the psalm as a prophecy of eschatological victory. As in 1:2-3 and 1:11, the 
passage would here be making use of the Old Testament picture of God coming in triumphant holy war to 
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quotation is the “capstone” of the parable, then Watts’ claim for a theme of the Isaianic 
New Exodus seems overstated.31 Although there are links to Isaiah 5 in the parable,32 the 
focus in Mark 12 on Psalm 118:22-23 implies a more basic Exodus/NE theme.33  
Like Keesmaat, Watts takes a maximalist view of context, arguing that  
the true significance of a brief and even fragmentary citation may go far beyond 
what might otherwise appear to be the case. Although to the untutored the 
citation might seem of little importance, the fact remains that to trained hearers 
it has considerable allusive power and thereby serves to invoke a comprehensive 
hermeneutical framework.34  
                                                                                                                                                                          
save his people” (The Way of the Lord: Christological Exegesis of the Old Testament in the Gospel of 
Mark [London: T&T Clark, 2004], 115). 
31 It would be more logical to argue Mark meant to invoke the INE if he had quoted Isa 28 and 
not Ps 118. In Isa 28:16 LXX, the stone (λίθος/ἀκρογωνιαῖος) is laid for a foundation (θεµέλιον) stone. 
But in Mark 12:10, which corresponds exactly to Ps 118:22 LXX, the “λίθον has become the κεφαλὴν 
γωνίας, ‘head of the corner,’ which probably refers to either a capstone that completes an arch or a capital 
that sits atop a column or pinnacle of the building. It is not a foundation stone” (C. A. Evans, Mark 8:27-
16:20 [Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2001], 238). 
32 Cf. Moyise, Jesus, 22-23. 
33 In several commentaries on Mark which use Watts’ book as a resource, this passage is not 
discussed with reference to the Exodus/INE. See J. R. Donahue and D. J. Harrington, The Gospel of Mark 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002); R. H. Stein, Mark (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008); 
Marcus, Mark. Moloney notes only that Watts provides “a strong evaluation of the impact of the Isaianic 
background on 11:27-12:12” (232n86). Others who find that Ps 118 points to the Exodus do not mention 
the INE. Hatina, for example, notes that “several studies have convincingly documented that Mark was 
indebted to the story of the first exodus” (Search, 160, with reference especially to Swartley). L. C. Allen 
believes Ps 118 was incorporated into the Hallel “due to its many echoes of Exod 15” (Psalms 101-150, 
Revised (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2002), 165; see also J. C. McCann, Jr., A Theological Introduction 
to the Book of Psalms: The Psalms as Torah (Nashville: Abingdon, 1993), 166-167). J. M. Fuhrmann 
believes that “by citing Exod 15:2, David recalls the communal story of God’s deliverance and salvation 
over Egypt at the Reed Sea and connects his personal story with the foundation story of Israel’s 
deliverance” (“The Use of Psalm 118:22-23 in the Parable of the Wicked Tenants,” Proceedings: Eastern 
Great Lakes and Midwest Biblical Societies 27 [2007]: 75; cf. 69, 81n52, ATLA Religion Database with 
ATLASerials, accession number ATLA0001666957 [accessed July 23, 2013]). 
It would have strengthened Watts’ argument if he had considered Isaiah more broadly. 
Fuhrmann points out that not only is Ps 118:14 an “exact quote of MT Exod 15:2,” Isa 12:2 also quotes 
Exod 15:2 (75). P. Constant believes that the presence “du nom divin ָהּי” Isa 12:2 and Exod 15:2, “jointe 
à la répétition d’Exod 15:2 en Ésa 12:2, atteste une influence probable du cantique d’Exode 15 sur ce 
psaume de louange concluant la promesse du retour de l’exil et des temps messianiques” (“Le Psaume 
118 et son emploi christologique dans Luc et Actes: Une étude exégétique, littéraire et herméneutique” 
[PhD diss., Trinity International University, 2001], 130, cf. 65). 
However, although the INE may be “not as basic for Mark as Watts makes it out to be” (D. H. 
Johnson, review of Isaiah’s ew Exodus in Mark, by Rikki E. Watts, Did 13, no. 2 [Spring 2002]: 108; 
cf. S. P. Ahearne-Kroll, The Psalms of Lament in Mark’s Passion: Jesus’ Davidic Suffering [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007], 170n7), it is important in Mark (cf. C. A. Evans, “The Beginning of 
the Good News in the Gospel of Mark,” in Hearing the Old Testament in the ew Testament, ed. S. E. 
Porter [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006], 86). For Hatina, the incorporation of both exodus narratives is 
“part of Mark’s larger sphere of influence” (Search, 159). M. L. Strauss concludes that Watts’ work has 
alerted scholars “to the possible influence of the Isaianic new exodus in the Gospels” (The Davidic 
Messiah in Luke-Acts: The Promise and its Fulfillment in Lukan Christology [Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1995], 304n2). 
34 R. Watts, IE, 32. Watts references Jeremias, C. E. B. Cranfield, Marcus and Dodd for his 
argument that Mark followed a rabbinic practice and quoted “the first section of a verse while the latter 
unstated section is actually in mind” [IE, 135; emphasis added]. This overstates the earlier claims. 
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For him, citations “provide a shorthand method of referring to whole fields of meaning 
which themselves are located within the on-going schema of Israel’s ‘story.’”35  
Here, too, in some cases Watts stretches a little.36 For example, again with regard 
to the quotation of Psalm 118:22-23 in Mark 12:10b-11, Watts believes that “in the light 
of the messianic overtones of the immediately following verses (118:25f) as used in 
11:9, Mark probably means that these verses here should recall that acclamation and 
likewise be messianically construed (cf. Acts 4:11; 1 Pet 2:7).”37 Certainly the fact that 
Psalm 118:25-26 was recently quoted in Mark increases the likelihood that passage may 
still be in mind as a nearby verse is cited. However, even if one agrees that the use of 
Psalm 118:25-26 in Mark 11:9 has messianic “overtones,” does this mean a reference to 
other verses of Psalm 118 is also necessarily messianic?38 We take up a similar question 
in our case study of the NT quotation of Psalm 110:1. 
In summary, some of Watts’ thoughts about ideology/worldview are helpful. In 
particular, his notion that quotation highlights elements of the on-going relationship 
between God and God’s people is in line with our argument that a function of quotation 
is to evoke tradition as it is textually represented by Story and thereby to activate 
mutual context. However, we are not convinced either that every OT quotation in Mark 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Cranfield’s source is Jeremias, so his evidence is not independent (“A Study of St Mark 1.9-11,” SJT 8 
[1955]: 59). Dodd and Marcus make only the vague point that “the conjuring up of the larger context of a 
passage through the citation of a specific verse or two … corresponds to a method of citation found in 
rabbinic literature” (Marcus, Way, 199-200; cf. Dodd, 126). Jeremias’ claim is also weaker than Watts’: 
“In the Judaism of this period, when large parts of scripture were known off by heart, it was regularly the 
custom to quote only the beginning of a passage, even if its continuation were kept in mind” (ew 
Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus, trans. J. Bowden [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1971], 54-55). With regard to Isa 42:1 in Matt 12:18, Jeremias states that “as so often in OT quotations, 
e.g., in Rabb. Literature, the continuation … is implied but not directly cited” (παῖς θεοῦ, TDT, 5:701). 
None of these scholars gives a rabbinic example. Nor does the example Jeremias gives in T Theology of 
the quotation of Ps 51:4b in Rom 3:4b support his claim since the source text is not the beginning of a 
passage or even the beginning of a verse. In sum, this argument is too slender a branch to bear the weight 
Watts tries to hang on it. 
35 R. Watts, IE, 382. This appears to be his only use of “story” although he may refer to it 
indirectly in his two references to Dodd’s “text plots” (50, 382) and in describing “ideology’s account of 
the founding moment,” “ideology’s account of subsequent events,” and “Israel’s retelling of its inaugural 
event” (40, 42, 43). In general, his concern is icon and symbol (the “media of ideology”) along with ritual 
re-enactment (“symbolic revivification”) rather than story (cf. 40-46). 
36 As Hatina queries, “Do individual terms like ‘gospel’ and broad themes like forgiveness and 
wilderness necessarily point to the literary context from which the quotation is borrowed? If Mark wanted 
to show a continuity between the exodus of Second Isaiah and Jesus’ ministry, why did he not explicitly 
mention the exodus or deliverance in his prologue? And why would he not quote from either Isa. 40.9, 10 
or 11 since these texts express the theme of the exodus more than all the others?” (Search, 159-160). 
37 R. Watts, IE, 346. 
38 M. A. Elliott believes 1QS 8.5, which draws on the “stone” imagery of Isa 26:1, Isa 28:16 and 
Ps 118:22, provides “evidence of the use of stone motifs prior to the New Testament that may actually 
refer to the saved community rather than a messiah” (The Survivors of Israel: A Reconsideration of the 
Theology of Pre-Christian Judaism [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 332-333). 
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is a reference to the INE or that a quotation generally refers to the “whole context.” We 
hold instead that each quotation is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
The Isaianic New Exodus in Acts 
David Pao, who references Watts’ work, also argues for understanding “scriptural 
statements” as pointers “toward a wider story” with which the narrative of Acts 
interacts.39 Like Watts, Pao contends that “the scriptural story which provides the 
hermeneutical framework for Acts is none other than the foundation story of Exodus as 
developed and transformed through the Isaianic corpus.”40 Pao, however, ventures 
beyond the INE, noting that “in ancient Israelite traditions, … the Exodus narrative is 
not understood as being entirely distinct from the Creation story; and a strict separation 
between the two should not be made.”41  
Although, as Pao correctly notes, some Psalms contain creation language, these 
are not the Psalms quoted in Acts.42 Since, by Pao’s own count, more explicit OT 
quotations in Acts come from the Psalms than from any other source,43 this raises a 
question as to whether Pao has truly captured the “wider story” with his amalgam of the 
Exodus narrative as transformed in Isaiah plus the Creation story. Somewhat ironically, 
Watts is among the questioners: “Since most of his [Pao’s] explicit Davidic references 
invoke the Psalms and as Isa. 55:3 is the only explicit Davidic reference in Isaiah 40-66 
one wonders if the link with Isaiah’s new exodus is as straightforward as Pao implies.”44  
An example is illustrative. Pao analyzes several passages that present Jesus as “a 
royal figure in the line of David” and “highlight the Davidic kingdom in the restoration 
program in Acts.”45 These include the series of quotations in Paul’s speech in Acts 
13:33-35, which Paul uses to describe the raising of Jesus. The first quotation is of 
Psalm 2:7. The second, from Isaiah 55:3, concerns God’s promises to David. The final 
                                                           
39 D. W. Pao, Acts and the Isaianic ew Exodus (2000; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2002), 4. 
40 Ibid., 5.  
41 Ibid., 57. For Pao, “in the evocation of both the Exodus and Creation traditions, the concern 
with the creation of a new people of God is highlighted” (57; cf. 251). See Beale for an argument that the 
NE theme in the NT “is another metaphor for the new-creational kingdom” (T Theology, 172). 
However, exploring the relationship between the NE and the new creation would take us too far afield. 
42 The psalms which contain creation language are “Pss 74:12-17; 77:12-20; 89:5-37; and 114” 
(Pao, 57n67) and Ps 145[146]:6 (204n62). The only explicit references to Exodus events in the NT 
Psalms quotations are Ps 78:24 (John 6:31) and Ps 95:7-11 (Hebrews). 
43 Pao lists the 20 OT (LXX) quotations in Acts (4n15). Seven Psalms are the source of six 
quotations, five come from Isaiah, and seven other OT books each provide one or two.  
44 R. E. Watts, review of Acts and the Isaianic ew Exodus, by David W. Pao, JTS, n.s., 55, no. 
1 (April, 2004): 260. Similar criticism has been levied against Watts, as we discussed above. 
45 Pao, 135. 
  59 
quotation, from Psalm 15:10 LXX, restates the promise that Yahweh’s holy one would 
not see decay. Pao aptly notes that “the cluster of these three quotations, together with 
the explicit mention of David in vs 36, point to the significance of the David tradition 
for understanding the status of the exalted Christ.”46 
But since there is no overt mention in this quotation sequence of the INE, the 
link Pao attempts to create to an Isaianic motif of restoration is fragile. Not only is the 
book of Psalms the only identified source text, the Psalms quotations carry more of the 
content of Paul’s argument. The more general quotation from Isaiah 55:3d, with its 
reference to the promises given to David now fulfilled in Jesus, can as logically be 
considered to support the Psalm quotations as vice versa.47 And, although this passage is 
bookended with promises of salvation and forgiveness of sins (Acts 13:26 and 39-40), 
which support a restoration motif, Paul’s references are to Abraham (v 26) and David 
(vv 34, 36) rather than to the Exodus or INE.48  
Although, overall, we agree with Watts that in Acts “the connection between 
Davidic hopes and the specifically Isaianic version of the new exodus remains 
tenuous,”49 Pao is correct that “an emphasis on the typological use of Scripture that 
focuses primarily on individual figures of Israel’s past should be balanced by an 
approach that emphasizes the broader story in which the individuals play a part.”50 This 
is similar to our argument that quotation evokes textual tradition (Story). Although Pao 
does look at Story beyond the INE, we construe Story even more broadly and determine 
on a case-by-case basis which Story-lines are evoked by quotation. 
An issue we raised previously is that scholars question whether the receptor or 
source text should be primary in determining the meaning of a quotation. In this regard, 
                                                           
46 Ibid. Pao confusingly refers to several Psalms quotations, such as Ps 16:10 in Acts 13:35, as 
“Isaianic passages” (85n86). One such “Isaianic passage” (Acts 2) has no explicit quotation of Isaiah. 
47 Here we disagree with Strauss, who finds the NE restoration in view in Luke’s use of Isa 
55:3d LXX in Acts 13:34 (cf. 297). 
48 Admittedly, the Exodus is described several verses earlier (Acts 13:17-20). C. S. Keener, who 
believes Isaiah is “more dominant at key points in Acts’ structure” than the Davidic story, does not list 
Acts 13:33-35 as a “programmatic text” in which Isaiah is used (Acts: An Exegetical Commentary [Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2012], 1:482). He feels Pao “may limit Luke too much to a single ‘primary grid’” (Ibid.). 
49 R. Watts, review of Pao, 260. For Strauss also, “the eschatological new exodus which is 
described in Isaiah and the Prophets” is not “the controlling theme of Luke’s work” (304). More recently, 
P. Mallen concludes that “Luke uses Isaiah to clarify the nature of Jesus’ mission and message of 
salvation, and the surprising destiny of Israel and the nations” and “appears to use Psalms to provide 
focused support for Jesus’ suffering and resurrection as the Davidic Messiah and his enthronement as 
Lord” (The Reading and Transformation of Isaiah in Luke-Acts [London: T&T Clark, 2008], 105, cf. 
189). This points to two interrelated themes rather than a single INE focus. Cf. S. Moyise, The Later ew 
Testament Writings and Scripture: The Old Testament in Acts, Hebrews, the Catholic Epistles and 
Revelation [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012], 38, 41).  
50 Pao, 253, 251. 
  60 
Gregory Beale contends Pao wrongly believes “the NT text exercises its power over its 
OT source text.”51 But this criticism is not justified. Pao refers not to the power of the 
NT text over the OT text, but rather to the power of the OT text in its NT context to 
accomplish the goal of the implied author: “In the development of the identity of the 
early Christian movement, the appropriation of ancient Israel’s foundation story 
provides grounds for a claim by the early Christian community to be the true people of 
God in the face of other competing voices.”52 Secondly, Pao’s thought that “in any use 
of ‘ancient’ texts, the embedded meaning of the source text is both affirmed and 
qualified”53 presents both contexts as important. Pao sees the scriptural tradition as both 
valuable to and transformed for the current situation, in which the socio-historical 
context has changed, most notably by the advent of Jesus Christ. In this, Pao takes a 
step towards what we argue is the dialogical nature of the relationship between the OT 
and the receptor texts in which it is quoted. Wagner opens this door further.  
Paul’s Use of the Old Testament in Romans 9-11 
Building on Hays’ work in intertextuality, Ross Wagner examines Paul’s use of Isaiah 
in Romans 9-11 and 15. However, Wagner does not focus on the INE but instead 
considers the interweaving of Isaianic material with other OT material (notably from 
Deuteronomy and the Psalms). He emphasizes that “other scriptural voices … play a 
crucial role in shaping the meaning and force of Isaiah’s words in Paul’s argument.”54  
In general, Wagner finds Paul’s citations and allusions to be coherent “with the 
larger narrative and structural patterns found in their scriptural contexts” and considers 
that the gospel Paul preaches “stands in deep continuity with the witness of the biblical 
texts to God’s continuing faithfulness to the covenant with Israel.”55 However, he calls 
some of Paul’s readings of Scripture “radical” in comparison to the readings of Paul’s 
Jewish contemporaries.  
According to Wagner, some of Paul’s “radical re-readings” emerge from one of 
his “fundamental interpretive strategies”: reading the OT “as testimony to the surprising 
                                                           
51 G. K. Beale, review of Acts and the Isaianic ew Exodus, by David W. Pao, TJ, n.s., 25, no. 1 
(Spring 2004): 96.  
52 Pao, 5. 
53 Ibid., 251. 
54 J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 352.  
55 Ibid., 11. Wagner cites Hays (Echoes, 157-158) to support this argument and refers to 
Keesmaat and others in the related footnote where he adds that “the view that Paul normally paid no 
regard to the larger context of his citations continues to live on happily in many quarters” (Heralds, 
11n40). Wagner rightly calls “incredible … Stanley’s assumption that once Paul expended the labor to 
find and excerpt a passage, he promptly forgot all about its original setting” (25). 
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reversal wrought by God’s grace, in which those apparently outside the scope of God’s 
mercy are included among the people God has redeemed for himself.”56 We consider 
“reversal” to be a legitimate form of continuity,57 and we use this concept below, along 
with Keesmaat’s notion of a range of possible responses to tension within tradition, in 
our discussion of the possible transformative goals/results of recontextualizing a source 
text.58 
Wagner’s characterization of Paul’s readings as “radical,” “stunning,” “brazen,” 
“scandalous,” “tendentious,” etc. or even as “misreadings” appears to support Stanley’s 
criticism of Paul’s quotation technique. Stanley argues that Paul’s “decision to include 
so many ‘brazen misreadings of Scripture’ in his letters must be judged a major 
rhetorical miscalculation” since it means the relation of Paul’s quotations “to the source 
text would have been difficult, if not impossible, for a knowledgeable reader to figure 
out.”59 One of Stanley’s examples is the quotations in Romans 10:18-21, among which 
is Psalm 18:5 LXX.60 Here, Stanley believes Wagner “has to strain … to maintain his 
position that Paul took seriously the context of his quotations.”61  
                                                           
56 Ibid., 83. Wagner believes “the ‘foreignness’ of Paul’s interpretations to the original scriptural 
contexts of the citations is best explained, not by assuming that at the moment of writing he did not recall 
the wider setting of a verse he had previously copied into his notebook, but by recognizing that Paul’s 
gospel and mission have driven him to a radical rereading of scripture” (52). Wagner also refers to “the 
shocking nature” of Paul’s interpretation of Hos 2:23 and 1:10 in Rom 9:25-26 and to “strong 
‘misreadings’ of this prophetic oracle” (82, 83), as well as to Paul’s “stunning” and “brazen” 
“misreading” of Isa 65:1-2 in Rom 10:19-21 (205, 213). At least twice, Wagner fails to put “misreading” 
in quotation marks (205, 211); this omission appears unintentional. 
Other “radical re-readings” stem from the fact that “on the face of it, Paul’s radical claim that the 
Law can be divorced from the ‘works’ it commands brazenly contradicts the scriptures, certainly as they 
were read by most of his contemporaries” (159; cf. 154). We cannot evaluate the law-works issue here 
although this could prove an interesting future use of our methodology. 
It is not clear against what benchmark Wagner considers Paul to “re-read” (especially as 
compared to his “reading”). Is it Paul’s own first reading, an amalgam of all his readings prior to his 
conversion, the reading of the original audience, the reading of the reading community to which Paul 
previously belonged or is it that of a reading community which has developed differently than the one to 
which he now belongs? Because of this, we avoid the idea of “re-reading” and instead develop a 
hierarchy of reader roles within the framework of SAT (see chapter 5). 
57 Per E. G. Chazon, continuity can be “of identity or … of dissonance”; in either case, it 
“engages the biblical context and imports it into the new composition” (“The Use of the Bible as a Key to 
Meaning in Psalms from Qumran,” in Emanuel: Studies in Hebrew Bible, Septuagint, and Dead Sea 
Scrolls in Honor of Emanuel Tov, ed. S. M. Paul et al. [Leiden: Brill, 2003], 96). 
58 By “recontextualization,” we mean using spoken or written words in a new literary context.   
59 Stanley, Arguing, 56n46, adding that this poses “serious problems for Wagner’s presumption 
(Heralds, 36-37) that Paul expected the literate members of his congregation to retrace, approve, and 
explain the intricacies of his biblical argumentation to the majority who had little or no formal education 
and little free time to devote to the task.” 
60 The other Psalm quotation among Stanley’s “notable examples” is Ps 115:1 LXX in 2 Cor 
4:13, which we take up in our first case study. 
61 C. D. Stanley, review of Heralds of the Good ews: Isaiah and Paul “In Concert” in the 
Letter to the Romans, by J. Ross Wagner, JBL 124, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 779; cf. Arguing, 3, 53n39, 
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Wagner concedes that  
at first glance, it would appear that Paul has merely torn this sentence [Ps 18:5] 
from its context … and forced it to say something quite different than it does in 
its original setting. Paul’s interpretation would probably have struck a person 
who was familiar with the psalm as extremely tendentious, since it is obvious 
that the “voice” and “words” spoken of by the psalmist belong not to Christian 
missionaries, but to the “heavens.”62  
But Wagner argues that, to the contrary, “Psalm 18, with its cosmic celebration of God 
as creator, … quite appropriately answers the question [in Rom 10:18] drawn from 
Isaiah 40:28” and that the “citation of Psalm 18:5 implies, not just that messengers of 
the gospel have gone out all over the world, but more specifically that Israel, knowing 
the truth about God as creator and entrusted with the inestimable gift of God’s νόµος, 
should have been particularly receptive to the good news of God’s salvation for Jew and 
Gentile alike through Christ.”63 
In general, Wagner does not believe Paul ignores the co-text of the OT passages 
he quotes.64 Rather, he finds that the OT “texts exercise a pervasive influence on Paul’s 
conception of the gospel. Particularly where Paul employs the device of intertextual 
echo, scripture maintains its own voice over against Paul’s, continually forcing the 
apostle to articulate his gospel in terms that are faithful to the scriptural story of God’s 
election of Israel.”65 This leads Florian Wilk to a different criticism of Wagner’s work. 
Wilk calls “exceedingly questionable” Wagner’s approach of beginning “with the 
analysis of the Old Testament passages” and specifying “the place and function of the 
statement quoted by Paul in its original context in order to understand the character of 
the Pauline interpretation of that statement on this basis.”66 He also feels Wagner’s 
maximalist view of the relevant co-text gives undue attention to the OT context.67 For 
                                                                                                                                                                          
56n46, 160-169. As we noted in chapter 3, Hays finds Paul’s reading in this instance to be of the eclectic 
type (Echoes, 175). 
62 J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 185.  
63 Ibid., 185, 186.  
64 In his title Wagner claims Paul and Isaiah are “in concert” in Romans. This “implies harmony 
rather than discord” (Moyise, “Quotations,” 25). 
65 J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 10, with reference to Hays’ work. 
66 F. Wilk, “Paul as User, Interpreter, and Reader of the Book of Isaiah,” in Hays, Alkier, and 
Huizenga, 87, 88.  
67 In this, Wagner follows Hays. As an example, see Wagner’s suggestion that in Rom 9-11, Paul 
“brings to fulfillment the essential story, not only of Deuteronomy 32, but of Israel’s scriptures in their 
entirety” (Heralds, 201). F. Wilk has also criticized Wagner on the grounds that “zudem wird die 
(sinnvolle) Absicht, im Sinne von Hays’ »intertextual echoes« die Resonanzen der jesajanischen 
Kontexte im Römerbrief aufzuspüren, nur selten ausgeführt” (review of Heralds of the Good ews: 
Isaiah and Paul “In Concert” in the Letter to the Romans, by J. Ross Wagner, TLZ 130, no. 1 [January 
2005]: 50). 
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his part, Wilk considers context quite narrowly, arguing it is only “possible and sensible 
to reconstruct his [Paul’s] understanding of this context in strict orientation toward the 
elements that coincide with his text.”68  
We concur that “how Paul implemented the reading and interpretation of a 
section” of the OT “and whether this happened in the same way every time are 
questions that cannot be answered a priori.”69 We do not want to pre-select a mold and 
attempt to fit Paul or any NT author into it; we continue to hold that the extent to which 
the OT co-text is relevant must be determined for each NT quotation. However, Wilk’s 
claim that because Wagner begins his analysis with the source text he must therefore 
derive the meaning of the receptor text from the meaning of the source text is 
unjustified. Nor do we believe that a redefinition of the referent in reversal necessarily 
means that the original context is being ignored or bypassed.70  
Although Wagner’s focus is on Paul as author, he does consider Paul’s audience. 
Wagner identifies the “ideal reader” of Romans and considers which groups among his 
original audience might have filled the roles of direct addressees and overhearers.71 In a 
footnote, he acknowledges that “readers and reading communities contribute an 
essential element to the interpretive process” and, as we noted in chapter 2, he 
advocates for a “‘hermeneutic of love,’ in which we approach the task of interpretation 
much as we would a conversation with someone we respect and admire.”72 This aligns 
with our approach; we put the final pieces of the author/reader partnership into our 
model in chapter 5. 
In general, Wagner’s thought that Paul finds a larger cultural “‘story’ of God’s 
relationship with Israel” in Isaiah, Deuteronomy, the Psalms and elsewhere in Scripture 
points to our understanding of the “Story” of Israel as not one particular narrative but as 
a richly interwoven tradition, mediated through the OT texts.73 The quotation of OT 
                                                           
68 Wilk, “Paul,” 88. 
69 Ibid., 87.  
70 In his review, Wilk does not take account of the possibility of reversal: “Demgemäβ ist das 
Unternehmen, Stellung und Funktion eines Jesajawortes in seinem Kontext zu bestimmen, um diese dazu 
mit seiner Verwendung bei Paulus zu vergleichen, wenig sinnvoll—und das Verfahren, auf dieser Basis 
seine Deutung durch Paulus zu klären, verfehlt” (review of Wagner, 51). 
71 See J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 35-37.  
72 Ibid., 13n51. 
73 Ibid., 31. We do not take any one narrative, such as the Exodus, to be the sole substructure for 
the non-narrative OT material. Nor do we follow Dodd in considering only a few “fundamental” OT 
passages to be “the substructure of all Christian theology” (Dodd, 127). Rather, we agree with K. D. 
Litwak: “This study does not require that every intertextual echo maps to a specific theme” (Echoes of 
Scripture in Luke-Acts: Telling the History of God’s People Intertextually [London: T&T Clark, 2005], 
ix).  
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texts by NT speakers/authors reflects the relationship perceived between the OT Story 
of Yahweh’s people and subsequent events, especially the Jesus-event. This leads us to 
further discussion of Story, the role of the Psalms and other non-narrative texts therein, 
how Story relates to theology, and how Story is transformed. 
Story and Lifeworld/Worldview 
We begin our exploration of literary tradition (Story) with a look at “story,” that is, 
narrative.74 Hays avers that we “reflect the character of the kerygma more faithfully by 
treating its elements not as atomized facts but as moments in a story.”75 He suggests the 
way to a narrative approach to Paul is via those who believe “all ordered worlds are 
shaped by narrative. This view is stated in its baldest and most radical form by Stephen 
Crites, who claims that ‘the formal quality of experience through time is inherently 
narrative.’”76  
Other scholars have noted the role of narrative in creating and sustaining 
personal and social identity. For example, David Horrell believes stories both “construct 
a sense of human identity and shape human interaction.”77 Joel Green argues that 
“narrative is central to identity formation; who we are as human beings is narratively 
and relationally shaped and embodied.”78 Of particular interest are Crites’ sacred stories, 
those “fundamental narrative forms” through which “men’s sense of self and world is 
                                                           
74 This terminology does not imply anything about the historicity of Scripture; “Story/story” and 
“fiction” are not equivalent. As R. B. Hays correctly points out, “we should not be misled into supposing 
that the description of Paul’s gospel as ‘story’ necessarily implies that it is ‘only’ the product of human 
ingenuity” (The Faith of Jesus Christ: The arrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11, 2nd ed. [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans; Dearborn, MI: Dove Booksellers, 2002], 21). 
75 Hays, Faith, 64. Although he is correct that “‘story’ … does not necessarily refer to an actual 
narrated text; it can refer to the ordered series of events which forms the basis for various possible 
narrations” (18), this distinction is not significant for us. 
76 Ibid., 20, quoting S. Crites, “The Narrative Quality of Experience,” JAAR 39, no. 3 
(September 1971): 291. N. T. Wright makes a similar claim for the value of story in epistemology: 
“Stories … provide a vital framework for experiencing the world” and thus “the stories which 
characterize the worldview itself are … located, on the map of human knowing, at a more fundamental 
level than explicitly formulated beliefs, including theological beliefs” (TPG, 38). Wright bases his 
epistemological model on critical realism: “a way of describing the process of ‘knowing’ that 
acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence ‘realism’), while 
also fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiraling path of 
appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence ‘critical’)” (TPG, 
35). Although we use insights from Wright’s model (below), our concern is not epistemology but 
communicative interaction. Therefore, we do not explore critical realism in detail. 
77 D. G. Horrell, “The Significance of ‘Paul’s Story’: Paul’s Narratives or Narrative 
Substructure?,” in arrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment, ed. B. W. Longenecker 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 170. Tannen concurs: “Storytelling … is a means by which 
humans organize and understand the world, and feel connected to each other” (Voices, 105). 
78 J. B. Green, “Practicing the Gospel in a Post-Critical World: The Promise of Theological 
Exegesis,” JETS 47 no. 3 (September 2004): 393-394.  
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created.”79 Such stories project symbolic worlds, which “are not like monuments that 
men behold, but like dwelling-places. People live in them.”80 To borrow (and slightly 
modify) a phrase from Brian Wicker, all humanity lives in a “Story-shaped world.”81 
This understanding of story leads us to the concept of lifeworld, “the world of 
our common experience.”82 According to Jürgen Habermas, “the world gains objectivity 
only through counting as one and the same world for a community of speaking and 
acting subjects. … Through this communicative practice they assure themselves at the 
same time of their common life-relations, of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld.” 83 
Because of its communicative focus, lifeworld is a construct which fits our methodology 
particularly well. In terms of our earlier discussion, the lifeworld is the world in which a 
“community of words” or “communicative community” shares mutual context. 
How a community that shares a lifeworld perceives the world “out there” and 
determines how to relate to that world is its “worldview.”84 David Naugle links 
                                                           
79 Crites, 295. Some scholars reject this because of their narrow construal of narrative. For 
example, in response to Hays’ Echoes, H. Hübner comments negatively that “Paulus erzählt im Röm ja 
keine ‘story about δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ’, er bietet vielmehr einen theologischen Diskurs” (“Intertextualität,” 
892). More basically, D. Beaumont (“The Modality of Narrative: A Critique of Some Recent Views of 
Narrative in Theology,” JAAR 65, no. 1 [Spring 1997], 133, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1465821 
[accessed August 29, 2011]) rejects the idea that “human experience itself is already narrative in its 
form,” which he considers to be the basic argument of Crites, S. Hauerwas and D. Burrell, and A. 
MacIntyre. (For Hauerwas and Burrell, see “From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality 
in Ethics,” in Why arrative? Readings in arrative Theology, ed. S. Hauerwas and L. G. Jones [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989]. For MacIntyre, see “The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life, and the Concept 
of a Tradition,” in Hauerwas and Jones). For the most part, Beaumont agrees with Ricoeur’s more modest 
claim that “since human experience (including experience of the divine) is temporal, narrative is the most 
suitable form of discourse to express its temporality” (Beaumont, 133).  
However to say we “live in” Story is not to say that all texts are narrative or that the only textual 
tradition which undergirds lifeworld is the narrative genre. As we discuss below, our interest in textual 
tradition is in what we name “Story,” in which biblical narratives and non-narrative textual elements all 
have a place. 
80 Crites, 295; emphasis added.  
81 This phrase comes from the title of B. Wicker’s The Story-Shaped World: Fiction and 
Metaphysics; Some Variations on a Theme (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). 
82 A. Schutz and T. Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-World, vol. 1 trans. R. M. Zaner and 
H. T. Engelhardt, Jr.; vol. 2 trans. R. M. Zaner and D. J. Parent (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1973, 1989), 1:68. 
83 J. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, vol. 1 of The Theory of 
Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984), 12-13. See also Habermas, Lifeworld 
and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, vol. 2 of The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T. 
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1987), 113-152. We do not agree that “the different aspects of 
communicative action (understanding, coordination, sociation)” are “rooted in the structural components 
of speech acts (propositional, illocutionary, expressive)” (xxv). In particular, the third component of a SA 
is not “expressive” but perlocution—a dimension critical to the model we finalize in chapter 5. We also 
prefer communicative “interaction” to communicative “action.” 
84 According to N. T. Wright, worldviews “form the grid through which humans, both 
individually and in social groupings, perceive all of reality” (TPG, 32). For philosopher J. Olthuis: “A 
worldview (or vision of life) is a framework or set of fundamental beliefs through which we view the 
world and our calling and future in it. … It is the integrative and interpretative framework by which order 
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worldview back to lifeworld with his pragmatic test: “Does the worldview work? Is it 
livable? … Can it be applied helpfully to the most important areas of human life and 
experience?”85 
Before we consider the relationship of lifeworld to intertextuality, we must first 
define Story and then articulate its role in lifeworld and worldview.  
 “Story” versus “story” 
We define “Story” as the aggregate of those elements of a communicative community’s 
literary tradition that help define its lifeworld and thus its worldview. With this, we 
broaden “Story” beyond “story” to include non-narrative literary tradition.86 “Story” 
encompasses not only narrative genre but also non-narrative speech and text, such as the 
Psalms and biblical epistles.87 It also can include intervening interpretations of a text.88 
Non-narrative material plays a role in Story from two related vantage points. 
First, there may be a narrative substructure to non-narrative literary tradition.89 As Crites 
points out, resonances of the sacred story “sound in poetic productions that seem to defy 
all traditional forms of storytelling.”90 Secondly, Paul Ricoeur identifies a critical role 
for non-narrative material in developing the lasting significance of stories: “Laws, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and disorder are judged; it is the standard by which reality is managed and pursued; it is the set of hinges 
on which all our everyday thinking and doing turns” (“On Worldviews,” Christian Scholar’s Review 14, 
no. 2 [1985]: 155). “Since a worldview gives the terms of reference by which the world and our place in 
it can be structured and illumined, a worldview binds its adherents together into community. Allegiance 
to a common vision promotes the integration of individuals into a group” (Ibid., 156). 
85 Naugle, 327. 
86 This seems preferable to attempting to include all NT writing in narrative genre. E. Adams’ 
claim that Romans is “story” in the sense of narrative is not plausible, and his attempt to identify elements 
of plot, setting and characterization therein using a Greimasian scheme is awkward (“Paul’s Story of God 
and Creation: The Story of How God Fulfils His Purposes in Creation,” in Longenecker). Hays also flirts 
with this when he attempts to locate narrative structure in Galatians 4:3-6, 3:13-14 and 3:21-22 as a 
means of demonstrating that Paul’s theology rests on a narrative substructure (cf. Faith, chapters 3-5). 
87 “A people’s story is not necessarily purely narrative: materials of many kinds may be slotted 
into a narrative structure, and this is done in the Hebrew Bible. Thus legal materials are inserted and 
appear, almost entirely, as part of the Moses story. In this case they are incorporated into the narrative. 
Others are more loosely attached: songs and hymns of the temple and of individuals, mostly collected in 
the Book of Psalms but some slotted into the narratives as in Samuel, Kings and Chronicles” (Barr, 356). 
88 D. L. Bock believes that “to be complete, intertextuality should continue to glance at the 
historical interpretive tradition behind an Old Testament text” (Proclamation from Prophecy and Pattern: 
Lucan Old Testament Christology [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987], 273). 
89 According to J. B. Green “even those texts that do not exhibit an explicitly narrative mode of 
discourse—say, the latter prophets or letters—have a storied character about them” (“Scripture and 
Theology: Failed Experiments, Fresh Perspectives,” Int 56, no. 1 [January 2002]: 17; cf. Beale, T 
Theology, 166). To use Hays’ term, “reflective discourse” can be “rooted in and shaped by a story” (or 
Story) without exhibiting narrative characteristics. 
90 Crites, 297. Referring to Ps 42, Watson points out the common tendency to see poetry “as a 
communing with self for the sake of self … ignores the fact that as communicative action writing is 
normally directed towards others, with the intention of conveying a communicable, public meaning that 
evokes a definite response. This text is intended for use” (Text, 117).  
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prophecies, wisdom sayings, and hymns, by contributing to the full meaningfulness of 
biblical narratives, start the transfer from mere storytelling to the grasping of the 
enduring signification of the stories themselves.”91 By contributing to Story, non-
narratives help define lifeworld/worldview.  
George Lindbeck connects non-narrative texts to lifeworld: “A habitable text 
need not have a primarily narrative structure” but must only “in some fashion be 
construable as a guide to thought and action in the encounter with changing 
circumstances. It must supply followable directions for coherent patterns of life in new 
situations.”92 Using our terminology, the implied author of a “habitable”93 text must 
create an implied reader whose lifeworld/worldview and related Story serve as a guide 
for thought and behavior.94 Such “habitable” texts include the Psalms.  
In this regard, Arvid Kapelrud highlights the criticality of the Psalms to 
tradition/Story: “No investigation of Israelite traditions can be done without a 
discussion of the material found in the psalms. … A picture of the religion of ancient 
Israel is not complete, not even correct, if it does not make a comprehensive use of the 
psalms. There the traditions were welded together in a theological form which was 
directive in Israelite religion.”95 This leads to our next step: to explore what we mean 
here by “theology” and how it relates to the biblical Story, lifeworld and worldview. 
Lifeworld/Worldview, Story and Theology 
To discuss the relationships among lifeworld/worldview, Story and theology, we adapt 
N. T. Wright’s model in which worldview consists of four elements: the stories we tell 
ourselves and one another, basic questions and answers concerning human existence, 
                                                           
91 P. Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, arrative, and Imagination, trans. D. Pellauer, ed. 
M. I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 246; cf. 37. “God is named in diverse ways in narration that 
recounts the divine acts, prophecy that speaks in the divine name, prescription that designates God as the 
source of the imperative, wisdom that seeks God as the meaning of meaning, and the hymn that invokes 
God in the second person” (Ibid., 227). J. E. Goldingay adds that “nonnarrative books such as the Psalms, 
the Prophets, and the epistles abound in material that has taken the first step from narrative to discursive 
statement” (“Biblical Narrative and Systematic Theology,” in Green and Turner, Horizons, 134). 
92 G. Lindbeck, “Scripture, Consensus, and Community,” in Biblical Interpretation in Crisis: 
The Ratzinger Conference on Bible and Church, ed. R. J. Neuhaus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 97.  
93 Ricoeur also speaks of “inhabiting” and “dwelling in” a text and the world it intends (cf. 
Figuring, 232-234). 
94 The implied author and implied audience, by definition, share a lifeworld and worldview. 
With regard to the relationship of the implied author to the empirical author, Thiselton reminds us that 
“what is important is not our knowledge of the name and biography of an author, but that the text which 
the author produces is understood … as a wholeness which represents the vision of a human mind and 
which belongs to some larger context or life-world” (ew Horizons, 261). 
95 A. S. Kapelrud, “Tradition and Worship: The Role of the Cult in Tradition Formation and 
Transmission,” in Knight, 123. 
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symbols, and praxis.96 Although Wright refers to stories as the “irreducible narrative 
element,”97 he allows room in worldview for other types of literature and, therefore, for 
Story. For example, he finds that “short poems and aphorisms are to worldviews what 
snapshots are to the story of a holiday, a childhood, a marriage.”98  
Wright makes explicit the connection between worldview, story (here, Story) 
and theology, arguing convincingly that “worldviews are … profoundly theological” 
since “‘worldview’ … embraces all deep-level human perceptions of reality.”99 In our 
model, theology stands at the intersection of two worldview elements: Story and the 
basic questions and their answers. The “basic questions” concern both the existence and 
attributes of a divine being, in our case Yahweh, and the relationship of Yahweh to the 
world. More specifically, they cover Yahweh’s character and work: 
• whether or not Yahweh exists,  
• if so, what Yahweh is like,  
• how Yahweh relates to the world, and  
• what Yahweh is doing or will do about putting the world to rights; 
and also human existence:  
• who are we,  
• where are we,  
• what is wrong, and  
• what is the solution, i.e., how are we to relate to Yahweh and each other?100  
Not only are these questions about Yahweh and humanity’s relationship to 
Yahweh theological, the answers are elements of Story.101 The Story of Yahweh’s 
                                                           
96 Cf. N. T. Wright, TPG, 38. For Wright, stories are the organizing focus and “most 
characteristic expression of worldview”; “symbol and praxis point beyond themselves to a controlling 
story or set of controlling stories which invest them with wider significance” (123; cf. 45; 125).  
97 Ibid., 38. For Naugle, “since people are storytelling creatures who define themselves and the 
cosmos in a narrative fashion, the content of a worldview seems best associated with this most relevant 
activity” (Naugle, 291). 
98 N. T. Wright, TPG, 65. He speaks primarily of “stories” or the “category” or “element” of 
story, by which he refers to narrative genre. Only rarely does he refer to “Story” (cf. 6).  
99 Ibid., 122, 123. Theology “provides an essential ingredient in the stories that encapsulate 
worldviews; in the answers that are given to the fundamental worldview questions; in the symbolic world 
which gives the worldview cultural expression; and in the practical agenda to which the worldview gives 
rise” (130). 
100 These questions are adapted from N. T. Wright, TPG, 127, 123.  
101 By construing the answers to the basic theological questions as the Story of Israel, we avoid 
L. T. Johnson’s criticism that Wright’s method demands “an artificial unification into a single story that 
he can term ‘the authentic first-century Jewish worldview’ (p. 149)” (review of The ew Testament and 
the People of God, by Nicholas Thomas Wright, JBL 113, no. 3 [Autumn 1994]: 537). 
Various scholars have attempted to outline the “single story” of Israel. We evaluated several 
examples earlier in this chapter. Beale also outlines a very general “story” (see T Theology, 116). For N. 
T. Wright, the OT story includes: Adam and the fall, Abraham, the descent into Egypt, the exodus rescue/ 
liberation under Moses’ leadership, the conquest, the period of the judges, David and the establishment of 
the monarchy, David’s successors and the division of the kingdom, the exile, the return from exile under 
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people, which is comprised of answers to the theological questions, gives rise to a 
certain lifeworld/worldview and determines and sustains appropriate praxis.102  
By providing answers to the basic questions, the Psalms contribute to 
theology.103 Therefore, the mutual context created/activated by the quotation of a psalm 
has a theological dimension, and the theology mediated via such a quotation is 
lifeworld/ worldview transformative for the NT audience.104 Story and theology also are 
transformed. Before exploring how this happens, we need to establish the connection 
between lifeworld, Story and quotation as well as what we mean by “transformation.” 
Evoking Story by Quotation 
Luke Timothy Johnson connects Story and lifeworld to intertextuality: “The world 
which the text produces is … a complex network of literary interconnections” which 
“create a world of metaphoric structures within which humans can live in a distinctive 
manner.”105 For NT authors to refer to or quote the OT is  
an indication that they perceive themselves as participating in a discourse that is 
shaped by a perception of life and the world according to the Scriptures, that is, 
according to a Jewish social and symbolic universe. At the center is the 
relationship with the one God who has committed himself in his covenant and 
promises to his people Israel. To refer to the Scriptures as a way of participating 
in a relationship is something entirely different from a so-called “use” of 
Scripture as prooftext or a reference to divine authority on the part of the 
interpreter. It could better be described as a reference to one’s foremost loyalty 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Zerubbabel and the high priest Joshua and also under Ezra and Nehemiah (cf. TPG, 216). Others argue 
instead for one basic theme. For Hays, “Scripture is … a story about dikaiosynē theou, God’s 
righteousness, which is the ground of the narrative unity between law and gospel” (Echoes, 157). 
Harrelson finds the basic theme of the core tradition to be “Yahweh’s Promise on the Way to 
Consummation” (30, although, oddly, he does “not understand the core tradition to provide anything like 
a ‘center’ of the Old Testament, theologically viewed” [30n17]).  
Here, we identify Story by its theological Story-lines and we do not limit it to one foundational 
narrative or central theme. Instead, all answers to the basic theological questions contribute to Story. 
102 Theology is also instrumental in interpreting worldview: It “suggests certain ways of telling 
the story, explores certain ways of answering the questions, offers particular interpretations of the 
symbols, and suggests and critiques certain forms of praxis” (N. T. Wright, TPG, 126). With quotation, 
however, our interest is in theology’s role in (trans)forming Story, worldview/lifeworld and praxis. 
103 Goldingay calls the Psalms “arguably the densest theology in Scripture” (“Biblical 
Narrative,” 137). According to McCann, the Psalms “instruct the people of God about God, about 
themselves and the world, and about the life of faith” (20-21). Since the Psalms universalize the emotions 
attached to situations of praise, thanksgiving and lament without being limited to specific historical 
circumstances, they are valuable to all Yahweh’s people. 
104 Since the psalms “expound a theme through repetition and poetic imagery” they provide “a 
medium whereby theological notions could be imparted to and remembered by the people” (J. W. Watts, 
Psalm and Story: Inset Hymns in Hebrew arrative [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992], 28, 81). 
105 L. T. Johnson, “Imagining the World Scripture Imagines,” MoTh 14, no. 2 (April 1998): 175. 
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and an acknowledgement of being a response-able participant in a life and 
discourse rooted in the guidance of the God of Israel.106 
Quotation plays a key role in sharing Story because worlds can be accessed “through 
the explicit presence of expressions of previous sentences.”107 OT quotations thus evoke 
the story/Story the NT speakers and authors are living and into which they are now 
inviting (or reminding) their audiences to live.108  
Transformation 
Our understanding of lifeworld and of story/Story is less static than that of Habermas, 
for whom the lifeworld is “presupposed as unproblematic” and within which “subjects 
acting communicatively always come to an understanding.”109 Rather, we believe that 
“no experience is in essence definable as ‘unproblematic’” and, further, that all “acts 
which gear into the everyday life-world change it.”110 However, to look ahead to the 
next chapter, we consider “full” transformation to involve more than a change in the 
mutual context of the hearer/reader.111 
Our interest is in the transformation of lifeworld/worldview, Story and theology 
which occurs in response to tension. This can stem from a new event, such as the Jesus-
event, or another element, such as the interposition of another Story.112 Quotation is an 
impetus for transformation since tension is “the inevitable product of engaging more 
than one context.”113 Thus, whenever Story is evoked and mutual context is created 
and/or activated, there is the potential for transformation of the empirical audience.  
We base our typology of transformation on communication theorist Walter 
Fisher’s categorization of the functions of stories: “(1) to give birth to—to gain 
                                                           
106 Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 310-311. With regard to Hays’ work, W. Green asks whether “a 
literary relationship between two texts necessarily imply a comparable theological one?” (62). We concur 
with Hays that “if the literary is not co-essential with the theological, it is at least organically fused. … 
Intertextual literary linkages both reflect and create theological convictions” (“Rebound,” 83). 
107 Van Dijk, 229, where he refers to “certain worlds” which can be accessed only in this way. 
108 As an example, for D. Neufeld, the author of 1 John “makes and shapes a world with definite 
ethical responsibilities, which his readers are invited to enter” (Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An 
Analysis of 1 John [Leiden: Brill, 1994], 4).  
109 Habermas, Reason, 70.  
110 Schutz and Luckmann, 1:265, 1:272.  
111 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are correct that an unfolding argument “changes the situation 
of the audience, and this no matter what its reception of the arguments. … A speech does not leave the 
hearer the same as he was at the beginning” (491). But this is not the “transformation” we consider. 
112 These are interrelated. Story is a means by which one’s own or others’ views of the world 
may be reinforced, modified or challenged (cf. N. T. Wright, TPG, 39). Wright theorizes, for example, 
that Paul’s “repeated use of the Old Testament is designed … to suggest new ways of reading well-known 
stories, and to suggest that they find a more natural climax in the Jesus-story than elsewhere” (79). 
113 Moyise, Evoking, 32.  
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acceptance of—ideas/images, affirmation; (2) to revitalize or to reinforce ideas/images, 
reaffirmation; (3) to heal or to cleanse ideas/images, purification; and (4) to undermine 
or to discredit ideas/images, subversion.”114 These can be consolidated into two basic 
types of transformation. Fisher’s second and third categories, in which a “later 
experience … does not suppress and replace the earlier experience,”115 can be combined 
as “realignment.”116 The second type is subversion, where existing ideas are 
undermined.117 But subversion does not leave a vacuum in the socio-cultural fabric. 
Rather, the subverted ideas are replaced by other ideas. Subversion is irrevocably linked 
to affirmation or re-creation.118  
In the same way that reaffirmation and purification are different subtypes of 
realignment, there are different subtypes of subversion. In addition to “reversal,” which 
we discussed earlier in this chapter, another key type is “inversion,” which  
was frequently practiced by Israel’s classical prophets. When in Rom. 11.9-10 
Paul cites imprecatory Psalms originally directed against Israel’s enemies (Pss. 
69.22-23 and 35.8) and applies them against Israel herself, he has employed the 
hermeneutics of prophetic criticism. He has done what Isaiah did centuries 
earlier when the seventh-century prophet, for example, alluded to David’s great 
victories, implying that God would once again defeat his enemies—only this 
time Israel was God’s enemy (see Isa. 28.21).119  
Another subtype is parody, i.e., “repeating an old pattern or echoing ancient metaphors 
to signal difference at the very heart of similarity.”120 Subversion also occurs “when a 
particular retelling of the community’s story … challenges or transforms accepted 
                                                           
114 W. R. Fisher, Human Communication as arration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value 
and Action, first paperback ed. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 144. Fisher is 
credited with introducing narrative theory to the field of communication.  
115 H. Gese, “Tradition and Biblical Theology,” in Knight, 314.  
116 Realignment is Fishbane’s term (see Biblical Interpretation, 409). It is a type of 
transformation since it generally occurs in response to some “disorder, either disparity between or 
disharmony within orientations. Some turmoil needs to be calmed, some order restored, some trouble 
resolved” (J. A. Crafton, “The Dancing of an Attitude: Burkean Rhetorical Criticism and the Biblical 
Interpreter,” in Rhetoric and the ew Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference, ed. S. E. 
Porter and T. H. Olbricht [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993], 436). 
117 It is not necessarily the case that “via the phenomenon of intertextuality a NT writer simply 
agrees with and builds on an earlier writing” (Hays and Green, 225). 
118 Although Thiselton believes “many narratives … found and create, rather than subvert, 
worlds” (ew Horizons, 571), in actuality, all hearers/readers belong to a lifeworld and have a worldview. 
As Schutz and Luckmann point out, “the actor is ‘always already’ within society” [2:66]). Thus, 
subversion and creation are linked and “explicit intertextuality can carry with it both ‘disruptive’ and 
‘reconstructive’ features” (D. Boyarin, “Old Wine in New Bottles: Intertextuality and Midrash,” PT 8, no. 
3/4 [1987]: 541, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1772567 [accessed July 16, 2010]). 
119 Evans, “Listening,” 51. 
120 Hays and Green, 225. 
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readings in the service of a revisionary vision for the community’s life.”121 Such 
transformation may be highly beneficial. As Ben Meyer notes, the “new ascertainment 
… may … be welcomed as a liberation, a life-saver, a pearl of great price.”122 
Wright downplays subversion with his argument that in order to make sense of a 
story, event or datum that conflicts with one’s worldview, one generally invents a new 
story to explain “how the evidence for the challenging story is in fact deceptive.”123 For 
him, subversion is a slow and stubbornly resisted process. Only eventually do “some 
worldviews become progressively harder and harder to retain, needing more and more 
conspiracy theories in order to stay in place, until they (sometimes) collapse under their 
own weight.”124 We, however, believe Story is evoked not only to support or realign 
lifeworld and worldview, but also to alter them more substantially—to “mediate, 
challenge, confront, reshape”125 them—and that this can happen more immediately. 
Whether realignment or subversion pertains in any particular situation depends 
in part upon to what extent the speaker/author and audience already share a lifeworld. 
Watson points out that 
it makes a considerable difference whether this relationship to existing language 
and knowledge is understood in terms of repetition and supplementation on the 
one hand or antithesis and eclecticism on the other. In the first case, an existing 
knowledge is given retrospective sanction by the gospel, which presents itself as 
the completion of that which already exists. … In the second case, existing 
knowledge is declared to consist largely in distortion and falsehood.126  
Thus, subversion appears to be in view in NT situations where Story is evoked 
via quotation for an audience whose lifeworld/worldview is dramatically different from 
the author’s. In such cases, “the telling of stories in the Bible has among its chief aims 
the subversion of the hearers’ and readers’ worldviews.”127 In other words, the message 
                                                           
121 R. B. Hays, “The Liberation of Israel in Luke-Acts: Intertextual Narration as Countercultural 
Practice,” in Hays, Alkier, and Huizenga, 102. 
122 B. F. Meyer, Reality and Illusion in ew Testament Scholarship: A Primer in Critical Realist 
Hermeneutics (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1994), 52.  
123 N. T. Wright, TPG, 42; emphasis added. Although T. Moritz links Wright’s “spiralling path 
of dialogue” to “hypothesis-verification/falsification” (“Critical but Real: Reflecting on N. T. Wright’s 
Tools for the Task,” in Renewing Biblical Interpretation, ed. C. Bartholomew, C. Greene, and K. Möller 
[Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000], 179), Wright’s model of hypothesis/verification 
does not include falsification.  
124 N. T. Wright, TPG, 117. Although Wright acknowledges that “stories are … peculiarly 
good at modifying or subverting other stories and their worldviews” (40), his model calls for the 
subversion of worldview to be a lengthy process which is often successfully deflected. 
125 Moritz, “Critical,” 186.  
126 Watson, Text, 250-251.  
127 Moritz, “Critical,” 179. Although N. T. Wright distinguishes “between those who share a 
worldview (who tell one another stories to confirm and fine-tune the worldview) and between holders of 
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of the NT may have been equally challenging for Jews who were not yet Christians and 
for Gentiles; for both groups, transformation would be of the subversion type. 
Transformation and Power 
Our argument is that OT quotation evokes theological elements of Story to invite the 
empirical audience (via the implied author and reader) to live into the lifeworld of the 
people of God as that lifeworld is redefined by the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus.128 Although changes in lifeworld are most obvious in the situation of subversion, 
realignment also has an impact on lifeworld, worldview and Story.  
But in neither case is the transformation accomplished via quotation necessarily 
the result of domination or manipulation. With regard to Paul, Ehrensperger points out 
that he “did not refer to the Scriptures in order to introduce prooftexts or to issue a final 
word that cannot be challenged. … For Paul, the word of God is alive, not static, and 
thus a word of God would never close a debate. It would serve rather to empower the 
debaters and thus to promote a response-able hearing by the community involved.”129 In 
other words, the interaction between author and reader generally is dialogic; 
communication is not a one-way street. “The Biblical text … seeks to persuade its 
readers to accept the depicted world as their world.”130 Since evoking Story calls for a 
transformative response of belief and/or action on the part of the audience, “telling” is 
not the only dimension of communication; “hearing” and “responding” are also critical 
elements.131  
                                                                                                                                                                          
different worldviews (who tell one another stories designed to subvert one another’s positions),” he 
believes a “subversive” story must be “close enough to the story already believed by the hearer for a 
spark to jump between them” (TPG, 45, 40). But it is hard to imagine how a “spark” could cross the 
vast gap from polytheism to monotheism. Such subversion is more dramatic than Wright describes. 
128 Contra to what he sees as B. Lindars’ notion that the earliest OT use by Jesus’ followers was 
apologetic, D. Juel argues cogently that OT quotation clarifies “the implications of faith in Jesus for one’s 
relationship with Israel’s God and with the world” (Messianic Exegesis: Christological Interpretation of 
the Old Testament in Early Christianity [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988], 1, with reference to Lindars, ew 
Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament Quotations [Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1961]). 
129 Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 319. “Never” may be too strong a word. A potential example of 
Paul using Scripture to close debate is 1 Cor 11:3-16, which contains an allusion to Gen 2:18-23 (1 Cor 
11:8-9) and where Paul closes the argument (1 Cor 11:16) with what may be a presumption of authority. 
However, Stanley finds that although Paul in 1 Cor 11 “adopts a more challenging tone,” it appears to 
him to be an argument which appeals “to the audience’s understanding instead of simply insisting on 
obedience and threatening those who hold a different view” (Arguing, 84n19). Another possible instance 
is 1 Cor 3:19-20; Shaw finds that in these verses “internal debate and discrimination are ruled out of order 
by appeals to Scripture”—in this case Job 5:13 and Ps 94:11 (67). 
130 D. Patrick and A. Scult, Rhetoric and Biblical Interpretation (Sheffield: Almond Press, 
1990), 19.  
131 As Hays avers, “In depicting Paul as a thinker who lived in a ‘story-shaped world,’ I do not 
intend to relativize the truth-claims of his gospel, which still confront the reader with the demand for 
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How the transforming communicative interaction occurs is the final piece of our 
methodology. We use linguistic pragmatics—and especially the often-neglected SA 
element of perlocution—to develop an “action” model which allows us to evaluate how 
quotation, by evoking Story and activating mutual context, calls the audience to live 
into the reconfigured lifeworld of the people of Yahweh.132 
                                                                                                                                                                          
decision and commitment” (Faith, 20). The response of the empirical reader may be negative; the 
lifeworld that is offered “may be inhabited or rejected” (Snodgrass, 21). We address this in chapter 5. 
132 This would include former pagans. As J. R. Wagner points out, it is “difficult to believe that 
these Gentiles who shared a common life with Jewish believers who presumably were concerned to 
understand their confession of Jesus as the Christ in relation to Israel’s scriptures and traditions would 
have been completely unfamiliar with or uninterested in these sacred texts” (Heralds, 34). 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMMUICATIVE ITERACTIO AD READER ROLES 
Since we take communication generally to be dialogical, cooperative and 
transformative, our definition of communication is interactive: Communication is “an 
activity in which symbolic content is not merely transmitted from one source to another, 
but exchanged between human agents, who interact within a shared situational and/or 
discursive context.”1 However, although this definition tells us how communication 
happens, it does not tell us why. Therefore, to complete our definition of 
communication, we add: “for the purpose of creating meaning.”2  
Linguistic pragmatics3 forms the basis for the analytical apparatus for our model 
of how quotation effects transformation since recent work in this field presents meaning 
along the lines of our definition of communication, i.e., as “jointly construed by the 
speaker and the hearer.”4 Specifically, we adapt Vanhoozer’s action model of the 
communication of meaning, which is based on SAT,5 to (i) define “meaning,” (ii) 
outline three possible reader roles in communicative interaction and (iii) provide a 
framework for our analyses. 
                                                           
1 S. Price, Communication Studies (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1996), 5; italics and bold omitted. 
2 We take this from L. R. Frey et al. who define communication as “the management of 
messages for the purpose of creating meaning” (Investigating Communication: An Introduction to 
Research Methods [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991], 28; italics omitted). 
3 Linguistic pragmatics is “the subfield of linguistics that studies the use of words (and phrases 
and sentences) in the actual context of discourse” (A. Akmajian et al., Linguistics: An Introduction to 
Language and Communication, 5th ed. [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001], 13).  
4 A. Carassa and M. Colombetti, “Joint Meaning,” JPrag 41 (2009): 1852, http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.pragma.2009.03.005 (accessed September 10, 2012). “Joint meaning is a joint commitment of 
two or more subjects, who are then obligated to each other to act coherently; in other words, joint 
meaning entails directed obligations, rights, and entitlements” (1851). Carassa and Colombetti’s work is 
based on that of H. Clark, for whom “communicative acts are inherently joint acts” (Clark, 125).  
5 “A branch of the theory of communication” (M. Bierwisch, “Semantic Structure and 
Illocutionary Force,” in Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, ed. J. R. Searle, F. Kiefer, and M. Bierwisch 
[Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980], 3; cf. T. W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy [Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 1991], 17), SAT is one of two major subcategories of linguistic pragmatics. The other 
subcategory is “implicature theories” (see Reed, 238-242), which includes Gricean pragmatics (named for 
its most famous proponent, H. Paul Grice) and relevance theory (the best-known formulation is Sperber 
and Wilson). SATs and implicature theories can be roughly distinguished by which of the participants in 
the communicative process is emphasized. SATs focus on the speaker’s acts, while implicature theories 
examine how a hearer infers a speaker’s intentions. See M. Dominicy and N. Franken, “Speech Acts and 
Relevance Theory,” in Essays in Speech Act Theory, ed. D. Vanderveken and S. Kubo (Amsterdam: 
Benjamins, 2002) and G. H. Bird, “Relevance Theory and Speech Acts,” in Foundations of Speech Act 
Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, ed. S. L. Tsohatzidis (London: Routledge, 1994) for 
comparisons of the two groups of theories. D. Wilson and D. Sperber provide a helpful comparison of 
Gricean pragmatics and relevance theory (“Relevance Theory,” The Handbook of Pragmatics, ed. L. R. 
Horn and G. Ward [Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004], especially 607). In contrast to conventional SATs, 
our model includes the reader as an active agent in constructing meaning via perlocutionary effect. 
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The Communication of Meaning 
There has been much debate over whether “meaning” (i) is to be found in authorial 
intention, (ii) is encoded in the text or (iii) is determined by the response of the reader.6 
Vanhoozer’s action model holds these three loci in creative tension.7 He defines 
meaning as “a three-dimensional communicative action, with form and matter 
(propositional content), energy and trajectory (illocutionary force), and teleology or 
final purpose (perlocutionary effect).”8 These action model dimensions are different 
elements of a single SA.9 
                                                           
6 Cotterell and Turner identify three aspects of the human communication process: “the (two) 
participants and the communication” (39). Other scholars refer to the author as sender or addresser; the 
receptor is also called reader, receiver, audience or addressee. Although these terms are generally 
interchangeable, we use “author” and “reader” to align with the implied author/reader construct 
introduced in chapter 3. Note that Cotterell and Turner’s “competent” reader is a type of empirical reader 
and is not the same as the implied reader.  
Corresponding to the communication process, Cotterell and Turner distinguish three “aspects” of 
meaning: author’s meaning, receptor’s meaning and textual meaning (39). They propose Hirsch as 
“perhaps the leading proponent of the theory of the determination of author’s intention” (42; see, e.g., 
E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967] and “Meaning and 
Significance Reinterpreted,” Critical Inquiry 11, no. 2 [December 1984]: 202-225, http://www.jstor.org/ 
stable/1343392 [accessed March 28, 2008]). Ricoeur and Gadamer are among those who locate 
“intentionality” in the text. Famously, Ricoeur adduces that “writing renders the text autonomous with 
respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author 
meant; henceforth, textual meaning and psychological meaning have different destinies” (“The 
Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” in HHS, 139). The text is also seen as autonomous in relation 
to “the original audience and the discursive situation common to the interlocutors” (“A Response by Paul 
Ricoeur,” in HHS, 37). Although Ricoeur speaks of the “three aspects of the act of discourse” (i.e., the 
locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts) as “having the same meaning” (“Function,” 135), in 
general, “theories of textual autonomy typically subordinate the importance of authorial intention and 
frequently ignore the significance of authorship altogether” (Walhout, “Texts,” 48). Fish is among the 
reader-response theorists who believe readers independently create meaning, while Umberto Eco and Iser 
more conservatively believe the text limits which reader responses are valid. We discuss “intentionality” 
below and we incorporate some of Eco’s thoughts into our model. Although there is much to admire 
about Cotterell and Turner’s model, it compartmentalizes the three aspects of meaning, which then must 
somehow be reconciled. To avoid this, we use Vanhoozer’s action model as a framework for our 
methodology. 
7 See chapter 3 for our discussion of Hays’ efforts along these lines. We find Vanhoozer’s model 
more robust. Other scholars recognize the benefits of an action model. For Walhout, hermeneutics “must 
not conceive of texts simply as objects which have certain properties but also as instruments which we 
use to perform various kinds of actions” (“Texts,” 44). A. C. Thiselton sees an action model as a guard 
against radical reader-response theory: “The action model allows us to separate out different levels and 
dimensions of language use without necessarily opening the door to the mistaken view that the ‘meaning’ 
of a text is simply what any reader cares to do with it” (“Reader-Response Hermeneutics, Action Models, 
and the Parables of Jesus,” in Lundin, Thiselton, and Walhout, 107).  
8 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 218. Our SA terminology is somewhat different; we discuss the 
relationship of “propositional content” and “locution” below. As with other sender/text/receiver models, 
Vanhoozer follows R. Jakobson’s schema (“Concluding Statement: Linguistics and Poetics,” in Style in 
Language, ed. T. A. Sebeok [Np: Technology Press of MIT; New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960], 353): 
CONTEXT 
MESSAGE 
CONTACT 
 
ADDRESSER 
CODE 
 
ADDRESSEE 
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SAT takes its name from its characteristic idea that speech does something—in 
other words, that speech is action. Thus, according to Vanhoozer and others, what a text 
does is what it means.10 Moreover, “strictly speaking it is people, not texts, who mean 
things. Texts mean something only when they are used in some way by someone.”11 We 
therefore follow Vanhoozer’s suggestion: “Let us henceforth think of meaning not as 
something that words and texts have (meaning as noun) but rather as something people 
do (meaning as verb).”12  
In presenting meaning as a unity, our action model holds the three dimensions of 
meaning in creative tension, doing justice to each dimension “without missing the 
distinctive ways each contributes to the communication process”13 or privileging any 
dimension.14 Since one of the dimensions is perlocutionary effect, the effect produced in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
This has been called the “message” model, which, for some, is irrevocably connected to the flawed 
concept of communication as the coding and decoding of transmissions by the sender and receiver, 
respectively. Akmajian et al. summarize six critical shortcomings of a “code/decode” model (see 366-
369). However, Jakobson’s model is not irrevocably linked to communication as coding and decoding 
since it “subordinates the code function to the overarching function of communication” (Vanhoozer, 
Meaning, 271n103). In Jakobson’s model, “code” receives no greater attention than any other element of 
text and much less than “message,” for example. In any event, we do not present communication as uni-
directional or based on coding and decoding. Rather, our action model of communicative meaning is 
interactional (see below).  
9 For this, see also T. Moritz, “Scripture and Theological Exegesis,” in The Sacred Text: 
Excavating the Texts, Exploring the Interpretations, and Engaging the Theologies of the Christian 
Scriptures, ed. M. Bird and M. Pahl (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2010), 121. He presents perlocution 
as “the intended response by the communicative partner” without distinguishing between associated and 
non-associated perlocution (see below). We disagree with Thiselton, who separates “illocutionary” SAs 
from “perlocutionary” SAs and says the latter “depend for their effectiveness on sheer causal 
(psychological or rhetorical) persuasive power” (First Epistle, 51). 
10 When W. Iser avers that “what is important to readers, critics and authors alike, is what 
literature does and not what it means” (The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response [Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978], 53), he uses a concept of “meaning” that “connotes the idea of a 
self-contained ‘sense’ lodged within the sentences of a text” (Walhout, “Texts,” 44). Walhout suggests 
that instead “the proper question for hermeneutics is ‘What actions are being performed by the making 
and use of this text?’” (Ibid.) Alston is another who argues that “an expression’s having a certain meaning 
consists in its being usable to play a certain role (to do certain things) in communication” (154; italics and 
bold omitted). 
11 G. Loughlin, Telling God’s Story: Bible, Church and arrative Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 132. 
12 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 202. 
13 J. K. Brown, Scripture as Communication: Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 2007), 27.  
14 Here we diverge from K. J. Vanhoozer since his model “entails a view of interpretation that 
gives primacy to the author as communicative agent,” (Meaning, 218). Although his formulation of “a 
theological general hermeneutic that sought to restore certain authorial rights, especially the right to be 
heard” (“Imprisoned or Free? Text, Status, and Theological Interpretation in the Master/Slave Discourse 
of Philemon,” in Reading Scripture with the Church: Toward a Hermeneutic for Theological 
Interpretation, by A. K. M. Adam et al. [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006], 59) helpfully counters 
certain moves of deconstructionism, his claim that “meaning is the result of intentional (illocutionary) 
action” (“From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts: The Covenant of Discourse and the Discourse of the 
Covenant,” in After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation, ed. C. Bartholomew, C. Greene, 
and K. Möller [Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001], 18) is too narrow. 
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or by the reader/hearer in response to the perlocutionary act of the author/speaker, our 
action model, including the implied author/reader construct, explicitly recognizes the 
contribution of the reader/hearer to the communication of meaning. 
The three dimensions of a speech act allow us to identify three possible roles for 
an empirical reader: (i) Independent, (ii) Analyst and (iii) Envisager.15 An Independent 
generates “meaning” from the locution without regard for the author/speaker’s 
illocutionary act, an Analyst understands the illocutionary act, and an Envisager 
understands the illocutionary act and also responds with the perlocutionary effect (belief 
and/or action) associated with the perlocutionary act. Only with perlocution does a 
reader move beyond understanding to adherence and lifeworld transformation.16  
To lay the groundwork to elaborate on the three reader roles, we next discuss the 
action model dimensions of locution (propositional content), illocution (illocutionary 
force) and perlocution (perlocutionary effect). 
Speech Acts 
J. L. Austin introduced the concept of speech as action in a 1955 lecture series later 
published as How to do Things with Words, a title which identifies SAT’s main thrust—
that words do things. One of Austin’s students, John Searle, revised and expanded 
Austin’s theory. Searle’s version is widely regarded today as “speech-act theory.” 
However, we adapt Austin’s terms locution, illocution and perlocution to frame our 
description of how words do things.17 With regard to locution, we provide a brief 
evaluation of Austin’s original theory in light of Searle’s subsequent work, since this 
and their taxonomies are arguably the points of greatest divergence between the two. 
With regard to perlocution, we go beyond Austin, Searle and pragmatic theories 
generally and consider that the entirety of perlocution contributes to meaning.  
                                                           
15 This concept comes from Vanhoozer (Meaning, 369-378), although we rename the categories 
and define them in SAT terms. The term “Envisager” comes from K. Callow, Man and Message: A Guide 
to Meaning-Based Text Analysis ([Dallas?]: Summer Institute of Linguistics; Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1998). Although Callow uses the term to describe authorial knowledge of the empirical 
audience, her thought that envisaging involves “the potential for matching without inconsistency” (66) is 
also appropriate for the reader.  
16 Although we reserve the term “understanding” for the sole intended illocutionary effect, 
Vanhoozer’s use points to our Envisager role: “In a broader sense, … understanding discourse goes 
beyond merely recognizing illocutions and includes right reception and right response” (“Imprisoned,” 
72). We take the term “adherence” from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (cf. 14). 
17 See J. L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and M. Sbisà 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), chapters 8-10, and Vanhoozer, Meaning, chapter 5. 
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Here, we use “act” (e.g., “illocutionary act”) to describe what is done by the 
speaker/author and “effect” (e.g., “perlocutionary effect”) to describe the audience 
response. A response may be a linguistic, mental or physical act. The terms “illocution” 
and “perlocution” refer to the total action, i.e., that of the speaker/author together with 
the effect/response of the audience. 
Since SATs focus on conversation, before we embark on a discussion of what 
words do, we must show SAT to be a viable approach to text.18 
Speech Acts and “Text” Acts 
Searle considers “writing in a language” to be the performance of an illocutionary act,19 
a claim that does not seem to be challenged as regards “non-literary” (i.e., nonfiction) 
texts. Speaking, for example, of newspaper stories, Ohmann states that in such a case 
“the usual rules of illocutionary action all apply.”20 However, since some parts of 
Scripture, including the Psalms, are “literature,”21 in order to be able to apply our 
methodology to such texts, we must refute the contentions of those who deny that 
“literary language figures among the words that do things.”22  
Mary Louise Pratt provides a decisive argument for the validity of applying SA 
analysis to texts: “Unless we are foolish enough to claim that people organize their oral 
anecdotes around patterns they learn from reading literature, we are obliged to draw the 
more obvious conclusion that the formal similarities between natural narrative and 
literary narrative derive from the fact that at some level of analysis they are utterances 
of the same type.”23 Furthermore, “all the problems of coherence, chronology, causality, 
foregrounding, plausibility, selection of detail, tense, point of view, and emotional 
intensity … are problems whose solutions can readily be adapted from spoken to 
                                                           
18 Since, as originally constructed, SAT does not deal with texts, authors or readers, B. Gilfillan 
Upton puts the cart before the horse when she argues that “because Speech Act Theory is a form of 
communication theory, it considers the process of the transmission of a message between the implied 
author and the implied audience” (Hearing Mark’s Endings: Listening to Ancient Popular Texts through 
Speech Act Theory [Leiden: Brill, 2006], 196). However, after demonstrating the applicability of SAT to 
text, we integrate the implied author/reader construct into our action model. 
19 J. R. Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, first paperback 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 58.  
20 Ohmann, 57.   
21 Ohmann defines “literature” as “poems, plays, novels, jokes, fairy tales, fantasies, etc.” (53). 
For Scripture, this would at least include psalms, hymns and parables. 
22 S. Petrey places Austin in this category (Speech Acts and Literary Theory [New York: 
Routledge, 1990], 50). In part, this issue exists because “the primary question posed by the intersection of 
illocution and literature” is taken to be “how fiction is different from lies” (Ibid., 64-65). But, as Walhout 
points, out “fiction is not … the same as falsehood” (“Hermeneutics,” 102). 
23 M. L. Pratt, Towards a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1977), 69.  
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written discourse.”24 As a result, “a speech act approach to literature offers the important 
possibility of integrating literary discourse into the same basic model of language as all 
our other communicative activities.”25 
Some scholars do not consider SAT to be useful in analyzing texts on the basis 
that the writing-reading relation is not “dialog,”26 where “dialog” is defined as the 
immediate occurrence of multiple exchanges. Not only does Thiselton argue that much 
of Scripture originated as a record of oral discourse,27 we believe that dialog occurs with 
a single exchange. Further, both Watson and Vanhoozer recognize writing as a 
“technology that makes possible the extension of a particular speech-act in time and 
space.”28 Thus, time and distance do not obviate the applicability of SAT to texts; a SA 
approach can profitably be used to analyze biblical texts.29  
To apply SAT to texts, we need to clarify our terminology. Following C. K. 
Grant, we construe any SAT reference to the “speaker” to include “the utterer of any 
word or sentence, whether written or spoken, or the user of any non-verbal symbol or 
combination of symbols that could be translated into a word or sentence.”30 In the case 
studies, the term “speaker” refers to a participant in a verbal exchange whose speech is 
set out in the text. We use the term “author” with regard to the written text. We 
recognize that where an author quotes a speaker, each may be performing a distinct SA. 
                                                           
24 Ibid., 66-67. 
25 Ibid., 88.  
26 P. Ricoeur argues that “dialogue is an exchange of questions and answers; there is no 
exchange of this sort between the writer and the reader. The writer does not respond to the reader” 
(“What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding,” in HHS, 146). For F. Young and D. F. Ford, with 
writing-reading “the text is independent of the author who no longer has control over it. … Dialogue is 
not possible” (Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988], 87).  
27 Thiselton, ew Horizons, 17. He remains “unconvinced by those who try to restrict speech-act 
theory to oral discourse” (2). 
28 Watson, Text, 98; cf. Vanhoozer, Meaning, 214. It is also certainly true that “if oral speech-
acts presuppose a state of affairs that is a matter of shared concern, the same is true of their written 
equivalents” (Watson, Text, 100).  
29 “In the last couple of decades Christian scholars have attempted to draw upon speech act 
theory as either a tool for exegesis or more systemically as a tool to reconceptualise theological 
hermeneutics” (K. Barker, “Speech Act Theory, Dual Authorship, and Canonical Hermeneutics: Making 
Sense of Sensus Plenior,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 3, no. 2 [Fall 2009]: 3, ATLA Religion 
Database with ATLASerials, accession number ATLA0001822220 [accessed July 29, 2102]). In the latter 
category, Vanhoozer and Wolterstorff are frequently mentioned. For examples of the former, see 
Appendix A. Of these, Tovey’s approach comes closest to our model in the areas of authorial 
intentionality, the role of the reader and the use of the implied author/reader construct. However, none of 
the exegetical studies use SAT, particularly perlocution, in the way we do. For example, we disagree with 
Tovey’s claims that illocutionary force “approximates to the perlocutionary effect, except that force is 
perhaps more within the control of the speaker than the effect” (71) and, with regard to Assertives, that 
“the illocutionary act is to persuade, the perlocutionary act is to convince and confirm belief” (89). 
30 C. K. Grant, “Pragmatic Implication,” Philosophy 33, no. 127 (October 1958): 304, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3748659 (accessed July 15, 2008). 
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Similarly, a SAT reference to the “hearer” may “refer either to the person to 
whom a statement is directly addressed, as in a conversation or letter, or to … people 
who understand a statement not directly addressed to them.”31 The latter may be side 
participants to a conversation, overhearers of a verbal exchange, the original readers of 
a verbal exchange in a text or later readers of a text. In the case studies, we use the term 
“hearer” or “listener” to refer to any participant in a verbal exchange described in the 
text, while the term “reader” refers to the audience of the text, even though some of the 
empirical audience may actually have had the text read to them. 
“Locutionary” Acts 
For Austin, performing “a locutionary act … is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain 
sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to 
‘meaning’ in the traditional sense.”32 Searle, however, objects to Austin’s locating 
meaning in the locutionary act.33 Instead, Searle divides this SA segment into the 
utterance act and the propositional act.34 However, because Austin’s symmetry is so 
memorable, we term Searle’s utterance and propositional acts, taken together, as 
locutionary acts.35 
Regarding the propositional act,36 Searle names its two components “referring” 
and “predicating.” A referring expression is “any expression which serves to identify 
any thing, process, event, action, or any other kind of ‘individual’ or ‘particular’ …. 
Referring expressions point to particular things; they answer the questions ‘Who?’ 
‘What?’ ‘Which?’”37 The predicating component “presents a certain content”38 without 
                                                           
31 Ibid., 304.  
32 Austin, HDTW, 109. By “the traditional sense,” Austin apparently refers to G. Frege’s 
linguistic theory, in which the components of meaning are “sense” and “reference” (cf. HDTW, 93, 149). 
Following Austin, P. N. Campbell sites meaning in the locution and then separates meaning and force: 
“Meaning is a property of locutions and force a property of illocutions” (see “A Rhetorical View of 
Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts,” QJS 59, no. 3 [October 1973]: 287). We disagree. 
33 Cf. J. R. Searle, “Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts,” in Essays on J. L. Austin, by 
I. Berlin et al. (London: Clarendon, 1973), 149. We agree with Searle that “‘saying’ something, in the full 
sense of ‘say’” (see Austin, HDTW, 92) is not found in the locutionary act, and we find valid Searle’s 
objection to Austin’s notion of “locutionary meaning.” 
34 J. R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), 23-24.). 
35 Whether a NT speaker/author followed the MT, the LXX, a targum or an unknown form has 
occupied generations of diligent scholars. Here we investigate only those text-critical (locutionary) issues 
which bear on how a particular quotation communicates meaning.  
36 The utterance act includes uttering (or writing) morphemes and sentences.  
37 Searle, SA, 26-27. Cotterell and Turner define “the referent of a word or expression in an 
utterance” as “the thing in the world which is intentionally signified by that word or expression” where 
“the thing in question may be an object, an event or a process” (84). 
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implying a particular illocutionary force. Rather, “different illocutionary acts can have a 
common content,”39 i.e., one propositional act can form the basis of a variety of 
illocutionary acts, depending on the illocutionary force with which it is presented. 
Therefore, a propositional act is only a statement or Assertive illocutionary act when it 
is presented with assertive (truth-valued) illocutionary force.40  
At the beginning of this chapter, we defined an Independent as a reader who 
creates meaning from the locution without considering the illocutionary act. Therefore, 
distinguishing the Independent reader from the Analyst requires a deeper understanding 
of the illocutionary act. 
Illocutionary Acts and Illocutionary Force 
Much of the work of SAT has focused on the second dimension of our action model of 
meaning, the illocutionary act, which has been described as “probably the most 
significant analytical tool offered by speech-act theory.”41 Following Austin, scholars 
define the illocutionary act as “doing” something via language. For example, 
Vanhoozer defines the illocutionary act as “what we do in saying something (e.g. 
greeting, promising, commanding, etc.).”42 
In contrast to those who consider words, propositions or locutionary acts to be 
the locus of meaning, Searle situates meaning in the illocutionary act: “Saying 
                                                                                                                                                                          
38 Searle, SA, 123. This term is related to the grammatical predicate. The first dimension of 
Vanhoozer’s action model, “propositional content,” appears to equate to Searle’s propositional act 
although Vanhoozer does not mention the referring component. 
39 Ibid.  
40 “A proposition, then, is to be distinguished from an assertion or statement of it. Asserting a 
proposition means the speaker … is committed to its truth. … In other words, speakers can do more than 
one thing with the same propositions; they can assert, question, command or wish. … ‘The illocutionary 
force indicator shows how the proposition is to be taken’” (Vanhoozer, Meaning, 210; quoting Searle, SA, 
30). M. Steinmann, Jr. is another who points out “the propositional act—expressing a proposition—must 
not (as it sometimes) be confused with asserting the proposition, which is an illocutionary act. … The 
illocutionary act … is the act of doing something with the proposition expressed. Asserting that this 
proposition is true is one kind of illocutionary act” (“Perlocutionary Acts and the Interpretation of 
Literature,” Centrum 3, no. 2 [Fall 1975]: 113). 
In a later work, J. R. Searle and D. Vanderveken move away from the proposition as the content 
of various illocutionary acts and instead confusingly argue that “all propositions are either true or false” 
(Foundations of Illocutionary Logic [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 32). This conflates 
the preparatory conditions concerning propositional content with the sincerity condition and leads to 
problems first in categorizing a SA and then in determining whether it is defective and/or unsuccessful 
(see below). In a recent essay, F. Récanati successfully counters Searle and Vanderveken’s claim 
(“Content, Mode, and Self-Reference,” in John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and 
Mind, ed. S. L. Tsohatzidis [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 49-63). 
41 R. S. Briggs, “Speech-Act Theory,” in DTIB, 763.  
42 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 209.  
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something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform an illocutionary act.”43 
Searle’s sometime collaborator Daniel Vanderveken is even more explicit; he takes as 
his “fundamental hypothesis” that “complete illocutionary acts (and not only 
propositions or truth conditions) are the primary units of literal meaning in the use and 
comprehension of natural languages.”44 Using the example of Jesus’ teaching, Richard 
Briggs illustrates the difference between locution and illocution: “It is the illocutionary 
act and not just the content of Jesus’ teaching which should occupy the interpreter, and 
which perhaps provides a useful step forward in understanding what Jesus is trying to 
do in any particular case.”45 
The components of the “full blown” illocutionary act are “illocutionary force 
and propositional content.”46 These two elements work together: “Predication presents a 
certain content, and the mode in which the content is presented is determined by the 
illocutionary force of the sentence.”47 Illocutionary force is one of the most important 
elements in Searle’s taxonomic system for illocutionary acts. Since his system is 
generally considered the “standard,”48 we outline it below. 
                                                           
43 Searle, SA, 46; cf. Searle, “Austin”, 153. Here we disagree with Wolterstorff, who believes 
that “since the meaning of a sentence is identical with the propositional content of the illocutionary act 
that the inscription of the sentence was used to perform, we can just as well say that the goal of 
interpretation is to identify and grasp the propositional content of the illocutionary act. To grasp the one is 
to grasp the other” (“Resuscitating the Author,” in Vanhoozer, Smith, and Benson, 41). 
44 D. Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, vol. 1 of Principles of Language Use 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11. A. Wagner, who uses SAT in his OT analyses, 
considers more broadly that “die Berücksichtung der Handlungszummenhänge von sprachlichen 
Äuβerungen macht klar, daβ Bedeutungsfragen nicht nur auf der Ebene der Semantik oder der Syntax 
liegen, sondern daβ sie auch abhängen vom ‘Gebrauch’ einer Äuβerung” (“Der Lobaufruf im 
israelitischen Hymnus als indirekter Sprechakt,” in Studien zur hebräischen Grammatik, ed. A. Wagner 
[Freiburg, CH: Universitätsverlag; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1997], 154). We use the 
adjective “lexical” to distinguish between the sense or meaning of a word or expression and the 
communicative meaning of a SA (see Cotterell and Turner, 164-165; cf. 145).  
45 R. S. Briggs, Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation: Toward a 
Hermeneutic of Self-Involvement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 263. This is not to say that we can 
ignore the locution. As A. Wagner points out, “Sprechhandlungstheoretische Analysen können aber nicht 
an die Stelle syntaktischer Forschung treten! Ebensolches gilt für semantische Fragen, für die 
Lexikographie, auch sie werden nicht durch die sprechakttheoretische Untersuchung überflüssig gemacht, 
sondern ergänzt” (“Die Stellung der Sprachakttheorie in Hebraistik und Exegese,” in Congress Volume: 
Basel 2001, ed. A. Lemaire [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 73). Here we explore only those questions of the lexical 
meaning of words and of syntax/grammar that bear on the communication of meaning. 
46 Searle, Expression, vii. It would probably be more accurate to call the second element the 
“propositional act.” Although Searle believes “not all illocutionary acts have a propositional content” (SA, 
30), if such illocutionary acts exist, they do not interest us. 
47 Searle, SA, 123. He holds it is not possible to “just refer and predicate without making an 
assertion or asking a question or performing some other illocutionary act” (25). 
48 Searle’s typology “remains the most influential” (Y. Huang, Pragmatics [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007], 106) and the only taxonomy “tied to a general theory of illocutionary acts” (Bach 
and Harnish, 40). Petrey calls Austin’s taxonomy “complex (not to say chaotic)” (59), and except for 
Commissives, Searle abandons it because it has “no clear or consistent principle or set of principles” 
(Expression, 10; cf. Bach and Harnish, 40). 
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Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts 
Although Searle outlines “twelve significant dimensions of variation” between 
illocutionary acts,49 within his taxonomic system the most important criterion is 
“illocutionary force,” of which “illocutionary point/purpose” or the “essential 
condition” or what the utterance “counts as” is the most important element.50 Other 
important criteria include the “sincerity condition”51 and the satisfaction of certain 
preparatory conditions which the speaker “implies in the performance of the act.”52 
Searle identifies five basic categories of SAs: Assertives, Directives, 
Expressives, Commissives and Declarations.53 Since we use these categories to analyze 
the NT psalm quotations in both their OT and NT settings, we describe them briefly.  
                                                           
49 Searle’s description of the illocutionary act is quite vague (see R. M. Harnish, “Speech Acts 
and Intentionality,” in Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of 
John R. Searle, ed. A. Burkhardt [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990], 174). We use the insights of other scholars 
(see below) to support our understanding of illocution. 
50 See Searle, Expression, 2; SA, 66-67. For him, illocutionary force determines “what 
illocutionary act the speaker is performing in the utterance of the sentence” (SA, 30). Bach and Harnish 
also equate “force” and “illocutionary act type” (6). Vanhoozer’s description of illocutionary force as “the 
stance adopted by the speaker” toward the propositional content (Meaning, 210) has the advantage of not 
using the word “illocutionary” but does not adequately explain “stance.” Tovey incorrectly considers 
illocutionary force and illocutionary point as different aspects of a SA (cf. Tovey, 71).  
51 The sincerity condition is “the psychological state expressed in the performance of the 
illocutionary act” (Searle, Expression, 5). S. L. Tsohatzidis correctly points out that, “confusingly, Searle 
sometimes … uses the term ‘sincerity condition’ to refer both to the possession and to the mere 
expression of mental states (see, for example, Searle and Vanderveken 1985:22), though it is only the first 
usage, inaugurated in Searle 1969, that is clearly intelligible: a sincerity condition on a SA is, 
presumably, a condition whose non-satisfaction would make that act insincere, and what makes, for 
example, an assertion insincere is not that its speaker does not express a belief in the truth of its content, 
but rather that he does not have this expressed belief. (Indeed, since, on Searle’s later views, assertions 
are necessarily expressions of belief in their contents, the idea that the mere expression of such a belief 
would be sufficient to make any assertion sincere would have the absurd consequence that it is 
impossible for any assertion to ever be insincere—a consequence that Searle explicitly rejects)” (“The 
Gap between Speech Acts and Mental States,” in Tsohatzidis, Foundations, 232n4). Here we follow early 
Searle in using the term “sincerity condition” to indicate the possession of a certain psychological state. 
52 Searle, SA, 65. Although every illocutionary act has an essential condition and preparatory 
conditions, some have “no sincerity and no propositional content conditions” (Harnish, 174). In addition 
to the three criteria outlined here, early Searle includes a criterion he calls “direction of fit” between the 
illocutionary act and the actual state of affairs in the world (see Expression, 3-4). A. Burkhardt is correct 
that “the ‘direction of fit’ in reality does not enrich our stock of categories, but is just another way of 
describing the ‘propositional content rule’” (“Speech Act Theory—The Decline of a Paradigm,” in 
Burkhardt, 107). Other criteria include the relationship of the illocution to the context, the strength of the 
illocutionary point, the role of authority and discourse relations. Many of these distinguish illocutionary 
acts within the taxonomic categories rather than across categories (see Searle, Expression, 3, 13). For a 
helpful discussion of the twelve dimensions, see J. Connor-Linton, “A Sociolinguistic Model of 
Successful Speech Act Construction,” in Pragmatics at Issue, ed. J. Verschueren, vol. 1 of Selected 
Papers of the 1987 International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 17-22, 1987 [Amsterdam: 
Benjamins, 1991], 98-100).   
53 In context, each SA has a single illocutionary purpose/essential condition, no matter its form 
(contra V. S. Poythress, “Canon and Speech Act: Limitations in Speech-Act Theory, with Implications 
for a Putative Theory of Canonical Speech Acts,” WTJ 70, no. 2 [Fall 2008]: 344-346). For example, 
“Can you pass the salt?” is a request (Directive) even though its form is of an inquiry about physical 
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Assertives are characterized by the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the 
stated proposition p. “The simplest test of an assertive is this: can you literally 
characterize it (inter alia) as true or false.”54 The psychological state is Belief (that p).55   
Directives are attempts “by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. … 
The sincerity condition is want (or wish or desire). The propositional content is … that 
the hearer H does some future action A.”56 
Commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action. “The sincerity 
condition is Intention” and “the propositional content is always that the speaker S does 
some future action A.”57 
Expressives express the “psychological state specified in the sincerity condition 
about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content,” which “ascribes some 
property (not necessarily an action) to either S or H.”58 “The truth of the expressed 
proposition is presupposed.”59 Expressives cover a wide variety of “psychological 
states,” including thanking, congratulating, apologizing and welcoming. 
Declarations are illocutions for which “the successful performance … brings 
about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality,” i.e., “the status 
or condition of the referred to object or objects”60 is altered. These are “cases where one 
brings a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist, cases where, so to speak, 
‘saying makes it so.’”61 
Since the Psalms are prayers, it might seem they would be Expressives. But this 
is not the case. The majority of the Psalm passages quoted (and the SACs of which they 
are a part) are either Assertives or Directives. Since Assertives are particularly 
important in our analysis, we explain below their “tellability.” 
                                                                                                                                                                          
capabilities. Using what we know of the socio-historical context and the conventions of language (see 
chapter 3) allows us to determine the illocutionary force of an indirect SA such as a metaphor.  
54 Searle, Expression, 13. By “it,” Searle apparently refers to the propositional act contained in 
an Assertive since he points out it is not the illocutionary act of stating which is true or false but the 
“statement-object” or proposition (“Austin,” 158-159). 
55 Searle, Expression, 12. This corresponds to Austin’s constative (see Ibid. and also n62 below).  
56 Ibid., 13-14.  
57 Ibid., 14.  
58 Ibid., 15, 16.   
59 Ibid., 15. We find confusing D. Vanderveken’s later notion that since “every successful 
performance of a speech act is an expression of mental states … any type of illocutionary act strongly 
commits the speaker to an expressive” (“Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory,” in Vanderveken 
and Kubo, 45). 
60 Searle, Expression, 16-17. 
61 Ibid., 16. 
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The Tellability of Assertives 
We agree with those, like Searle, who argue that making a statement (an Assertive) is 
truly a SA.62 This means that Assertives are “doing something”—often something 
significant. According to Pratt, some Assertives “represent states of affairs that are held 
to be unusual, contrary to expectations, or otherwise problematic.”63 In contrast to 
“informing” assertions, with such “tellable” Assertives a speaker is “verbally displaying 
a state of affairs, inviting his addressee(s) to join him in contemplating it, evaluating it, 
and responding to it. His point is to produce in his hearers not only belief but also an 
imaginative and affective involvement in the state of affairs he is representing and an 
evaluative stance toward it.”64 Similar to Tannen’s concept of involvement (see chapter 
2), the communicative purpose of a tellable assertive is that “the addressee will respond 
affectively in the intended way, adopt the intended evaluation and interpretation, take 
pleasure in doing so, and generally find the whole undertaking worth it.”65  
With regard to Scripture, Briggs correctly points out that Assertives are tellable 
“in even the most apparently unpromising of biblical texts. In other words: assertion can 
hardly be ‘mere assertion,’ unless perhaps we were discussing some idling form of 
language, utterances ‘said for no conceivable reason.’”66 
Assertives are the only category of illocutionary acts in which the essential 
condition is a commitment to the truth of the propositional content.67 However, all SAs 
can be both defective and/or unsuccessful.68 
                                                           
62 Although Austin initially found a distinction between saying things with words (the 
“constative”) and doing things with words (the “performative”), he came to understand that “stating is 
performing an act” (HDTW, 139). Searle agrees: “Making a statement is as much performing an 
illocutionary act as making a promise, a bet, a warning or what have you” (Expression, 17-18). 
63 Pratt, SAT, 36.  
64 Ibid., 136. She finds it “ironic that speech act philosophers and linguists have been so slow to 
recognize the extent to which assertions and representative discourse in general are used for purposes 
other than informing, reminding, or displaying knowledge at exams” (149). 
65 Ibid., 148. “An assertion that is both true and nonobvious will still be pointless if it has no real 
or supposed relation to the interests of the hearer” (134). 
66 Briggs, Words, 269.  
67 “Assertions … differ from (almost) all other types of speech acts in that they prima facie 
imply an unmistakable validity claim, a claim to truth” (J. Habermas, On the Pragmatics of 
Communication, ed. M. Cooke [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998], 74). In some situations, the 
illocutionary force of non-Assertives also “depends on contextual realities described by true propositions 
and understood by believers as part of background knowledge” (D. Clark, “Beyond Inerrancy: Speech 
Acts and an Evangelical View of Scripture,” in For Faith and Clarity: Philosophical Contributions to 
Christian Theology, ed. J. K. Beilby [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006], 123). However, here we 
consider only Assertives “true” or “false”; other SAs are “sincere” or “insincere.” 
68 Contra G. N. Leech, who argues that “pragmatics is concerned only with publicly conveyed 
meaning, and does not take account … of miscommunication” (Principles of Pragmatics [London: 
Longman, 1983], 35). Although we cannot concern ourselves with private or secret communications 
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Non-Defective and Successful Illocutionary Acts  
In a defective illocutionary act, a condition “intrinsic to the notion of the action in 
question,” such as the sincerity condition or a preparatory condition, is not satisfied.69 
With explicit quotation, an example of a potentially defective SA would be the implied 
NT author misquoting the OT. If the implied NT reader is not to take this as a deliberate 
alteration,70 such an illocutionary act would be defective. For example, some scholars 
argue the quotation of Psalm 68:18 in Ephesians 4:8 is defective.71  
A defective illocutionary act is not necessarily unsuccessful.72 Illocutionary act 
success is not defined as an absence of defects. The sole condition for illocutionary act 
success is that a “the hearer understands it in the way that the speaker intended it.”73 
Hearer understanding is both necessary and sufficient for illocutionary act success; “the 
fulfillment of illocutionary intentions consists in hearer understanding.”74  
To clarify the role of illocution in communicating meaning, we must more 
precisely define illocutionary intention (author) and illocutionary effect (reader).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
(which by definition are unavailable), we have an interest in defective and unsuccessful SAs to the extent 
we suspect their existence. 
69 Searle, SA, 54; cf. 65. Tovey correctly notes that “the implied author’s purpose is to fulfill the 
appropriateness conditions for his assertions” (263). 
70 Examples of deliberate alteration include punning, parody or irony. This “can point to an 
intensification, climactic development, acceleration of the actions and attitudes initially represented, or … 
to some unexpected, perhaps unsettling, new revelation of character or plot” (Alter, 97-98).  
71 T. Moritz summarizes the variety of explanations that been offered for the reversal of the verb 
in Eph 4:8 from Ps. 67:19c LXX (ἔλαβες to ἔδωκεν) (A Profound Mystery: The Use of the Old Testament 
in Ephesians [Leiden: Brill, 1996], 73). One plausible argument is that Eph 4:8 “rejects the MT and LXX 
rendering ‘take’ or ‘receive’ in favour of the translation ‘give’ found in the Targum and Peshitta” (E. E. 
Ellis, Paul’s Use of the Old Testament [1981; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2003], 144; cf. C. A. 
Evans, “Praise and Prophecy in the Psalter and in the New Testament,” in The Book of Psalms: 
Composition and Reception, ed. P. W. Flint and P. D. Miller, Jr. [Leiden: Brill, 2005], 577). That the 
tradition represented by Targum Psalms is also found in Midr. Pss. 68§11 supports Moritz’s own 
argument that the quotation “relates not directly to Ps 68, but to an early Christian polemic, formulated in 
response to what was perceived to be a Jewish misuse of Ps 68.18” (Mystery, 73).  
72 The three possibilities are: “A speech act may be unsuccessful, it may be successful but 
defective, and it may be successful and nondefective” (Searle and Vanderveken, 13). Tilley gives an 
example with regard to Assertives: “While any assertive which asserts what is false is defective, that does 
not cause its failure. If a challenger can show an assertive to be seriously defective, that may undercut its 
effectiveness. If an asserter can justify the assertion, that may enhance its effectiveness. However, neither 
of these rhetorical moves affects the truth of what is asserted” (78). 
73 J. R. Searle, “Literary Theory and Its Discontents,” LH 25, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 647, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/469470 (accessed January 26, 2009). Cf. Searle, SA, 47, and P. Lee, 
“Perlocution and Illocution,” Journal of English Linguistics 8 [1974]: 38n2, http://dx.doi.org/10. 
1177/007542427400800104 (accessed July 9, 2013).  
74 Bach and Harnish, 5. M. M. Bakhtin also argues that understanding is a goal of speech/text: 
“From the very beginning, the speaker expects a response from them [those for whom the utterance is 
constructed], an active responsive understanding. The entire utterance is constructed, as it were, in 
anticipation of encountering this response” (“The Problem of Speech Genres,” in Speech Genres and 
Other Late Essays, trans. V. W. McGee, ed. C. Emerson and M. Holquist [Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1986], 94). One biblical scholar who has adopted this position is Briggs (see Words, 66). 
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Illocutionary Intention 
For Searle, authorial intention is foundational to the meaning of an illocution: “The 
speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize 
his intention to produce that effect.”75 This has generated controversy. Some believe 
SAT falls afoul of the intentional fallacy, i.e., considering intention as bound to the 
author’s psychology.76 However, though later Searle speaks of “fundamental 
psychological notions such as belief, intention, and desire” and terms these 
“Intentional,”77 at no point does Searle enter the murky waters of motive in an attempt 
to determine why a speaker utters a certain SA. Searle takes the performance of a SA as 
evidence for the intention behind it, rather than looking behind the SA to discern the 
motives of its author.78 This coheres with Sternberg’s understanding of the biblical 
                                                           
75 Searle, SA, 45.  
76 Cf. M. Black, “Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views,” LH 4, no. 2 
(Winter 1973): 258, http://www.jstor.org/stable/468477 (accessed February 15, 2007). For the intentional 
fallacy, see W. K Wimsatt, Jr. and M. C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., The 
Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, University Paperback ed. (London: Methuen, 1970), 4. 
Although Booth is correct that Wimsatt and Beardsley “rule out only statements made by the author 
outside the work about his motives or purposes or plans or hopes for value” (Irony, 126n13), for many, 
“intention” remains linked to “the psychologizing approaches of F. Schleiermacher and others and the 
Romanticist ideas of getting into the mind of an author so that the interpreter knows the author’s mind 
better than he himself or she herself did” (Snodgrass, 16). As D. Patte has noted, “The mention of ‘mind,’ 
‘brain,’ and ‘mental states’ makes us cringe” since this appears to equate “intentionality” with 
“subjectivity” (“Speech Act Theory and Biblical Exegesis,” Semeia 41 [1988]: 95).  
77 J. R. Searle, “Intentionality and Method,” The Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 11 (November 
1981): 720, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026582 (accessed March 7, 2007), where he names these notions 
the sincerity conditions of statements, promises and desires, respectively. In this article, Searle often 
confusingly refers to “intentionality” rather than “Intentionality” even when not discussing Commissives. 
This becomes more puzzling when one compares early Searle, in which “Intention” is the sincerity 
condition of a Commissive (cf. Expression, 14). Here we agree with Thiselton that “there are ways of 
expressing intention which identify the directedness of a speech-act with presupposing some pychological 
[sic] notion of ‘inner mental states’” (ew Horizons, 59; cf. Vanhoozer, “Discourse,” 21, who refers to 
the “psychological sense of the term” as “planned to” and the “technical sense” as “directing their 
consciousness toward”). Like Briggs, we avoid adopting Searle’s “framework of intentionality and 
mental states,” but still find it “possible to utilise the insights of his philosophy of language” (Words, 55).  
78 Unlike Castelli, who equates “author’s intent” to “the motive residing in the mind of the 
writer” and finds intent to be “unattainable because it involves inaccessible aspects of the author’s 
psychology” (120; cf. Walhout, “Hermeneutics,” 71, 100; Wolterstorff, “Resuscitating,” 37), Q. Skinner 
correctly avers that “an agent’s motives for writing (though not his intentions in writing) can be said to 
stand ‘outside’ his works, and in a contingent relationship to them, in such a way that their recovery does 
seem to be irrelevant to the determination of the meaning of the works” (“Motives, Intentions and the 
Interpretation of Texts,” LH 3, no. 2 [(Winter 1972]: 402, http://www.jstor.org/stable/468322 [accessed 
August 27, 2007]). Similarly, for P. Ricoeur, “the hermeneutical task is to discern the ‘matter’ of the text 
(Gadamer) and not the psychology of the author” (“Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” in HHS, 111). 
Vanhoozer agrees “there is a difference between understanding why someone says something (a question 
for historians and psychologists) and what a person said—his or her speech act” (“Imprisoned,” 61n26). 
We concur with him: “I am not interested in recreating the inner life of the author or in reconstructing the 
author’s motives but in giving a description, as thick as it is correct, of the author’s Akt des Redens 
(speech act, discourse)” (“Discourse,” 21).  
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interpreter’s only concern being “‘embodied’ or ‘objectified’ intention. … ‘Intention’ 
no longer figures as a psychological state consciously or unconsciously translated into 
words. Rather, it is a shorthand for the structure of meaning and effect supported by the 
conventions that the text appeals to or devises: for the sense that the language makes in 
terms of the communicative context as a whole.”79  
Nicholas Wolterstorff puts this back into SA terminology with the thought that 
reading a text for “authorial discourse” is not “to enter the dark world of the author’s 
psyche” but rather “to discover what assertings, what promisings, what requestings, 
what commandings, are rightly to be ascribed to the author on the ground of her having 
set down the words that she did in the situation in which she set them down.”80  
Any residual concern over “intentionality” is dispelled by the use of the implied 
author and reader construct since this “is a tool which rescues and places in a proper 
perspective the concept of an intent behind the production of a literary work.”81 Thus, 
the illocutionary acts of the implied author—those “assertings,” “promisings,” 
“requestings,” and “commandings”—reveal to the empirical reader, via the construct of 
the implied reader, the implied author’s intentions.82  
Turner relates intention to the NT writings (specifically to Paul):  
When we ask concerning authorial intention, we are not seeking information 
about Paul’s unexpressed psychological motivations (interesting though they 
may be), which may or may not have been realized. We are inquiring rather 
about what intentional acts he has indeed performed in and through what he has 
                                                                                                                                                                          
In a later work, Q. Skinner finds value in investigating motive: “We can … seek further 
corroboration for such ascriptions of intentionality by enquiring into the motives and beliefs of the agent 
in question” (“A Reply to My Critics,” in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. J. 
Tully [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988], 280; cf. 266-267). We disagree and argue below that 
the implied author/reader construct makes inquiry into the motives of an author unnecessary. 
79 Sternberg, Poetics, 9.  
80 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 93. Even radical reader-response theorist S. Fish recognizes 
SAT does not link authorial intention to motivation: “Intention, in the view of … [SA] theory, is a matter 
of what one takes responsibility for by performing certain conventional (speech) acts. The question of 
what is going on inside, the question of the ‘inward performance’ is simply bypassed; speech-act theory 
does not rule on it. This means that intentions are available to anyone who invokes the proper (publicly 
known and agreed upon) procedures, and it also means that anyone who invokes these procedures 
(knowing that they will be recognized as such) takes responsibility for having those intentions” (Is There 
a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1980], 203-204). We discuss linguistic conventions with regard to author intention/audience 
understanding below. 
81 Tovey, 79, adding that thus “it is no longer the case that the ‘Intentional fallacy’ bulks large in 
literary criticism.” See also Meyer, Reality, 97-98. 
82 This does not speak to the possible communicative inadequacy of an empirical author, i.e., the 
failure to create the appropriate implied author. However, we assume the empirical author is competent 
unless evidence is found to the contrary (see J. D. BeDuhn, “The Historical Assessment of Speech Acts: 
Clarifications of Austin and Skinner for the Study of Religions,” MTSR 14, no. 1 [2002]: 93, 95, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006802760198785 [accessed May 7, 2007]). 
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actually said, understood within the linguistic/cultural world in which he 
uttered/inscribed the words.83  
Turner makes it clear that not only are intentional acts performed through speech or text 
but that the goal is they be “understood.” “Understanding” is the intended illocutionary 
effect. 
The Illocutionary Effect of Understanding 
We argued above that the illocutionary effect of understanding is both necessary and 
sufficient for illocutionary act success. The questions now before us are: What do we 
mean by “understanding” and what makes understanding possible?  
To answer the first question, we look to Bach and Harnish, who “restrict 
illocutionary intentions to those intentions whose fulfillment consists in nothing more 
than their recognition.”84 Thus, to “understand” means the empirical reader grasps the 
purport of the locutionary act and recognizes what type of illocutionary act is being 
performed.85 Since the implied reader, by definition, is of the same mind as the implied 
author, in our action model “understanding” involves the empirical reader discovering 
the implied author and implied reader and “the world which it [the text] intends to 
disclose,” i.e., the lifeworld.86 When understanding happens, mutual context is activated 
                                                           
83 Turner, “Criticism,” 47.  
84 Bach and Harnish, xv. This differs from Austin’s three types of illocutionary effects: “securing 
uptake, taking effect, and inviting a response” (HDTW, 118). Only “securing uptake,” which equates to 
Searle’s illocutionary effect of understanding, occurs in every instance (Ibid., 139). “Taking effect” refers 
to changes in social reality caused by Declarations (Ibid., 117) and is not of concern here. Austin 
describes “inviting a response” with an example: “Many illocutionary acts invite by convention a 
response or sequel. Thus an order invites the response of obedience” (Ibid.). However, considering 
“inviting a response” to be an illocutionary effect of a Directive blurs the distinction between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary effects. Although Austin argues “we must distinguish ‘I ordered him and 
he obeyed’ from ‘I got him to obey’” (Ibid.), such a distinction is difficult to make or defend—and Austin 
does not explain how to do it. Indeed, by Austin’s definition, a Directive illocutionary act would be 
illocutionarily unsuccessful if the hearer does not do what is asked. Contra Austin, we consider “inviting 
a response” to be a perlocutionary intention and the response to be a perlocutionary effect (see below). 
85 See, e.g., Bach and Harnish, 56. We reject Habermas’ definition of understanding 
[Verständigung] in which “reaching understanding is considered to be a process of reaching agreement 
[Einigung] among speaking and acting subjects” (Reason, 286-287; brackets original). We do not agree 
that the illocutionary aim is both “that the hearer understand what is said and undertake the obligations 
connected with the acceptance of the offer contained in the speech act” (Ibid., 293-294; emphasis added; 
cf. n84, where we reject Austin’s similar ideas). Reaching agreement and undertaking obligations are 
perlocutionary effects (see below). 
86 Walhout, “Texts,” 47, with reference to Ricoeur. Vanhoozer also points out that “what the 
reader receives according to Ricoeur is not the author’s intention but the ‘world of the text’—that is, a 
proposed way of being-in-the-world” (“The Reader in New Testament Interpretation,” in Green, 309). In 
our terms, this is the lifeworld presented in/by the text. 
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and one becomes “immersed in conversation with a tradition and engaged in that form 
of life which the tradition has assumed.”87 
To determine what makes understanding possible, we begin with Paul Ricoeur’s 
thought that the “intention of being identified, acknowledged, and recognized as such 
by the other is part of the intention itself.”88 Bach and Harnish’s “Communicative 
Presumption” expands on this idea: 
The communicative presumption is the mutual belief prevailing in a linguistic 
community to the effect that whenever someone says something to somebody, 
he intends to be performing some identifiable illocutionary act. … People … do 
mutually believe that speakers speak with overt intentions, and this mutual belief 
figures in ordinary communication situations. People do rely on others to have 
identifiable intentions in their utterances, and they expect others to rely on them 
to have such intentions.89  
Understanding, then, is made possible when the empirical author constructs an 
implied author whose illocutionary acts the empirical audience can identify.90 “The 
utterance must be made with the intention that H can find the inference route, and part 
of what the hearer takes into account in trying to find the route is that the utterance is 
made with that intention.”91 But the empirical reader also has a role; s/he must be 
willing to enter into the reading “contract.” A certain cooperation is therefore required.  
The cooperative effort which underpins understanding relies in part on linguistic 
conventions (an element of context).92 Searle defines the conventions of language as 
those constitutive rules related to illocutionary force and the essential condition which 
generally have the form “X counts as Y in context C.” 93 The existence of linguistic 
                                                           
87 Stroup, 208. To the extent understanding is considered an “act,” with successful illocution we 
already have participation in communication, i.e., in joint action (see H. Clark, 219). 
88 P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas 
Christian University Press, 1976), 18. This is similar to Searle’s argument (cf. n75). 
89 Bach and Harnish, 12.  
90 As Schutz and Luckmann remind us, “steering one’s own behavior toward anticipated 
interpretation by others is a basic presupposition of communicative action” (2:8). 
91 Bach and Harnish, 80. Cf. Brown and Yule, 33. Like authorial intention, reader understanding 
is “less a mental state than something like an ability, or a competency” (Briggs, Words, 54). 
92 “Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter of convention” (J. R. Searle, 
“What is a Speech Act?,” in Philosophy in America, ed. M. Black [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1965], 230).  
93 Searle, SA, 35. Searle, who considers language to be “rule-governed intentional behavior” (SA, 
16), defines “constitutive” rules as those rules which “constitute (and also regulate) an activity the 
existence of which is logically dependent on the rules” (SA, 34). According to van Dijk, “the rules are 
CONVENTIONAL in the sense of being shared by most members of a linguistic community: they 
KNOW these rules implicitly and are able to use them” (1).   
Ours is a weaker concept of “convention” than that of Bach and Harnish (see 108-109; cf. 
Briggs, Words, 64). For us, “rules” can be simply practices, norms or, as P. Cotterell terms them, 
“regularities” (“Sociolinguistics and Biblical Interpretation,” VE 16 [1986]: 75n12; cf. Alston, 264). We 
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conventions common to both author and audience is critical to achieving the 
illocutionary effect of understanding. As Briggs puts it, “If there is any agreement on 
what illocutionary analysis achieves, it is that it draws together the issues of authorial 
(or speaker’s) intention and the audience’s understanding, by examining what 
conventions exist within the public domain of both the author and the audience.”94  
This does not mean all empirical readers will necessarily agree “about the kind 
of illocutionary act which is being performed in a specific utterance.”95 But using our 
action model means that disagreements about an illocutionary act are not about different 
understandings of the author’s motivations. Rather, they are founded in different 
premises about the relevant context or linguistic/literary conventions and they center on 
what role a particular illocutionary act plays in creating the implied author and implied 
reader. Such disagreements are more productive than those which concern the empirical 
author’s unrecoverable “mental acts.”  
As we have defined reader roles, accomplishing “understanding” means the 
empirical reader reads as an Analyst. We conclude our discussion of illocutionary acts 
by distinguishing between the reader roles of Independent and Analyst. 
The Reader Roles of Independent and Analyst 
Based on our discussions of illocution and illocutionary success, we add to our 
definition of reader roles that an Independent reader does not evidence having arrived at 
(or possibly even attempted) the illocutionary effect of understanding.96 Therefore, vis-
à-vis an Independent reader, the illocutionary act is unsuccessful and illocutionary 
                                                                                                                                                                          
follow H. Clark in considering convention to be “a regularity … in behavior … that is common ground in 
a given community C … as a coordination device” (71). 
94 Briggs, “SAT,” 764; cf. Tovey, 79. “One of the necessary conditions for understanding in any 
situation what it is that S in uttering utterance x must be doing to A must be some understanding of what 
it is that people in general, when behaving in a conventional manner, are usually doing in that society and 
in that situation in uttering such utterances” (Q. Skinner, “Conventions and the Understanding of Speech 
Acts,” Philosophical Quarterly 20, no. 79 [April 1970]: 133, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218084 
[accessed March 28, 2008]; cf. Skinner, “Motives,” 406). This extends beyond linguistic conventions. As 
A. Wagner notes, “so ist z. B. die Handlungsstruktur von Äuβerungen (also die Frage nach dem Zweck 
einer Äuβerung, ob sie zu etwas auffordern soll, etwas mitteilen will, etwas ausdrücken soll usw.) 
bestimmt von allen Gesetzen und Gegebenheiten, die das Handeln in einer Gesellschaft insgesamt 
bestimmen: Kommunkationsgegebenheiten, sprachliche Konventionen, Werte, institutionelle 
Gegebenheiten, etc.” (“Der Lobaufruf,” 151). 
95 Lanser, Act, 68n9. 
96 An Independent reader is very similar to the reader described by radical reader-response 
theories. According to Fish, “the reader’s response is not to the meaning: it is the meaning” (3). R. Rorty 
believes that “a text just has whatever coherence it happened to acquire during the last roll of the 
hermeneutic wheel” (“The Pragmatist’s Progress,” in Interpretation and Overinterpretation by U. Eco et 
al., ed. S. Collini [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 97).  
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meaning has not been communicated.97 To claim a reader-now-author quotes “out of 
context” is the equivalent in our model of naming the quoting author an Independent 
reader of the source text.98 The way Stanley describes Paul’s use of Psalm 115:1 LXX in 
2 Corinthians 4:13 dovetails with calling Paul an Independent reader: “The sense in 
which he uses the verse is so far removed from the original context as to raise questions 
about Paul’s reliability as an interpreter.”99 We take up this example as a case study. 
An Analyst, on the other hand, is a reader who recognizes the illocutionary 
intentions of the implied author and achieves the intended illocutionary effect of 
understanding the illocutionary act. When a reader reads as an Analyst, the illocutionary 
act is successful.  
This does not mean that the illocutionary force of the original SA is retained in a 
quotation. Most quotations are Assertives, i.e., they report earlier SAs, which may have 
been Assertives, Commissives, Directives, etc.100 Even if the locution is replicated 
verbatim, the illocutionary act (and therefore the perlocutionary act) in the reporting 
context may be different. Further, the referent may be redefined by reversal, inversion 
or expansion. Thus, a quotation does not necessarily reproduce earlier meaning (as we 
have defined “meaning”). Our question instead is whether and, if so, how earlier 
meaning resonates in the new context. 
We believe that in many instances of biblical quotation, the NT author evokes 
the OT Story, thereby activating mutual context, in support of his invitation to the NT 
audience to read as Envisagers and experience transformation. To describe the 
Envisager more precisely we must plunge into perlocution. 
Perlocutionary Acts and Effects 
The final dimension of our action model is perlocution, another term coined by Austin. 
However, he, Searle and others not only focus their efforts on illocution, they deny 
                                                           
97 An Independent reader may achieve understanding but choose to disregard the illocution. The 
result is the same as for a reader who does not understand. 
98 Our characterization of a NT author as a reader of an OT text is based on the NT quotation of 
that text. Whether any NT authors are fully Independent OT readers is unclear. As Moyise points out 
concerning the “eclectic” quotation in Matt 2:15, “There is far more involved than Matthew taking a 
verse out of context with no interest in the original meaning” (“Out of Context,” 139). 
99 Stanley, Arguing, 100. Stanley does not consider Paul in the interpretive role of Envisager (see 
below); he believes “Paul often quotes from Scripture in a way that bears little evident relation to the 
apparent sense of the original passage” (53).  
100 See E.-M. Becker, Letter Hermeneutics in 2 Corinthians: Studies in Literarkritik and 
Communication History, trans. H. S. Heron (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 88; and J. Grey, “Acts of the 
Spirit: Ezekiel 37 in the Light of Contemporary Speech-Act Theory,” Journal of Biblical and 
Pneumatological Research 1 (Fall 2009): 78. 
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perlocution a role in communicating meaning.101 Other linguists split the SA into two 
elements: Linguistic, i.e., “communication” (illocution), and potentially non-linguistic, 
i.e., “interaction” (perlocution).102 But Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst are 
                                                           
101 Very little was done with perlocution in the early development of SAT. In the 36 page 
bibliography published by R. B. Meyers and K. Hopkins in 1977, fewer than 10 entries contain 
“perlocution” in the title. See “A Speech-Act Theory Bibliography,” Centrum 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1977). 
Although Austin and Searle include perlocution in the total SA, they argue meaning is communicated via 
a successful illocutionary act. In opposing Grice’s inclusion of the perlocutionary act in meaning, early 
Searle argues that (i) “even where there generally is a correlated perlocutionary effect, I may say 
something and mean it without in fact intending to produce that effect” (SA, 46) and (ii) “the 
characteristic intended effect of meaning is understanding” which “is not a perlocutionary effect” (SA, 
47). Austin’s argument that “perlocutionary acts do not have stable meaning” is based on his assumption 
that “perlocutionary acts are not conventional” (HDTW, 120; cf. Searle and Vanderveken, 12). Similarly, 
Steinmann argues that “there are no rules that the writer can follow that guarantee performance of the 
intended perlocutionary act” (“Perlocutionary Acts,” 113-114). However, as E. Rolf notes, “The fact that 
there is no way that a conventional procedure can guarantee that the intended [perlocutionary] effect will 
be achieved does not represent any peculiar property of speech acts at all. It is a common characteristic of 
all actions that there is no such guarantee. The actor, though he (in general) takes for granted that there is 
no guarantee that the effects he intends will be achieved, does what he wants to do, i.e. tries to achieve 
the effect he intends to be realized” (“On the Concept of Action in Illocutionary Logic,” in Burkhardt, 
164). Alston’s approach also “presents as a necessary and sufficient condition of performing an 
illocutionary act of a certain type is not that one succeed in producing a certain effect in the addressee 
(actually perform an perlocutionary act), but only that one have the intention to produce that effect (to 
perform the correlated perlocutionary act)” (Alston, 37). Furthermore, J. Verschueren finds perlocution to 
be “relevant on condition that (i) we redefine perlocutionary effects in terms of the speaker’s intentions, 
(ii) we restrict ourselves to those intended effects which are typically associated with the speech act type 
involved, and (iii) we recognize that the intended typically associated effects are not necessarily 
achieved” (“Lexical Decomposition, Perlocutions, and Meaning Postulates” PIL 8, no. 3/4 [1975]: 353). 
Along these lines, in our inclusion of perlocution in meaning, we use a looser concept of convention, 
allow for perlocutionary intentions and consider only associated perlocutionary effects.  
102 Some linguists refuse to include perlocution in communication because they take 
communication as linguistic and perlocutionary effects can be non-verbal (see Y. Gu, “The Impasse of 
Perlocution,” JPrag 20, no. 5 [November 1993]: 427; Bach and Harnish, 16). According to M. A. van 
Rees, “Illocutionary acts involve the attainment of a communicative effect by producing verbal utterances 
with the intention of getting a listener to recognize, by recognizing that one has that intention, what 
particular attitude (belief, want, intention, affect) with respect to a particular state of affairs one is trying 
to express. Perlocutionary acts involve the attainment of an interactional effect by trying to bring about 
further effects on the cognitive, affective, or conative state of the listener by way of a communicative act” 
(“The Adequacy of Speech Act Theory for Explaining Conversational Phenomena: A Response to Some 
Conversation Analytical Critics,” JPrag 17, no. 1 [January 1992]: 40; bold omitted). 
Although later Searle defines “speech acts proper” as illocutionary acts (see Searle and 
Vanderveken, 12) and restricts meaning to “speaker meaning,” (see J. R. Searle, “What is Language: 
Some Preliminary Remarks,” in Tsohatzidis, Searle’s Philosophy, 31), he agrees that “communicating is 
a matter of producing certain effects on one’s hearers” (Intentionality, 165). Then, in order to sustain his 
argument that only illocution matters in producing meaning, he adds that “one can intend to represent 
something without caring at all about the effects on one’s hearers” (Ibid.). He goes so far as to aver that 
“one can make a statement … without even intending to get them [one’s hearers] to understand it at all” 
(Ibid.), a notion which seems to eliminate speaker intentionality. These are not the normal situations of 
communication or of intentionality and do not concern us (cf. Tilley, 16). Nor are we interested in the 
example of sentences uttered in solitude (Alston, 30); utterances not involving a listener are not 
communication. 
Others who equate speech acts only with illocutionary acts include van Dijk (cf. 195) and D. 
Kurzon, who goes so far as to argue “perlocutionary acts … are not part of speech act theory, and as such 
are not part of pragmatics” (“The Speech Act Status of Incitement: Perlocutionary Acts Revisited,” JPrag 
29, no. 5 [May 1998]: 595, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378216697000830 
[accessed July 7, 2008]). Vanhoozer also appears to include only illocution in communication: “The 
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correct that “communication” and “interaction” are both “in principle part of a complete 
speech act and therefore must be included in an adequate theory of speech acts.”103 Thus, 
in referring to meaning as created in fully successful communicative interaction, we 
consider meaning to result from illocution and perlocution taken together. For both 
illocution and perlocution, we include acts and effects, even if the intended 
perlocutionary effect is non-linguistic.104 In our action model, “full” meaning is situated 
in the successful completion of the total SA.  
This accords with recent thinking about pragmatics. According to social 
psychologist Wendelin Reich, “the problematic status of perlocutionary acts in SAT can 
only be rectified if we give up the assumption that speech acts are produced by speakers 
alone, together with the related assumption that meanings (illocutionary level) rather 
than effects (perlocutionary level) are all that matters.”105 Our action model thus goes 
beyond traditional pragmatic theories—both SAT and implicature theory—in which 
communicating meaning is a function only of authorial intention and reader recognition 
(understanding). Because perlocution is a critical element of our action model and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
proper function of our communicative faculties, I contend, is to produce true interpretation—
understanding” (Meaning, 205). However, he opens the door to perlocution as “strategic action” a few 
pages later in averring that “speakers and authors … are both perlocutionary and illocutionary agents. 
Interpreting texts is thus a matter of understanding purposive action—communicative and strategic. When 
I speak of communicative action in relation to texts, therefore, I am referring to the full-fledged, four-
dimensional reality described by speech act theory and not only to the illocutionary dimension” 
(Meaning, 224-225). This last sentence corresponds to our use of perlocution. 
103 F. H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions: A 
Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion 
[Dordrecht: Foris, 1984], 25; cf. 23. 
104 Generally, even those who include perlocution in communicative meaning do not include the 
reader. Instead, they use one of two approaches: (i) the communication of meaning involves only the 
perlocutionary acts/intentions of the author/speaker or (ii) perlocutionary effects are attributed to the 
efforts of the speaker/author who, in essence, causes them. We discuss and reject causality below. An 
example of the former approach is H. P. Grice. He defines nonnatural (“NN”) meaning on the basis of 
intentional perlocutionary acts: “‘A meantNN something by x’ is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended the 
utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention’” 
(Studies in the Way of Words [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 220). See also 
Verschueren, 347, and Connor-Linton, 96. 
Within biblical scholarship, Watson expresses a Gricean view of meaning: “The literal sense of 
the biblical texts comprises (i) verbal meaning, (ii) illocutionary and perlocutionary force, and (iii) the 
relation to the centre. As communicative actions, the texts seek to convey a meaning in order to evoke a 
particular response” (Text, 123). Although he adds that “the true end of communicative action … is 
responsive action” (116), for him the audience’s role is passive: “Readers can only receive meaning, they 
cannot create it” (104). Other biblical scholars/theologians who recognize perlocutionary intentionality 
include Meyer (cf. Critical Realism, 22), Gilfillan Upton (cf. 93) and Tovey (cf. 264). 
105 Reich, 1352. Tilley puts it more strongly: “A theory of speech acts cannot … equate the 
meaning of the act performed to the illocutionary intent of the agent. That would be as flawed as a 
general theory of human acts which neglected the essential links between act and results or which equated 
the act performed to the bare intention of the agent. … Hence, part of the meaning of communicative 
speech acts is their perlocutionary results” (23). 
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because it has often been ignored or excluded, we look more closely at perlocutionary 
acts and effects —beginning with their relationship to illocution.  
Like illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts are acts of the speaker/author. Max 
Black defines a perlocutionary act as “something we may do by producing an 
illocutionary act (e.g., persuading, getting somebody to do something, checking 
somebody, annoying him, etc.)”106 We go further than Black in arguing that a 
perlocutionary act necessarily occurs in connection with an illocutionary act, that is, all 
illocutionary acts have intentional perlocutionary acts associated with them.107  
Although the full range of perlocutionary effects includes all reader responses 
except the illocutionary effect of understanding,108 in this study, our concern is 
associated perlocutionary effects, i.e. those the implied author intends for the implied 
reader which are directly and conventionally correlated with understanding the 
illocutionary act and recognizing its related perlocutionary act.109 We do not consider 
                                                           
106 M. Black, “Austin on Performatives,” Philosophy 38, no. 145 (July 1963): 224, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3748453 (accessed July 5, 2008); cf. Searle, SA, 25. Contra C. Tanner, 
“Climbing the Lampstand-Witness-Trees: Revelation’s use of Zechariah 4 in Light of Speech Act 
Theory,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 20, no. 1 (2011), 88; and J. N. Vorster, “Toward an 
Interactional Model for the Analysis of Letters,” eot 24, no. 1 (1990): 111-112, we reject an 
understanding of illocution as the intended effect on the audience and perlocution as the actual effect. 
Similarly, we find misleading Tovey’s assignment of illocutionary intent to the implied author and 
perlocutionary effect to the story (see 263). 
107 Contra J. E. Botha’s concept of the perlocutionary act as “sometimes … performed” (Jesus 
and the Samaritan Woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1-42 [Leiden: Brill, 1991], 48; cf. Vorster, 
111). Rather, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst point out, “Language users performing speech acts do 
not, in principle, do so with the sole intention of making the persons to whom they address themselves 
understand what speech act they are performing: rather, by means of those speech acts they hope to elicit 
from their listeners a particular response (verbal or otherwise)” (SAs, 23). Similarly, “when the listener 
perceives and understands the meaning (the language meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes an 
active, responsive attitude toward it. He either agrees or disagrees with it (completely or partially), 
augments it, applies it, prepares for its execution, and so on. … Thus, all real and integral understanding 
is actively responsive, and constitutes nothing other than the initial preparatory stage of a response (in 
whatever form it may be actualized)” (Bakhtin, 68-69).  
108 See S. Davis, “Perlocutions,” in Searle, Kiefer, and Bierwisch, 54.  
109 Contra H. Irsigler, who considers that “perlokutive Effekte oder Zwecke, das, was der 
Sprecher tatsächlich beim Hörer/Adressaten bewirken will, sind bzw. ist nicht konstitutiv mit bestimmten 
Illokutionen verbunden” (“Psalm-Rede als Handlungs-, Wirk- und Aussageprozeβ: Sprechaktanalyse und 
Psalmeninterpretation am Beispiel von Psalm 13,” in eue Wege der Psalmenforschung: Für Walter 
Beyerlin, 2nd ed., ed. K. Seybold and E. Zenger [Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1995], 69). Rather, we 
follow T. Cohen in considering “standard” perlocution to be directly “associated” with the illocution 
(“Illocutions and Perlocutions,” Foundations of Language 9 [1973]: 494-499; cf. van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst, “The Study of Argumentation from a Speech Act Perspective,” in Verschueren, 155). In 
this, “perlokutive Akte [i.e. perlokutionäre Effekte …] schließen sich irgendwie konventionell an den 
illokutiven Akte an” (E. Luge, “Perlokutionäre Effekte/Perlocutionary Effects,” Zeitschrift für 
germanistische Linguistik 19 [1991]: 75, brackets original, quoting P.-L. Völzing, “Gebrauchstexte, 
Linguistik und perlokutive Akte,” in Gebrauchsliteratur: Methodische Überlegungen und 
Beispielanalysen, ed. L. Fischer, K. Hickethier, and K. Riha [Stuttgart: Metzler, 1976: 103]). 
Cohen identifies two other types of perlocution: unintentional perlocution and indirect 
perlocution. In the latter, the perlocution stems from the locution (495-497). Indirect perlocution fits 
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other perlocutionary acts and effects, i.e., either unintentional perlocutionary effects or 
“effects or consequences of speech acts that are not brought about on the basis of 
understanding of an illocutionary act.”110 This means we reject Habermas’ model, since 
in it only non-associated perlocutionary effects are the goal of perlocutionary intention 
and associated perlocutionary effects are included in illocution.111 
The three-way correlation between each illocutionary act type and the associated 
perlocutionary act and perlocutionary effect is as follows: 
Assertive: that H believe that P. 
Directive: that H (intend to) do A. 
Commissive: that H believe S intends to fulfill his obligation to do A. 
Expressive: either (i) H believe S has the appropriate feeling or (ii) H respond 
with the appropriate feeling.112 
This correlation between illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts and associated 
perlocutionary effects113 is key to our action model of meaning since it shows the 
intended perlocutionary effect of every SA to be transformation of beliefs or behavior. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Tovey’s view when he defines “perlocutionary acts (perlocutions)” as “the intended effects that locutions 
are conventionally expected to have or to achieve” (71; cf. Lee, 37; and Luge, 74, 83). Our use of 
perlocution is narrower than that of Botha, who includes some non-associated perlocution (see 99, 104).  
110 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, SAs, 27. See also Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture 
& Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity; Nottingham: Apollos, 2002), 185. We do not find helpful 
Burkhardt’s redefining perlocution as the “intra-illocutionary effect” or the “illocutionary point” (“SAT,” 
98n117 and 98n119) or the notion that illocution is “a special type of perlocution” (Lee, 38n2). 
111 For Habermas, perlocutionary acts are not SAs but instead “constitute a subclass of 
teleological actions which must be carried out by means of speech acts, under the condition that the actor 
does not declare or admit to his aims as such” (Reason, 292; emphasis added. Cf. Reason, 293-294; 
Pragmatics, 126). Habermas considers perlocution to be strategic action, i.e., concealed action which 
involves exerting influence and manipulation while communicative action is “linguistically mediated 
interactions in which all participants pursue … only illocutionary aims” (Reason, 295). 
In his later work, Habermas modifies this slightly, distinguishing three classes of perlocutionary 
effects (Pragmatics, 320). The first resembles associated perlocution, the second are unintentional 
perlocutionary effects and the third are strategic actions, which “come about only if they are not declared 
or if they are brought about by deceptive speech acts that merely pretend to be valid” (203). However, 
Habermas emphasizes “that the distinction between communicative and strategic action is not influenced 
by this revision” (203). Moreover, for him, “the agreement reached with the hearer, that is, the hearer’s 
acceptance of the speech-act offer” is “achieved solely through the performance of the illocutionary act” 
(202). Thus, “the illocutionary meaning of an utterance is not that the hearer should take note of S’s belief 
(or intention) but rather that she should come to hold the same view as S (or that she should take seriously 
S’s announcement)” (320). For us, this is perlocution, not illocution. 
112 Adapted from Bach and Harnish, 81. With texts these correlations apply to the implied 
reader. Although Rolf uses Searle’s title of “extra-linguistic purposes” (see Searle, Intentionality, 178), 
instead of “perlocution,” his similar correlation includes Declarations. We agree with him that “the so-
called extra-linguistic purposes … have to be considered at all costs, if one wants to describe adequately 
what makes a speech act an action” (“Concept of Action,” 163).  
113 Contra S. Davis, who gives promising and thanking as examples of illocutionary acts without 
perlocutionary purposes (47), all illocutionary acts have associated perlocution. As Alston puts it, “For 
every illocutionary act type there is some type of belief or action such that the intention to elicit a belief 
or action of that type in A normally accompanies illocutionary acts of that type” (44). 
  98 
As with illocutionary intention,  
discernment of what perlocutionary acts a speaker is attempting to commit 
requires neither direct nor inferential access to the speaker’s cognitive or 
affective states. This is because it may be inferred pragmatically that the speaker 
attempts the same perlocutions with the speech act that any rational speaker 
would be attempting with such an act in identical circumstances.114  
Therefore, perlocutionary intentions are expressed through the correlated illocutionary 
intentions of the implied author, and they reveal the associated perlocutionary effects 
(responses) of the implied reader.115 
Because perlocution occurs in correlation with illocution, different types of 
illocutionary acts have different intended perlocutionary effects. With an Assertive, for 
example, the intended illocutionary effect is that the hearer/reader understand the 
illocutionary act, that is, understand that the Act is an Assertive and also what content is 
presented and with what degree of force. The intended perlocutionary effect is that 
hearers/readers adhere to the truth of the Assertive and transform their 
lifeworld/worldview accordingly.116  
In this regard, Directives are unique. They are the only illocutionary acts 
“definable in terms of the intended perlocutionary effect”; in other words, the intended 
perlocutionary effect of a Directive is a key element of the essential condition of a 
Directive illocutionary act.117 Additionally, unlike other SAs where the intended 
perlocution relates to transformation of the hearer’s knowledge base or belief system, 
the intended perlocutionary effect of a Directive is transformation of the hearer/reader’s 
actions. For this reason, Directives can be particularly important. 
                                                           
114 R. N. Gaines, “Doing By Saying: Toward a Theory of Perlocution,” QJS 65 (1979): 214n25. 
We do not mean to imply by this that the making of a perlocutionary act depends on its success. Rolf 
names “absurde” those views in which “den Vollzug perlokutionärer Akte in irgendeiner Form abhängig 
machen vom faktischen Eintreten beabsichtigter Wirkungen auf seiten des Adressaten einer solchen 
Handlung” (“Perlokutionäre Akte und perlokutionäre Effekte,” in Sprache erkennen und verstehen, ed. K. 
Detering, J. Schmidt-Radefeldt, and W. Sucharowski [Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1982], 264). He adds 
that “der Erfolg, das Erreichen des Ziels einer Handlung für deren Vollzug keine Bedingung darstellen 
kann” (267).  
115 This is what we take “understanding” a perlocutionary act to mean. 
116 The mutual context of the speaker and hearer is altered at the illocutionary level (see chapter 
4, n111) as a result both of the presentation of an illocutionary act with its preparatory and sincerity 
conditions and of hearer/reader understanding (see Thiselton, ew Horizons, 565; Gadamer, 570; Lee, 
38n2; D. Wunderlich, “Methodological Remarks on Speech Act Theory,” in Searle, Kiefer, and 
Bierwisch, 292; T. Ward, Word and Supplement: Speech Acts, Biblical Texts, and the Sufficiency of 
Scripture [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], 99; and Sbisà, 433). As Alston notes, “Just by virtue 
of being an act it [an illocutionary act] will have consequences” (32). But this is not the transformation 
which occurs with full perlocutionary act success. 
117 Searle, SA, 71. This refutes his contention that perlocution never plays a role in meaning.  
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Some illocutionary acts are indirect, i.e., their function is not evidenced by their 
grammar. Such illocutionary acts still have a single illocutionary force and perlocution. 
For example, “Blessed is he whose transgressions are forgiven, whose sins are covered” 
(Ps 32:1 NIV, quoted in Rom 4:7-8) is, on its surface, an Assertive. But taken within its 
OT co-text, and especially considering Psalm 32:5-6, it is a warning (or, minimally, a 
suggestion) and thus is a Directive.118 The intended perlocutionary effect is not audience 
adherence to the truth of the statement. Rather, as a Directive, the intended 
perlocutionary effect is the action of confession and seeking forgiveness; this is what 
the implied reader does upon both understanding and adhering to the warning. 
Successful Perlocution and the Interactive Communication of Meaning 
A SA is fully successful only when it is perlocutionarily successful. We define a 
successful perlocutionary act as one where the empirical reader/hearer responds with 
the intended perlocutionary response (belief or action) called for from the implied 
reader.119 This we term “adherence.”  
Because perlocutionary acts are both intentional and direct, illocutionary success 
is necessary for perlocutionary success. This means that for empirical readers to make 
the intended perlocutionary response, they must first respond with the illocutionary 
effect of understanding.120 However, illocutionary success is not sufficient for 
perlocutionary success.121 As Gadamer points out using the example of a Directive, “The 
intended recipient of the order … is well able to distinguish between understanding and 
obeying an order. It is possible for him not to obey even when—indeed, precisely 
when—he has understood it.”122  
                                                           
118 See Bach and Harnish, 49, for a discussion of the “Advisories” subtype of Directive. 
119 We follow Rolf in speaking “vom Erfolge einer Handlung” as “wenn die intendierte und die 
faktisch erzielte Wirkung zusammenfallen” (Sprache, 265), with the caveat that regarding perlocution we 
refer only to associated perlocution. Rolf adds that “wenn meine Worte jedoch nicht gehört und nicht 
verstanden wurden, dann läβt sich dennoch nicht sagen, ich hätte nicht gehandelt …; feststellen läβt sich 
lediglich, daβ ich mit meiner Handlung den mit ihr verfolgten Zweck nicht erreicht habe und insofern 
nicht erfolgreich war” (266). 
120 See S. Davis, 44. Although a reader/hearer who does not understand the illocution could 
make the appropriate perlocutionary response by chance, “accidental” perlocution does not concern us. 
Nor are we interested in the possible success of a non-associated perlocutionary act. 
121 See van Eemeren and Grootendorst, SAs, 25. As K. Bach points out, “We need to distinguish 
the success of a speech act as an illocutionary and as a perlocutionary act” (“Pragmatics and the 
Philosophy of Language,” in Horn and Ward, 469). 
122 Gadamer, 330. Cf. W. J. Houston, “What Did the Prophets Think They Were Doing? Speech 
Acts and Prophetic Discourse in the Old Testament,” BibInt 1, no. 2 [July 1993]: 177). This is a difficulty 
with Habermas’ model, in which successful illocution includes adherence (see n111). 
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Perlocutionary intentionality does not imply causality. Perlocution “is a joint 
endeavour between S and H. It involves S’s performance of speech acts and H’s 
performance of response-acts.”123 Perlocutionary effects are “actively produced by H, 
who has the claim to the agency of the effects.”124 The success of a perlocution depends 
on hearer cooperation.125  
In our model, neither authorial intention (even with perlocutionary intention) nor 
reader response is the sole determinant of communicative meaning. Although we agree 
the author “created and patterned the set of relations being analyzed, had a purpose in 
doing so, and still has a relation to the text him or herself that is important for 
interpretation,”126 communication is not a one-way transmittal from author to reader. 
Nor does the hearer/reader create meaning unilaterally; we disagree with the radical 
reader-response positions of theorists such as Stanley Fish and Richard Rorty127 as well 
as with the notion that “the autonomy of the text … hands writing over to the sole 
interpretation of the reader.”128 Rather, the empirical reader plays a role in the interactive 
                                                           
123 Gu, 422, arguing against Austin’s claim that since “mental events … are not acts,” a hearer 
“has no claim of agency concerning the effects produced in him.” Like Gu, Rolf argues that “kann 
generell festgestellt werden, daβ—in analytischer Perspektive gesehen—eine Handlung und der mit ihr 
verfolgte Zweck beziehungsweise die mit ihr intendierte Wirkung eines ist, die erzielte Wirkung jedoch 
ein anderes” (“Perlokutionäre Akte,” 265). D. Marcu calls “attaching little or no importance to the role of 
the hearer in the perlocutionary act” a fallacy (“Perlocutions: The Achilles’ Heel of Speech Act Theory,” 
JPrag 32, no. 12 [November 2000]: 1726; italics omitted, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0378-2166(99)00121-
6 [accessed July 4, 2008]).  
124 Gu, 422; cf. Luge, 76. Similarly, P. R. Cohen and C. R. Perrault argue that “while a speaker 
often has performed illocutionary acts with the goal of achieving certain perlocutionary effects, the actual 
securing of those effects is beyond his control. Thus, it is entirely possible for a speaker to make an 
assertion, and for the audience to recognize the force of the utterance as an assertion and yet not be 
convinced” (“Elements of a Plan-Based Theory of Speech Acts,” Cognitive Science 3 [1979]: 187). P. 
Campbell asserts that “each party to a language or communicative act possesses language and, therefore, 
is not simply manipulated by others, but participates in the acts of persuading, ordering, etc.” (296). This 
is in contrast to the passive role allotted to the reader by Bach and Harnish: “If the hearer forms a 
corresponding attitude that the speaker intended him to form, the speaker has achieved a perlocutionary 
effect in addition to illocutionary uptake” (39, emphasis added; cf. Austin, HDTW, 121.). 
125 See Kurzon, 571, 574, 575, passim. 
126 Snodgrass, 19. 
127 See n96. For a summary of various reader-response arguments, including Barthes’ lisible and 
scriptible texts and deconstructionism, see Y. Sherwood, The Prostitute and the Prophet: Hosea’s 
Marriage in Literary-Theoretical Perspective (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), especially 
chapters 1-3. Witherington points out that even ardent reader-response theorists “like S. Fish, have been 
willing to object that they have been misquoted or misunderstood at times and that we must think in terms 
of interpretive communities which guide our reading. But no complaints about being misunderstood can 
be allowed to stand unless one has intended some specific meaning in the first place which was misheard 
or misinterpreted. And why should we need interpretive communities if the meaning simply happens 
between the reader and the text?” (Mark, 57).  
128 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics,” in HHS, 174. (See n6, this 
chapter). Our difficulty is with the word “sole” since, in general, Ricoeur neither unleashes the reader nor 
ignores the author. For example, he finds that “to interpret is to explicate the type of being-in-the-world 
unfolded in front of the text” (“Function,” 141) and he warns against forgetting “that a text remains a 
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communication of meaning first by understanding the identity of the implied reader 
created by the implied author and presented in the text and then, in situations of fully 
successful communicative interaction, by envisaging him or herself as that reader. 
In this, there are similarities between our model and the thoughts of conservative 
reader-response theorist Umberto Eco. As we do, Eco uses the construct of the implied 
(for him, Model) reader.129 Similarly, he sees pragmatics as concerned 
not only with the phenomenon of interpretation (of signs, sentences, or texts) or 
of indexical expressions, but also with the “essential dependence of 
communication in natural languages on speaker and hearer, on linguistic context 
and extralinguistic context, on the availability of background knowledge, on 
readiness to obtain this background knowledge and on the good will of the 
participants in the communication act.”130  
Eco does not privilege the reader to the extent of considering any reading to be valid,131 
and in his focus on the interaction of the text and the reader, he equates the intentions of 
the text with those of the implied author.132 His concept of pragmatics accords with our 
ideas about mutual context and author/reader cooperation.  
Our action model, in which meaning is a three-dimensional communicative 
interaction mediated through text via the construction of the implied author and the 
implied reader, does not present the communication of meaning as the sole purview of 
either the author or the reader but of both/and. Our action model recognizes both the 
author and the reader as active agents in the co-creation of meaning.133 And it does not 
consider just the dimension of illocution; we see meaning as fully communicated only 
when the SA in its totality, including perlocution, is successful. Since successful 
perlocution occurs only when the empirical reader responds with the perlocutionary 
                                                                                                                                                                          
discourse told by somebody, said by someone to someone else about something” (Interpretation Theory, 
18). For the empirical reader, “it is not a question of imposing upon the text our finite capacity of 
understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarged self” (“Function,” 
143). Walhout suggests the way “to defend textual autonomy” is “to ignore authorial intention and posit 
the presence of an ‘implied author’” (“Texts,” 48). But we argue instead that it is via the implied author 
that we discover the intentions of the empirical author. 
129 See U. Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts, First Midland 
Book ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 7-10. 
130 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 213, 
quoting Y. Bar-Hillel, “Communication and Argumentation in Pragmatic Languages,” in Linguaggi nella 
società e nella tecnicà (Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1970), 271.  
131 According to Eco, there are “bad” readings; any interpretation is to be checked against “the 
text as a coherent whole” (Limits, 60, 149). 
132 Cf. U. Eco, “Between Author and Text,” in Eco et al., 69; and Eco, Limits, 59. Although Eco 
says that “in this dialectics between the intention of the reader and the intention of the text, the intention 
of the empirical author has been totally disregarded” (“Between Author and Text,” 65), this reference to 
“intention” appears to be to authorial “motive,” which we agree is not necessary to recover. 
133 Our model of communication “treats speakers and addressees as partners” (H. Clark, 132).  
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response (effect) intended for the implied reader by the implied author, SAs which are 
only understood (the illocutionary response) are not fully successful communicative 
interactions. This understanding of the role of the author and reader in both illocution 
and perlocution is the foundation of the reader role of Envisager. 
The Reader as Envisager 
The implied reader is an Envisager since, by definition, the implied reader responds 
with the illocutionary effect of understanding and also with the perlocutionary effect 
corresponding to the perlocutionary intention of the implied author.134 Therefore, for 
Envisaging to be accomplished empirically, there must be full communicative 
interaction, i.e., the SA must be both illocutionarily and perlocutionarily successful. An 
Envisaging empirical reader not only understands the force of the illocutionary act but 
also responds with the intended perlocutionary effect.135 Only Envisaging readers 
undertake the necessary transformation of beliefs/thoughts or action to “live into” or 
“inhabit” the lifeworld and Story presented by the implied author.136 What 
transformation is required of the Envisager can be examined on a theoretical basis, 
without knowing the actual response of any empirical reader or whether any particular 
SA has been fully successful.137 
                                                           
134 When empirical readers envisage themselves as the implied or “ideal” reader, they 
“experience the intended perlocutionary effect” (M. Steinmann, Jr., “Speech-Act Theory and Writing,” in 
What Writers Know: The Language, Process, and Structure of Written Discourse, ed. M. Nystrand [New 
York: Academic Press, 1982], 310). Since the construct of implied author/reader does not apply to 
conversation, we call hearers “envisaging” if they respond appropriately to a NT speaker’s illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts. 
135 An Envisaging empirical reader does not have to form an intention to be an Envisager. It is 
the result that determines what role an empirical reader adopts. 
136 L. Johnson avers that “if Scripture is ever again to be a living source for theology, those who 
practice theology must become less preoccupied with the world that produced Scripture and learn again 
how to live in the world Scripture produces” (“Imagining,” 165). More specifically, K. Möller concludes 
with regard to Psalm 101 that “in singing or praying this psalm, we, its modern readers, are ourselves 
making a pledge; we are committing ourselves to the behaviour the ancient psalmist thought appropriate 
for a king” (“Reading, Singing and Praying the Law: An Exploration of the Performative, Self-Involving, 
Commissive Language of Psalm 101,” in Reading the Law: Studies in Honour of Gordon J. Wenham, ed. 
J. G. McConville and K. Möller [New York: T&T Clark, 2007], 135-136). With regard to Directives, 
Gadamer notes that if the contemporary reader “really wants to understand the order,” i.e., if the order is 
to be perlocutionarily successful for that reader, that reader must “perform the same act as that performed 
by the intended recipient of the order” (330). In this regard, P. Stuhlmacher notes that “Gadamer … geht 
vom dem Grundsatz aus, eine wirklich werkgetreue Interpretation historischer Urkunden sie nur möglich 
im Horizont des Einverständnisses mit der Tradition” (Vom Verstehen des euen Testaments: Eine 
Hermeneutik, 2nd ed. [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986], 224, as quoted by Sohns, 15).  
137 Contra Vorster, who argues that “perlocutionary acts are relevant for New Testament studies 
only in an intratextual conversational situation where the effect of an illocutionary act is given” (112). T. 
Polk treats “meaning” differently than we do when he adds actual reader response. For him, a text’s 
“ultimate meaning … is only completed in the reader’s living. How s/he responds to the summons and 
pursues the intended transformation become part of the work’s scope. In fact, that response becomes one 
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Empirical readers may have difficulty undertaking the called-for transformation. 
Not only is “the perlocutionary function … the least communicable,”138 i.e., a SA has 
the greatest chance to be unsuccessful in the dimension of perlocution, reading 
cooperatively “does not foreclose critique.”139 Hays relates this to the faithful reading of 
Scripture: “Is all questioning to be excluded, all critical reading banished? By no means. 
Asking necessary and difficult questions is not to be equated with apistia.”140 In some 
cases, even if understanding is accomplished, the empirical reader may choose not to 
make the intended perlocutionary response. Even a cooperative reader may conclude 
that the role of Envisager must be rejected, i.e., that the world being offered is not one 
that can be “inhabited” with integrity or coherence.141 In such a case, the potential 
Envisager remains at the level of Analyst, someone who understands the intention of the 
implied author but does not respond with the intended perlocutionary effect and the 
requisite lifeworld transformation.  
We tie Envisaging to quotation with Stanley’s thought that “Paul wrote his 
letters not to lay out a set of theological beliefs, but to motivate specific first-century 
Christians to believe and/or act (or stop believing or acting) in particular ways.”142 As 
Derek Tovey asks, “Is it the case that the primary intention of the Fourth Gospel is to 
display a state of affairs with no intention that this should have an impact on the reader 
which is world-changing, or action-inducing?”143 He answers his own question: “The 
purpose of his [the implied author’s] narrative is so to affect their worldview that they 
orient their lives in accordance with what follows from accepting his assertions.”144 
Lifeworld/worldview and theology are transformed when reading is Envisaging. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
criterion for evaluating what the text is and does, what it ultimately means” (The Prophetic Persona: 
Jeremiah and the Language of the Self [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1984], 174). 
138 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 18. 
139 Meyer, Critical Realism, 22; cf. Vanhoozer, Meaning, 227. Tovey also points out that 
“readers are at liberty to accept or reject at all levels” (97).  
140 Hays, “Salvation,” 221. 
141 For Vanhoozer, “readers must not only respond but respond responsibly. … It may be that, 
once having grasped the text’s intended sense, the reader will recoil in disgust” (“Reader,” 315). This 
reference is to the empirical reader since the implied reader always makes the response intended by the 
implied author. The more divergent the goals and interests of the empirical author and reader, the more 
difficult it may be for an empirical reader to be envisaging (see M. L. Pratt, “Ideology and Speech-Act 
Theory,” PT 7, no. 1 [1986]: 68-69, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1772088 [accessed October 5, 2007]).  
142 Stanley, Arguing, 3. This thought inspired some of our discussion of quotation in chapter 2. 
143 Tovey, 196. 
144 Ibid., 89. “The narrative is a theological display which, in setting forth the state of affairs it 
represents, seeks an affective response. This response is not to be at the level of aesthetic enjoyment but 
of belief and self-involvement in the ‘world’ which is represented in the story” (265). 
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As the final step in creating our methodology, we put our action model on the 
same linguistic level as our theological framework and the implied author/reader 
construct. In other words, we consider “how speech act functions are realized in larger 
text units”145 since those are the building blocks of Story. 
Speech-Act Complexes 
In the 1960s there was a move from the word to the sentence as the unit of 
communication. This is reflected in Searle’s belief that “the characteristic grammatical 
form of the illocutionary act is the complete sentence. … Sentences, not words, are used 
to say things.”146 Linguistics has gone further and now operates “from the assumption 
that communication occurs in discourses, not in isolated or random sentences.”147 
Although some scholars name the paragraph “the developmental unit of discourse,”148 
because “paragraph” is a grammatical term, we instead consider the SAC to be the 
portion of a text which has homogeneity and cohesiveness.149  
The SAs in a SAC are not generally equally weighted. SAs “do not merely 
follow each other at the same level: … some acts may have secondary rank with respect 
to others.”150 Our name for “the main act intended in a sequence of speech acts, such 
                                                           
145 E. M. Hatch, Discourse and Language Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 152.  
146 Searle, SA, 25. “The history of linguistics shows that for semantics the word was first 
regarded as the practical unit of communication” (J. P. Louw, “Discourse Analysis and the Greek New 
Testament,” BT 24, no. 1 [January 1973]: 102). Prior to Searle, “Frege pointed out … sentences and not 
words are the primary units of meaning of a language” (Vanderveken, 7). Austin also argued that “it 
appears correct to say that what ‘has meaning’ in the primary sense is the sentence” (Philosophical 
Papers, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock [Oxford: Clarendon, 1970], 56). 
147 S. E. Porter, “Greek Grammar and Syntax,” in The Face of ew Testament Studies: A Survey 
of Recent Research, ed. S. McKnight and G. R. Osborne (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic; Leicester: 
Apollos, 2004), 99. G. H. Guthrie refers to discourse analysts D. Allen and T. Givón in pointing out that 
“the primary locus of discourse meaning resides above the sentence level” (“Discourse Analysis,” in 
Interpreting the ew Testament: Essays on Methods and Issues, ed. D. A. Black and D. S. Dockery 
[Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2001], 256). Similarly, Walhout avers we “have to go beyond the 
sentence in order to determine the illocutionary force of its utterance” (“Hermeneutics,” 67). 
148 Longacre, 288. See also Osborne, for whom the paragraph is “the key to the thought 
development of biblical books” (41). 
149 We adapt “speech-act complex” from van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s discussion of 
illocutionary act complexes (cf. SAs, 34). The notion that “homogeneity and cohesiveness” define its 
boundaries comes from Louw (103). In a later work, van Eemeren and Grootendorst tie these “‘higher’ 
textual levels” to SAT (cf. “Study,” 154).  
A SAC is generally a smaller unit than van Dijk’s macro or global SA (cf. 238), which is similar 
to Brown and Yule’s “speech event,” i.e., “an activity in which participants interact via language in some 
conventional way to arrive at some outcome” (57; cf. 47, 135, and Hatch, 136). Conventionally patterned 
interactions such as Brigg’s examples of confessing faith, forgiving sin and teaching (see Words, chapters 
6-8) are beyond the scope of this study. Not only are they not related to quotation, they would require an 
expansion of our action model. 
150 Van Dijk, 216. As Chatman describes it, the various “text-types routinely operate at each 
other’s service” (Terms, 10). 
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that the other speech acts are components or auxiliary/preparatory for that act” is the 
core SA.151 The illocutionary act type of the core SA determines the illocutionary 
function of the SAC.152 Tellability also can be extended into SACs since it “can be 
meaningfully applied to utterances of more than a single sentence, utterances whose 
individual sentences probably represent a wide variety of speech act types.”153 
Whether there is a natural hierarchy of SAs in a SAC has not been proven.154 But 
Kathleen Callow and John Callow find that  
cohesive prominence occurs when two units are joined in a coherence relation: 
unless this is a purely additive relationship, it is normal for one member of the 
pairing to carry more impact, more cognitive weight, than the other. Thus result 
is more naturally prominent than reason, response than stimulus, and so on. … 
The naturally prominent elements constitute the structural core of the unit, to 
which the less prominent units relate.155  
From a SA perspective, Alessandro Ferrera argues that “the hierarchic status of 
a speech act in a sequence corresponds to the hierarchic status of the extra-illocutionary 
[i.e., perlocutionary] goal that it is meant to achieve.”156 This means Directives are likely 
to have some sort of “purposive prominence.” Therefore, in our analysis, we generally 
                                                           
151 Van Dijk, 226. The core SA equates to the topic sentence of a paragraph. But “topic” has the 
sense of content, i.e., “what a discourse or part of it ‘is about’” (6) whereas the core SA includes not only 
propositional content but also illocution and perlocution.  
152 Often, a “sequence of (various) speech acts as a whole has the function of a command, 
advice, etc.” (van Dijk, 233; cf. Brown and Yule, 233). Pratt convincingly argues that there is “a level of 
analysis at which utterances with a single point or purpose must be treated as single speech acts, or 
‘discourse acts,’ or ‘texts,’ if we wish” (SAT, 141). See also Irsigler, who argues with regard to Psalm 13 
that “von der Feststellung 6d her, d.h. von der Ebene des erreichten Wirkungszwecks her, erscheint die 
ganze Psalmrede nachträglich als ein einziger komplexer perlokutiver Akt” (87) and Tovey, who speaks 
of “the perlocutionary effect intended by the narrative [of John’s Gospel] taken as a whole” (92). 
153 Pratt, SAT, 141. In some cases, it is helpful to further identify the illocutionary force of the 
SAs and/or the SAC according to the subtypes proposed by Bach and Harnish. 
154 In response to the questions “Was aber, wenn in einem Text aufgrund seiner Komplexität 
verschiedene Illokutionen vorkommen …? Welche Illokution ist dann die dominante?,” A. Wagner 
suggests several possibilities: “Die einen beschreiten den Weg, einen Text mit einer Äuβerung 
gleichzusetzen und nach der dominanten zugrundeliegenden Illokution zu fragen. … Ein zweiter Weg, 
sich der Sprechaktseite eines Textes zu nähern, is es, auf die Kombination und Abfolge von Illokutionen 
einzelner Äuβerungen/Sätze in Texten zu achten. … Ein weiterer Weg besteht darin, die 
sprechakttheoretische Dimension eines Texts nicht aus der Addition seiner Einzelteile, sondern aus der 
(in sich heterogenen) Gesamtheit des Textes zu gewinnen” (“Die Stellung,” 80-81). We prefer those 
options which recognize that individual SAs retain their illocutionary force. 
155 K. Callow and J. C. Callow, “Text as Purposive Communication: A Meaning-based 
Analysis,” in Discourse Description: Diverse Linguistic Analyses of a Fund-Raising Text, ed. W. C. 
Mann and S. A. Thompson (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1992), 11. Motsch and Pasch believe “offenbar ist 
jeweils eine der beiden illokutiven Handlungen dominierend, d. h., sie gibt an, was der Sprecher mit der 
Textäuβerung erreichen will” (72). Further, “ergibt sich die Möglichkeit von Hierarchien illokutiver 
Handlungen” (Ibid., 73). This seems intuitively likely. 
156 A. Ferrera, “Pragmatics,” in Dimensions of Discourse, vol. 2 of Handbook of Discourse 
Analysis, ed. T. A. van Dijk (London: Academic Press, 1985), 144. Along these lines, Searle and 
Vanderveken argue that “expressives are the weakest” type of SA (178). 
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consider how other SAs support any Directives in either the SAC or the related speech 
event. 
Thiselton notes that “a speech-act, or series of speech-acts, may be able 
simultaneously to project narrative-worlds and assert states of affairs and transform the 
perceptions of readers.”157 This we believe is the goal of an envisaging OT reader-now-
NT author who quotes an OT passage. An Envisaging NT speaker/author moves beyond 
understanding the message of the text to live into the world presented by the implied 
OT author. By subsequently quoting that passage, the envisaging NT speaker/author 
evokes an OT Story-line or an intervening interpretation of it in order to invite the NT 
audience to hear/read the recontextualized Story as Envisagers and then to live into that 
lifeworld and adopt its theological worldview of its Story.158 Because an Envisaging 
empirical reader responds with the intended perlocutionary effect of belief and/or 
action, that reader moves towards inhabiting the lifeworld presented in the text and 
adopting its Story and worldview. 
In our two case studies, we use our methodology to explore how a particular 
quotation is intended to transform the Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview of the 
Envisaging empirical NT audience. In the next chapter, we introduce the case studies by 
outlining the steps of our analysis and laying some groundwork concerning the Psalms 
generally. 
                                                           
157 Thiselton, “Reader-Response Hermeneutics,” 100-101; cf. First Epistle, 41; ew Horizons, 1-
54, 558-620. 
158 Although the NT writings were no doubt crafted with certain audience characteristics in 
mind, we do not limit “empirical” to “original.” “Empirical” refers to all flesh-and-blood readers or 
potential readers. “Audience” also includes hearers within the text. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ITRODUCTIO TO THE CASE STUDIES 
Our final step is to demonstrate the applicability of our methodology. In addition to the 
examples we have already presented from the NT Psalms quotations to illustrate various 
aspects of our methodology, as case studies we use our full methodology to examine 
two Psalms passages quoted in the NT. The first is Psalm 115:1 LXX as quoted by Paul 
in 2 Corinthians 4:13. The second is Psalm 110:1 [109:1 LXX] as quoted by Jesus in the 
Synoptic Gospels, by Peter in Acts 2:34-35, by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:25, and by the 
author of Hebrews in Hebrews 1:13. 
The Organization of the Case Studies 
In each case study, we first determine the contribution of the source (OT) SAs within 
their SAC to Story and thus to lifeworld/ worldview and theology. In keeping with our 
pragmatic focus, we use Ernst Wendland’s five major Psalm functions: “petition, 
thanksgiving, praise, instruction and profession of trust” and his five minor functions: 
“repentance, remembrance, retribution, royalty, and liturgy”1 to establish the boundaries 
of the SAC which contains the quoted passage.  
We next ascertain what role is played by each SA. This involves applying our 
action model, first discussing any critical issues of locution and then determining the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions and desired perlocutionary response, using 
the construct of the implied author/reader and remembering the implied reader is not 
necessarily the direct addressee.2 As part of this analysis, we consider relevant elements, 
if any, of the socio-cultural context, literary conventions and the immediate and broader 
                                                           
1 E. R. Wendland, Analyzing the Psalms: With Exercises for Bible Students and Translators, 2nd 
ed. [(Dallas?): SIL International, 2002], 33. We prefer Wendland’s schema to the more complicated 
typology of H. Gunkel (see Introduction to Psalms: The Genres of the Religious Lyric of Israel, comp. J. 
Begrich, trans. J. D. Nogalski [Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1998]). We also find that typologies 
which contain three or fewer categories are not sufficiently detailed for SAC analysis. Examples include: 
Westermann; A. Weiser (The Psalms: A Commentary, trans. H. Hartwell [Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1962]); W. Brueggemann (The Message of the Psalms: A Theological Commentary [Minneapolis: 
Augsburg, 1984]); and Wendland’s earlier work (“Continuity and Discontinuity in Hebrew Poetic 
Design: Patterns and Points of Significance in the Structure and Setting of Psalm 30,” in Discourse 
Perspectives on Hebrew Poetry in the Scriptures, ed. E. R. Wendland [Reading, UK: United Bible 
Societies, 1994]).  
2 In Psalms passages where God is the original direct addressee, the implied reader is most likely 
a side participant or an overhearer. 
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co-text.3 We also evaluate what is known of any subsequent interpretations of the 
passage which may have been available in the NT period. 
Determining illocutionary and perlocutionary intention and desired 
perlocutionary response allows us to identify what it would mean for an empirical 
hearer/reader to respond as an Envisager, i.e., a hearer/reader who understands the 
illocutionary acts and also responds with the perlocutionary effects associated with the 
perlocutionary acts. This allows us to evaluate the theological import of the SA, i.e., 
what answers to the basic theological questions are implied, as well as how the SA 
contributes to the Story of God’s people and ultimately to lifeworld and worldview. 
Turning to the NT quotation, we follow the same process to determine the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions and desired perlocutionary response of the 
SAC which contains the quotation. We then consider what elements of the theological 
OT Story-line are evoked by the quotation and what perlocutionary responses of belief 
and/or action would be made by the implied reader and, by definition, the Envisaging 
empirical reader. From this, we can ascertain both whether the NT author reads the OT 
as an Envisager and what transformation of lifeworld/worldview and corresponding 
Story is in view for those in the NT audience who read as Envisagers. 
Whenever a text contains a report of direct speech, there are two levels of 
discourse. These are not entirely separable since what we know of the original dialog is 
mediated and framed by the implied author of the reporting text. Nevertheless, we must 
attend to both levels. This is the situation in our second case study where (i) the source 
text contains a quotation and (ii) the NT author recounts an episode in which either 
Jesus or Peter quotes the source text.  
To introduce the case studies, we consider the role the Psalms may have played 
in the lifeworld and Story of Yahweh’s people, both ethnic Jews and God-fearers.4 
The Psalms within the Jewish Lifeworld 
In their original setting the Psalms are primarily non-narrative and non-historical.5 In 
general, they do not recount events that occurred in the history of Yahweh’s relationship 
                                                           
3 In each case study, we discuss which elements of co-text are relevant. 
4 Although some Psalms use “Elohim” (םיהלא) to refer to the Israelite deity, the case study 
Psalms use “Yahweh” (הוהי). Where clarity is needed, we use “Yahweh.” 
5 There are a few exceptions. Of the 18 historical psalms identified by Wendland (Analyzing, 48) 
or A. A. Anderson (“Psalms,” in It is Written: Scripture Citing Scripture; Essays in Honour of Barnabas 
Lindars, SSF, ed. D. A. Carson and H. G. M. Williamson [1988; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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with Israel. Their connection to the Story of Israel is not via its stories. However, the 
Story of Yahweh and Yahweh’s people not only underpins the Psalms, the Psalms 
contribute to that Story in a significant way by providing answers to the basic 
theological questions.  
On the one hand, the Psalms answer the basic theological questions about the 
deity: “whether there is a god, what relation this god has to the world in which we live, 
and what if anything this god is doing, or will do, about putting it to rights.”6 The 
Psalms define and describe what can be expected of Yahweh, presenting Yahweh as a 
god of righteousness and justice as well as the covenant people’s source of help and 
comfort in times of trouble, whether that trouble comes from external sources or results 
from the psalmist’s or the people’s own behavior. 
On the other hand, the Psalms also provide answers to the basic theological 
questions of human existence (“who are we, where are we, what is wrong, and what is 
the solution”7). The answers to these questions in the Psalms involve worship (i.e., 
praxis). As Watson describes it, “in the context of the covenant, it is the Book of Psalms 
that best represents the full range of human worship of God.”8 Every human emotion is 
included: “From anger to adulation, the various psalms cover the gamut of human 
emotion and response to God’s presence in the world, or lack thereof.”9 More than 
simply describing how a person or group has interacted with Yahweh in a specific 
situation, the Psalms call for an integrated life in relationship with Yahweh. 
William Brown argues that the Psalms are “the theological center of the Old 
Testament. … On David’s many-stringed lyre, as it were, there can be heard almost 
every theological chord that resounds throughout the Hebrew Scriptures, from covenant 
and history to creation and wisdom.”10 Although some scholars have attempted to 
identify one major theological theme of the Psalter,11 it is more helpful to determine 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Press, 2008], 59), six are explicitly quoted in the NT. In three instances, Pss 78:24b, 89:20 and 95:7-11, 
the quoted passage references an historical event. However, these quotations do not figure in our study.  
6 N. T. Wright, TPG, 127. As McCann notes, “The Psalms are not just human words to God. 
They are also words about God. They teach us about God; they reveal who God is” (16). 
7 N. T. Wright, TPG, 123. 
8 Watson, Text, 240. 
9 W. P. Brown, Seeing the Psalms: A Theology of Metaphor (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox, 2002), 2. 
10 W. Brown, 1. According to S. Terrien, the themes of the Psalter “are articulated together 
according to an unspoken architecture of theocentricity” (The Psalms: Strophic Structure and Theological 
Commentary [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 44). 
11 Some central themes scholars argue for the Psalms include: the cult of the Covenant, the 
presence of Yahweh, and Yahweh as king. The first of these is Weiser’s thesis and also encompasses S. 
Mowinckel’s cult functional approach (The Psalms in Israel’s Worship, trans. D. R. Ap-Thomas [New 
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how the SACs with which we are concerned contribute to Story and then to determine 
whether and, if so, how the NT quotation re-presents those elements of Story. 
To demonstrate that the Psalms inhabited the lifeworld/worldview intersection 
of Story, theology and praxis for the people of Yahweh at the end of the Second Temple 
period, we need to briefly assess the role the Psalms played. 
The Psalms in the Praxis of the First-Century People of Yahweh 
Worship and prayer were a vital part of first-century praxis in Jerusalem. There were 
daily sacrifices in the Temple, with special requirements for the Sabbath; other festivals 
were celebrated monthly or annually.12 The postexilic books of Chronicles and 
Nehemiah tell us that “in the period of the Second Temple, during the rule of the 
Persians, Greeks and Romans, the singing of psalms and sacred music had a privileged 
place among all the liturgical celebrations, sacrifices, fasts, vigils, pilgrimages, etc., in 
Jerusalem.”13 Since a goal of the Chronicler was to encourage true worship of Yahweh, 
the importance placed on singing Psalms and other hymns highlights proper worship 
praxis in the Second Temple period.14 Additionally, there are numerous allusions to the 
Psalms and psalmic language in the postexilic OT prophets, most notably in the later 
chapters of Isaiah and in Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi.15 
The Psalms appear to have been used not only in the Temple in Jerusalem but 
also in domestic devotional practices. Domestically, J. A. Smith believes the Psalms 
were sung during the Second Temple period in the Passover ritual, at weddings and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
York: Abingdon, 1962]). The second is the foundation of Terrien’s argument (cf. 57). For the central 
theme of Yahweh as king, see H. H. Guthrie, Jr., Israel’s Sacred Songs: A Study of Dominant Themes 
[New York: Seabury, 1966], 23); J. L. Mays, “The Centre of the Psalms,” in Language, Theology, and the 
Bible, ed. S. E. Balentine and J. Barton (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 232; D. M. Howard, Jr., “The Psalms 
and Current Study,” in Interpreting the Psalms: Issues and Approaches, ed. D. Firth and P. S. Johnston 
(Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2005), 27; and McCann, 163.  
However, we do not wish to presuppose any single theme for the Psalms or Psalms quotations. 
Nor do we accept B. K. Waltke’s notion that “the specific predictions of some psalms that find their 
fulfillment in Jesus Christ combined with the use of the Psalter in the New Testament suggest that the 
entire Psalter pertains to Jesus Christ and his church” (“Christ in the Psalms,” in The Hope Fulfilled: 
Essays in Honor of O. Palmer Robertson, ed. R. L. Penny [Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2008], 
41). Instead, we evaluate each quotation on its own merits. 
12 For a discussion of the worship use of the psalms, see J. W. McKinnon, “On the Question of 
Psalmody in the Ancient Synagogue,” Early Music History 6 [1986]: 163, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
853939 (accessed February 13, 2008). 
13 R. J. Tournay, Seeing and Hearing God with the Psalms: The Prophetic Liturgy of the Second 
Temple in Jerusalem, trans. J. E. Crowley (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 27. Tournay also refers to the 
book of Ezra (probably Ezra 3:11). 2 Macc 2:13 attributes to Nehemiah the collection of “the books about 
the kings and prophets, and the writings of David, and letters of kings about votive offerings.” 
14 Cf. Terrien, 60n200.  
15 Cf. S. Gillingham, “From Liturgy to Prophecy: The Use of Psalmody in Second Temple 
Judaism,” CBQ 64, no. 3 (2002): 474-476.  
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funerals, and, based on 4 Maccabees 18:15, as part of a father’s religious instruction of 
his children. He concludes that “psalm singing may therefore be considered to have 
been a normal concomitant of the religious life of the family in the home.”16 Another 
indication that the Psalter was “the meditation book of pious groups and of private 
individuals” comes from the use of part of Psalm 136 in 1 Maccabees.17 
As regards synagogue use, Samuel Terrien claims “the book of Chronicles 
reflects an epoch when the Psalms were intoned not only in the temple ceremonies but 
also among the synagogues of the Diaspora.”18 Lawrence Schiffman concurs that 
“throughout the Second Temple period, increasing emphasis was placed on the 
requirement of daily prayer for all Jews. For many Jews it was the emerging synagogue 
that served as the locus of their prayers.”19 More cautiously, Lee Levine suggests first 
century synagogue worship was “limited to Sabbaths and holidays. Pre-70 sources 
speak almost exclusively about the Sabbath and in several instances, both in Berenice, 
to New Moon and Sukkot gatherings. Other holiday gatherings—although unattested—
can reasonably be assumed.”20 
                                                           
16 J. A. Smith, “The Ancient Synagogue, the Early Church and Singing,” Music & Letters 65, no. 
1 (January 1984): 10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/736333 (accessed February 13, 2008). In 4 Macc 18:15, 
a pious father is remembered as singing or chanting (ἐµελῴ δει) words of David, the “hymn-writer” 
(ὑµνογράφον), from Ps 34:19.  
17 M. Maher, “The Psalms in Jewish Worship,” PIBA 17 (1994): 34. 
18 Terrien, 20. According to L. I. Levine, “the earliest ‘hard’ evidence we have for the existence 
of a synagogue appears in a number of inscriptions from Ptolemaic Egypt which mention a proseuche, 
commencing with the third century B.C.E. To date, about twelve such inscriptions and papyri have been 
discovered from the Hellenistic period” (The Ancient Synagogue: The First Thousand Years [New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000], 19). P. V. M. Flesher agrees the synagogue “arose in a region without 
access to the Temple cult (i.e., in Egypt) and in a sense comprised a substitute for it. It served as a 
gathering place for all Israelites—priests and commoners—where they took part in worship” 
(“Palestinian Synagogues before 70 C.E.: A Review of the Evidence,” in Ancient Synagogues: Historical 
Analysis and Archaeological Discovery, ed. D. Urman and P. V. M. Flesher [Leiden: Brill, 1995], 1:28).  
We do not rely on rabbinic evidence concerning the pre-70 synagogue, following D. D. Binder, 
who concludes that “what probably constitutes the earliest and most reliable stratum of evidence from the 
rabbinic writings yields us no useful information about pre-70 synagogues” (Into the Temple Courts: The 
Place of the Synagogues in the Second Temple Period [Atlanta: SBL, 1999], 12). 
19 L. H. Schiffman, “Foreword: The Ancient Synagogue and the History of Judaism,” in Sacred 
Realm: The Emergence of the Synagogue in the Ancient World, ed. S. Fine (New York: Oxford 
University Press; Yeshiva University Museum, 1996), xxviii. See also Maher, who believes the practice 
of regular daily worship grew out of sending ma ‘amadot to serve in the Temple in Jerusalem “during a 
particular week. On the days when the ma ‘amad was in Jerusalem the people who remained at home 
refrained from work, came together to worship and recited the same biblical passages from Genesis (cf. t. 
Ta ‘anit 4[3], 3)” (13). Levine finds “the division into ma ‘amadot was already known to the author of I 
Chronicles (24:1-18) in the fourth or third century B.C.E.” (36n64; contra L. L. Grabbe, who, without 
considering 1 Chronicles, believes “passages which speak of the ma ֜ ǎmādôt do not occur in the pre-70 
stratum of tradition” [“Synagogues in Pre-70 Palestine: A Re-assessment,” in Urman and Flesher, 
1:22n20]). Levine takes a middle perspective, i.e., that “presumably, the Torah was read twice a year in 
the towns and villages whose local priestly courses were officiating in the Jerusalem Temple” (141). 
20 Levine, 134.  
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Another question is the content of synagogue worship. Given the early-attested 
name “proseuche” (“place of prayer”), it seems safe to conclude that synagogue 
worship at least “consisted of prayers and Scripture reading.”21 Further, it is likely—
although not certain—that by the late Second Temple period, those prayers included 
psalms. The evidence is overwhelming that the canonical psalms were important to the 
inhabitants of Qumran. “Among the almost nine hundred scrolls that were discovered in 
the Judean desert, no book is represented by more manuscripts than the book of 
Psalms.”22 That “the Psalms scrolls represent nearly 20% of biblical manuscripts found” 
indicates “the important place of the Psalms in the life of the community that copied 
and preserved them.”23 Additionally, 11QPsa  
informs us that David “wrote 3,600 psalms (thlym); and songs (shir) to sing 
before the altar over the whole-burnt tamid offering every day, for all the days 
of the year, 364; and for the qorban of the Sabbaths, 52 songs; and for the 
qorban of the New Moons and for all the Solemn Assemblies and for the Day of 
Atonement, 30 songs …”. This text takes it for granted that psalms and songs 
formed part of the worship on weekdays, Sabbaths and feastdays.24 
Other evidence of psalm usage (although not necessarily the canonical psalms) 
in connection with first-century worship is found in the NT.25 In the context of the 
gathering of the church, Paul refers in 1 Corinthians 14:15 (twice) to “singing psalms” 
                                                           
21 Flesher, 1:28. According to Levine, in the Diaspora “proseuche” was a more common term to 
describe the institution than “synagogue,” which may “indicate a desire by Diaspora synagogues to 
highlight a religious dimension” (127).  
22 P. W. Flint, “Psalms and Psalters in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Scripture and the Scrolls, vol. 1 
of The Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls: The Second Princeton Symposium of Judaism and Christian 
Origins, ed. J. H. Charlesworth (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2006), 233. Of the 150 canonical psalms, 
“126 are at least partially preserved in the forty Psalms scrolls or other relevant manuscripts such as the 
pesharim. All the remaining twenty-four psalms were most likely included, but are now lost because of 
the damaged state of most of the scrolls. … The reason for this discrepancy is because the beginnings of 
scrolls are usually on the outside and are thus far more prone to deterioration” (234). 
23 D. D. Swanson, “Qumran and the Psalms,” in Firth and Johnston, 248-249. In addition to the 
manuscripts that contain only Psalms, “there are seven other texts that include significant citations of the 
psalms” (248), including “three pesharim, 4QFlorilegium, 4QTanhumim, 4QCatena A, and 
11QMelchizedek” (260). The biblical psalms were not the only prayers at Qumran; “the remains of over 
two hundred non-biblical prayers, psalms, and hymns … have been recovered from among the Qumran 
manuscripts” (Levine, 60). 
24 Maher, 19, with reference to J. A. Sanders, The Psalm Scroll of Qumrân Cave 11 (11Qpsa) 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1965), 92. We concur with Maher that the arguments for a triennial cycle for the 
Sabbath reading of the psalms in the pre-70 synagogue are not convincing (32; cf. McKinnon, 188-190; 
Grabbe, 1:24). Although synagogue worship “probably included reading of the Scriptures and the 
recitation of the Daily Psalm” (Maher, 13), daily use of the psalms in the synagogue is not established by 
documentary evidence until the eighth-century tractate Soferim (Ibid., 27). 
25 Although Stanley argues that due to their great expense, “it seems highly unlikely that anyone 
(including Paul and the members of his churches) would have had access to a full complement of 
‘Septuagint’ scrolls in the middle of the first century CE” (“Pearls,” 127), Abasciano’s counter-arguments 
are more convincing (see especially Abasciano, 156-161). 
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(ψάλλω) and in 14:26 to a “psalm” (ψαλµός). Ephesians 5:19 speaks of singing 
“psalms, hymns and spiritual songs among yourselves.”26 Other NT references to 
speaking or singing psalms include Romans 15:9, Colossians 3:16 and James 5:13.27  
From what is known of Second Temple practices, along with those of local 
households and probably at least the Diaspora synagogues, plus the evidence from 
Qumran and the NT, it appears the canonical Psalms were well-known to first century 
Yahweh-worshippers. N. T. Wright concludes that the Psalms were an important part of 
the worship and prayer life of even the “average” Jew, who “would grow up knowing 
the basic prayers, and a good many psalms.”28 The Psalms would have been known not 
only by the NT authors (especially Paul and Matthew, whose Jewish roots are 
unquestioned) but also by all observant Jews, including those in the Diaspora, and by 
God-fearers among the Gentiles.  
We reserve our discussion of how familiar a first-century audience of Jews, 
God-fearers, and/or former pagans might have been with a specific Psalm for our case 
study examples.29 In both examples, it is likely that Diaspora God-fearers and even Jews 
were more familiar with the Septuagint translation (LXX) than the Hebrew text.30 We 
begin with Psalm 115:1 LXX [116:10 MT] as quoted by Paul in 2 Corinthians 4:13. 
                                                           
26 According to E. P. Sanders, since Paul’s “view of group worship was almost certainly 
influenced by the synagogue services that he had attended, we may add singing to prayers and the reading 
and exposition of scripture as possible synagogal activities” (Judaism: Practice and Belief, 63 BCE—66 
CE [London: SCM; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992], 202. 
27 Although not a reference to the Psalms, Jesus speaks of those who “stand and pray [ἑστῶτες 
προσεύχεσθαι] in the synagogues [συναγωγαῖς]” (Matt 6:5). Furthermore, the NT evidence is clear that 
“by the first century C.E. at the very latest, readings from the Torah were accompanied by readings from 
the Prophets” in the synagogue context (Levine, 142, referring to Luke 4:16-21 and Acts 13:14ff.). 
28 N. T. Wright, TPG, 233.  
29 Most evidence for the use of specific Psalms comes from what is known of the cultic practices 
of the Temple. Despite the fact that Terrien and others refer to the Psalter as “the hymn book of the 
second temple” (and even of the synagogue, cf. Terrien, 60), there is direct evidence for use of only a few 
individual Psalms. 
30 According to K. H. Jobes and M. Silva, “since the New Testament authors were writing in 
Greek, they would naturally quote, allude to, and otherwise use the Greek version of the Hebrew Bible” 
(Invitation to the Septuagint [Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2000], 23). Ahearne-
Kroll makes the excellent point that an ancient native reader of Greek would have analyzed the Greek text 
of the OT in its own right rather than reading it through the lens of its MT counterpart (84). 
Jobes and Silva argue that “the current consensus among Septuagint scholars, with few 
exceptions, is that only one ‘original’ Greek translation was made of each book prior to the Christian era, 
and that whatever differences are found between surviving texts of the same book reflect a revision of the 
Greek” (45-46). For the Psalms, J. Eaton believes the LXX translation was “completed by about 200 
BCE” (The Psalms: A Historical and Spiritual Commentary with an Introduction and ew Translation 
[London: T&T Clark, 2003], 43). At the other end of the spectrum, D. M. Hay believes “scholars 
increasingly emphasize the fact that there was no single unified Greek translation of the Jewish scriptures 
in the pre-Christian era” (Glory at the Right Hand: Psalm 110 in Early Christianity [1973; repr., Atlanta: 
SBL, 1989], 21n9). In either case, today we have multiple texts. In referring to “LXX,” “the Greek text” 
or, for the Hebrew, “MT,” we do not intend to imply there is only one such document. 
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CHAPTER 7   
PSALM 115:1a LXX AS QUOTED I 2 CORITHIAS 4:131 
In this chapter, we use our action model to study Paul’s use of Psalm 115:1a2 in 2 
Corinthians 4:13. Although this is a “small” quotation—the only NT quotation from 
Psalm 1153—it has been the subject of quite varied discussion. On the one hand, some 
scholars charge that, using our terminology, Paul reads as an Independent but presents 
his reading as Envisaging. According to C. K. Barrett, “Paul pays no heed to the 
context, but picks out the two significant words.”4 From another perspective, Jan 
Lambrecht posits that “since in the psalm the ‘speaking out’ addresses God it is rather 
unlikely that Paul, who changes that speaking into preaching to people, intends to refer 
to the broader context of that psalm (situation of need).”5 Stanley incorporates elements 
of both arguments into his forceful criticism of Paul’s handling of this quotation: “The 
sense in which he uses the verse is so far removed from the original context as to raise 
questions about Paul’s reliability as an interpreter. … In a context in which Paul’s 
motives were already under a cloud, this kind of observation would have given 
ammunition to those who argued that Paul could not be trusted.”6 
                                                           
1 Since 2 Corinthians is an undisputed Pauline letter, we refer to its author as “Paul.” Whether it 
was originally one or several letters does not affect our argument since scholars generally agree 1:1-7:4 
was a single letter. For the argument that the letter was a unity from its inception, see P. E. Hughes, 
Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians: The English Text with Introduction, Exposition and otes 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), xxx; P. Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1997), 16-26, 40; B. Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical 
Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995), 333; and M. 
J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans; Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2005), xiii. Those who agree with D. M. Hay that 2 Corinthians is 
“a combination of Pauline letter fragments” (“The Shaping of Theology in 2 Corinthians: Convictions, 
Doubts, and Warrants,” in Hay, 139) include C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the 
Corinthians (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 9; V. P. Furnish, II Corinthians: Translated with 
Introduction, otes, and Commentary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 35; J. Murphy-O’Connor, 
The Theology of the Second Letter to the Corinthians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
10; and Becker (66). F. Watson’s argument that 2 Cor 1-9 was written after 2 Cor 10-13 (Paul and the 
Hermeneutics of Faith [London: T&T Clark, 2004], 150-151) might affect the mutual context of what are 
now the earlier chapters, but we are not able to explore that here. 
2 All psalm references in this chapter are to the LXX unless otherwise noted. 
3 Some scholars find an allusion to Ps 115:2 in Rom 3:4a. (See, for example, Hanson, Studies, 17 
and Hays, Echoes, 204n33). There also may be an echo of Ps 116:3 MT in Acts 2:24.  
4 Barrett, 143. R. P. Martin also argues Paul “fastens on the two verbs, ‘believe,’ ‘speak,’ in 
order to justify his apostolic ministry as proclamation” (2 Corinthians [Waco: Word Books, 1986], 83). 
5 J. Lambrecht, Second Corinthians (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 74.  
6 Stanley, Arguing, 100-101; see also 100n7 and n8. He finds this to be an instance in which Paul 
“quotes verses in such a way that their relation to the source text would have been difficult, if not 
impossible, for a knowledgeable reader to figure out” (56n46). In a later work, Stanley repeats much of 
his argument verbatim but softens this criticism: “An audience that was familiar with the psalm might 
well have been disturbed by the discrepancy between the original sense of the words that Paul cites and 
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At the other end of the spectrum, Hays, Thomas Stegman, Kenneth Schenck and 
Douglas Campbell all have taken hold of A. T. Hanson’s notion that in 2 Corinthians 
4:13, Paul reads Psalm 115:1 messianically.7 The first to do so was Hays, who calls this 
“christological ventriloquism.”8 For him, the passage “is greatly clarified if we see in it 
another instance of Christ as the praying voice in the psalm quotation.”9 
In addressing these varied Pauline readings, our first step is to determine what it 
would mean to read Psalm 115:1a or an interpretation thereof as an Envisager. 
Following this, we identify what audience transformation Paul encourages by evoking 
this OT Story-line and assess whether Paul reads this OT text as an Envisager.  
Psalm 115 LXX [116:10-19 MT] 
Although “in the standard ‘LXX’ text, the verse that Paul quotes is the first verse in a 
new psalm (Ps 115:1) rather than the midpoint as in the Hebrew (Ps 116:10),”10 both 
Psalms 116 MT and 115 LXX are Psalms of Individual Thanksgiving.11 They contain: 
(i) praise of Yahweh for Yahweh’s glorious attributes or acts of deliverance, (ii) a 
description of the distress experienced by Yahweh’s people and how they called upon 
Yahweh, (iii) a profession of trust in Yahweh or a testimony that Yahweh has 
responded, and (iv) an expression of thanksgiving and/or a promise to praise Yahweh.12  
In their OT setting, the SAs later quoted describe the psalmist’s distress and also 
tell us about the lifeworld/worldview of the psalmist, most notably, that the psalmist 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the way in which he uses them in his argument. This in turn could have led them to question whether they 
could trust Paul’s skills as an interpreter” (“Paul’s ‘Use’ of Scripture: Why the Audience Matters,” in 
Porter and Stanley, 148).  
7 Hanson’s discussion of this quotation is inconsistent. On the one hand, he argues the psalm 
predicts the Messiah’s death and resurrection, that v 2 is uttered by the pre-existent Messiah and that 2 
Cor 4:13-15 is “midrash” on Ps 116:8-19 MT; on the other, he claims that “we need not imagine that in 
such passages Paul is intentionally commenting on Scripture, or even that he expects his readers to 
recognize his scriptural allusions” (Studies, 167). However these comments are to be taken, we agree with 
Furnish that “it is certainly too much to describe vv. 13-15 as a ‘midrash’ on Ps 116:8-19 [MT]” (285). 
8 R. B. Hays, “Christ Prays the Psalms,” in The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as 
Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 104n14. 
9 Ibid., 108. 
10 Stanley, Arguing, 100. The various versions of the LXX give “united testimony” as to the 
division of Ps 116 MT into two parts (C. D. Stanley, Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation 
Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992], 216). Psalm 116:14 MT is omitted in the LXX, but that is not an issue here. Interestingly, in 
fragment 2 of 4Q96=4QPso, “the alignment of text on lines 4-5 shows that a long interval followed Ps 
116:9, indicating that vv10 onwards most likely constitute a new Psalm” (P. W. Skehan, E. Ulrich, and P. 
W. Flint, “Psalms,” in Psalms to Chronicles, vol. 11 of Qumran Cave 4, by E. Ulrich et al. [Oxford: 
Clarendon, 2000], 139; cf. 140). Thus, the LXX may preserve an older tradition than does the MT. 
11 According to C. H. Bullock, Ps 116 MT is one of only three psalms categorized as a psalm of 
individual thanksgiving by Gunkel, Mowinckel, Westermann and Kraus (Encountering the Book of 
Psalms: A Literary and Theological Introduction [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001], 154). 
12 See Wendland, Analyzing, 38-40, 58, 60.  
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professes faith in Yahweh.13 The SAC includes an acknowledgement of the help 
Yahweh provided and is followed by a vow to give praise and offer thanks.  
The Locution 
Although there are some locutionary issues surrounding the relationship of the MT and 
LXX texts,14 since Paul quotes the LXX,15 we use that text to evaluate the illocution and 
perlocution of the source text. There are five SAs in this SAC, vv 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 and 3. 
For convenience, the LXX and NETS of this SAC are presented in Appendix B§1. 
The Illocution 
The first four SAs are Assertives.16 As δέ in v 1c makes plain, they describe a series of 
events: believing (v 1a), then speaking (v 1b), followed by affliction (v 1c), and, finally, 
                                                           
13 We discuss lifeworld/worldview and Story in greater detail below. 
14 According to Skehan, Ulrich, and Flint (140), only a few letters of Ps 116:10 MT were found 
at Qumran (4Q96=4QPso contains the first two letters and perhaps the last of the first word “I believe” as 
well as the first letter of the third word “I spoke”). Therefore, the LXX may translate a non-MT Hebrew 
text. If the LXX does translate the MT, two translation decisions in Ps 115:1 often result in different 
English renderings of the MT and LXX. This has led to comments such as: “The meaning of the Hebrew 
is problematic … but it is certainly not given correctly in the LXX” (Furnish, 258; cf. M. D. Hooker, 
“Interchange and Suffering,” in Suffering and Martyrdom in the ew Testament: Studies Presented to G. 
M. Styler by the Cambridge ew Testament Seminar, ed. W. Horbury and B. McNeil [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981], 78n11). Because this can lead to the charge that Paul chose the LXX 
in order to manipulate his audience, we briefly examine these possible translation decisions.  
The first is the translation of יכ, the conjunction connecting vv 10a and 10b MT. Of the three 
common English lexical meanings for יכ (BDB, s.v. “יִכּ”), “when” (including with concessive force, “even 
when”) is the most common English translation of this verse. However, the LXX Psalter renders יכ here—
and only in this verse, according to L. Allen (152 note 10.c)—with the Greek διό, an “inferential 
conjunction” with a lexical meaning of “therefore” or “for this reason” (BDAG, s.v. “διό”). NETS gives 
“and so” for διό in Ps 115:1, which also is inferential.  
Often this is seen as a discrepancy between the MT and LXX. But, according to B. K. Waltke 
and M. P. O’Connor, “a result clause can be introduced by יִכּ” (An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew 
Syntax [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990], 639). This correlates with an option BDB gives for כי  as 
“that”: “expressing consecution.” “With the result that” gives a coherent rendering of Ps 116:10 MT and 
approaches the lexical meaning of “therefore” or “so” (i.e., διό). H.-J. Kraus believes that “יכ is correctly 
rendered with διὸ in Gk” (Psalms 60-150: A Commentary, trans. H. C. Oswald [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 
1989], 387). Several modern English translations do give an inferential meaning for כי  here. NKJV and 
NIV render כי  as “therefore”; NLT and NCV give “so.” 
The second decision is the addition in Ps 115:1 of the conjunction δέ prior to ἐταπεινώθην. This 
does not correspond to a word in the MT and may have been added for clarity. It makes it impossible to 
read the third clause of the LXX verse as the content of the “speaking,” which is the translation decision 
of all the English versions listed above except NETS. We discuss this further below. 
15 As a self-identified “Hebrew of Hebrews; in regard to the law, a Pharisee” (Phil 3:5 NIV), a 
pupil of the Pharisee Gamaliel (Acts 22:3-4), a member of the Sanhedrin and a teacher of the law (Acts 
5:34), Paul would have known the Hebrew. Presumably he quotes the LXX because his Greek-speaking 
audience knew that translation. For this, see Binder, who finds that one of the few differences “in the 
reading practices of the diaspora synagogues … was the use of the Septuagint for the sacred scriptures” 
(402, with reference to E. Tov, “The Septuagint,” in Mikra: Text, Translation, Reading and Interpretation 
of the Hebrew Bible in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, ed. M. J. Mulder, vol. 1 of The Literature 
of the Jewish People in the Period of the Second Temple and the Talmud [Assen/Maastricht: Van 
Gorcum; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988]). 
16 Since these Assertives recount an event, they are Retrodictives (see Bach and Harnish, 44). 
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complaint—presumably about those causing the affliction (v 2). The final SA is a 
Commissive, set against the background of an unstated but assumed event, i.e., that 
Yahweh has delivered the psalmist (cf. v 7). 
Verse 1a signals that this SAC serves as a Profession of Trust. The content of 
the psalmist’s “belief” (ἐπίστευσα, v 1a) is debated. Pierre Auffret construes v 1c as 
describing “I” (“qui étais trop humilié”) and considers that v 2 presents the content of 
the psalmist’s belief, i.e., “le caractère trompeur de l’homme.”17 But the presence of δέ 
in v 1c causes his argument to fail for the LXX. John Eaton considers the psalmist 
“believed that I should perish”18 based on the Hebrew verb having “not the usual sense 
‘speak’, but (as in the Arabic counterpart) ‘be carried away, pass away, die.’”19 This 
also seems unlikely. 
Others consider the psalmist’s “belief” to be trust that Yahweh would rescue20 or 
had rescued him.21 However, for the psalmist to be “speaking” of his deliverance is 
inconsistent with the LXX text. The presence of δέ in v 1c means both the psalmist’s 
troubles and Yahweh’s saving action result from (or at least follow) his speaking, which 
in turn is preceded by his belief/trust.22  
Since a Profession of Trust can concern who God is,23 it is more likely that 
Yahweh or Yahweh’s character is the object of the psalmist’s belief. For the implication 
                                                           
17 P. Auffret, “‘Je marcherai à la face de Yahvé’: Étude structurelle du Psaume 116,” RTh 106 
(May-June 1984): 390. 
18 Eaton, 399, where he adds that those around the psalmist are “earthly helpers” who “fail.” 
19 Ibid., 400. 
20 Cf. L. Allen, 155-156. Goldingay considers that the psalmist’s trust in Yahweh comes because 
“there was nowhere else to turn” (Psalms 90-150, 343). For T. D. Stegman, the “story” of Pss 114-115 
suggests both that “the psalmist trusted in God to rescue him; and second, he has been faithful to God” so 
that ἐπίστευσα is used “in the sense of being faithful to doing God’s will and trusting in God to vindicate 
him” (“Έπίστευσα, διό ἐλάλησα [2 Corinthians 4:13]: Paul’s Christological Reading of Psalm 115:1a 
LXX,” CBQ 69, no. 4 [October 2007]: 732, 733). Although the former seems possible (cf. n24 below), 
the latter is unlikely, and the combination of the two is overly complicated. 
21 Barnett’s position is that the psalmist “believed” God had delivered him from death and 
therefore he “spoke” of it (241). According to R. J. Clifford, “people entrusted themselves to a particular 
deity on the basis of the deity’s ability to save them” and in Ps 116 MT “Yahweh, the Savior of Israel, has 
proved to be a saving God” (Psalms 73-150 [Nashville: Abingdon, 2003], 198). 
22 We are given no information in Ps 115 as to what has prompted the psalmist’s belief in 
Yahweh. According to J. E. Goldingay, psalms are not tied to a socio-historical context but rather are 
designed to be used “as the vehicles for praise and prayer throughout the story of God’s people” (Psalms 
1-41, vol. 1 of Psalms [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006], 25). Similarly, J. A. Grant believes the 
“the ahistoricity of the psalms” means “they are designed to be appropriated in the way that is most 
relevant to the community of believers in their setting” (“Interpreting the Psalms,” in Firth and Johnston, 
112). Commonly in Psalms of Thanksgiving, the psalmist’s purpose is not “to relate what happened to 
him, but to testify what God has done for him” (Westermann, 109). Ps 116 MT is “more indefinite than 
usual” and “was deliberately framed indefinitely to cover more than one occasion for thanksgiving” (L. 
Allen, 153).  
23 See Wendland (Analyzing, 33, 45) for a brief description of a Profession of Trust. 
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of v 1 to be “I believed/put my faith [in Yahweh], therefore I spoke” is more probable 
than “I believed [that Yahweh would rescue/had rescued me] therefore I spoke.”24  
The result of the psalmist’s faith was speaking (ἐλάλησα, v 1b). Since the 
implied content of what was “spoken” relates to the “belief” of v 1a, presumably the 
psalmist spoke of his faith or of Yahweh, the object of his faith. There is no basis in the 
LXX text for considering that the “speaking” was directed towards Yahweh since the 
result of speaking was the psalmist’s affliction.25 Thus, Stanley’s notion that the 
psalmist was “‘humbled’ by God” is not a valid understanding of the Greek text.26 The 
almost certain implication of v 3 is that Yahweh is the psalmist’s rescuer and not the 
source of his difficulty.27  
As to the tellability of these Assertives, the first Assertive is foundational to the 
discourse. Absent the faith/belief of the psalmist there would be nothing to relate; this 
Assertive motivates the subsequent sequence of events. As the opening phrase and the 
foundational thought of the psalm, the faith/belief of the psalmist is both structurally 
and naturally prominent. Because the second Assertive (v 1b) gives the result of the 
psalmist’s belief, it also has natural prominence. Thus, the first two Assertives are both 
tellable. Whether or not the psalmist’s speaking was considered normal, it may have 
been unusual for the psalmist to have been brought low or afflicted (ἐταπεινώθην 
σφόδρα, v 1c) by those who heard him. Even if this negative result was not unexpected, 
it certainly was unwelcome. This explains the tellability of the third Assertive (v 1c). 
The final Assertive, v 2, describes the consequences of the situation in v 1c. 
Here it is clear the psalmist’s alarm (τῇ ἐκστάσει µου) is caused by humans since the 
                                                           
24 N. T. Wright finds that the “point” of Ps 116:10 MT is “a statement of ‘faith’” and considers 
that the best translation of that verse in 2 Cor 4:13 may be “I kept faith, and so I spoke” (“Faith, Virtue, 
Justification, and the Journey to Freedom,” in Wagner, Rowe, and Grieb, 485). However, Wright does not 
consider the LXX text, and his suggestion seems to require that Pss 114 and 115 LXX be read together. 
But other than an implication that the psalmist’s faith has already weathered some trials, this alternative is 
not too different from what we propose here unless “keeping” faith is equated with obeying rules.  
25 There is no reason to consider the “speaking” (v 1b) to have the same audience as the “saying” 
(v 2). Not only is this a chain of events in the Greek text but the Greek verbs are different. 
26 Stanley, Arguing, 100; emphasis added. Although he is correct that v 1c is a “statement of 
what transpired after the ‘speaking’ (‘and I was greatly humbled’),” it does not follow that God humbled 
him (100n5). As Abasciano puts it, “The psalmist’s words are not a complaint for which God humbled 
him as Stanley claims. Quite to the contrary, they are an expression of faith in God despite suffering and 
opposition contained in a psalm of thanksgiving which does indeed breathe a spirit of praise and joy. … 
The fact that the psalmist grounds (δίο) his speech on faith ensures that he is not suffering God’s 
judgment for what he says. … This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the psalm goes on to thank 
and praise the Lord for deliverance, presumably from the affliction of his lying enemies and in response 
to his faith-filled prayer making known his wretched state” (174). Stanley’s later attempt (see “Paul’s 
‘Use,’” 147) to rebut Abasciano’s argument is unconvincing. 
27 Auffret agrees that “Yahvé a sorti son fidèle” (390). 
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psalmist voices the complaint that πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης. If the psalmist’s alarm stems 
from his being brought low (v 1c), the persons about whom he complains are most 
likely the perpetrators of his affliction.28 The complaint is part of the “description of 
distress” common to a Thanksgiving psalm. Yahweh must be its audience, since v 3 is 
logically understood against the background of Yahweh’s rescue (made explicit in v 7).  
Although the interrogative form is somewhat unusual, v 3 is a Commissive.29 
Yahweh’s salvific action has produced a thankful spirit in the psalmist, and the psalmist 
is pondering how to best express his thanksgiving. Verse 3 thus both includes “a 
testimony that God has indeed helped and delivered”30 and looks forward to the 
following SAC, which has the function of a vow to give praise.31 
This understanding of the function of the SAs of this SAC helps identify the 
implied author and audience. As to the implied author, faith in Yahweh led to or even 
impelled speech (v 1a-b). The implied author was not angry with Yahweh for not 
having prevented the serious negative consequences which resulted from this speaking. 
Nor did he lose faith in Yahweh’s providence. Rather than retaliating against his 
persecutors, he complained to Yahweh about those who were spreading malicious lies 
about him (v 2), and, ultimately, his hopes of rescue were realized. In response, the 
implied author expresses an attitude of thanksgiving (v 3) rather than entitlement. The 
implied author calls on Yahweh’s name (v 4) and gives or promises Yahweh thanks, 
praise and sacrifice, as well as eternal devotion (vv 7-10). 
We infer the identity of the implied audience from both the construction of the 
implied author and other elements of the text and co-text. For the majority of the Psalm, 
including this SAC, the psalmist directly addresses a human audience. As the implied 
audience, these direct addressees understand what the psalmist has done and that these 
actions are appropriate for followers of Yahweh. 
                                                           
28 Since the psalmist complains that lies are being told about him, his affliction may have 
included the humiliation of slander. It is also likely he experienced physical suffering since he speaks of 
death in v 6. This combination dovetails with T. Booij’s evaluation of “the experience denoted by ‘nh” as 
“often, perhaps always, the suffering from hard, oppressive, threatening or humiliating treatment” 
(“Psalm 116,10–11: The Account of an Inner Crisis,” Bib 76, no. 3 [1995]: 390). 
29 This is a non-rhetorical question. Whether this Commissive is a Promise or an Offer is not 
critical, although we favor the latter (see Bach and Harnish, 50-51).  
30 Wendland, Analyzing, 39. 
31 W. S. Prinsloo makes a semantic argument that Ps 116:12 MT [115:3 LXX] should be taken 
as part of the next SAC, the vow of praise (“Psalm 116: Disconnected Text or Symmetrical Whole?” Bib 
74, no. 1 [1993]: 80). Although Ps 115:3 is a bridge to the vow of praise, we include it in the first SAC 
since it includes the testimony of God’s response to the distress. 
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The knowledge assumed in the co-text adds information about the implied 
audience. They understand what “a cup of salvation” (v 4) and “a sacrifice of praise” (v 
8) are as well as the importance of fulfilling one’s vows (v 9). They know who the 
Lord’s people are (v 9) and where “the courts of the house of the Lord” are located (v 
10). In the closing verses of the Psalm, “before all his people” and “the courts of the 
Lord” are equated to “your midst, O Ierousalem” [NETS; emphasis added]. Taken 
together, the implied audience is seen to be a group of faithful Yahweh-followers united 
in fellowship with the implied author.32  
By definition, the implied audience responds with the desired illocutionary 
effect of understanding. For empirical hearers/readers to read at the Analyst level, they 
must understand the implied author’s illocutionary act in the way the implied audience 
would. So to read this SAC as an Analyst, an empirical reader would understand that 
Yahweh’s followers are those who believe in and trust Yahweh and are willing to speak 
of their faith even if the consequences are unpleasant. The Analyst also understands that 
the faithful believe Yahweh will rescue them from their distress and that the appropriate 
response in those circumstances is to thank and praise Yahweh.33   
To determine the Envisaging reading, we evaluate the perlocution of this SAC. 
The Perlocution 
The Envisaging reader enacts an appropriate perlocutionary response. The associated 
perlocution of an Assertive is “that H believe that P” and that of a Commissive is “that 
H believe S intends to fulfil his obligation to do A.”34  
As regards the Assertives in this SAC, “believing that P” is more than the 
Envisaging reader agreeing that the psalmist’s account of the situation is factual. For the 
Assertives in Psalm 115:1-3, successful perlocution requires the reader to live into a 
lifeworld in which: (i) faith leads to or motivates speaking of one’s faith, (ii) one 
acknowledges that Yahweh’s lordship and preservation does not mean protection from 
affliction, including affliction resulting from the proclamation of faith, and (iii) one 
knows that Yahweh ultimately rescues and preserves Yahweh’s people. 
                                                           
32 The implied audience does not necessarily (and in some cases cannot) possess the exact 
characteristics of the original empirical audience, who were Jews in the Temple grounds in Jerusalem. 
33 If we define prayer as speech addressed to God, this SAC is not a prayer, per se. “In Ps 116 … 
God is as much the one spoken about as the one spoken to. What this tells us is that thanksgiving and 
praise are features of Christian worship that are to be heard by God but especially by others” (P. D. 
Miller, The Way of the Lord: Essays in Old Testament Theology [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007], 212). 
34 Bach and Harnish, 81. 
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For the Commissive, an Envisager recognizes the psalmist is obligated to 
“return” (ἀνταποδώσω, v 3a) something to Yahweh since Yahweh has “returned” 
(ἀνταπέδωκεν, v 3b)35 something to him and lives into the lifeworld where this is true. 
Potentially relevant here is Αλληλουια (“Praise Yahweh”) at the beginning of the 
Psalm.36 If this is a genuine request (Directive), its desired perlocutionary response 
would be that listeners join in worship of Yahweh. This gives a communal aspect to the 
requirement to give praise and thanksgiving to Yahweh for both the deliverance of the 
psalmist and the relationship Yahweh has initiated and maintains with Yahweh’s 
people.37 In the following SAC, the psalmist determines that to “take a cup of salvation 
and call on the name of the Lord,” to “sacrifice to you a sacrifice of praise,” and to “pay 
… vows to the Lord before all his people” satisfies the obligation of the Commissive. 
Thus, the recital of the psalm may not only describe the vow but may also fulfill it.38  
To identify the intended transformation, we recall our description of the implied 
audience as faithful Yahweh-followers. The Psalm appears to be a realignment of that 
audience’s understanding of Yahweh and the relationship they are to have with 
Yahweh, either by reaffirming beliefs under attack from some source or restoring a 
belief system which has deteriorated. This may also be subversion if the audience did 
not previously realize the causal connection between belief and speech or if they 
expected Yahweh to prevent any difficulties resulting from faith-driven speaking. The 
transformation of the Envisager’s belief system—and the actions that flow from it—is 
linked to Story, lifeworld and theology. 
The Contribution of Psalm 115:1-3 to Story, Lifeworld and Theology 
Psalm 115:1-3 speaks to the basic theological question of how Yahweh’s people are to 
relate to their god. The SAs later quoted contribute to Story the information that the 
                                                           
35 The use of ἀνταπέδωκεν in v 3b raises the question of how rescue by Yahweh is a “return.” 
(This is not a translation issue since the Hebrew root למג can have the sense of “recompense” [BDB s.v., 
“לַמָגּ”; cf. Ps 18:21 MT]). The answer is found in the mutuality of the psalmist’s relationship with 
Yahweh; for both parties to have privileges and responsibilities helps make sense of the otherwise 
puzzling v. 6. 
36 This transliterates the Hebrew imperative ָהּי־וּלְלַה. 
37 The ending of Ps 116 MT “s’impose d’en rendre grâces dans ce peuple qui est celui de 
l’Alliance, et d’en appeler en conséquence au Nom de Yahvé non plus seulement dans le cadre d’une 
détresse individuelle, mais dans ce contexte où le peuple élu peut exprimer cette Alliance dont il est l’un 
des partenaires” (Auffret, 394). 
38 Contra M. J. Dahood’s understanding that the “whole trend” of the psalm is that “the Psalmist, 
placed in extreme danger and abandoned by men, did not despair, but relying on the divine promises, he 
pleaded for help from God and was saved” (“Two Pauline Quotations from the Old Testament,” CBQ 17, 
no. 1 [January 1955]: 23), the psalm’s movement is toward the response of thanksgiving and praise. 
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psalmist’s speaking to others of Yahweh or of faith in Yahweh was a natural result of 
belief and that Yahweh does not prevent trouble from occurring in the life of the faithful 
even under these circumstances. Further, even in a situation of distress, the believer is 
not to take matters into his/her own hands but to turn to Yahweh for help. Yahweh hears 
and responds to the complaints of the faithful and is the ultimate source of protection 
and rescue. The appropriate response to Yahweh’s saving acts is an attitude of 
thanksgiving and the offering of praise. 
Understanding the contribution of this SAC to Story leads to quite profound 
conclusions about the relationship Yahweh’s people are to have with Yahweh and with 
others. The lifeworld and worldview of the Envisager incorporate these Story-lines—an 
Envisager agrees that the psalmist has behaved appropriately and lives his or her own 
relationship with Yahweh and in the world according to these precepts.  
Intervening Interpretation 
Psalm 115 has no obvious link to the narrative of Scripture. It is not a historical psalm; 
it makes no reference to any specific incident and has no superscription. Most do not 
consider it a royal psalm.39 However, Psalm 116 MT [Pss 114-115 LXX] is part of the 
Egyptian Hallel, which was sung in the Temple and probably elsewhere during 
Passover and perhaps also for other cultic occasions.40 Because Passover was 
“associated with Israel’s national liberation from bondage in Egypt,” the Hallel psalms 
may have been “linked with the hope of a future eschatological liberation and the 
coming of a new king.”41 But there is no explicit evidence for this with regard to Psalm 
115 LXX and there is no indication that the psalm played any core role in NT theology. 
We next evaluate the SAC which includes Paul’s quotation of Psalm 115:1a.  
                                                           
39 According to J. Day, S. J. L. Croft is one who adds Ps 116 MT (and 37 others) “to Gunkel’s 
irreducible minimum” of royal psalms (Psalms [1999; repr., London: T&T Clark, 2003], 88).  
40 During the first century, the Hallel was sung in the Temple while the Passover lambs were 
sacrificed (see Maher, 14; E. Sanders, 135; Smith, 9). Per McKinnon, it “was sung in the Temple on 
about eighteen days of the year: the eve of Passover, possibly the first day of Weeks, the eight days of 
Tabernacles and probably the eight days of Hanukkah” (164). 
41 Hays, “Liberation,” 109; cf. Swanson, 242. Although J. R. Wagner finds that for Jeremias, the 
entire Hallel “was understood as having eschatological and messianic connotations by the time of Jesus,” 
Wagner himself contends convincingly that “the rabbinic evidence traditionally used to support this 
contention is problematic” since “the earliest authorities cited for eschatological interpretations of the 
Hallel” range between late 2nd century CE and 4th century CE (“Psalm 118 in Luke-Acts: Tracing a 
Narrative Thread,” in Early Christian Interpretation of the Scriptures of Israel: Investigations and 
Proposals, ed. C. A. Evans and J. A. Sanders [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997], 158).  
While Moses is referred to several times in 2 Cor 3 and the letter as a whole contains a Story-
line of rescue/redemption from suffering, a link to the Exodus in 2 Cor 4:12 is very faint. In any case, 
unlike the psalmist, Moses’ suffering did not result from his speaking; rather, the initial suffering of the 
Israelites was the cause of Moses’ speaking and their later suffering followed their disobedience. 
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The Quotation of Psalm 115:1a in 2 Corinthians 4:1342 
Stanley directs some of his harshest criticism of Paul at this verbatim quotation from 
Psalm 115: “To an informed audience, the discrepancy of the original sense of the 
words and the way Paul used them in his argument would have been jarring.”43 Further, 
“the freedom with which he manipulates the biblical text to support his positions might 
have induced a person with a deeper knowledge of Scripture (the ‘informed audience’) 
to challenge or reject some of the arguments in which his quotations were embedded. … 
Fortunately for Paul, it appears that few people in his churches fit this description.”44 
Barrett and Lambrecht also argue that with this quotation Paul is, in our terminology, 
acting as an Independent reader rather than an Envisager. In contrast, some scholars 
believe Paul read this psalm messianically, i.e., that Paul took the words of the psalm as 
the words of Jesus. Thus, this quotation makes a good case study of our methodology. 
To begin to evaluate these arguments, we assess the degree of familiarity the 
original empirical audience might have had with Psalm 115. 
Would the Corinthian Church Have Known Psalm 115 LXX? 
Some members of the Corinthian church were no doubt very familiar with the Jewish 
Scriptures. A devout, well-educated and prominent Jew like Crispus, the former 
synagogue leader (Acts 18:8, 1 Cor 1:14), would have worshipped in the Jerusalem 
Temple—perhaps regularly. Since it is likely that the Egyptian Hallel (Pss 113-118 MT 
[111-117 LXX]) was used in Temple worship at the time 2 Corinthians was written,45 
Crispus most likely knew those Psalms.46 Other Diaspora Jews and even God-fearers, 
like Titius Justus (Acts 18:7)47 and Stephanas (1 Cor 16:15), probably knew the Hallel 
since some scholars believe it was recited in the Diaspora synagogues on a variety of 
festival days and during the Seder.48 Thus, Paul could have expected those in the 
                                                           
42 All Scripture references from this point on are to 2 Corinthians unless otherwise noted. 
43 Stanley, Arguing, 100.  
44 Ibid., 178. 
45 According to R. Martin, “2 Corinthians (at least chaps. 1–9), [was] written in the autumn of 
A.D. 55 or, less likely, 56, and the last four chapters a short while later” (xxxv). 
46 See n40. 
47 If Titius Justus is the person later referred to as “Gaius” (Rom 16:23; 1 Cor 1:14), as some 
argue (e.g., Barnett, 5), he remained an important part of the Corinthian church. 
48 See chapter 6 concerning the use of the Psalms in intertestamental and first-century domestic 
devotional practices and possibly in at least the Diaspora synagogues. For some thoughts about the 
domestic singing of the Hallel during the Passover/Seder meal, see Smith (9-10) and Maher (14, 26). As 
to synagogal use, L. I. Rabinowitz, who believes the Psalms were used very little in the synagogue as late 
as the Talmudic period (ca. 70–500 CE), finds evidence for the recitation of the Hallel “on 18 days of the 
year in Palestine, and on 21 days in the Diaspora, viz., the first day(s) of Passover, Pentecost, every day 
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Corinthian church with synagogue ties to have known Psalm 115. Further, because the 
first-century churches read and studied Scripture corporately (cf. 1 Cor 14:26, Eph 5:19, 
Col 3:15), those in the Corinthian church without a synagogue background would have 
learned from those who did.49 Rather than trying to bypass those who had prior 
knowledge of the Jewish Scriptures, Paul encourages the Corinthians to submit to 
Stephanas’ leadership (1 Cor 16:16). Given the importance of the Hallel in Jewish 
worship and the way first-century churches read Scripture, if there is any OT Scripture 
with which Paul could have expected his entire Corinthian audience to have been 
familiar, it would have been a passage from a Hallel psalm like Psalm 115:1.  
Knowledge of Psalm 115 appears to be an element of the mutual context of Paul 
and his empirical audience; this helps us identify the implied author and implied 
audience. We begin our analysis of the illocution of the SAC containing the quotation 
by taking a closer look at what else we learn about the implied author and audience 
from this letter—especially the segments prior to and within this SAC50—as well as 
from a previous letter, 1 Corinthians, the contents of which would have been part of the 
mutual context of Paul and the original recipients of this letter. 
The Implied Author and Audience 
From 1 Corinthians, we learn the implied author of the Corinthian correspondence was 
called to be “an apostle of Christ Jesus by the will of God” (1 Cor 1:1).51 However, he is 
“the least of the apostles, unfit to be called an apostle,” because he “persecuted the 
church of God” (1 Cor 15:9). But by God’s grace, his life has been redirected (cf. 1 Cor 
15:10) and now his calling is to preach the gospel (1 Cor 2:4-5; cf. 1 Cor 15:11), a task 
set him by God and Jesus Christ (1 Cor 1:17; cf. 1 Cor 3:5). This call is not based on his 
superior speaking abilities; he is not an eloquent or confident speaker (1 Cor 2:5). 
Rather, he speaks “in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit” (1 
Cor 2:12-13; cf. 1 Cor 1:17, 25-30; 2:1; 3:18-21, etc.).  
In the present letter, the implied author is presented as a follower of Jesus 
“Christ/Messiah” (1:1, 2, 3, 5), who is also named “Lord” (1:2, 3) and “Son of God” 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of Tabernacles and Hanukkah” (“The Psalms in Jewish Liturgy,” Historia Judaica 6, no. 2 [October 
1944]: 110; cf. Maher, 25-26).  
49 See Abasciano, 156-169. Of the NT references to speaking/singing psalms listed in chapter 6, 
half have a corporate dimension. 
50 On a first reading, the empirical audience would only have learned about the implied author 
and implied reader from what had been already presented in the letter. However, we assume multiple 
readings, and so we reference the remainder of the letter in some cases. 
51 This is repeated verbatim in the opening verse of 2 Corinthians. 
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(1:19). Jesus is the climactic fulfillment of the promises of the faithful God (1:18-20). 
Among Paul’s “working assumptions” are that “he everywhere presupposes that God 
exists and acts (or has acted) in a decisive and reconciling way in Jesus, especially 
through his death (5:14-15, 18, 21)” and resurrection.52  
The hardships Paul experienced in his ministry were so severe that “we felt that 
we had received the sentence of death” (1:9). In those situations, his reliance on God for 
strength and consolation and his trust in God for deliverance were justified (cf. 1:3-5, 8-
10). He remains confident that God “will continue to rescue us” (1:10; cf. 2:14, 5:5-8).  
Paul’s planned visit to Corinth (1 Cor 16:7) was painful (2:1). A subsequent visit 
(1:15-16) has not materialized (1:23). This “broken promise” plus the painful visit and a 
painful letter (2:4), along with divisions within the Corinthian church (cf. 1 Cor 1:10-
11, 3:3, 11:18) and church discipline problems, have strained Paul’s relationship with 
the Corinthian believers and caused him emotional pain and anguish (cf. 2:4).53 Paul’s 
detractors54 accuse him of vacillating when he fails to make another visit (1:15-18, 23) 
and also of being self-aggrandizing (1:24, 3:1) and inappropriate in his handling of 
God’s message (2:17). In particular, since the Corinthian value system “perceived 
suffering and weakness as signs of failure,”55 Paul’s suffering, affliction and near-death 
experience (1:4-9, 4:7-11; cf. 1 Cor 4:9-17) have raised questions about his ministry and 
his status as an apostle.56 
In addressing these pressing questions, Paul’s implied audience is not his 
opponents but rather the Christians in Corinth and Achaia (1:1) who are tempted to fall 
away from the message Paul has brought them, believing instead those who are 
                                                           
52 Hay, “Shaping,” 140. For others of Paul’s “working assumptions,” see Ibid., 140-141. 
53 The relationships among the Corinthians also are strained (cf. 1 Cor 1:10-11, 2 Cor 2:7-8).  
54 The identity of Paul’s “enemies” is debated. Furnish summarizes the three major viewpoints 
(48-54) and concludes they “were of Jewish background” and probably “Christian missionaries” (53). 
Similar conclusions are reached by M. E. Thrall, Introduction and Commentary on II Corinthians I-VII, 
vol. 1 of A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1994); and Harris, 71. However, D. Georgi’s argument that “the adversaries in 1 Cor. were 
Gnostics, and those of 2 Cor. were shaped by Hellenistic-Jewish Apologetics” (The Opponents of Paul in 
Second Corinthians [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986], 317) outruns the available evidence, as does Murphy-
O’Connor’s position that the opponents are “Corinthianized” Judaizers (see Theology, 12-15). In any 
event, our concern is the charges against which Paul defends himself and the reasons that he does so 
rather than the identity or belief system of his opponents. 
55 Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 316. “Paul tries to demonstrate that such experiences are inherent 
to life in Christ under the contextual circumstances of life under Roman rule” (Ibid.) 
56 “Paul’s sufferings reveal him to be anything but ‘glorious’; therefore, his theology of 
‘fulfillment’ must be questioned. Paul is the living denial of what he preaches” (Barnett, 37; cf. Hay, 
“Shaping,” 146; and Furnish, 277). Paul’s defense of his apostleship “deals with two issues: the 
relationship between suffering and ministry, and the prospect of death” (Murphy-O’Connor, Theology, 
44; cf. Furnish, 277). 
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“peddlers [καπηλεύοντες] of God’s word” (2:17). Despite the fact that, in general, the 
Corinthian Christians are neither well-educated nor of high social status (cf. 1 Cor 
1:26),57 they have become arrogant, thinking they know more than they do (1 Cor 4:18-
19, 14:36), placing themselves above others (1 Cor 11:20-22, 14:26), excusing sinful 
behavior (1 Cor 5:1-2) and even flirting with (or more!) the worship of other gods (1 
Cor 10:14). Surrounded by inhabitants of a lifeworld that is “external, if not hostile, to 
the story,”58 the former pagans seem to have not broken completely with their past. 
Although Paul assumes “the Corinthian church is functioning and has a general sense of 
Christian purpose,”59 the Corinthians are progressing quite slowly in faith (1 Cor 3:1-2). 
The implied audience remembers Paul’s behavior when he was with them as 
well as his previous preaching, both in person and through written or oral messages sent 
via ministry colleagues. They know that Paul has been given authority or power 
(ἐξουσία) by Jesus and in the gospel.60 That this is not dominating power but rather the 
power to transform can be seen in his reliance on persuasion (πείθοµεν, 5:11) rather 
than on force or coercion.61 Paul uses his power to build up (οἰκοδοµή, 10:8) the 
Corinthians rather than to tear them down (καθαίρεσις, 13:10) or for personal financial 
gain (11:7-9; 1 Cor 9:18).62 At its core, the relationship of the implied audience to Paul 
is based on mutual faith in God and in Jesus (cf. 1:24). Paul refers to God as our father 
(1:2) and the father of our Lord Jesus Christ (1:3). The Corinthians understand they 
participate in Paul’s experience (1:7) to their benefit (1:4-6, 2:10, 4:12; cf. 1 Cor 4:10). 
Paul is a sacrifice for them, “the aroma of Christ to God” (2:15).63  
                                                           
57 Murphy-O’Connor (Theology, 8) highlights the class distinctions found in 1 Cor 1:26-28. 
58 J. Hartt, “Theological Investments in Story: Some Comments on Recent Developments and 
Some Proposals,” in Hauerwas and Jones, 291.  
59 Hay, “Shaping,” 140. Witherington’s thought that “to call Paul’s apostleship into question 
would be for the Corinthians to call their own Christian existence into question” and that this is what calls 
for Paul’s response in 2 Corinthians (Conflict, 207) is another possibility. 
60 The Corinthians recognize this since they have written to Paul for guidance (1 Cor 7:1). 
61 “Paul is urging, cajoling, remonstrating, using every kind of rhetorical device, to get this 
community both to see things his way and to conform their behavior accordingly, that is, in keeping with 
the gospel” (G. D. Fee, “Toward a Theology of 1 Corinthians,” in Hay, 38). Paul may not have the power 
to excommunicate/restore since in 1 Cor 5:2 he calls on the Corinthians to remove an errant member and 
in 2 Cor 2:6-8 he urges them to restore a member. If Paul does have authority to compel these actions, it 
may be that he instead “wants them to respond voluntarily to his discourse” (Witherington, Conflict, 358). 
62 Amador finds that “Paul is genuinely interested in building up the community, both through 
outreach and through practices that take into account the need to address those who are spiritually weak. 
… It is nowhere apparent that his appeals to community benefit and his use of the spiritually weak to 
curb the authority of the strong in the community are appeals for his sake or for the sake of his followers. 
They instead appear to be genuine concern for those in the community who are at the time of the writing 
the most (spiritually and/or socially) disadvantaged (8.10-13; 10.24-29; 11.22)” (232). 
63 See H. H. Drake Williams, “The Psalms in 1 and 2 Corinthians,” in Moyise and Menken, 173.  
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On a literary level, the implied audience is able to “recognize all or many of his 
[Paul’s] references to … [the Jewish] scriptures (and perhaps to special exegetical 
traditions).”64 Although David Hay believes Paul “assumes without argument that the 
Jewish scriptures have continuing authority for Christians,”65 our position is instead that 
Paul assumes the OT Story frames the lifeworld and worldview of the Christians in 
Corinth, throughout Achaia (1:1b) and everywhere (1 Cor 1:2). The broad Story 
underlying the letter is the Story of Yahweh and the relationship of a Yahweh-follower 
to Yahweh, as the character both of Yahweh and of this relationship have been further 
revealed through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.66 
Our next step is to evaluate which theological Story-lines are particularly 
relevant in the first speech event of this letter, 2 Corinthians 1:8-7:16.67 
The Theological Story-Lines of 2 Corinthians 1:8-7:16 
In our model, a text’s theological Story-lines are revealed by determining which basic 
questions about Yahweh and humanity’s relationship to Yahweh the text answers.68 In 
the first speech event of 2 Corinthians, the relevant theological questions include: who 
Yahweh is, how Yahweh relates to the world and how Yahweh’s people are to relate to 
Yahweh. Several interrelated theological Story-lines emerge from exploring these 
questions.  
First, the side-by-side presentation of Jesus Christ and God in 5:20 demonstrates 
that “who Yahweh is” and “how Yahweh relates to the world” are now answerable only 
through the lens of Jesus Messiah, the “likeness of God” (4:4; cf. 4:6). Jesus is 
foundational to the speech or “preaching” of the implied author and his colleagues 
                                                           
64 Hay, “Shaping,” 140. Those among the empirical audience who did not have this familiarity 
would have learned from those who did (see above). 
65 Ibid. 
66 As Hays notes, “The history of God’s dealings with Israel is always read by Paul 
retrospectively through the lens of God’s act of reconciling the world to himself through the death of 
Jesus Christ” (“Rebound,” 78). From the outset of the letter, it is Messiah Jesus who is both the content of 
Paul’s speaking (1:19, 2:12, 4:5) and the one who makes it possible (2:17). He is the one for whom Paul 
and his colleagues suffer (1:5, 4:10-11), through whom they are consoled (1:5) and have confidence (3:4), 
and in whom both they and the Corinthians stand firm (1:21). The emphasis on Jesus Christ continues 
past 4:13. It is “the judgment seat of Christ” before which believers all must appear (5:10), the “love of 
Christ” that “urges us on” (5:14), “for him” that believers live (5:15), “in Christ” that “there is a new 
creation” (5:17) and through Christ that believers are reconciled to God (5:18-19).  
67 C. G. Kruse comes close to our linguistic/pragmatic division, calling 1:12-7:16 “The Body of 
the Response” (The Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians: An Introduction and Commentary [1987; 
repr. Leicester: Inter-Varsity; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994], 54). 
68 See chapter 4. 
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(1:19; 2:12, 17). Paul proclaims “Jesus Christ as Lord” (4:5; cf. 1:3)69 and calls himself 
and his colleagues “ambassadors for Christ” (5:20a). The “ambassadors” speak not only 
about Jesus Christ but also in him; Jesus is both the content and the ground of their 
message, which is given by God in God’s power (cf. 2:17; 3:4-6; 4:1, 7; 12:19).70  
Paul’s ministry is to proclaim that message (cf. 2:17; 4:2; 5:20). He has “laid a 
foundation as an expert builder” (3:10), and Christians are to hold fast to the good news 
he proclaimed to them (15:1-11) and the teaching he passed on to them (11:2).71 
Ultimately, Paul is confident that God will rescue (1:10; cf. 2:14, 5:5-8), that God’s 
promises, of which the gift of the Spirit is a “first installment” (1:20-22), will be 
fulfilled, and that God has granted a new covenant, through which the Spirit brings life 
(3:6). Since “it is by God’s mercy that we are engaged in this ministry,” God can be 
expected to provide what is necessary for its success; therefore, Paul and his colleagues 
“do not lose heart” (4:1). This phrase is repeated in 4:16, thus book-ending this sub-
section of the letter with Paul’s continued ministry resolve. 
At this writing, Paul is weak and suffering (4:8-10). But his apparent “lack of 
glory” is not, as the Corinthians assume, evidence of a defective ministry. Rather, 
Paul’s suffering demonstrates his solidarity with the Savior and therefore, the rightness 
of his message (cf. 13:3-4).72 Paul’s weakness reveals divine power (1:9; 3:5; 4:7; 12:8). 
In the co-text immediately preceding the quotation, Paul highlights the benefits to the 
Corinthians of the affliction and peril he and his colleagues have experienced (v 12).73 
For Paul, the messenger matters only as a vehicle for the message. His “defence 
… of the integrity of his personal character and apostleship” was “dictated not by self-
interest but by the necessity for protecting the church God had founded through him 
from forces and doctrines which were essentially inimical to the gospel committed to 
                                                           
69 The implied topic of Paul’s preaching is described as: “‘the word of God’ (2:17; 4:2), ‘the 
gospel’ (4:4), ‘Jesus Christ as Lord’ (4:5)” (Barnett, 241).  
70 Mack notes that “whereas Paul had to argue for his authority as an apostle, he never argued for 
the authority of the kerygma” (98). 
71 Paul received some of his teaching from Jesus (1 Cor 11:23) but does not indicate the source 
of all his teaching (see 1 Cor 15:3-11). For his teaching topics, see 1 Cor 5:1, 6:19-20, 7:19, 10:7-8. 
72 Paul interprets “these mortal adversities … as an integral and appropriate part of true 
apostleship (4:7-15)” (Furnish, 277). Further, his “endurance in the sufferings of ministry” marks him “as 
a genuine servant of Christ, whose own sufferings are now reproduced in the ministry of the one who 
represents him” (Barnett, 212; cf. Furnish, 285-286). However, it goes too far to say “there is a divine 
purpose for apostolic suffering, namely, that Paul might testify to God’s deliverance (1:11; 4:12-15)” 
(Barnett, 236) or “these adversities are for the ultimate purpose of the overflowing of ‘thanksgiving to the 
glory of God’” (S. J. Kraftchick, “Death in Us, Life in You: The Apostolic Medium,” in Hay, 171). 
73 Paul suffers on behalf of the Corinthians so they, like him, might experience the “life, or 
deliverance, of Jesus” (Barnett, 227). In 5:21, Paul reminds them that “God made him who had no sin to 
be sin for us, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God” (NIV; emphasis added).  
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Paul and to the spiritual welfare of those whose lives, through response to that gospel, 
had been transformed and set free.”74 The goal of Paul’s ministry is “that those to whom 
he came might have the ‘life’ that Christ’s death made possible for them to have.”75 Paul 
defends himself and his ministry not to preserve his own reputation (cf. 1 Cor 4:3) but 
rather to remove any barriers that might keep the Corinthians from trusting his message 
and, through it, his Lord.76 
Using these identifications of the implied author and audience and of some 
major theological Story-lines of this letter section, we turn to a more detailed analysis of 
the quotation and its SAC. Our goal is first to determine what transformation of the 
lifeworld/worldview, theology and Story of the audience is intended by Paul’s quotation 
of Psalm 115:1, i.e., what it would mean for Paul’s readers to be Envisagers. From this, 
we can assess whether Paul himself reads the OT text as an Envisager. 
The Illocution of the Quotation and its Speech-Act Complex77 
2 Corinthians 4:13 is part of a SAC which includes vv 1478 and is composed of four 
Assertive illocutionary acts: (i) the quotation and its introduction (v 13a), (ii) καὶ ἡµεῖς 
πιστεύοµεν (v 13b), (iii) διὸ καὶ λαλοῦµεν (v 13c), and (iv) the reason statement (v 
14).79 For convenience, NA27 and the NSRV are presented in Appendix B§2. 
What is the tellability of these Assertives?80 The first Assertive includes the 
quotation from Psalm 115:1a. Since ἐπίστευσα, διὸ ἐλάλησα is a marked quotation and 
also the first explicit OT quotation in the letter,81 it has rhetorical prominence. Paul uses 
the quotation to equate the “spirit of faith”82 he and his ministry colleagues possess to 
                                                           
74 Hughes, xvi-xvii. Barrett’s thought that “nothing appears more powerfully in 2 Corinthians 
than the strength of Paul’s vocation” (32) misses the mark slightly. Nothing appears more powerfully in 
the letter than the importance of Paul’s message. His ministry serves the message he is called to proclaim. 
75 Barnett, 238.  
76 As Hay notes, “a decision against Paul implies a rejection of the Jesus and the God whose 
ambassador Paul is” (“Shaping,” 141; cf. 135. Also see Barnett, 301, 311). Witherington adds that “to be 
alienated from the agent was to be alienated from the one who sent him” (Conflict, 328; cf. 396-397). 
77 Stanley puts this in his “U+” category as a quotation in “full agreement with the standard 
printed edition of the author’s normal Vorlage, with no significant variations in either text” (Paul, 58; cf. 
216; and Furnish, 258). We find no locutionary issues in 2 Cor 4:13. 
78 Contra Barnett, who believes the “the unity of vv. 13-15 is indicated by the conjunctions” 
(239), we agree with Lambrecht that “a division of 4:7-15 into three (unequal) parts appears to be 
justified: vv. 7-12, 13-14, and 15” (Second Corinthians, 76). However, as the immediately following co-
text, we consider v 15 in our analysis. 
79 Verse 14 could be considered two SAs. But it simplifies the analysis to consider it as one, and 
nothing is lost by doing so. 
80 Identifying the subcategory of these Assertives is not critical. 
81 See, e.g., Furnish, 258. 
82 Stegman asks: “Does πνεῦµα refer to a human quality or to the Spirit of God?” (732). Furnish 
convincingly argues that these are intertwined: “Paul means to identify the Spirit of faith he has 
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that of the psalmist, who also experienced suffering and came close to death.83 This is 
either a new way for Paul to describe faith or a reaffirmation of previous teaching.  
From the next two Assertives we learn that because Paul and his colleagues have 
the same spirit of faith as the psalmist, they are impelled to speak as the psalmist did.84 
The tellability of these Assertives lies in the way they present Paul and his colleagues as 
successors to the psalmist in belief and subsequent speech.85 
Although Ralph Martin feels that “the centerpiece is the assertion, πιστεύοµεν, 
‘we believe’ (v 13),”86 it seems more plausible that the following SA, “and so we speak” 
is the core.87 Not only does this have natural prominence as an implication, result or 
consequence, it aligns with how the letter has developed thus far. All of Paul’s 
experiences—not only the ministry success evidenced in the faith of the Corinthian 
believers (3:2-3) but also the persecution Paul has endured (cf. 1:3-9; 4:8-12, 16-17) 
and the pain and grief he and the Corinthians have suffered due to difficulties in their 
relationship (2:1-4)—stem from Paul’s speaking the truth of the gospel, i.e., that Jesus 
Christ is Lord (4:5; cf. 4:2, 4:4). 
The final Assertive, v 14, stands in a causal relationship to the core SA. This 
Assertive is tellable in part because in it, “Paul identifies the object of faith and thus the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
experienced with the same one known to the psalmist from whom he proceeds to quote. … It is preferable 
… to read this as a reference to the (Holy) Spirit, in and with which faith comes, as in 1 Cor 12:9; Rom 
8:14-16; Gal 3:2, 5, 14; 5:5; cf. 1 Cor 2:4-5; 1 Thess 1:5-7” (258; cf. 286). We do note that nowhere else 
in the NT is the Holy Spirit referred to as the “spirit of faith.” There are three later uses of “spirit” in the 
letter (7:1, 13; 11:4) which do not refer to the Holy Spirit. 
83 Although Moyise is correct that “it is unlikely that they [the original recipients] would know 
the Hebrew text,” (Paul, 107), it seems quite likely that some (many?) of them would have understood Ps 
115 against the backdrop of the psalmist’s suffering since that suffering is the subject of v 1c and his 
rescue is alluded to in vv 3 and 7. While Paul does not explicitly quote Ps 115:1c, it is clear throughout 
the letter that he has been “brought very low”; he uses ταπεινός in 7:6, 10:1, and 12:21. As Murphy-
O’Connor points out, the “majority of commentators have seen that to auto pneuma tês pisteôs means that 
Paul identifies with the faith of the psalmist. This necessarily implies that he perceived the similarity of 
their situations because he was still thinking of his sufferings” (“Faith and Resurrection in 2 Cor 4:13-
14,” RB 95, no. 4 [October 1988]: 547; cf. Furnish, 285).  
84 Unlike Young and Ford (64), we do not assume Paul considers David to be the psalmist. In 
Rom 4:6 and 11:9, Paul attributes to David two sayings from psalms with Davidic superscriptions. But 
Paul makes no such attribution here in quoting from a psalm with no superscription. 
85 According to Dahood, “of the various interpretations of the Pauline intention in quoting these 
words from the Psalter (Ps 116,10), that which places a relationship of cause and effect between faith and 
preaching seems best to fit the context” (23; see also Kruse, 108; Thrall, 338). Even Barrett, who argues 
that Paul uses this quotation out of context, recognizes that “Paul thinks of faith that leads to speech” 
(142). This is not, however, as Clifford takes it, a situation of “faith authorizing one to instruct others” 
(200). Nor, contra Murphy-O’Connor, is it significant that Paul uses λαλέω in 4:13 rather than κηρύσσω 
as in 4:5. (Murphy-O’Connor believes Paul uses λαλέω not to refer to his preaching but to what he has 
just said in 4:7-12; see “Faith,” 547). Not only does Paul use λαλέω regarding his ministry in 1 Cor 2:6-7, 
13 and 2 Cor 2:17, 12:19, since Paul is emphasizing the similarities between himself and the psalmist, it 
is important that he use the same verb as Ps 115:1. 
86 R. Martin, 89.  
87 See Furnish, 286. 
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ultimate source of apostolic boldness as the God who raised [the Lord] Jesus and will 
raise us also with Jesus.”88 Paul and his colleagues see their righteous suffering in the 
same light as the psalmist considered his righteous suffering—a negative consequence 
of faith-fueled speech from which the speaker is ultimately redeemed by Yahweh.89 
Although Paul has already lauded Yahweh for his earthly deliverance (cf. 1:10), in 4:14 
he adds a broader, eternal perspective. He returns to this in 4:17 where he compares 
“this slight momentary affliction” to “an eternal weight of glory beyond all measure.” 
That Paul and his colleagues will be raised with Jesus is a link to both the immediately 
preceding and succeeding co-text of this SAC, especially 4:8-11 and 4:16b-5:5, as well 
as to earlier passages, such as 1:8-10 and 2:16. Yahweh’s rescue or deliverance, of 
which the resurrection of believers is the ultimate, final and eternal example, is the 
reason for Paul’s hope (cf. 4:1 and 4:16).90   
The links in 2 Corinthians 4 to Psalm 115 extend beyond this SAC.91 The 
clearest and most relevant example is the immediately following co-text, v 15. There, 
Paul presents the overarching purpose of his ministry as the increase of thanksgiving to 
the glory of God.92 This ties back to 1:11, where many are to give thanks because God 
                                                           
88 Furnish, 286. Jesus’ resurrection was a core element of Paul’s preaching (cf. 1 Cor 15:4) and, 
according to Shaw, “the resurrection and vindication of Jesus is the pledge of Paul’s vindication and the 
Corinthians’ also, so that the origin of his authority is also the source of their hope. … We see here the 
way in which a quite tangential text was used by the early church to indicate that Jesus’ resurrection was 
indeed ‘according to the Scriptures’” (104-105). We agree with his argument without agreeing that this 
quotation is “tangential.” 
89 Furnish highlights that “courage to speak out despite adversity” is the point both in the psalm 
and “in 2 Cor 4:13, which (against Windisch, 147-48) does not sit loosely in its context but helps to 
support the statements about apostolic boldness Paul has already made (3:12; 4:1) and will make again 
(4:16; 5:6, 8)” (285). As K. T. Kleinknecht puts it, “In ihm [Ps 115] sieht er denselben Geist des 
Glaubens wirksam, so daβ er ein Entsprechungsverhältnis zwischen seiner Heilserwartung und der 
Rettung des leidenden Gerechten sowie zwischen seinem und dessen λαλεῖν postuliert” (Der leidende 
Gerechtfertigte: Die alttestamentlich-jüdische Tradition vom „leidenden Gerechten“ und ihre Rezeption 
bei Paulus [Tübingen: Mohr, 1984], 261). 
90 As Young and Ford correctly note, “Paul’s confidence explicitly depends upon the 
resurrection, as he has already indicated in 1.9, and will again in 13.4” (64). However, this does not mean 
“the basis and motive for Paul’s ‘speaking’ are eschatological, specifically in reference to judgment” 
(Barnett, 243). Paul wants the Corinthians to live a life of grace and thanksgiving now. But, in turn, that 
does not imply “the ‘resurrection’ of Paul in v. 14b takes place within the framework of terrestrial 
existence” or that Paul depicts “his arrival at Corinth as a ‘resurrection’” (Murphy-O’Connor, “Faith,” 
546, 549). Rather, Paul believes both that God has rescued (ἐρρύσατο) Paul and his colleagues from death 
and will continue to deliver (ῥύσεται) them (1:10) and that God raises (ἐγείροντι) the dead (1:9) and in 
the future will raise (ἐγερεῖ) believers (4:14; cf. 4:17ff. See Hay, “Shaping,” 140). 
91 Kleinknecht finds it “sehr wahrscheinlich, daβ Paulus mit dem Zitat des zunächst recht 
unmotiviert erscheinenden Psalmwortes mehr zitiert als nur jene drei Wörter” (261). 
92 Verse 15 also picks up the Story-line of 1:6 and 4:12 regarding the benefit to the Corinthians 
of Paul’s suffering (cf. Barrett, 143-144). “Everything,” including Paul’s ministry of speaking/preaching 
the Gospel and the suffering that ensues, occurs so the Corinthians may have the life faith brings, both in 
the present and eternally (cf. v 17). Lambrecht ably ties this together: “With v. 15 Paul both summarizes 
and motivates the main ideas of the first two parts. Suffering and preaching occur for the sake of the 
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has rescued and will continue to rescue Paul, and also to 2:14, where thanks are due to 
God who causes ultimate triumph for those who know Him. Thanksgiving is also the 
central focus of Psalm 115. Of the psalm’s ten verses, six concern giving thanks and 
praise, honoring vows, etc. Because Psalm 115 “is a hymn of thanksgiving for 
deliverance from death,” it fits Paul’s situation particularly well.93 Like the psalmist, 
Paul has been rescued by Yahweh and recognizes that thanks and praise are due to the 
God who sustains.  
In summary, this SAC, situated immediately after Paul’s expanded description 
of affliction in 4:8-12 and just prior to his call to increase thanksgiving to Yahweh, ties 
together believing, speaking, suffering and confident hope of rescue, including future 
resurrection, the “eternal” rescue. These interrelated Story-lines are also those of the 
original psalm and especially the SAC which contains the quoted passage.94 With the 
quotation, Paul connects himself and his colleagues to the Story of the psalmist, who 
was compelled to speak because of his belief, subsequently experienced serious 
negative consequences, and was ultimately rescued by Yahweh. Yahweh’s response led 
the psalmist to further proclamation of his faith in and loyalty to Yahweh and to make 
and fulfill vows to praise. Like the psalmist, Paul and his colleagues continue in both 
faith and the ministry to which Yahweh has called them, despite the ensuing afflictions. 
They are confident that Yahweh will rescue them and will, ultimately, bring the faithful 
into His very presence. Using our terminology, our conclusion is that via this quotation 
Paul successfully evokes a key element of the Story of Yahweh’s people.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Corinthians. Then, … the last purpose clause points out the ultimate aim of all apostolic activity, namely 
the glory of God. People are to be persuaded to be thankful. God’s free gift of the ministry should lead to 
giving thanks to God” (Second Corinthians, 77). 
Verse 15 also connects the discussion of glory in 3:7-4:6 to 4:16-18. Although God’s glory is not 
mentioned in Ps 115, it is present in other Hallel psalms, including Ps 111:9, which Paul quotes in 9:9. 
These and other allusions Young and Ford find to the Hallel psalms lead to their conclusion that “Paul 
almost seems to follow themes in progression from a group of Psalms of which the core might well be 
particularly familiar and significant to him” (68). We cannot explore this here.  
93 Hughes, 146, referring to Ps 116 MT.  
94 Hooker incorrectly believes Paul “is using the quotation atomistically” since the sufferings of 
the psalmist are described in Ps 116:1-9 MT and Paul instead uses Ps 115, which is “a psalm of 
deliverance” (“Interchange,” 78n11). Furnish points to a number of scholars who believe Paul has the 
broader Psalm in mind and notes just one, Barrett, who disagrees (285). On the one hand, we do not find 
it necessary to consider the broader psalm since Ps 115 does refer to the psalmist’s suffering (vv 1c, 2, 6, 
7c). On the other, we do not find sustainable Young and Ford’s “almost claim” that Ps 115 “is the text of 
Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians” (66), which is based on this quotation and such links as 
ἐκστάσει/ἐξέστηµεν (Ps 115:2/2 Cor 5:13), σωτηρίου/σωτηρίας (Ps 115:4/2 Cor 1:6, 6:2), and the inexact 
parallel δοῦλος/διάκονοι (Ps 115:7/2 Cor 6:4) (65). 
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Contra Stanley, the quotation does not play “a fairly minor position in a lengthy 
chain of arguments that Paul brings forward to defend his ministry.”95 On the other 
hand, it also “does not serve as a proof imbued with claims to divine authority” or 
“serve the purpose of closing the debate, of being the final word that would allow no 
further discussion.”96 The quotation is not designed either to dominate or to 
manipulate.97 Rather, it supports the core SA by evoking a lifeworld in which Yahweh’s 
people, like Paul and his colleagues, continue to proclaim Yahweh’s message with 
boldness even though they suffer for their speaking. Suffering is not inconsistent with 
Paul’s apostleship; rather, it demonstrates solidarity with Yahweh’s faithful, including 
the psalmist, and Jesus himself.98 
Successful illocution requires the illocutionary response of understanding. The 
implied reader makes this response. Paul would have expected some of his audience, 
particularly those who had a background in the synagogue, to have been able to assume 
the role of the implied reader at this level. Since “reading and interpreting Paul’s letters 
was an ongoing community process in his churches,”99 we do not agree with Stanley 
that Paul was trying to mislead the informed audience. Rather, Paul would have 
expected the informed group to lead the way in making sure those who had come 
directly to faith in Christ from paganism had the necessary mutual context to 
understand Paul’s illocutionary intent. 
Before we turn to the perlocution, we need to address the possibility raised in 
recent scholarship that Paul considered the psalm’s implied author to be the Messiah, 
and thus Jesus. A. T. Hanson was the first to argue that “Paul in all probability takes the 
                                                           
95 Stanley (“Paul’s ‘Use,’” 146; cf. Arguing, 99). He refers to 2 Cor 4:13-14 as an “obscure” 
quotation/reference (Arguing, 98; “Paul’s ‘Use,’” 146); Hays calls it an “obscure Pauline passage” 
(“Christ Prays,”108).  
96 Ehrensperger, “Authority,” 316, 318. Contra Hooker, it is not “an ordinary proof-text” 
(“Interchange,” 78). In this regard, Stanley’s remarks that the quotation “does not serve as a ‘proof’ for a 
specific argument” but is a “biblical warrant” which “does function somewhat like a ‘proof’ since it 
serves to justify Paul’s ministry” (“Paul’s ‘Use,’” 147) seem contradictory. In any event, we reject his 
contention that “its link to the preceding verses is so loose that the audience would likely have been 
puzzled by its appearance” (Ibid.) 
97 R. Watts is correct that “if Paul was knowingly misleading his readers on the meaning of 
Scripture, he was seriously undermining his own credibility. This is where it seems to me that Stanley’s 
rhetorical model goes awry. It has little appreciation of the centrality of ethics and character to Paul’s 
identity, mission, and message” (“In Need”). 
98 “If Paul is intending to correct any false notion here, it is … the belief that afflictions are 
inconsistent with true apostleship” (Furnish, 286). The “acknowledged weakness, vulnerability, and 
suffering which characterize his apostolate … are interpreted … as fully appropriate to the apostolic 
vocation of preaching ‘Jesus Christ crucified’” (287). For R. Hays, “the whole passage (2 Cor 4:7-15) is a 
description of Paul’s apostolic ministry and sufferings as an embodiment of the sufferings of Christ” 
(“Christ Prays,” 108). 
99 Abasciano, 171; he contrasts this to “Stanley’s highly individualistic approach” (see 169, 172). 
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verse from Ps. 116 as an utterance of the Messiah, an utterance of faith in God’s 
salvation. In the context of the psalm the humiliation of the psalmist so emotionally 
expressed would be taken as referring to the passion.”100 Further, Hanson believes that 
“‘I said in my haste, All men are liars!’ is uttered by the pre-existent Messiah to 
God.”101 He connects Paul to Christ via “the same spirit of faith”: “If we go back to the 
Septuagint and read it with Paul’s eyes, there can be only one answer: Paul is claiming 
the same spirit of faith as Christ.”102 
Hays was among the first to adopt Hanson’s argument.103 He believes it “almost 
surely correct, because the whole thrust of the passage depends upon a series of 
parallels that Paul is drawing between himself and Christ. The verses quoted here say in 
effect, ‘Jesus believed and spoke, and God raised him; therefore, we also believe and 
speak, knowing that God will raise us too along with him.’”104 Wagner, who is Hays’ 
former student, also tentatively adopts this viewpoint.105  
Campbell is another who argues along these same lines. According to him, Paul 
uses “spirit” pneumatologically. It then follows that “once it has been conceded that the 
Holy Spirit is identifying Paul with another person, it will be difficult to resist the 
further implication that this must be Christ; the Spirit is, after all, for Paul the Spirit of 
Christ!”106 From this, he argues that Paul here takes the Messiah as the “implicit subject 
of the verb πιστεύω.”107 But even if the “spirit of faith” is taken to be the Holy Spirit,108 
this does not necessarily identify the subject of πιστεύω as Messiah Jesus. Many of 
Yahweh’s faith-filled people, including David, would have been able to make this 
statement. 
                                                           
100 Hanson, Studies, 17-18; emphasis added. 
101 Ibid., 19. 
102 A. T. Hanson, Paul’s Understanding of Jesus: Invention or Interpretation? ([Hull?]: 
University of Hull Publications, 1963), 11. 
103 In a work published slightly before Hays’, Hooker tentatively connects “the same faith” in 2 
Cor 4 to that of Jesus and thus connects Paul’s faith to Jesus’ faith (“Interchange,” 79). Many who have 
followed this line of argument take the quotation in 2 Cor 4:13 to mean Jesus possesses faith or is faithful 
and thus use it to argue that πίστις Χριστοῦ can be a subjective genitive. We cannot explore this here. 
104 Hays, Faith, 152n125. Hays counts Ps 115 among the “messianic psalms” Paul interprets 
christologically (“Christ Prays,” 109, 108). He argues that if modern readers do not find Paul’s reading 
selbstverständlich, “it is because we lack the necessary hermeneutical key: that ὁ Χριστός (Rom 15:3, 7) 
is the true and ultimate speaker of Israel’s laments and praises” (“Christ Prays,” 109). Although we 
cannot fully investigate this claim, Paul’s use of Ps 115 in 2 Cor 4 does not substantiate it (see below). 
105 “If the speaker of the psalm is understood to be Christ,” this quotation becomes an “example 
of the theme, so prominent in 2 Corinthians, that in his ministry Paul participates in ‘the death of Jesus’” 
(J. R. Wagner, Heralds, 314n30). 
106 D. A. Campbell, “2 Corinthians 4:13: Evidence in Paul That Christ Believes,” JBL 128, no. 2 
[Summer 2009]: 345.  
107 Ibid., 353.  
108 See n82.  
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Schenck’s approach includes the idea that Paul’s “belief” is his expectation of a 
future resurrection of believers. Then, since the OT psalmist “is not speaking of 
resurrection, only of deliverance from trial,” he supposes instead “that Paul is reading 
Ps 115:1 LXX messianically in reference to Jesus’ faith in his own resurrection.”109 For 
Schenck, “in 4:13, Paul has the same spirit of faith that Jesus had, typified in the words 
of Psalm 115:1 LXX: ‘I have faith [that God will raise me from the dead]; I speak this 
faith.’ Paul and his coworkers also have faith [that God will raise them from the dead], 
and they speak accordingly.”110 But, as we argued earlier, the structure of the LXX 
psalm makes it unlikely that (expected) deliverance is the content of either the 
psalmist’s belief or speaking.111 
Although Stegman also considers Paul’s reading of Psalm 115 messianic,112 
contra Schenck he rejects a “principally cognitive understanding of πιστεύω in 4:13” in 
which the content is “that God raises the dead to life.”113 For Stegman, this  
fails to recognize that the apostle has been alluding to the story of Jesus and his 
πίστις since 4:10. And given that Paul offers no indication of changing the 
subject matter here, I propose that the verb πιστεύω in 4:13 is best translated 
“be faithful,” understood primarily as living in constant fidelity and obedience 
to God and God’s will.114  
However, in 4:10-12 there is no overt mention of Jesus’ πίστις and no 
discussion of the reason for Jesus’ death. Additionally, although Stegman is correct that 
Paul “makes the daring assertion that his experience of being afflicted, confused, 
persecuted, and humiliated is somehow connected with the story of Jesus,”115 that does 
not mean Paul makes a direct reference to Jesus in every instance. 
In summary, the arguments that Paul reads Psalm 115 messianically are not 
compelling. Nor is there evidence for a messianic interpretation of the psalm prior to 
                                                           
109 K. Schenck, “2 Corinthians and the Πίστις Χριστοῦ Debate,” CBQ 70 no. 3 (July 2008): 527, 
528. We do disagree with Young and Ford (64) that the psalmist’s faith is in the resurrection. 
110 Schenck, 533; brackets original. 
111 Schenck’s conclusion hinges on the only option for Paul’s faith being “rescue from his 
current mission trials” (527n11; see also 528n15). These two alternatives present “faith” too narrowly. 
112 Stegman regards “Paul as assuming that these words were spoken by the risen Jesus” 
(733n34). And, although Stegman argues that “το πνεῦµα της πίστεως … ought to be interpreted to mean 
‘πνεῦµα οf faithfulness,’” like D. Campbell, he believes this reference is to the Holy Spirit (735). 
113 Ibid., 734. By “principally cognitive,” Stegman refers to rendering “πιστεύω here as 
‘believe,’ in the sense of having conviction or certainty” (734; cf. 733n34, where he contrasts his 
understanding to Hanson’s rendering of ἐπίστευσα as “Jesus believed”).  
114 Ibid., 734. Interestingly, although Stegman believes that Paul “was not constrained by the 
original meaning of the text” (734), he argues that Paul draws on the entire LXX equivalent of Ps 116 
MT, i.e., Pss 114 and 115 (733n34; cf. 738-739, 745; and Schenck, 530-532). This is in contrast to 
Hanson and Hays who, according to Stegman, consider only Ps 115. 
115 Stegman, 729.  
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the writing of this letter,116 and the introductory formula “κατὰ τὸ γεγραµµένον” argues 
against the idea that Paul initiates a messianic interpretation. Although “Paul uses this 
precise citation formula nowhere else,”117 it in no way points to Jesus as the author of 
the Psalm. If Paul were reading Jesus as the subject of πιστεύω, he would more likely 
introduce the quotation with the formula he uses in Romans 4:18, “κατὰ τὸ εἱρηµένον.” 
To demand exact parallels between the psalmist’s situation and Paul’s or to 
postulate that since Paul expected to be resurrected, he must consider the psalmist to be 
Jesus because Jesus was resurrected both carry co-text too far. There is no indication 
Paul takes this verse as a Messianic utterance or the psalm as foretelling the Messiah’s 
death and resurrection.  
The final step in our analysis is to consider the perlocution of the SAC and to 
determine what transformation of the NT audience is called for and whether Paul reads 
the OT as an Envisager. 
Perlocution and Transformation 
The perlocutionary intention and desired perlocutionary effect of an Assertive 
illocutionary act or SAC is that the hearer/reader respond with adherence. The implied 
reader of the OT source text concurs that the psalmist has acted properly in speaking of 
his faith and agrees that Yahweh will deliver the believer from any resulting suffering. 
The Envisaging NT reader of 2 Corinthians 4:13-14 accepts that Paul’s belief impels his 
speech and that neither his ministry nor his message is negated or compromised by his 
suffering. Additionally, an Envisaging NT reader adheres to the notion that believers 
can be confident of Yahweh’s protection, and that ultimately, they, too, will be brought 
into Yahweh’s presence with Jesus Christ, who is the means by which they are saved.  
Paul clearly reads Psalm 115 as an Envisager since the perlocutionary intention 
of the SAC in 2 Corinthians which includes the quotation is in alignment with the 
perlocutionary intention of the psalm. Paul evokes the Story of the psalmist—who 
believes, speaks, suffers, is rescued, and gives thanks—in order to link the Corinthians 
to the lifeworld of the people of Yahweh, thereby transforming (by realigning or 
restoring118) the Corinthians’ attitudes towards Paul’s ministry and thus towards his 
message. The Corinthians’ behavior also is to be transformed; thanksgiving is to be 
                                                           
116 See the section “Intervening Interpretation” above. 
117 Furnish, 258; cf. R. Martin, 82.  
118 For those who have fallen away from faith in Jesus Christ, their current theological position 
would need to be subverted and their Christian faith re-created or restored. 
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increased to the glory of God (v 15).119 This, too, parallels the perlocution of the co-text 
of the psalmic SAC, in which thanks, praise and worship are offered to Yahweh (cf. Ps 
115:4, 9, and especially 8).  
With this quotation, then, Paul invites his readers to think as he does about 
Yahweh, the appropriate relationship a Yahweh-follower is to have with the deity, and 
what it means to live into one’s faith.120 He creates/activates mutual context by evoking 
the theological Story-lines of Psalm 115:1 to encourage his audience also to read as 
Envisagers, responding with the desired perlocutionary effect of adherence and thereby 
experiencing a realignment or restoration of their attitude towards Paul’s message. 
Ultimately, for Envisaging readers, their faith in and behavior towards Yahweh and the 
Lord Jesus Christ is also transformed and they join Paul in the lifeworld he inhabits.121 
Conclusion 
As we have applied our methodology to Paul’s quotation of Psalm 115:1 in 2 
Corinthians 4:13, we have determined it is neither “so far removed from the original 
context as to raise questions about Paul’s reliability as an interpreter” nor likely that 
“Paul simply ran across a set of words that sounded like a good ‘motto’ for his ministry 
and then copied them down (or memorized them) for later use without regard for their 
original context.”122 Rather, we have shown that, as Joseph Bonsirven observes with 
regard to this quotation, “S. Paul reste fidèle au sens général du texte.”123 More 
                                                           
119 The audience probably is also to take the “speaking” of the psalmist and Paul as a model. It 
appears in 2 Cor 9:13 that the Corinthian believers are expected, like the psalmist and Paul, to speak of 
their faith and its object (τῇ ὑποταγῇ τῆς ὁµολογίας ὑµῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ) despite the 
testing (δοκιµῆς) which may follow. According to Hughes, “Believing and speaking, or open confession, 
are in fact two essential aspects of salvation” (148, referring also to Rom 10:9f). 
120 The important theological Story-line of coming into or remaining in right relationship with 
God and Christ is stated firmly in the Directive which arguably forms the peak of this letter segment: “we 
entreat you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God” (5:20b). (N. T. Wright argues convincingly that 2 
Cor “5:20-21 forms the natural climax to the entire argument of the preceding three chapters” [“On 
Becoming the Righteousness of God: 2 Corinthians 5:21,” in Hay, 208]). The SAC which includes the 
quotation of Ps 115:1 supports this Directive because the Corinthians’ ability to enter into this state of 
reconciliation depends on their active acceptance of Paul’s message. Throughout the letter Paul defends 
his apostolic credentials and calls for the Corinthians to “open wide” their hearts to him (6:13)—not to 
mislead his audience or because he is concerned for his reputation but because he wants them to accept 
the truth of his message and then to act on it by being reconciled to Yahweh. 
121 As Ehrensperger puts it, “The frequent references to the Scriptures in the Pauline letters thus 
are more than mere proof-texts or ornaments to an argument previously made; they constitute the world 
in which he lived and thought” (Dynamics, 6).  
122 Contra Stanley, Arguing, 100. Nor is this a “power play” or an argument from authority in 
the sense of attempting to “anticipate and/or close off debate regarding a statement made by a 
speaker/author in direct speech” (Ibid., 13). 
123 J. Bonsirven, Exégèse rabbinique et exégèse paulinienne (Paris: Beauchesne et ses fils, 
1938), 320, adding “tout au moins tel qu’il le lisait dans la version grecque.” Bonsirven does not believe 
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specifically, Paul is an Envisaging reader of Psalm 115, who evokes the Story-lines and 
lifeworld of that psalm to support the desired transformation of his readers’ own 
lifeworld via the intended illocutionary and perlocutionary responses (of beliefs and 
behaviors) that the implied author establishes for the implied reader.124
                                                                                                                                                                          
Paul is always faithful to the OT context. He includes the quotation of Ps 68:19 in Eph 4:8 (which we 
discussed in chapter 5) under the category “Divergences graves.” 
124 This does not imply, contra B. Witherington, that “in all cases, a careful rereading of the Old 
Testament texts Paul cites or alludes to provides a larger and clearer context in which to understand what 
he is trying to say” (Paul’s arrative Thought World: The Tapestry of Tragedy and Triumph [Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox, 1994], 50; emphasis added). Each quotation must be examined on its own 
merits. 
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CHAPTER 8 
PSALM 110:1 AS QUOTED BY VARIOUS T AUTHORS1 
Our final case study is more intricate: the quotation of all or part of Psalm 110:1 in 
various NT situations, including by Jesus (as quoted in Matt 22:44, Mark 12:36 and 
Luke 20:42-43), Peter (as quoted in Acts 2:34-35), Paul (1 Cor 15:25), and the author of 
Hebrews (Heb 1:13).2  
The conclusions of some scholars concerning the relationship of the NT 
quotations of Psalm 110:1 to the OT context put these quotations squarely within the 
purview of this study. For example, John Goldingay finds that although some verses of 
this psalm “are applied to Jesus, … as a whole it does not fit him, and most of its 
application to him in the NT requires it to be understood in a way that would not 
correspond to its meaning in any OT context.”3 More broadly, Hay claims that “apart 
from their sheer number, the most remarkable feature of early Christian references to Ps 
110 is the wide diversity of meanings.”4  
As we use our methodology to evaluate these claims, we consider these specific 
questions: 
• What does Psalm 110:1 contribute to the Story of Yahweh’s people? What 
would it mean to read Psalm 110:1 as an Envisager?  
• Since there is little evidence for the pre-Christian interpretation of Psalm 110 
(it is not, for example, attested at Qumran), what can be said about 
“messianic expectations” in the first century generally that may help us 
understand the socio-historical context of the NT quotations of Psalm 110:1? 
                                                           
1 References to Ps 110 are to that MT number unless otherwise noted. 
2 According to L. Allen, Ps 110:1 is the text “most often cited or alluded to in the NT; it appears 
a score of times” (118). Hay lists 23 NT quotations/allusions (Glory, 164-166); D. E. Aune finds five 
quotations and 19 allusions (“Christian Prophecy and the Messianic Status of Jesus,” in The Messiah: 
Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity; The First Princeton Symposium on Judaism and 
Christian Origins, ed. J. H. Charlesworth [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992], 404n4). Space precludes a 
detailed discussion of Rom 8:34, Eph 1:20, Col 3:1, and 1 Pet 3:22, which refer to a seat at the right hand 
of God but do not directly quote Ps 110:1. We do, however, evaluate Jesus’ clear allusion to Ps 110:1 as 
reported in Matt 26:64, Mark 14:62, Luke 22:6. 
3 Goldingay, Psalms 90-150, 292.  
4 Hay, Glory, 17. M. Gourgues also believes “nos passages … ne placent pas toujours l’accent 
sur la même idée et, lorsqu’ils retiennent la même, celle de la droite notamment, ils l’utilisent en des sens 
divers” (À la droite de Dieu: Résurrection de Jésus et actualisation du Psaume 110:1 dans le ouveau 
Testament [Paris: Gabalda, 1978], 212). 
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• Is there any commonality in what the NT speakers/authors mediate to their 
readers/hearers in their illocutionary and perlocutionary acts? Is there any 
evidence of development of the OT idea(s)? 
• What would it mean to read these various NT passages as an Envisager? 
Does evoking the OT Story promote lifeworld/worldview transformation? If 
so, is there any commonality to the expected perlocutionary response? 
We begin by examining the OT text from a speech act (SA) perspective.  
Psalm 110 [109 LXX] 
Psalm 110 generally is classified as a royal psalm.5 “References to ‘my Lord’ (ִיֹנדֲא-
110:1), and the kingly diction—‘sit at my right hand’ (ִיניִמיִל בֵשׁ—110:1, 5), ‘a footstool 
for your feet’ ( ֲהֹ דםךָיְֶלגַרְל ), and ‘scepter’ (טֶבֶשׁ)—support a royal psalm motif.”6 The 
structure of Psalm 110 is “determined by the oracular introductions of vv 1 and 4.”7 
These verses each begin a SAC. 
 The Locution of Psalm 110:1-3 [109:1-3 LXX]  
The SAC that is the psalm’s first oracle can be divided into five SAs: vv 1, 2a, 2b, 3a 
and 3b. For convenience, this division is given in Appendix B§3 for the LXX, NETS 
and NRSV. Since all the NT authors clearly quote the LXX, we use it to evaluate the 
illocution and perlocution of the source text. However, because Jesus and Peter may 
have quoted the Hebrew OT or an Aramaic translation,8 we briefly discuss two 
locutionary issues concerning the relationship of the MT and LXX.9  
                                                           
5 According to Wendland, royal psalms “speak either of Israel’s earthly, human ruler—the 
LORD’s ‘anointed (chosen) one’—or of God as the supreme King” (Analyzing, 51). He calls royalty a 
minor function and lists it under the major functions of petition (lament) and praise (60). Since Ps 110 
does not fit into either of these major categories (cf. Ibid., 41, 58), we stop at identifying it as a royal 
psalm. Bock concisely refutes the arguments against understanding Ps 110 as a royal psalm 
(Proclamation, 128-129). See Bullock for an explanation of why Ps 110 is to be considered a royal psalm 
even though it does not explicitly mention an anointed person, the king or David (178-179). 
6 H. W. Bateman, Early Jewish Hermeneutics and Hebrews 1:5-13: The Impact of Early Jewish 
Exegesis on the Interpretation of a Significant ew Testament Passage (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 
175. We discuss the metaphors of the “kingly diction” below. Note Ps 110:2 has הֵטַּם, not טֶבֶשׁ. 
7 L. Allen, 113. The arguments he presents (113-114) for a tripartite structure are not convincing.  
8 Hay dates Ps 110 LXX to “somewhere between the third and first centuries BCE” and notes it 
“represents the earliest known interpretation” (Glory, 21). It may reflect a non-MT Hebrew text (see 
Jobes and Silva, 21). 
9 Another issue in v 1 is the use of εἶπεν for םְֻאנ since this bypasses “the special aura of prophetic 
revelation” םאנ has elsewhere in the OT. However, “the OG represents the command to be seated as a 
divine oracle no less plainly than does the MT” (Hay, Glory, 21). In addition, L. Allen believes דע in v 1 
would be better translated as “while” rather than “until” (i.e., ἕως) (110n1a, with reference to, among 
others, T. Booij, “Psalm cx: ‘Rule in the Midst of Your Foes!,’” VT 41, no. 4 [October, 1991]: 407. Cf. 
Clifford, 179). Allen finds “until” acceptable “with the understanding that it can mark a relative limit 
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The first of these is the rendering in Psalm 109:1 LXX of both הוהי and ינדא by a 
form of ὁ κύριος. However, ὁ κύριος and τῷ κυρίῷ µου are distinct personages; the 
oracle’s addressee is not presented as Yahweh or equivalent to Yahweh, i.e., divine. 
The other locutionary issue is that the final two SAs (vv 3a and 3b) present 
serious interpretive challenges in both the MT and LXX. Over 50 years ago, Raymond 
Jacques Tournay noted that v 3 “a donné lieu à une foule d’interprétations et de 
conjectures.”10 Scholars seem no closer to consensus today. Hay, for example, 
acknowledges the Hebrew is “virtually unintelligible” but believes “the Greek distinctly 
describes the birth of a divine child.”11 This, however, takes literally language which is 
very likely metaphoric, given the three metaphors in vv 1-2. For others, like Ulli Roth, 
“die LXX-Übersetzung bietet keine messianische Interpretation dieses Verses und des 
Psalms 110.”12 Since the psalm is not present in the Qumran texts and v 3 is not quoted 
in the NT, it cannot be determined how this verse was read in the first century CE.13 
Therefore, we do not consider it in our analysis. 
As we have noted, vv 1-2 contain several metaphors. To bridge our discussion 
of the locution and illocution, our next move is to unpack these metaphors. 
The Metaphors in Psalm 110:1-2 [109:1-2 LXX] 
The governing metaphor of this SAC—the command to be seated at the right hand of 
Yahweh in v. 114—is more than the offer of a chair or even permission to sit in the royal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
beyond which the activity of the main clause still continues” (110n1a). We reject G. R. Driver’s view of 
דע in v 1 as “when” and his understanding that this is “a promise of a seat beside His when he (sc. The 
Messianic king) has won the victory on God’s behalf for Israel” (“Psalm 110: Its Form, Meaning and 
Purpose,” in Studies in the Bible Presented to M. H. Segal, ed. J. M. Grintz and J. Liver [Jerusalem: 
Kiryat Sepher, 1964], 20*, 19*). Not only is “when” based on an unattested Hebrew form, “I” in v 1c 
must be Yahweh. Therefore, Yahweh clearly has a role in the victory (cf. vv 5-6). We agree with H.-J. 
Kraus: “With Yahweh’s help the king defeats and destroys all his enemies. … The decisive factor is not 
trust in one’s potential for waging war, but the invoking of Yahweh, his involvement, and his aid” 
(Theology of the Psalms, First Fortress Press ed., trans. K. Crim [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992], 120). 
10 R. J. Tournay, “Le Psaume cx,” RB 67 (1960): 10, noting that “les mss hébreux ne sont pas 
d’accord entre eux” and “le texte massorétique est obscur.” 
11 Hay, Glory, 21. His thought that “the corruption of the present Hebrew text may have resulted 
from deliberate efforts by scribes to conceal the [messianic] meaning” (22) is quite speculative.  
12 U. Roth, Die Grundparadigmen christlicher Schriftauslegung—im Spiegel der 
Auslegungsgeschichte von Psalm 110 (Berlin: LIT, 2010), 49. For a discussion of the messianism in Ps 
109:3 LXX, see The Septuagint and Messianism, ed. M. A. Knibb (Leuven: University Press; Peeters, 
2006), especially Knibb’s “The Septuagint and Messianism: Problems and Issues” and A. Cordes’ 
“Spricht Ps 109 LXX von einem Messias oder nicht?”  
13 See W. van der Meer, “Psalm 110: A Psalm of Rehabilitation?,” in The Structural Analysis of 
Biblical and Canaanite Poetry, ed. W. van der Meer and J. C. de Moor (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988), 
233-234. 
14 “Metaphor” is not an illocutionary category. Nor can metaphoric language be taken literally. 
“It is difficult to imagine how the king could have literally sat at Yhwh’s right hand, on a throne in the 
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presence. In the ancient Mediterranean world, the place to the right of a ruler or other 
important person was a location which indicated the conferring of honor and often also 
of authority. There are literary or pictorial references to monarchs being seated (or 
sometimes standing) at the right hand of a god in Egyptian, Ugaritic, and Babylonian 
works.15 The ancient Greek poets Pindar (ca. 522-443 BC) and Callimachus (ca. 305-
240 BC) speak of Athena and Apollo, respectively, as sitting at the right hand of Zeus.16 
In addition to Psalm 110, Psalm 80:17 implores Yahweh to “let your hand be upon the 
one at your right hand, the one whom you made strong for yourself.” Other OT usage 
includes 1 Kings 2:19 and Psalm 45:9, where the king’s mother and the queen, 
respectively, are found at the monarch’s (not Yahweh’s) right hand.17  
This metaphor also appears in intertestamental literature. In addition to the 
king’s concubine sitting at his right hand (and removing his crown and slapping him!) 
in 1 Esdras 4:29-30, King Alexander clothes Jonathan in purple and seats him “at his 
side” in 1 Maccabees 10:62-63. This is referred to twice as honoring him (vv 64, 65) 
and as a sign that Jonathan was among the king’s closest friends as well as “general and 
governor of the province” (v 65).18 Since later Jewish works also use this metaphor, it 
seems clear that the notion of being seated at the right hand of God “would be richly 
meaningful to contemporary pagans and Jews.”19 
That the use of this metaphor in v 1 involves not only divine honor but also the 
conferring of worldly authority and power is made clear in v 2a, which speaks of 
“sending out the mighty scepter” and either predicts or proposes earthly rule by the 
recipient of the oracle, as well as victory in battle. This figurative reference to the rule 
of the king is followed by a direct reference in the parallel colon (v 2b). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
temple, and it is in any case unwise to infer some literal, concrete event from a poetic colon in a prophetic 
oracle in a liturgical text, whose main point is metaphorical” (Goldingay, Psalms 90-150, 294). However, 
although as A. Burkhardt notes, “metaphorical sentences as such can be neither true nor false” (“Searle 
on Metaphor,” in Burkhardt, 324), an Assertive which contains a metaphor has truth-value.  
15 “In the Ugaritic Baal cycle it is recorded that Kothar wa-lasis is seated on a chair at the right 
hand of the god” (Booij, “Psalm cx,” 396n2). An Egyptian pictorial reference shows “Pharaoh Horemheb 
… seated at the right hand of the king’s god, Horus” (O. Keel, The Symbolism of the Biblical World: 
Ancient ear Eastern Iconography and the Book of Psalms, trans. T. J. Hallett [1978; repr. Winona Lake, 
IN: Eisenbrauns, 1997], 263, fig. 353). See also Hay, Glory, 52-53. 
16 Hay, Glory, 53. While no human ruler would have been considered divine in Israel, in other 
cultural contexts, monarchial divinity may have been presumed (cf. Kraus, Theology, 110-111, 113). 
17 Only in 1 Kgs 2:19 is there mention that the honored person (the king’s mother) is seated.  
18 L. Allen, 115, points to this passage as an example of the metaphor although it does not 
specifically mention the right hand. In pagan culture, a similar demonstration of giving honor and 
potential authority is found in “the pre-Islamic Arabian custom of seating the viceroy of a king at the 
latter’s right (the viceroy took precedence over everyone but the king himself)” (Hay, Glory, 53). 
19 Hay, Glory, 58. See Keener for Greek examples of being seated at right hand as an honor in 
the Christian era (1:948). 
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The second metaphor in v 1 is of making the enemies of the addressee of the 
oracle his “footstool.” Here, too, “reflection of an ancient Near Eastern cultural pattern 
is evident: in the El Amarna letters vassals refer to themselves as the footstools of 
Pharaoh, while a similar promise features in an oracle from Marduk to the Assyrian 
king Esarhaddon.”20 This situation is also represented in Egyptian iconography. Othmar 
Keel reproduces two Egyptian illustrations dating to the 15th century BCE, each of 
which shows the figures or heads of nine enemies placed as (or in) a footstool under the 
feet of the pharaoh or future pharaoh.21 In another drawing, nine bows, symbolizing the 
enemies’ military capacity, are placed under a pair of feet.22 The metaphor of serving as 
a footstool or being placed under the feet indicates total subjection. In the OT, the idea 
of enemies as/in a footstool is found only in Psalm 110. However, the concept of 
enemies or subjects being placed or falling under the feet of a ruler, ruling nation or 
Yahweh is found elsewhere, including 1 Kings 5:3 and Psalms 8:6, 45:5 and 47:3.23  
Booij summarizes the symbolism in Psalm 110:1-2: “The ruler sitting at 
YHWH’s right hand (representing honour); the enemies laid down as a footstool 
(submission); the staff, or ‘sceptre’, stretched out from Zion (dominion).”24 Taken 
together, the metaphors in vv 1 and 2 indicate that a seat at the right hand of Yahweh is 
“a position of honor in the power structure of God,” and that the one seated there 
“becomes a participant in Yahweh’s strength in battle and victory” over that ruler’s—
and by extension Yahweh’s—enemies.25 There is no doubt, however, “that God is the 
real king. David rules not in his own right but as vicegerent and representative, deriving 
                                                           
20 L. Allen, 115; cf. Booij, “Psalm cx,” 396n3. In the Amarna letters, “the submissive city kings 
(as, e.g., Ammunira of Berytus) explain: ‘A stool for your feet am I’” (Kraus, Psalms, 349). 
21 Keel, 253-256, especially figs. 341 and 342. “Nine” is thought to symbolize the totality.  
22 Ibid., 255, fig. 342. 
23 Cf. Booij, “Psalm cx,” 396n3; Tournay, “Psaume cx,” 7; Clifford, 179. They refer to other OT 
texts, including Josh 10:24, Ps 18:39 and Isa 51:23, which describe submission at or by the feet of a 
victor or suzerain. The frequent use of this metaphor may explain why many NT quotations merge the 
language of Ps 8:6 with Ps 110:1. Indeed, “wherever in the NT Ps. 8:4-6 is quoted, it is interpreted in the 
light of Ps. 110:1” (P. Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle, Paternoster, 1993], 151). 
24 Booij, “Psalm cx,” 397. 
25 Kraus, Psalms, 348-349. Booij believes in v 1 “it is only YHWH who acts” (“Psalm cx,” 396). 
L. Allen also argues that Yahweh promises to vanquish the enemies “while the king sat … serene and 
secure” (115; cf. N. C. Tharel, “The Use of Psalm 110:1 in Acts 2:34-35” [ThM diss., Dallas Theological 
Seminary, 2008], 21). However, Booij and Allen agree that vv 2 and 3 add a different note: In “v. 2 the 
sovereign is given a more active part. … The staff, being stretched forth by YHWH, is nevertheless in the 
hand of the ruler, who is surrounded by enemies and has to maintain his dominion forcibly” (Booij, 
“Psalm cx,” 397; cf. Allen concerning the role of the royal army [115-116]). 
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authority from his divine counterpart.”26 Kingship is both an honor and a gift from 
Yahweh.27 Thus, “the ultimate goal of the king is to extend the reign of God. The defeat 
of enemies means the defeat of evil enemies in the pursuit of a positive final goal: the 
realization of the just and peaceful world that the Lord intends.”28 This understanding of 
the various metaphors helps us explore the illocution. 
The Illocution of Psalm 110:1 [109:1 LXX]29 
The first SA is an Assertive which reports the speech of Yahweh.30 The reported speech 
contains two embedded SAs. The first is a Directive (Κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν µου [1b: 
LXX])31 and the second is a Commissive (θῶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν 
σου [1c: LXX]).32 They are connected temporally (ἕως ἂν). Considering the embedded 
SAs together gives the reason the Assertive in v 1 is tellable: “My lord” is being granted 
honor and authority by Yahweh, along with the promise of victory over his enemies. 
These are particularly significant words from Yahweh for Yahweh’s people, and thus 
this situation is to be broadly proclaimed and recorded for posterity. 
Of the remaining four SAs in the SAC, the second, fourth and possibly the fifth 
(vv 2a, 3a, 3b) are Assertives of the subclass of Predictives33 which describe how the 
Commissive in v 1c is to be fulfilled. The third SA (v 2b) is another Commissive, which 
                                                           
26 L. Allen, 115; cf. Keel, 259. Clifford notes “Davidic kingship was rooted in the kingship of 
Yahweh. … The king represents the god, extending the rule of his divine patron; his enemies are the 
enemies of the god” (177).  
27 Cf. Booij, “Psalm cx,” 396.  
28 Clifford, 180. R. Rendtorff expands on this with a look at the co-text: “It is only God himself 
who gives the king the rule over his enemies and who will execute judgment among the nations (vv. 5-6)” 
(“The Psalms of David: David in the Psalms,” in Flint and Miller, 62). 
29 For the role of Ps 110 in its psalmic grouping, see B. C. Davis, “Is Psalm 110 a Messianic 
Psalm?” BSac 157 (April–June 2000): 168, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, accession 
number ATLA0000913001 (accessed March 28, 2011); Clifford, 171; and Roth, 19-32. J. Kim also 
considers the relationship of Ps 107 and Pss 111-118 to Pss 108-110 as well as the links between Pss 108, 
109 and 110 (“The Speaker and the Addressee of Ps 110 in its Literary Context” [paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, Baltimore, MD, November 21, 2013]). We 
cannot explore this here. 
30 This is probably of the subclass of Ascriptive. See Bach and Harnish, 42. 
31 This Directive is probably of the subclass of Requestive (cf. Bach and Harnish, 47). If it is 
considered instead to be of the subclass of Requirement (Ibid.), it would be at a low level of force (i.e., 
enjoin), since Yahweh is not ordering the hearer to accept power and authority. 
32 This Commissive could be a Promise or an Offer. The difference is that “promises are acts of 
obligating oneself; offers are proposals to obligate oneself” (Ibid., 50). If it is considered that in v 1b 
Yahweh is obligating Himself unilaterally, then this is a Promise. However, this SA could be considered 
an Offer if the hearer’s action of sitting is a condition for its acceptance. In this case, the expectation is 
that “my lord” considers this Offer desirable and will gladly and gratefully accept it. 
33 Cf. Ibid., 42. Due to the textual difficulties, we do not analyze v 3 further. 
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either occurs contemporaneously with the fulfillment of the Commissive in the oracle or 
results from its fulfillment.34 
Since the invitation to be seated at the right hand of Yahweh (the Directive) is 
the controlling metaphor, the SA which contains it is the core SA, and the other SAs 
support or enhance its tellability. Here, tellability is enhanced if the Commissive in the 
embedded SAC in v 1 is read with the Commissive in v 4 (the immediately following 
co-text of our SAC) so that “forever” (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα) applies to both. This would mean 
the Commissive in v 1 would have no temporal limit and that Yahweh’s promise to 
place the enemies of Israel’s ruler “under his feet” would cover all subsequent rulers 
anointed by Yahweh.35 The hope of the restoration of a Yahweh-anointed ruler would 
explain why this psalm was preserved in the editing of the Psalter long after the collapse 
of the Davidic dynasty when Israel had instead become the footstool of foreign rulers.36 
In evaluating the illocution, we next identify the implied author and audience on 
two interrelated levels: (i) the speaker/issuer and hearer of the oracle and (ii) the 
reporting speaker/author and audience, i.e. the author and audience of the psalm.37 
The Hebrew text identifies the implied author/speaker of the oracle as Yahweh 
(Hebrew הוהי, translated in the LXX as ὁ κύριος and generally in English as “the 
LORD”).38 Using the socio-historical context of the psalm helps us identify the direct 
addressee of the oracle. In the Israelite socio-historical context, the invitation to be 
seated at the right hand of Yahweh would be issued to an earthly ruler—Yahweh’s 
Anointed—upon whom honor and representative authority are being conferred.39 
Further, the psalm tells us the direct addressee has enemies, and Yahweh is promising 
defeat of those foes such that the oracle’s recipient will rule in their midst (v 2). There 
appears to be no doubt of Yahweh’s ability to confer honor and vanquish enemies.40  
                                                           
34 Although κατακυρίευε is in the imperative mood, the classification by Waltke and O’Connor 
as a figure of heterosis seems correct since “with the imperative, heterosis creates a promise or prediction 
to be fulfilled in the future” (572; see the NIV for this rendering). 
35 Relying on “you are a priest forever” from the second oracle (v 4), Booij claims that “Psalm 
cx is an assurance of everlasting dominion, made to a ruler on Zion” (“Psalm cx,” 396). 
36 “Although the Davidic kingship ceased with the exile,” the royal psalms were “preserved in 
Israel’s psalter probably because the Davidic covenant was eternal” (R. Watts, “The Psalms,” 27). 
37 The NT authors create their own implied authors and audiences. We discuss this below. 
38 Verse 2 clarifies the speaker’s identity since a viceroy’s public foes would be the monarch’s. 
39 Because the oracle speaks of someone chosen, honored and given authority by Yahweh and 
for whom Yahweh fights such that the defeat of his foes is assured, it can be considered “messianic” even 
though the term חישׁמ (χριστός) is not used (See K. Möller, “Proclaiming the Reign of Christ, the Lord: 
The Psalms in the New Testament,” in Praying by the Book: Reading the Psalms, ed. C. Bartholomew 
and A. West [Carlisle: Paternoster, 2001], 163). 
40 Admittedly, this is an argument from silence. 
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But who is this chosen one, the implied hearer of the oracle? Is it David, the 
Lord’s anointed (cf. Pss 18:50, 89:20), a literal “son” of David, e.g. Solomon, or a 
“messiah” anticipated by the psalmist who has not yet appeared to claim his throne?  
Before we attempt to answer this question, we must clarify some terminology. 
By “messiah,” we refer to someone anointed by Yahweh who brings about salvation of 
any kind, whether or not the term “messiah” is used to describe that person.41 If the 
messiah is to bring future salvation, we call that future “eschatological.” This does not 
necessarily refer to the end-times or the end of time.42 Rather, “eschatological” can refer 
to what Shemaryahu Talmon calls the “the turn of times, … a profound crisis in history 
marked by tribulations of cosmic dimensions.”43  
To determine the identity of the implied hearer of the oracle, we look at the SAC 
as well as at the broader co-text. First, the direct addressee of the oracle is “my Lord” to 
the psalmist (v 1a). Therefore, what we learn about the implied author of the psalm 
helps us identify the direct addressee of the oracle and vice versa. Another element is 
the superscription דודל/Τῷ ∆αυιδ. With this, it is clear “daβ der Psalm selbst in eine 
enge Verbindung mit David als dem israelitischen Idealkönig und legendären Dichter 
der Psalmen gebracht wird.”44 However, it not clear how “David” relates to this psalm.45 
                                                           
41 For this definition, see M. de Jonge, “The Use of the Word ‘Anointed’ in the Time of Jesus,” 
ovT 8, no. 2/4 (April-October 1966): 132. 
42 Following M. F. Bird (see Are You the One Who Is to Come?: The Historical Jesus and the 
Messianic Question [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009], 34, 146), we do not conflate messianic 
expectations and eschatological expectations. Thus we disagree with Juel that overall in the NT 
“eschatological convictions pervade everything: the prophetic dimensions of the Scriptures are central; 
the present is understood as the last days and as a time of fulfilled promises (l Corinthians 10:11; Acts 2; 
Matthew 1-2; Luke 1-2; etc.)” (Messianic Exegesis, 57).  
43 S. Talmon, “The Concept of Māšîaḥ and Messianism in Early Judaism,” in Charlesworth, 
Messiah, 109. The turn of times is when “the Anointed will come, not at the end of time”(109). Thus, “the 
New Order to be established by the anointed is not otherworldly but rather the realization of a divine plan 
on earth, the consummation of history in history” (112).  
Beale offers several summary definitions of eschatology (T Theology, 112-115), which he sees 
“not merely as the end of redemptive or cosmic history, or the goal of Israel’s hopes, or the goal of the 
individual saint’s hopes, but rather as an ‘already-not yet new-creational reign in Christ’” (177). This, in 
turn, refers to “the entire network of ideas that belong to renewal of the whole world, of Israel, and of the 
individual” (178).  
44 Roth, 19. Although Roth points out that there are several options as to “wer mit David 
überhaupt gemeint ist” (Ibid.), the superscription indicates Ps 110 takes a monarchical, pre-exilic 
perspective and the majority opinion today is that it “is a pre-exilic royal psalm, composed for a Davidic 
monarchy in Jerusalem” (Hay, Glory, 19). Among scholars who “still advocate a post-exilic origin; the 
favorite theory … has been one supposing the psalm a piece of Hasmonean propaganda” (Ibid.). This 
theory is unlikely, since the Hasmoneans were not Davidides. We discuss this below. Witherington finds 
it implausible to date Ps 110 to the Maccabean period, “not least because it is found in early psalter 
collections such as the one at Qumran” (Mark, 131). For a discussion of the time frame of the psalm, see 
H. W. Bateman, “Psalm 110:1 and the New Testament,” BSac 149 (October-December 1992): 438-441, 
ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, accession number ATLA0000855656 (accessed January 24, 
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One alternative is to take David as the direct addressee of the oracle. Then, since 
David is the psalmist’s lord, the psalmist would be a court poet or prophet.46 This ties 
into evidence in 1 Samuel 24:11 and 2 Samuel 15:21, which indicates “royal etiquette” 
would call for a court poet to address the king as his master or lord.47 Against this has 
been raised the argument that David could not “rightly be called a ‘priest forever after 
the order of Melchizedek’” (Ps 110:4).48 But the “order of Melchizedek” is not the 
Levitical order. Willem van der Meer gives a number of examples from 2 Samuel and 1 
Kings which demonstrate that “in the offices of David and Solomon, a priestly, 
mediatorial role is present. The king is able to function in this role because he is the 
head of a theocratic nation.”49 Although this would “not entail that the king becomes a 
priest in the ordinary sense of that word,” the monarchical function of service to 
Yahweh is similar to the description of Melchizedek as both king of (Jeru)Salem and 
“priest of God Most High” (Gen 14:18).50 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2011); and Tharel, chapter 2. See van der Meer for scholars who defend a pre-exilic context for Ps 110 
generally or a Davidic context specifically (227n55). 
45 For ְל, CEV gives “by” and NETS gives “pertaining to.” Day argues that “it is impossible to 
suppose that ledawid in these instances is anything but an ascription of authorship” (115). However, 
Goldingay points out that “while lĕ can mean ‘of,’ it has many other meanings, mostly more common 
than ‘of.’ … In an expression such as ‘To the choirmaster. Of David’ (Pss. 11 and 14 RSV), ‘to’ and ‘of’ 
both represent lĕ, and it may seem arbitrary to translate it in these two different ways” (Psalms 1-41, 27). 
We do not assume “of” is the only possible translation or that it denotes authorship. 
46 “On the basis of the two divine oracles of vv 1, 4, it is commonly held that it was uttered by a 
court prophet” (L. Allen, 111; cf. Kim, 16n52). Allen (111-113) and Bateman (“Psalm 110:1,” 442-443) 
summarize which scholars advocate for the various proposed settings. A commonly suggested setting is a 
coronation ritual, but such proposals differ substantially as to the site and the era of the enthronement.  
47 See L. Allen, 115.  
48 J. Aloisi, “Who is David’s Lord? Another Look at Psalm 110:1,” Detroit Baptist Seminary 
Journal 10 (2005): 123.  
49 Van der Meer, 229; cf. Hay, Glory, 20.  
50 Van der Meer, 229. On the one hand, this is contra Eaton, who believes Ps 110:4 “appoints the 
king to be God’s priest for ever. … There are indications in the historical sources that the role was indeed 
held by David and his successors, though opposed and obscured in the records by priestly clans after the 
end of the monarchy” (385). At the other end of the spectrum is J. de Fraine, for whom “ni à l’origine, ni 
dans son développement ultérieur, la royauté israélite n’a entraîné pour le souverain la qualité de prêtre; 
dès le début, les fonctions ‘sacerdotales’ étaient clairement distinctes des privilèges du roi-guerrier. Tout 
en n’étant nullement un ‘fonctionnaire du culte’, le roi peut être considéré comme investi d’un droit de 
surveillance concernant le culte” (“Peut-on parler d’un véritable sacerdoce du roi en Israël?,” in Sacra 
Pagina: Miscellanea Biblica Congressus Internationalis Catholici de Re Biblica, ed. J. Coppens, A. 
Descamps, and É. Massaux [Gembloux: Duculot, 1959], 1:546-547). However, although David is never 
identified as a priest, it seems likely that H. W. Attridge (referring to 1 Sam 6:12-21; 24:25; 1 Kgs 3:4; 
8:1-5, 62; 12:33) is correct that “in the pre-exilic period the high priest was definitely subservient to the 
king, who could himself exercise priestly functions” (The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Hebrews, ed. H. Koester [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989], 97; cf. Beale, T Theology, 72, and 
Kraus, Psalms, 351). According to Beale, “Solomon is depicted more than any other king, except perhaps 
David, to be functioning like a priest” (T Theology, 71). 
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Another alternative is to consider “of David” in the sense of “by David”—in 
other words, to hold David to be the implied author of the Psalm.51 But in that case, who 
is the original addressee of the oracle, that is, who is David’s lord? The alternatives are 
the king under whom David served (Saul), or one of David’s heirs.  
The psalm’s second oracle excludes King Saul from consideration.52 Although 
Saul was promised—and received—victory over his enemies and ruled over Israel (1 
Sam 9:15-16, 27; 14:47-48), he was not king in Jerusalem. Further, his downfall came 
about when he disobeyed Yahweh by usurping priestly duties (cf. 1 Sam 13:9ff). It is 
therefore unlikely that David would have referred to Saul as “a priest forever according 
to the order of Melchizedek” (v 4).53 
If David is the psalmist, the other possibility for the hearer of the oracle is a 
future anointed king or royal “messiah” of Israel whom Yahweh addresses, most likely 
according to Yahweh’s promise in 2 Samuel 7:16. There are two options for a messianic 
interpretation. First, this messiah may be an anointed king of Israel of David’s line.54 
Herbert Bateman argues that “the most viable option is that David spoke the psalm … 
to Solomon when David freely handed over his kingship to Solomon (1 Kgs. 1:32-35, 
43-45; 1 Chron. 28:1-8, 29:20-25).”55 This identification is supported by Benaiah’s 
prayer for Solomon’s throne to be even greater than David’s in response to David’s 
request that Solomon be crowned king (cf. 1 Kgs 1:37, 47-48).56 This prayer is 
                                                           
51 See Kim, 15n53, for a summary of scholars who hold to this view. 
52 Even after being anointed king, “David often referred to King Saul as either ‘my lord’ ([1 
Sam] 24:6, 10; 26:18) or ‘my lord the king’ (24:8; 26:17, 19)” and “he also referred to Achish of the 
Philistines as ‘my lord the king’ (29:8)” (Bateman, “Psalm 110:1,” 449). However, Bateman is surely 
correct to conclude that “neither of these men … was the recipient of Psalm 110” (Ibid.)  
53 As S. E. Balentine puts it, the addressee of the oracle is “the point of union between God and 
his people” as both king and priest (“The Royal Psalms and the New Testament: From ‘messiah’ to 
‘Messiah,’” TTE 29 [Fall 1984]: 57). This is not a description of King Saul. 
54 Balentine concludes that “in Ps. 2, and throughout the royal psalms generally, Yahweh’s 
‘anointed one’ (masiah) should be understood in terms of the earthly Davidic king” (58). Similarly, R. 
Watts argues that “most modern scholars take the addressee to be either David or his royal descendants, 
possibly at enthronement” (“The Psalms,” 36). 
55 Bateman, Hermeneutics, 175.   
56 This prayer is made in David’s presence, although he is never said to make such a prayer, even 
in his final charges to Solomon (1 Kgs 2:1-9) and to Israel concerning Solomon’s rule (1 Chr 29:1, 19). 
Nor does David refer to Solomon as “my Lord,” and he is not listed as pledging submission to Solomon 
(1 Chr 29) although he may have been present. But Solomon appears to ascend the throne during David’s 
lifetime (1 Chr 29:22b-23a), and his royal splendor surpasses that of his father (1 Chr 29:25); his is the 
pinnacle of riches and honor (2 Chr 1:12). There is no reason that Waltke’s claim that “in Psalm 110:1a 
David, using distinctively prophetic language, foresees a King greater than himself” could not apply to 
Solomon (38). As Marcus points out, “the ‘shoot of Jesse,’ the ideal king descended from David in Isa 
11:1-16, is not only a military conqueror but also a righteous judge filled with wisdom and 
understanding—qualities more usually associated with Solomon than with David” (Mark, 1120). 
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answered; Yahweh exalts Solomon and bestows on him “such royal majesty as had not 
been on any king before him in Israel” (cf. 1 Chr 29:25). 
For this messiah to be a “descendant” of David would not limit the office to 
Solomon since the Davidic monarchy has no temporal limit: David’s house, kingdom 
and throne are established forever ( עע דלום  twice in 2 Sam 7:16). As psalmist, David 
may consider the oracle addressed to his dynastic line and “prophesy” this.57 
The second possibility is “that David addressed his messianic Lord, his divine 
Lord, in a directly prophetic manner,” as Derek Kidner and others have argued.58 But it 
seems unlikely that a psalm written from a pre-exilic perspective would have leaped 
history to directly prophesy an eschatological messiah,59 much less a divine one. David 
was Yahweh’s anointed (cf. 1 Sam 16:3, 2 Sam 2:4, Ps 89:20). The Israelites knew 
others had been anointed previously (e.g., King Saul and various priests) and, based on 
Yahweh’s promises, would have expected David’s heirs would be anointed after him.60 
                                                           
57 In 11QPsa 27:11 David is “considered a prophet who composed the psalms under divine 
inspiration”; before this, the Chronicler and Nehemiah both give “him the prophetic title ‘the Man of 
God’ (2 Chr 8:14; Neh 12:24, 36)” (D. Dimant, “Use and Interpretation of Mikra in the Apocrypha and 
Pseudepigrapha,” in Mulder, 391n50; cf. Evans, “Praise,” 552. 
58 According to D. Kidner, “what is unique” to this psalm “is the royal speaker [David], 
addressing this more-than-royal person” (Psalms 73-150: A Commentary on Books III-V of the Psalms 
[Leicester: Inter-Varsity, 1973], 392). He feels that since the NT presents Jesus as “not only greater than 
David (Acts 2:34 …) but greater than the angels (Heb. 1:13 …),” this verse must display “the divine 
Person of Christ” (393; cf. E. E. Johnson, “Hermeneutical Principles and the Interpretation of Psalm 
110,” BSac 149, no. 596 [October-December 1992], 431, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, 
accession number ATLA0000855655 [accessed March 28, 2011]). Others concur. J. H. Charlesworth 
believes the yearning of some Jews “for salvation from their pagan oppressors … centered on the future 
saving acts by a divinely appointed, and anointed, supernatural man: the Messiah” (“From Messianology 
to Christology: Problems and Prospects,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 3-4). More recently, M. Rydelnik 
argues that “Psalm 110 does indeed picture the divine Priest-King, now seated at the right hand of God 
but who will descend from heaven at the end of days to save Israel and extend His rule over all the earth. 
This is none other than the Messiah” (The Messianic Hope: Is the Hebrew Bible Really Messianic? 
[Nashville: B&H Academic, 2010], 184). Cf. W. T. Slusser, “The Function of Psalm 110 in the Argument 
of Hebrews: An Examination of the Uses of Psalm 110 Found in the Priesthood Section of Hebrews 
(4:14-10:18)” (2005): 14-15, http://www.slusser.us/papers/Intertextuality%20paperweb.pdf (accessed 
March 28, 2011). Bateman calls this “the traditional view” (“Psalm 110:1,” 445, 445n34). See Rydelnik 
(especially 13-33) for a summary of how OT scholarship sees such “messianic prophecy.”  
59 Some, like Aloisi, find Ps 110 to be direct messianic prophecy (cf. 123) without necessarily 
involving a divine messiah since “just how much David understood about the nature of the Messiah is 
difficult to determine” (119n82). From a slightly different perspective, Roth speaks of “die Prophetie, die 
nicht das Kommen eines Messias, sondern die Ankunft der endzeitlichen Herrschaft Gottes verheiβt” 
(26). We do not find these arguments compelling. However, after the Davidic dynasty appeared to end, it 
seems likely the psalm was interpreted “eschatologically” in the sense of an expectation of the coming of 
the turn of times. 
60 As did happen (1 Kgs 1:39). As J. J. M. Roberts points out, these “were not prophecies 
holding out hope for a distant future but oracles that gave expression to political, social, and religious 
expectations for the reign of a contemporary king just being installed into office” (“The Old Testament’s 
Contribution to Messianic Expectations,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 42). Here we disagree with J. J. 
Collins. Although he admits that in the OT the term “messiah” does not necessarily refer to an 
eschatological figure, he applies it only to “a figure who will play an authoritative role in the end time, 
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Linguistic evidence also argues against seeing the oracle as prophecy of a divine 
messiah. According to Bateman 
The form “to my lord” (ִיֹנדאַל) is never used elsewhere in the Old Testament as a 
divine reference. Also, none of the 138 forms of “my lord” (ִיֹנדֲא) and none of the 
nine other prefixed forms of “my lord” ( ִיֹנדאַמ ,ִיֹנדאִב ,ִיֹנדאַו ) is a divine reference. 
… Furthermore, when “my lord” (ִיֹנדאַ) and ‘Lord’ (הָוְהי) are used in the same 
sentence, as in Psalm 110:1, “my lord” (ִיֹנדאַ) always refers to an earthly lord.61  
We agree with Allen that although “one respects the worthy motives of those 
who seek to restrict the psalm to a messianic intent from the beginning, … it hardly 
accords with the pattern of historical and theological development discernible in the 
royal psalms in general and with the ancient cultural and historical royal references 
within Ps 110.”62 All in all, the most probable explanation is that a court prophet 
composed Psalm 110 about or “for” David—perhaps “to celebrate David’s earlier 
conquest of Jerusalem and succession to Jebusite kingship (cf. 2 Sam 12:30).”63 
However, it is likely that, beginning with Solomon’s coronation, the psalm was used 
“by succeeding kings in a context of national enthronement and also in any other cultic 
settings in which the king’s relation to Yahweh was celebrated.”64 “Like the other royal 
psalms, it became in the postexilic canonical Psalter a witness to the restoration of the 
dynasty, guaranteed by God’s ‘forever,’ and so a witness to Israel’s messianic hope.”65 
This explains its attribution to David in the Synoptic Gospels and in Acts 2.66 
                                                                                                                                                                          
usually the eschatological king” (The Scepter and the Star: Messianism in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls, 
2nd ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010], 16) and he defines “messianism” as “the expectation of a figure 
who will act as God’s designated agent in the eschatological time” (“Messianism and Exegetical 
Tradition: The Evidence of the LXX Pentateuch,” in Knibb, 129). 
61 Bateman, “Psalm 110:1,” 448, adding that 94% of the 168 forms “refer to earthly lords. The 
exceptions are when Joshua, Gideon, Daniel, and Zechariah addressed an angelic being as ‘my lord’” 
(448). Aloisi rightly notes that B. Davis’ claim that the “angelic being” addressed as ינדא in Judg 6:13 and 
Josh 5:14 is later identified as Yahweh does not disprove Bateman’s argument. Davis “has not proven 
that the OT contains a clear text in which a person knowingly addresses Yahweh as ִיֹנַדְא” (Aloisi, 118, 
referring to Davis, 164). Although Aloisi believes “even if Bateman’s distinction holds up, David could 
very well have used the term ִיֹנדֲא with reference to the Messiah” (119), the question remains as to why 
David would ignore his immediate descendants to prophesy only an eschatological Messiah.  
62 L. Allen, 113. For Cordes, “gut möglich ist es, dass sich auch der Übersetzer unter dem von 
JHWH gezeugten κύριος einen Messias vorgestellt hat. Aber eine dahingehende interpretatorische 
Tendenz im Sinne einer bewussten theologischen Exegese des Vorlagentextes lässt sich aus dem Text 
von Ps 109 LXX selbst nicht ablesen” (260). 
63 L. Allen, 113. See also Goldingay, Psalms 90-150, 291.  
64 L. Allen, 113, adding that “the divine oracles of vv 1 and 4 certainly appear to belong to such 
a context [enthronement], but the psalm as a whole may not intend to issue them but to simply echo them 
(cf. 2 Sam 3:18; 5:2).”  
65 L. Allen, 118. Kim avers that Ps 110 has become an “eschatological psalm in its final form in 
the context of the psalter” (15; cf. 18n60). 
66 Kim points out that “the Synoptic Gospels and Acts clearly describe David as the speaker in 
Ps 110 (Mark 12:36; Matt 22:43-44; Luke 20:42-44; Acts 2:34-35)” (17). It is also possible David 
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In any event, in all these cases, the use in the psalm of the metaphors of sitting at 
the right hand and enemies as a footstool indicates that honor and authority/power have 
been or are to be conferred on a recipient who will rule over Yahweh’s people and 
whose enemies will be vanquished with Yahweh’s help. The implied audience, no 
matter what the situational particulars, understands these aspects of the illocution. The 
implied audience also knows who Yahweh is, what Yahweh’s nature is like and what 
Yahweh can do. More specifically, the implied reader understands that Yahweh has 
promised to anoint a ruler for Israel whose enemies will be defeated and will become 
subject to his rule. Psalm 110:1 speaks to the protection, assistance and deliverance 
which Yahweh provides; the implied audience expects that as a result of the work of 
Yahweh, “my lord” will come to rule over his foes.67  
In order to read as an Analyst (a reader who understands the illocutionary act), 
empirical readers must either activate these aspects of mutual context or add this Story-
line to the mutual context they share with the implied author. We wrap up our 
discussion of Psalm 110:1 with an evaluation of the impact on lifeworld, worldview and 
theology of reading this SAC as an Envisager. 
The Perlocution of Psalm 110:1 [109:1 LXX] 
The embedded oracle contains a Directive and a Commissive illocutionary act. For a 
Commissive illocutionary act, the related perlocution is “that H believe S intends to 
fulfil his obligation to do A.”68 With regard to the Commissive in the oracle, the 
intended perlocutionary effect/response is that the listeners believe Yahweh has the 
capacity and the intention to give the direct addressee dominion over his enemies. For a 
Directive illocutionary act, the intended perlocution is “that H (intend to) do A.”69 Here, 
the intended perlocutionary effect is that the direct addressee accept the honor and 
anointing Yahweh offers. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
preserved for posterity something originally spoken about him (cf. Bateman “Psalm 110:1,” 445, 
443n27). Bock offers another alternative: “Could it reflect that the prophet was regarded as acting as 
David’s mouthpiece in declaring the authority of the king as his successor into his covenant? … David 
would be seen as the real speaker in the cultic context in the hope that this king will fulfil the Davidic 
covenant” (Proclamation, 129). 
67 According to van der Meer, ינימיל בשׁ emphasizes that v 1 speaks to “the protection which God 
provides” (224).  
68 Bach and Harnish, 81. 
69 Ibid. 
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Within the psalm, v 1 is an Assertive illocutionary act, for which the related 
perlocution is “that H believe that P.”70 The psalmist’s audience is called to believe that 
this report is true, i.e., that Yahweh has offered the addressee of the oracle honor, 
authority and power to rule and that Yahweh can and will place the enemies of that ruler 
in subjection. The remaining SAs of this SAC describe how this is to come about (v 2a) 
and the ultimate result (v 2b). 
By the time of the NT, when the Davidic dynasty had not ruled Israel in 
centuries, an Envisaging reader of the Psalm takes a position of trust that the promises 
of the oracle continue past their fulfillment in David and his pre-exilic heirs. An 
Envisaging reader looks to the future and “forever” fulfillment of these promises. 
Depending on the situation of each empirical hearer/reader, to respond with the 
intended perlocutionary effect (the response of the implied reader), an Envisaging 
reader must transform (realign or subvert/re-create) their understanding of Yahweh and 
these promises. This transformation of the Envisager’s belief system—and the actions 
that flow from it—is linked to Story, lifeworld/worldview and theology.  
A Summary of the Contribution of Psalm 110:1 to Story, Lifeworld and Theology 
In terms of the basic theological questions and the role of this SAC in Story, Psalm 110 
speaks to the question of how Yahweh relates to the world, and, in particular, the role of 
the monarch in relationship to Yahweh as well as the world. The SAs later quoted 
contribute to Story the information that Yahweh has made temporally unlimited 
promises regarding the honor and authority to be given to a ruler of Yahweh’s people 
and that Yahweh will place that ruler’s (and by extension, the people’s) enemies in 
submission. The Envisaging reader expects that Yahweh will fulfill these promises, and 
the lifeworld and worldview of such a reader incorporates these Story-lines. 
Post-Exilic Interpretation of Psalm 110 
Although there is no evidence to support the claim of those who believe Psalm 110:1 
was direct messianic prophecy from its inception, it is possible that it was interpreted 
that way once the Davidic succession had collapsed.71 But there is scant evidence for 
                                                           
70 Ibid. 
71 Balentine believes that “by the time of Jesus it is likely that Psalm 2 and probably Psalm 110 
had already come to be understood as messianic, that is as pointing to the king who would come in the 
future to rule as Yahweh’s anointed son” (61; cf. Marcus, Mark, 846; Way, 132-37). For M. Hengel, “Ps 8 
und 110, schon in Jerusalem von der Urgemeinde als ‘messianische Hymnen’ gesungen wurden, wobei 
sie sich gegenseitig interpretierten und zugleich einen entscheidenden Einfluβ auf die Entstehung der 
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intervening interpretations of Psalm 110 and even less evidence of any interpretation 
involving an eschatological messiah.72 Perhaps the most telling absence is that no part of 
Psalm 110 is found in any form among the Dead Sea Scrolls.73 Overall, we concur with 
Hans-Joachim Kraus that “no messianic interpretation of Psalm 110 in Jewish circles 
can be documented.”74 However, absent any consideration of Psalm 110, there were 
messianic expectations in Judaism at the turn of the millennium. Since this issue is 
important to our analysis of the NT use of Psalm 110:1, we examine it briefly below.75 
Messianic Expectations in the First Century 
Interest in messianism remained “virtually dormant from the early fifth to the late 
second century BCE.”76 Messianic expectation experienced a resurgence in the first 
century BCE,77 although it was far from uniform.78 One prominent source for the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
frühen Christologie ausübten” (“‘Setze dich zu meiner Rechten!’ Die Inthronisation Christi zur Rechten 
Gottes und Psalm 110,1” in Le Trône de Dieu, ed. M. Philonenko [Tübingen: Mohr, 1993], 146). 
72 We do not find any interpretive traditions that clearly either are of Ps 110 or are pre-Christian. 
For a discussion of some of the options that have been presented, see Appendix C. 
73 According to P. W. Flint, Ps 110 is one of 24 canonical psalms “missing” from the forty 
Psalms scrolls and related manuscripts (such as the pesharim) found among the Dead Sea Scrolls 
(“Psalms and Psalters,” 234; cf. Kraus, Theology, 186, and Hay, Glory, 27). Flint believes the missing 
psalms were originally included but “are now lost due to the fragmentary state of most of the scrolls” 
(The Dead Sea Psalms Scrolls and the Book of Psalms [Leiden: Brill, 1997], 48). He restores “Ps 110 
after 109, mainly on the basis of its Davidic superscription” since “computerized reconstruction shows 
the sequence 109→110 followed by 113-118 in cols. iv-vi [of l1QPsa] to be very plausible on the basis of 
spacing” (Psalms Scrolls, 191). 
74 Kraus, Theology, 186. Hay attributes to Strack-Billerbeck the unsupportable conclusion that 
“messianic interpretation was the norm for rabbis of the first century” (Glory, 29); Aune relies on Hay to 
make a similar argument (409). But Hay himself claims only that “it seems fair to suppose that in the NT 
era a messianic interpretation of Ps 110 was current in Judaism, although we cannot know how widely it 
was accepted” and that “Jews shortly before and during the period of Christian origins applied the psalm 
variously, sometimes to a future messiah, sometimes to the heavenly vindication of a righteous sufferer 
(T Job), perhaps sometimes to a reigning Hasmonean king or supernatural being (the son of man, the 
heavenly Melchizedek)” (Glory, 30, 161). 
75 For a helpful list of some of the studies of messianism in the intertestamental period and 
Second Temple Judaism, see M. Bird, 31n1. 
76 J. Collins, Scepter, 51. See also J. Collins, “Messianism,” 133; and G. S. Oegema, “Messianic 
Expectations in the Qumran Writings: Theses on their Development,” in Qumran-Messianism: Studies on 
the Messianic Expectations in the Dead Sea Scrolls, ed. J. H. Charlesworth, H. Lichtenberger, and G. S. 
Oegema [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998], 56. Knibb adds that “the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha and 
the Scrolls provide strong evidence for messianic belief in the first century before the Common Era, but 
much less substantial evidence for such belief in the preceding period” (15).  
77 Charlesworth credits the resurgence to “the degeneration in the Hasmonean dynasty and the 
claim of the final ruling Hasmoneans, especially Alexander Jannaeus, to be ‘the king,’ and … the loss of 
the land promised as Israel’s inheritance to the gentile and idolatrous nation Rome” (“From 
Messianology,” 35; cf. Oegema, 56). Similarly, I. Broer believes “dürfte dann durch den Zusammenbruch 
der Hasmonäerdynastie … die Hoffnung auf Erneuerung der Davidsdynastie bestärkt worden sein” 
(“Versuch zur Christologie des ersten Evangeliums,” in The Four Gospels, 1992: Festschrift Frans 
eirynck, ed. F. van Segbroeck et al. [Leuven: University Press; Peeters, 1992], 2:1255). 
78 For Keener, “there was no single interpretation of messiahship in the first century, but at the 
heart of most messianic expectation was an ultimate Davidic ruler associated with the eschatological 
restoration of Israel” (1:964). 
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expectation of a Davidic messiah is Psalms of Solomon 17 and 18, two of a collection 
of eighteen psalms critical of the Hasmonean rulers.79 In the introduction to his critical 
edition of the Greek text, Robert Wright calls Psalm of Solomon 17 “an extended 
messianic hymn describing the anticipated victory and reign of the expected redeeming 
king, the anointed Son of David.”80 The king, the Lord Messiah (or Lord’s Messiah; Ps 
Sol 17:32),81 “is to lead the pious in a rebellion against the occupying forces, in the 
expulsion of foreign influences, and in the displacement of the corrupt administrations 
of state and temple. He is to establish an independent and holy Jewish theocratic state to 
which foreign nations would be subordinate.”82 To accomplish this victory, Yahweh will 
undergird the Davidic king with strength (cf. Ps Sol 17:22); the king will continue to 
rely on Yahweh during his reign (cf. Ps Sol 17:33-34, 37-39). As with Psalm 110, in the 
Psalms of Solomon, the authority of the human king is derivative, that is, “the king-
Messiah rules in the messianic kingdom, with authority and power given him by God.”83 
It is Yahweh who is the true king.84 
                                                           
79 “For the period before the Common Era, Psalms of Solomon 17 and 18, from the middle of the 
first century, provide the main evidence in the Pseudepigrapha for the belief in a Davidic messiah” 
(Knibb, 11). J. Collins believes that although the Psalms of Solomon were written about 15 years after the 
end of the Hasmonean dynasty, the psalmist remembered Hasmonean rule vividly and judged it 
illegitimate in part because the later Hasmoneans usurped the Davidic throne (Scepter, 56). For the dating 
of the Psalms of Solomon, see R. B. Wright, ed., The Psalms of Solomon: A Critical Edition of the Greek 
Text (New York: T&T Clark, 2007), 6-7; and C. A. Evans, Ancient Texts for ew Testament Studies: A 
Guide to the Background Literature (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2005), 58.  
80 R. Wright, 1. Charlesworth considers the Psalms of Solomon (along with the Similitudes of 
Enoch) to be “the earliest explicit use of the terminus technicus—‘Messiah’ or ‘Christ’” (“From 
Messianology,” 24; see Appendix C regarding the dating of the Similitudes of Enoch). In addition, Ps Sol 
17:23 explicitly states the Messiah is to be the “son of David,” which, according to Witherington, is the 
first known use of this precise phrase (Mark, 331). Thus, W. D. Davies’ idea that Pss Sol 17 and 18 may 
already present “the term Son of David as a standard messianic title” (“The Jewish Sources of Matthew’s 
Messianism,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 500) outstrips the available evidence. By the time of the NT 
writings, however, “the Anointed One or Messiah=Christos is the expected eschatological king from the 
line of David” (Marcus, Mark, 1105; cf. J. Collins, Scepter, 52). 
81 The choice between these readings is not material to our analysis (cf. R. Wright, 48-49; 
Keener, 1:960; and the Rahlfs-Hanhart LXX). 
82 R. Wright, 1. As Broer points out, “der irdische Charakter dieses Königstums ist schlieβlich 
auch in dem Stück aus PsSal 17, das ja vom Davidssohn und Messias spricht, deutlich” (2:1255; cf. Stein, 
213). Although de Jonge agrees the king expected in Ps Sol 17 “is a national figure using political means 
and even military power,” he finds him “not a typical warrior-king, striving for the mastery of the world; 
the deliverance of Israel is only a means towards a greater goal, the triumph of God’s righteousness and 
power as manifested in His Torah, which will then be obeyed by Israel and by the nations” (“Use,” 136). 
83 A. Chester, “Jewish Messianic Expectations and Mediatorial Figures and Pauline 
Christology,” in Paulus und das antike Judentum, ed. M. Hengel and U. Heckel (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), 
28. Keener does not provide any support for his theory that “the Psalms of Solomon … probably is 
interpreting Ps 110:1, since the pseudepigraphic psalm goes on to identify the Messiah’s king as the 
‘Lord himself’ (κύριος αὐτός, 17:46)” (1:960). 
84 J. H. Charlesworth points out that in the Psalms of Solomon, it is not the Messiah, but God, 
who “is clearly the actor” and that Ps Sol 17 “is close to the Old Testament emphasis that God is King” 
(“Messianology in the Biblical Pseudepigrapha,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 31). 
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Not all messianic expectations involved a ruler or only a ruler. “The Hebrew 
word חישׁמ … means simply ‘anointed’. While it refers to a royal figure some thirty 
times in the Hebrew Bible, it can also refer to other figures, most notably the anointed 
High Priest.”85 The expectation of a coming leadership pair—king and high priest—is 
reflected in Zechariah 4:14 and in some Qumran documents.86  
Although not every Qumran document that speaks of a messianic ruler refers 
specifically to Davidic descent,87 a number of Qumran documents do speak of a 
Davidic “messiah” or “anointed” one. 4QPBlessing 1:3-4 (4QpGen=4Q252-254a) 
appears to speak of the coming of “the Messiah of righteousness, the Shoot of David” 
to whom and to whose seed “has been given the Covenant of Kingship over his people 
for eternal generations.”88 A clearer reference is found in 4QFlorilegium (4Q174), 
where the single messiah is a Davidic king.89 Other texts which use metaphors such as 
“shoot,” “branch” or “horn” of David to refer to a Davidic messiah include 4QpIsaa 
                                                           
85 J. Collins, Scepter, 16. J. Starcky finds that, after the Exile, “on considéra que toute mission 
divine supposait une onction” (“Les quatre étapes du messianism à Qumran,” RB 70 [1963]: 481).  
86 “The prominence of the priesthood was more enduring than that of the Davidic line in the 
Second Temple period. … For most of the postexilic period, with exceptions in the times of Ezra and 
Nehemiah, the High Priest was sole leader in Judah” (J. Collins, Scepter, 36). But that does not mean R. 
A. Horsley is correct that “there was little interest in a Messiah, Davidic or otherwise, … in the diverse 
Palestinian Jewish literature of late Second Temple times” (“‘Messianic’ Figures and Movements in First- 
Century Palestine,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 295). Rather, “by the second century B.C. the idea of an 
ideal king who would come as ‘anointed prince’ (Dan. 9:25) began to lay the foundation for the messianic 
expectations which would emerge full blown in the New Testament” (Balentine, 61). 
87 For example, in the two-Messiah scheme of 1QS (Rule of the Community), the “Messiah of 
Israel is nowhere said to be Davidic” (L. H. Schiffman, “Messianic Figures and Ideas in the Qumran 
Scrolls,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 120; cf. Charlesworth, “From Messianology,” 20). Furthermore, in 
both 1QS and 1QSa (Rule of the Congregation), “the priest is the more important” of the two messiahs 
(de Jonge, “Use,” 138). With regard to 4QAhA (=4Q451), Starcky concurs: “Pour notre auteur comme 
pour celui de la Règle de la Congrégation, le messie d’Aaron sera le messie principal” (492). “The 
division between priestly and political functions and their allotment to two figures may have been a 
critical reaction to the uniting of the Highpriesthood and the Kingdom by the Hasmonaeans” (H. 
Lichtenberger, “Messianic Expectations and Messianic Figures During the Second Temple Period,” in 
Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 13). 
88 See Chester, “Expectations,” 23. Evans translates “Shoot” as “Branch” (Ancient Texts, 106). 
Bateman links the “‘covenant of royalty’ in 4QpGena and ‘covenant of kings’ in Sirach 47:11” since both 
“emphasize the dynastic permanence of Yahweh’s covenant with David” (Hermeneutics, 161). However, 
Charlesworth refers to 4QPBless as an “obscure reference” (“From Messianology,” 25). 
89 See Charlesworth, “From Messianology,” 26. According to Chester, 4QFlor 11 refers to the 
future salvific work of the “Shoot of David” (“Expectations,” 23; cf. Schiffman, “Messianic Figures,” 
125), and Bateman argues that 4QFlor “applies 2 Samuel to a Davidic heir yet to come” (Hermeneutics, 
159). Since “the common rabbinic epithet, ‘son of David,’ has not been found at Qumran,” M. G. Abegg 
and C. A. Evans find that “only the reference in 4Q174 is indisputably messianic. In this passage only is 
the ‘son’ of 2 Sam 7:14 identified as the ‘Branch of David,’ this figure is understood to be the fulfillment 
of the prophecy of Amos 9:11 (cf. 4Q174 1-3 i 12)” (“Messianic Passages in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in 
Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 199; cf. Witherington, Mark, 331). 
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(4Q161),90 which is a commentary or pesher, and the Rule of War (4Q285). Overall, 
Mark Strauss believes the “various Cave 4 documents suggest an increase in royal-
Davidic expectation in the sect’s later years (c. 4 BC to AD 68).”91  
James Dunn helpfully puts most of this (and more) together, averring that the 
hoped-for Davidic or royal messiah is  
so designated explicitly in the Psalms of Solomon 17 (see esp. 17:32; cf. 18:57), 
and Shemoneh ‘Esreh 14, and almost certainly in view in the DSS’s designation 
of the “messiah of Israel” (1QSa 2.12, 14, 20; also 1QS 9.11; cf. CD 12.23f.; 
14.19; 19.10; 20.1). This more specific language is clearly part of a richer strain 
influenced both by other “messiah” references with eschatological overtones 
(1Sam 2:10; Pss 2:2, 89:51, 132:17; Dan 9:25-26); and by specific promises 
regarding the Davidic dynasty—David’s son/God’s son (2Sam 7:12-4; 4QFlor 
1.10-13), the royal “branch” (Jer 23:5 and 33:15; 4QPat 3-4 and 4QFlor 1.11), 
and the Davidic “prince” (Ezek 34:24 and 37:25; CD 7.20, 1QSb 5.20, 1QM 
5.1, 4Q161); see also Isa 11:1-2; Hag 2:23; Zech 3:8, 4, 6:12; Sir 47:11, 22; 
1Mac 2:57. We may conclude that these passages must have nurtured a fairly 
vigorous and sustained hope of a royal messiah within several at least of the 
various subgroups of Israel at the time of Jesus, and that that hope was probably 
fairly widespread at a popular level (such being the symbolic power of kingship 
in most societies then and since).92 
John Collins sums this up well: The Messiah “is presumably a human figure, although 
he is endowed with the spirit of the Lord. He is expected to re-establish a dynasty, 
rather than rule forever himself. … But the most basic and widespread expectation in 
                                                           
90 According to T. Eskola (Messiah and the Throne: Jewish Merkabah Mysticism and Early 
Christian Exaltation Discourse [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001], 85; cf. 132, 342), G. Vermes restores 
4Q161 frgs. 8-10 iii as “[… Branch] of David who shall arise at the end [of days] … God will uphold him 
with [the spirit of might, and will give him] a throne of glory and a crown of [holiness] … [He will put a 
sceptre] in his hand and he shall rule over all the [nations].” Evans believes “the interpretation of Isa 
10:34-11:5 in 4Q161 frgs. 7-10 iii coheres with the prophecy of 4Q285, in which the Messiah is expected 
to defeat Rome” (Ancient Texts, 147). However, Charlesworth accurately calls the “reference to the 
Branch of David which shall arise at the end of days” in 4Q161 “frustratingly brief” (“From 
Messianology,” 25).  
91 Strauss, 43. Charlesworth’s conclusion that “statistically we must admit that messianology 
was not a major concern of this [Qumran] community, at least not in its early history” (“From 
Messianology,” 25), is based only on the number of times the noun “Messiah” is used and overlooks the 
metaphoric references of the Cave 4 documents. For a list of messianic terms (some disputed), see C. A. 
Evans, “Are the ‘Son’ Texts at Qumran ‘Messianic’?: Reflections on 4Q369 and Related Scrolls,” in 
Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 135-136. 
92 J. D. G. Dunn, “Messianic Ideas and Their Influence on the Jesus of History,” in Charlesworth 
Messiah, 367. Dunn’s reference is to a royal, not a divine, messiah. See also Bateman, who believes “the 
conceptual sense of Yahweh’s covenant to David as a perpetual covenant for David’s descendants is 
clearly observed in early Jewish literature (4QFlor 1:1-13; 4QpGena 5:1-7; Sir. 47:11, 22; Pss. Sol. 17:4, 
21)” (Hermeneutics, 163; cf. 203). For J. Collins, “the Dead Sea Scrolls provide evidence of the 
messianic interpretation of several biblical texts which were also taken as messianic prophecies in other 
strands of Judaism” (“Messianism,” 132). Examples are Isa 11:1-5, Num 24, Gen 49 and 2 Sam 7.  
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this period was for a royal, Davidic, messiah, who would restore the kingdom of 
Israel!”93  
Nowhere in Dunn’s comprehensive summary of messianic texts is there mention 
of Psalm 110.94 Psalm 110 did not meet the needs or expectations of any pre-Christian 
Jewish group. The Hasmoneans, who had ancestral priestly prerogatives and non-
Davidic kingly pretensions, would have shied away from Psalm 110 because of its ties 
to David. Jewish groups who rejected Hasmonean kingship would have avoided a text 
that suggested the kingship and priesthood might be combined in one individual. One 
such group would have been the Qumran community, for whom the psalm’s heralding 
of one individual as both king and Melchizedekian priest would not have been 
compatible with the “Two Messiah” scheme.95 Additionally, the availability of Psalm 2 
to support renewed interest in the coming of a Davidic messiah may have minimized 
interest in Psalm 110 in the first-century BCE.96 Thus, although it may be true that 
“there is nothing in the psalm which … Jews could not have predicated of the 
messiah,”97 there is no evidence that any group did so. To draw conclusions about a 
messianic interpretation of Psalm 110 in first-century Judaism is at best speculative.  
Our next step is to determine what of the Story to which Psalm 110 contributes 
is mediated by the implied NT speakers and authors to their implied audiences. Because 
the NT speakers/authors themselves may contribute to the interpretive history of Psalm 
110:1, we present the NT quotations of this verse in roughly the order of their 
occurrence.98 Chronologically, the first speaker is Jesus. 
                                                           
93 J. Collins, “Messianism,” 132. 
94 Neither is Ps 110 included in M. Bird’s compilation of “Old Testament Texts and Messianic 
Interpretations” (47). 
95 For R. Watts, “it might be these two factors—sitting at God’s right hand and the 
Melchizedekian priest-king connection—that explain the relative absence of this text in intertestamental 
literature” (“The Psalms,” 37).  
96 Hay believes “Christians of the earliest period neglected it [Ps 110] … because they knew that 
its meaning (and form) were disputed and because they could find other scriptural texts to support ideas 
of Jesus’ divine sonship (notably Ps 2.7; 2 Sam 7.14)” (Glory, 22).  
97 Ibid., 30. Similarly, although Aloisi is correct that “nothing in the text of the psalm prohibits 
identifying this king-priest as the Messiah” (122), no evidence indicates the king-priest was so identified. 
Aloisi’s contention that “a directly messianic interpretation of Psalm 110:1 seems the most viable 
position” (122) is based on the fact that Jesus and the NT authors take the psalm as messianic. But, given 
the paucity of evidence concerning any pre-Christian use of Ps 110, we believe Jesus may have been the 
first to highlight a messianic interpretation of the Psalm. See pp. 162-166 below for further discussion. 
98 We assume the Stories of Jesus and of the Church’s founding at Pentecost were transmitted 
orally before being committed to writing in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, respectively, and thus formed 
part of the mutual context of other NT authors. See Hays for the idea that although Paul is the first to 
document a christological reading of Ps 110:1 (in 1 Cor 15:25-27), it is likely “he is appealing to an 
already established tradition” (Echoes, 84). 
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Psalm 110:1 as Quoted by Jesus and Reported in the Synoptic Gospels99 
As reported in Matthew 22:44, Mark 12:36 and Luke 20:42-43, Jesus quoted the 
entirety of Psalm 110:1 as part of a teaching exchange.100  
The Locution 
For convenience, we present NA27 and the NRSV translation of the SACs from each 
Synoptic Gospel in Appendix B§4.101 In Luke, the SAC is composed of three SAs: (i) 
Jesus’ opening question concerning what the scribes say about the identity of the 
Messiah, (ii) the quotation of Psalm 110:1, and (iii) Jesus’ final question concerning the 
identity of the Messiah as both David’s son and David’s Lord. Mark’s Gospel has an 
additional concluding SA describing the crowd’s reaction. Matthew adds an 
introductory interchange between Jesus and a group of Pharisees which Jesus initiates 
by posing a question to the Pharisees concerning the sonship of the Messiah. The 
Pharisees’ response that the Messiah is the son of David makes explicit what Mark and 
Luke imply in their presentation of Jesus’ opening question. In each Gospel, the 
quotation follows the form of Psalm 109:1 LXX closely102 and Jesus’ final question runs 
along the lines of “if David calls him [the Messiah] Lord, how can he be his son?”  
The Illocution 
In each Gospel, Jesus is the implied speaker of the episode.103 And in each case, the first 
“Lord” of the quoted oracle is Yahweh and identity of the second “Lord” (the implied 
hearer of the oracle) is the subject of Jesus’ initial question, i.e., the Messiah.  
                                                           
99 Although for convenience we refer to the authors of the Synoptic Gospels as Matthew, Mark 
and Luke, it is not important for our purposes to assert that people with those names were the empirical 
authors or to adduce historical details about the empirical authors from other writings. 
100 J. Nolland presents the grounds for rejecting this as an episode of the historical Jesus along 
with the main views of its original function (Luke 18:35-24:53 [n.p.: Nelson Reference & Electronic; 
[Dallas?]: Word, 1993], 970-971). We follow Roth in attributing this episode to Jesus (57-58). Cf. M. 
Bird, 131; and D. L. Bock, “Blasphemy and the Jewish Examination of Jesus,” BBR 17, no. 1 (2007): 98. 
101 Each gospel has different teaching before this speech event. Afterwards, Mark and Luke 
present the episode of the poor widow’s gift, while Matthew lists a series of “woes” against the Pharisees. 
Therefore, although to broaden each SAC would give a Directive SA as the climax (“Watch out for the 
teachers of the law” in Mark 12:38; Luke 20:46a; Matt 23:3a), it would complicate our analysis unduly. 
So we limit our SACs to the verses which include the quotation. 
102 All three quotations omit “ὁ” before the first “κύριος” and Matthew and Mark use “ὑποκάτω” 
instead of the LXX “ὑποπόδιον,” which Luke retains. Matthew and Mark appear to be influenced here by 
“the association between Ps. cx. 1 and Ps. viii. 7” (W. R. G. Loader, “Christ at the Right Hand—Ps. cx. 1 
in the New Testament,” TS 24, no. 2 [January 1978]: 210n1). 
103 This is a double-level quotation (the NT authors quote Jesus quoting Ps 109:1 LXX). Thus, 
we generally present the implied author and audience at both the episode and the discourse levels. 
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Discerning the implied audience is more complex. In Mark’s Gospel, Jesus is 
teaching in the Temple (12:35a),104 where his interlocutors have been, variously, οἱ 
ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ γραµµατεῖς καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι (11:27), τινας τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ τῶν 
Ἡρῳδιανῶν (12:13), Σαδδουκαῖοι (12:18) and εἷς τῶν γραµµατέων (12:28). It is not 
clear whether any of these are the direct addressees of Jesus’ question in v 35 or 
whether he is now speaking to πολὺς ὄχλος (v 37), as is the case beginning with v 38.105 
In Luke’s Gospel, Jesus addresses the Davidssohnfrage πρὸς αὐτούς (20:41). 
The previously referenced plural audiences are scribes (vv 39-40), Sadducees (vv 27-
34) and the scribes and chief priests (vv 19-26), but it seems unlikely that Jesus would 
direct “how can they say?” to these groups. Rather it seems that λέγουσιν (v 41) refers 
to the scribes and chief priests while Jesus’ question is addressed to the people (τὸν 
λαόν) he is teaching (20:1; cf. 20:9).106 This would explain why Jesus finds it necessary 
to tell his audience that David said this in the Book of Psalms (v 42)—the scribes, chief 
priests and Sadducees would have known these basics about the quoted verses. 
In Matthew’s Gospel, the direct addressees are Pharisees, with a group of Jewish 
overhearers or side participants (the disciples and the crowd; 23:1) also present. Here 
also, as overhearers/side participants, these groups are to be considered in evaluating the 
intended illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of this SAC.  
In each Gospel, the first illocutionary act of the SAC is a question, which in 
Mark and Luke can be rephrased as a negative Assertive107: “The scribes cannot say 
(λέγουσιν) that the Messiah is David’s son/the son of David” (Mark 12:35, Luke 20:41). 
More details are given in Matthew’s account. There Jesus begins by asking the 
Pharisees whose son is the Messiah (Matt 22:41). When they answer, “The son of 
David” (Matt 22:42), Jesus builds on their answer to ask “How is it then that David by 
the Spirit calls him Lord …?”  
                                                           
104 Jesus remains in the temple until 13:1a (see Moloney, 229). It may be significant that Jesus 
comes closer in this episode “to revealing his identity in public” than he has earlier and “not incidental 
that he does so in the temple, which is to say in the place where people come to encounter their God and 
his truth and redemption” (Witherington, Mark, 331; cf. R. Watts, “The Psalms,” 44-45). 
105 Mark 12:35 begins καὶ ἀποκριθείς, but the question to which Jesus is responding is not given. 
106 J. B. Green makes a similar point (The Gospel of Luke [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997], 
723). Nolland points out that “most likely, … we should think of address to the People” but v 45, in 
which Jesus addresses the disciples in the presence of the crowd, “raises the possibility of address to the 
disciples in the hearing of the People” (Luke 18, 972).  
107 G. H. Guthrie points out that many rhetorical questions are semantically equivalent to 
“propositions,” i.e., Assertives (The Structure of Hebrews: A Text-Linguistic Analysis, first paperback ed. 
[Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998], 62). 
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In each case, the apparent expectation of the scribes and Pharisees was that the 
messiah was to be a descendant (“son”) of David, who, with Yahweh’s help, would 
restore a powerful, independent kingdom of Israel on earth. This aligns with the Psalms 
of Solomon and the Qumran writings which refer to a Davidic messiah as well as with 
the metaphoric OT references to Yahweh raising “up for David a righteous Branch” (Jer 
23:5, cf. Jer 33:15; Isa 11:1; Zech 3:8, 6:12).108 Jesus’ question signals that this existing 
scribal/Pharisaic interpretation of Scripture is going to be challenged in some way.109 
In all three Gospels, Jesus follows his question by quoting the oracle from Psalm 
110:1 as the speech of David. This report is an Assertive. As it is framed in the various 
Gospels, different aspects of mutual context are created/activated. For example, Luke’s 
direct addressee, Theophilus, whether an actual person or a way to address Gentile 
“God-lovers,” had received “instruction” concerning Jesus, of whom he was a follower 
(cf. Luke 1:1-4), but he may have been less familiar with the Story of Yahweh and 
Yahweh’s Anointed.110 This would explain why Luke includes the information that 
Jesus tells the audience that David said this in the Book of Psalms (Luke 20:42). As 
Jews, Matthew’s audience would have been aware of the presumed connection of the 
Psalms to David and the Jewish expectations of a messiah who would ascend David’s 
throne. Mark’s audience also was “familiar with both the gospel traditions and the 
Judaism of the first century.”111 However, both Mark 12:35 and Matthew 22:43 report 
that Jesus tells his audience that David spoke “in” or “by” (ἐν) the Holy Spirit. This is 
apparently a reminder of David’s prophetic role.112 
                                                           
108 “In view of prophecies such as these, the scribal habit of referring to the Messiah as ‘son of 
David’ seems reasonable” (Evans, Mark, 272). D. H. Juel considers “the view of the scribes that ‘the 
Christ is David’s son’ may be a shorthand substitution for the actual citation of a passage like 2Sam 7:12-
14” (“The Origin of Mark’s Christology,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 454). See M. Bird, 104-107, for a 
discussion of how Jesus seeing himself as king of God’s kingdom is to be understood messianically. 
109 Evans points out that “on the face of it, this is a curious position [for Jesus] to adopt” (Mark, 
272). For him, this supports the authenticity of Mark 12:35-37 (275). 
110 Based on other ancient prefaces, J. Nolland suggests Theophilus is an individual, although “a 
symbolic significance for the name cannot be entirely ruled out” (Luke 1–9:20 [Dallas: Word Books, 
1989], 10). Mallen, however, believes Luke writes more broadly to an audience of “Hellenistic Jewish 
Christians and/or Hellenistic Gentile Christians” who have been “associated with the Jewish synagogue” 
(163). If not the direct addressees, such a group would likely be overhearers. 
111 Stein, 10. He believes “the original audience of Mark consisted primarily of gentile 
Christians,” possibly God-fearers, “but this cannot be proven” (Ibid.). In any case, “the intended audience 
would have some detailed knowledge of Jewish scripture” (Ahearne-Kroll, 28). 
112 “The tradition of David’s being inspired and prophetic reaches back to the ancient Scriptures 
themselves” (Evans, Mark, 273, with reference to 2 Sam 23:2; 11QPsa 27:2–4, 11). M. J. J. Menken 
equates “speaking by the Spirit” to David speaking “as a prophet” as in Acts 2:30 (“The Psalms in 
Matthew’s Gospel,” in Moyise and Menken, 74). See the discussion below of Acts 2. 
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The framings of this episode indicate that a connection between messianic 
expectations and Psalm 110 may not have existed prior to this quotation by Jesus. 
Although Hay points out that “the universal opinion of early Christians that the psalm is 
messianic is readily explained if Jews of that period commonly took that view,”113 there 
is no evidence any first-century Jews did so. That some background about the Psalm is 
given in each Gospel also argues against Donald Juel’s contention that “Jesus’ question 
presumes his learned audience knows that Ps 110:1 refers to the Messiah; that 
interpretation does not have to be argued.”114 Rather, it appears Jesus creates—rather 
than simply activating—mutual context concerning Psalm 110, using the psalm’s Story-
lines to point to a new kind of messiah.115 It is significant that all the implied authors 
include Jesus’ quotation of the entirety of Psalm 109:1 LXX, thus making it clear that 
David’s “Lord” is both the one given honor and authority via a seat at the right hand of 
Yahweh116 and “the one linked to God’s decisive intervention” against the enemies.117 
                                                           
113 Hay, Glory, 30.  
114 Juel, “Origin,” 455.  
115 As Nolland points out, “There is no good evidence of a messianic understanding of the psalm 
prior to Jesus” (Luke 18, 973; cf. Witherington, Mark, 131n138; Dodd, 110; N. T. Wright, Jesus and the 
Victory of God, vol. 2 of Christian Origins and the Question of God [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996], 508, 
508n116; and Moyise, Writings, 146. Moyise makes a good argument for Jesus as the originator of this 
speech event: “Had this dialogue been invented by the early Church, one might have expected Jesus’ 
identification with the figure addressed in the psalm to be more explicit” (Jesus, 109). 
116 On the basis that “in all other NT citations of this verse the emphasis lies on the second or 
third part of the line,” D. Johansson objects to an “interpretation that the citation speaks of Yahweh 
designating one to rule” (“Kyrios in the Gospel of Mark,” JST 33, no. 1 [September 2010]: 116n61; cf. 
Stein, 570). But the quotation of the entire verse by all three implied authors negates this argument. 
Furthermore, “Mark’s readers have already been introduced” to the honor of the seat ἐκ δεξιῶν by “James 
and John’s ill-timed request in 10:35-40” (Evans, Mark, 273; cf. Matt 20:20-21) and this Story-line of Ps 
110:1 is alluded to again at Jesus’ trial (see below). 
117 Nolland, Luke 18, 971. As Watts points out, “if the significance of messianic identity was the 
only issue in question the first strophe of Ps. 110:1 would have sufficed” (“The Psalms,” 40; cf. Marcus, 
Way, 134). Although the identity of the enemies remains vague, Witherington’s suggestion that “the motif 
of combat and victory may allude to Jesus’ verbal victories over his scribal foes” (Mark, 333-334) seems 
quite tame. Marcus’ thoughts regarding Mark 8:29-30 seem relevant here. He points out that both Jesus 
and Peter have accepted that Jesus is the Messiah; “the point at issue is exactly how his messianic victory 
over the forces of evil will be accomplished. For Peter, steeped in traditional versions of Davidic 
messiahship, the struggle anticipated is one in which victory will be accomplished through a military 
assault on flesh-and-blood enemies (cf. the Qumran War Scroll). … For Jesus, however, the messianic 
victory will in the first instance be a cosmic one over supernatural foes (cf. 1:24; 3:23-27), and it will be 
achieved not by a conventional battle but by death and resurrection” (Mark, 614). This is contra Ahearne-
Kroll, who believes that Mark denies “the epithet ‘Son of David’ for the Messiah” and thereby also 
“denies the association of the Messiah with the earthly, bellicose characteristics most likely evoked by 
this title. … In this case, the earthly, militaristic images evoked by the ‘Son of David’ are downplayed 
and denied, but the royal imagery is still upheld by the quotation of Ps 110:1” (164). 
With regard to the subjection of enemies, Matt 22:44 and Mark 12:36 conflate Pss 110:1c and 
8:6b. These psalms are also intertwined in 1 Cor 15:25, Eph 1:20-22 and Heb 2:5-9. See C. R. Koester, 
Hebrews: A ew Translation with Introduction and Commentary (2001; repr., New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010), 204; Hay, Glory, 35; and Hengel, who argues that “lediglich die schriftgelehrte 
Akribie des Hebräerbriefs vermeidet jede Zitatenkontamination zwischen Ps 110 und Ps 8” (147). 
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Jesus’ final SA is also a question: “How can he (the Messiah) be his (David’s) 
son if David calls him ‘Lord’?” This question also can be rephrased as an Assertive: 
Since David calls the Messiah “Lord,” the Messiah cannot (merely) be David’s son.118  
Given the broader co-text, Jesus’ question cannot be taken to imply that the 
Messiah was not “Son of David.”119 And, although Jesus makes no explicit messianic 
claim here, the evolution of the narrative supports the notion that Jesus’ audience and 
the implied audiences of the Gospels would have considered the Davidssohnfrage to 
apply to Jesus’ own identity as both Son of David and Messiah.120  
All the implied authors of the Gospels have already presented Jesus as “the son 
of David.”121 In Matthew, this happens in the very first verse. Similarly, in Luke, the 
angel tells Mary that her child will receive τὸν θρόνον ∆αυὶδ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ (1:32; 
cf. 1:69, 2:4). Jesus is addressed as “Son of David” by a blind man or men earlier in 
each Gospel (Mark 10:46-48, Luke 18:38-39, Matt 9:27, 20:30-31).122 In each case, a 
                                                           
118 While “the most natural reading of the concluding question of Mark 12:37 is that it expects a 
negative answer” (Marcus, Way, 152), the co-text makes it clear that the situation is not so simple. 
119 Contra Shaw, who believes Jesus “denies the Davidic descent of the Messiah (12.35-37)” 
(225; cf. 191, 218); Moloney, who contends “David cannot possibly be the father of the Messiah because 
… a person cannot be ‘father’ of his ‘lord’” (243; cf. 243n148); and Bock, who argues that for David to 
call his own descendant his Lord would have been “a very unusual designation in a patriarchal culture” 
(Proclamation, 183), we agree it is “highly unlikely” Jesus “is questioning the popular assumption that 
the Christ would be a son of David” (Watts, “The Psalms,” 39; cf. Evans, “Praise,” 563n28). Since the 
Synopticists “show no embarrassment in combining this episode with an affirmation of Davidic descent,” 
we must “leave the possibility open that from the beginning no denial of Davidic descent was intended” 
(Nolland, Luke 18, 971). Furthermore, “the scribal habit of referring to the Messiah as the ‘son of David’” 
does not necessarily imply “he is in some sense subordinate or inferior to David” (Evans, “Praise,” 563). 
For Moyise, “all that is required is the recognition that a descendant of David (the Messiah) will be 
greater than David, though one should not underestimate the size of that claim” (Jesus, 109). 
120 Stein makes the reasonable argument that “it would be unlikely that the early church, which 
took for granted that Jesus the Messiah was the Son of David, would create an account that appears to 
question this. The Davidic lineage of Jesus and the Messiah does not seem to have been an issue in the 
Jewish-Christian debates or within the Christian community” (568). 
121 Nowhere in Mark’s gospel is “there a suggestion that Jesus is not the ‘Son of David’” (Juel, 
“Origin,” 454; cf. Stein, 569). Additionally, “Luke’s repeated emphasis on Jesus’ Davidic descent (Lk. 
1.27, 32, 69; 2.4; 3.31) rules out the possibility that the question is meant to deny the messiah’s Davidic 
origin” (Strauss, 317; cf. 197-198).  
122 Since the gospels relate these episodes in the same order, this appears to represent their 
chronology. Mark and Luke place this title for Jesus in the mouth of a blind man begging near Jericho 
(Mark 10:46-48, Luke 18:38-39) who persistently requests mercy from the “Son of David.” Stein points 
out that in Mark 10:46, “the wording of the address, ‘Son of David, Jesus,’ places the title in the emphatic 
position. This … indicates that Mark wants to emphasize that Jesus is indeed the Son of David” (495; cf. 
497, 570, 571, 572). In both Gospels, the newly healed blind man follows Jesus, which for Ahearne-Kroll 
gives the reader “every confidence that Bartimaeus is a reliable character, and so his identification of 
Jesus as ‘Son of David’ should be taken seriously” (143, referring to Mark 10:52; the blind man is not 
named in Luke). Ahearne-Kroll makes this interesting connection: “By constructing the story of the 
healing of the blind Bartimaeus in such a way as to combine the title ‘Son of David’ with the healing of a 
reliable character, he stresses the tradition of healing that is associated with Solomon as the Son of 
David” (144; see n123). 
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crowd hears Jesus called “Son of David” and is aware that Jesus does not challenge this 
title. In Matthew, Jesus’ miraculous healing of a blind mute prompts the crowd to 
query, “Can this be the Son of David?” (Matt 12:22-23).123 Later, as Jesus rides into 
Jerusalem, the crowd shouts “Hosanna to the Son of David!” (Matt 21:9; cf. Mark 11:9-
10 where the crowd also refers to “the coming kingdom of our father David”).124 Thus, 
since Jesus never rejects the title “Son of David,” it seems likely that at the episode 
level also his disciples and most, if not all, the rest of his audience would have 
understood that Jesus considered himself the “Son of David,” whether or not they were 
willing to accord him that title. 
The implied authors have already made it clear that Jesus also is the Messiah.125 
Matthew and Mark refer to Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in their opening verses.126 In Luke, Jesus is 
named χριστός and also called σωτήρ and κύριος in 2:11 by the angel announcing his 
birth to the Bethlehem shepherds.127 Luke refers to the adult Jesus as χριστός in 4:41. 
Additionally, all the implied authors have presented the episode in which Jesus asks his 
disciples, “But who do you say that I am?” (Matt 16:15, Mark 8:29a, Luke 9:20). When 
Peter replies, “You are the Messiah [ὁ χριστός]” (Mark 8:29; cf. Matt 16:16, Luke 
9:20),128 Jesus does not reject the title (see especially Matt 16:17). Although at the point 
of the Davidssohnfrage, Jesus has made no explicit messianic claims, at the episode 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Matthew reports two incidents in which Jesus heals blind men who appeal to the “Son of David” 
(Matt 9:27, 20:30-31). In the first, the blind men disobey Jesus’ injunction to not tell anyone about their 
healing. Perhaps the news they spread (Matt 9:31) included that he did not reject the title “Son of David.”  
123 Evans believes “rumors that Jesus was some sort of ‘son of David’ probably arose from his 
ministry of healing and exorcism. The association of ‘Solomon, son of David’ with healing and exorcism 
is attested in the Testament of Solomon, which dates to the end of the first century C.E.” (Mark, 275). But 
this does not fully account for the references to Jesus as son/Son of David in Matt 1 and Luke 2. 
124 In the parallel account in Luke 19, there is no “Hosanna!” and no mention of David. Jesus is 
promised “the throne of his father David” in Luke 1:32 as part of the annunciation to Mary (see n127) and 
Jesus’ genealogy includes “of David” (Luke 3:31; cf. Matt. 1:6). Moreover, Davies is wrong that “Son of 
David” never occurs in Luke; it appears in the story of the blind man (Luke 18:38, 39). However, “of all 
New Testament writers it is Matthew who most emphasizes that Jesus is of Davidic ancestry” (Davies, 
500). Even a Gentile woman cries out to Jesus as “Lord, Son of David” in Matt 15:22. 
125 For Juel, the “major focus” of Christian “interpretations of Israel’s Scriptures … was Jesus, 
the crucified and risen Messiah” (Messianic Exegesis, 1). Although “there is no attempt to identify Jesus 
as the ‘Lord’ of the Psalm” (Moyise, Writings, 86), M. Bird (chapter 3) gives a convincing demonstration 
of the weaknesses inherent in the various arguments denying Jesus’ messianic self-understanding. 
126 Many ancient sources add υἱοῦ θεοῦ in Mark 1:1. With regard to Mark, M. Bird believes that 
“the whole context of Jesus’s entry [into Jerusalem]—precursors, content, sequel, result—all point in the 
direction of a messianic claim” (126). As “precursors,” M. Bird includes the Davidssohnfrage and also 
Jesus’ earlier action in the Temple (Mark 11:15-17). However, as Donahue and Harrington point out, 
“From the opening of the gospel, readers know that Jesus is the ‘Messiah.’ What awaits full disclosure is 
the kind of Messiah Jesus is” (29). 
127 Luke’s birth narrative emphasizes that Jesus is no ordinary child (1:32-33, 35, 43; 2:29, 32).  
128 Luke adds “of God” and Matthew adds “the son of the living God.” 
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level, the disciples would have believed Jesus considered himself the Messiah.129 And if 
they disobeyed Jesus’ injunction to keep the messianic secret (Matt 16:20, Mark 8:30, 
Luke 9:21),130 others may have also heard this news. 
Some argue “Psalm 110 is invoked to make the point that Jesus is not the 
Davidic messiah, that he stands for a different messianic hope.”131 But since the 
Davidssohnfrage activates the already established mutual context of Jesus’ identity as 
Son of David and as Messiah, it is more likely that Jesus instead is subtly informing his 
audience that Davidic messiahship is not going to be what the religious experts were 
expecting. Jesus’ messiahship is “more than the traditional expectations of the Davidic 
messiah”;132 the Messiah is “more than” the heir to the Davidic monarchy. Via the 
quotation of Psalm 110:1 and its metaphors, Jesus signals to his audience that what was 
expected of the Messiah, that is, that he would occupy David’s earthly throne, did not 
correspond to the full reality of Yahweh’s Messiah. As David’s Lord (κυρίῳ  µου), the 
Messiah is more than David’s biological son or descendant.133 He is David’s “Lord”; his 
honor and authority and even his kingdom are in some way greater than David’s.134  
                                                           
129 In Matt 12:42 and Luke 11:31, Jesus has also made the self-reference as “someone 
[something] greater than Solomon.” N. T. Wright finds that “for Jesus to compare himself with Solomon, 
to the latter’s disadvantage, was to stake a definite messianic claim” (Jesus, 535). 
130 With regard to Mark, M. Bird believes Jesus responds to Peter’s confession with an 
injunction to secrecy because Jesus is moving “along the thread of a different messianic story, one related 
to the enigmatic ‘Son of Man’” (120). We discuss this in the following section. 
131 R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, “Sacred Violence and the Messiah: The Markan Passion Narrative as 
a Redefinition of Messianology,” in Charlesworth, Messiah, 477.  
132 Strauss, 30; cf. J. Green, Luke, 724; Bock, Proclamation, 132; M. Bird, 107; Broer, 2:1254. 
This is substantively different from the claim that “the Jesus known to us from the New Testament simply 
does not fit the profile of the Davidic Messiah which was espoused by many Jews of his time” (J. H. 
Charlesworth, “Introduction: Messianic Ideas in Early Judaism,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and 
Oegema, 6). As Thiselton cogently argues, “It was important that an understanding of Jesus, seen in his 
words and in his completed work, should govern interpretations of conventional ‘messianic’ language, 
rather than that ready-made assumptions about the meaning of such language should govern an 
understanding of Jesus” (ew Horizons, 287).  
133 “The challenge to this normal understanding of the Son of David (cf. Ps. Sol. 17.21) in 
[Mark] 12:35-37 is not that this is an incorrect understanding of Jesus Christ, but that it is an inadequate 
one. … The NT understanding of the person and work of Jesus does not deny that he is the Son of David 
(Matt. 1:1, 17, 20; 9:27; 12:23; 15:22; Luke 1:27, 32, 69; 2:4, 11; Acts 13:22-23; Rom. 1:3; 2 Tim. 2:8; 
Rev. 5:5; 22:16). It points out that he is this and more” (Stein, 495; cf. R. Watts, “The Psalms,” 39, and 
Marcus, Mark, 848, and Way, 145). In Luke also, “there is something bigger here than can be contained 
in merely Davidic categories” (Nolland, Luke 18, 973). Witherington explains it well: “Is Jesus here 
repudiating the Davidic origins of Messiah, as some have suggested? This seems unlikely, since 
elsewhere he doesn’t repudiate the title Son of David, but he may well have repudiated certain popular 
early Jewish notions about the Davidic Messiah, for instance, that he would simply be a normal, though 
God-empowered, human being like David himself. It is best to say that Jesus is repudiating the adequacy, 
not the accuracy, of assessing the Messiah by means of his Davidic descent. The point is that in Jesus’ 
view the Messiah is more than, not other than, Son of David” (Mark, 333; cf. 52n150). 
134 “Unless it was [sic] true, it would be peculiar to refer to one’s own son as greater than 
oneself” (Donahue and Harrington, 360) since “normal conventions would have the son showing honor to 
his father rather than vice versa” (J. Green, Luke, 724; cf. D. A. Hagner, Matthew 14-28 [Dallas: Word 
  
   166 
The tellability of this SAC stems from its contradiction of the beliefs/ 
expectations of the legal experts (either present or referred to) and of those who rely on 
their expertise (the crowds). The quotation itself is tellable because it sheds new light on 
the relationship between David, David’s heirs and the Messiah. And, by presenting his 
thought that the coming Messiah would not be what was expected in the form of a 
question, Jesus promotes involvement in his listeners.135 
Each Gospel ends the SAC differently. Like his introduction, Luke’s ending is 
the briefest; he concludes with Jesus’ question (20:44) and gives no indication of the 
response of the audience. Mark comments that “the large crowd was listening to him 
with delight.” This may be the crowd’s appreciation of Jesus’ ability to confound the 
legal experts, rather than an affirmation of Jesus’ message. In Matthew, the audience 
disengages. Jesus’ audience was not able to answer (οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο ἀποκριθῆναι) the 
question, “nor from that day did anyone dare to ask him any more questions” (Matt 
22:46).136 The implication is that the direct addressees are either unwilling to be put in a 
position of feeling ignorant by asking further questions or so uncomfortable with the 
direction Jesus’ thoughts are taking that they are unwilling to pursue this topic.137 
The second option seems quite likely. The Jewish leaders (and the crowds) 
could have answered Jesus’ question a number of different ways. They could 
have denied that the passage had anything to do with the Messiah, but they did 
not. If they had understood “my Lord” as a reference to David or Solomon, the 
Jewish leaders could have explained that the primary or perhaps exclusive 
referent of “my lord” was a historical king, and therefore resolved the dilemma. 
But they did not.138  
Although Aloisi believes “their silence conceded Jesus’ point,”139 it seems as plausible 
that the Jewish leaders among the direct addressees were unwilling to enter into any 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Books, 1995], 651). Thus, Jesus must be “more than David’s son and more than the messiah of Jewish 
expectations” (Donahue and Harrington, 360). 
135 This is not what Amador suggests is common in the NT: “The pronouncements are 
legitimated strictly by appeal to the assumed authority of Jesus himself” (147).  
136 “Anyone” apparently did not include the disciples, since they ask Jesus theological questions 
in Matt 24:3 and again in 26:8. In Mark and Luke, the comment that “they no longer dared to ask him 
another question” (Luke 20:40; cf. Mark 12:34) concludes the episode prior to the Davidssohnfrage. 
137 The religious authorities’ silence may also hearken back to their fear of the people, which 
each gospel has recently highlighted (Matt 21:23-27, Mark 11:27-33, Luke 20:1-8).  
138 Aloisi, 120-121; cf. E. Johnson, 432-433. That “Jesus and the Jewish leaders agreed that 
Psalm 110:1 was a direct prophecy about the Messiah” (Aloisi, 121; cf. E. Johnson, 433) goes too far.  
139 Aloisi, 121. Similarly, S. J. Kistemaker contends Jesus gave “the correct interpretation and 
application of the psalm, which the Pharisees were unable to refute” (“Psalm 110 in the Epistle to the 
Hebrews,” in Penny, 141; cf. J. Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary on the Greek Text 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Bletchley: Paternoster, 2005), 917. However, Jesus’ “interpretation and 
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further discussion of the Messiah that might bring into the conversation the priestly 
references of Psalm 110’s second oracle. 
In any event, what “more than Messiah” means is left undefined by Jesus and 
the implied authors.140 Not only is the son/Lord question left unanswered, Jesus’ 
role/identity remains implicit. The Davidssohnfrage is “a provocative remark designed 
to open up the question of the nature of the hoped-for ultimate intervention of God in 
the affairs of his People”—a question which cannot “be separated from the question of 
Jesus’ own relationship to the fulfillment of the hoped-for kingdom of God.”141 At the 
end of this episode, these questions remain unresolved.142 The Davidssohnfrage is not a 
complete teaching; rather, with it Jesus initiates a transformation that continues to 
unfold during his trial and is subsequently moved forward by other NT authors. The 
Analytic reader understands both the questions which are being raised and what 
challenges to the existing interpretation of Story are posed by those questions. An 
Analytic reader also understands that the resolution of this issue remains in the future. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
application” are at best implicit; it is unclear whether the Pharisees were unable to respond to Jesus or 
simply chose not to. 
140 “Jesus provides no immediate resolution of the enigma he poses” (J. Green, Luke, 724; cf. M. 
Bird, 132; Witherington, Mark, 333). Nor do the implied authors of the gospels draw any explicit 
conclusions. However, according to Witherington, “The implication … seems to be that the scribes’ 
notion of Messiah is far too mundane. He is a much greater figure than the original David, not merely a 
chip off the old block. Indeed, he is a transcendent figure, exercising lordship over even David” (Ibid.).  
141 Nolland, Luke 18, 972. As Keener points out, “Given the environment in which Jesus 
ministered, he had to know that his teachings about the kingdom and some of his actions would lead to 
speculation about his messianic character” (1:968). 
142 Thus, it is premature to conclude that “the point of Jesus’ speech is evident. The messiah … 
must be a heavenly ruler who shall also be David’s Lord, not his son and subordinate” (Eskola, 180). The 
same is true for E. Johnson’s assertion regarding Mark 12:35-37 that Jesus’ “interpretation of Psalm 
110:1 establishes ‘my lord’ as a reference by David to Christ as deity” (432; emphasis added; cf. Keener, 
1:962, regarding Luke; and Hagner, 651, regarding Matthew). Contra the claim that “‘Lord’ (kyrios)” 
was “a title that at least in Jewish circles placed him on a level with the ‘Lord’ who is God” (Donahue 
and Harrington, 361; cf. Marcus, Mark, 850), “there is no basis for speaking of a ‘divine predicate’ in 
connection with the use of ‘lord’ in the pericope” (Nolland, Luke 18, 971). Even Brawley’s more 
restrained use of “exalted” to describe the messiah outpaces the development of Story to this point (86). It 
is possible, however, that Jesus’ divine sonship may be alluded to. The argument that “the emphatic 
placement of αὐτοῦ in [Mark] 12:37b … implies that Jesus is the son of someone other than David” and 
“the logical candidate is God” (Marcus, Way, 141; cf. Evans, “Praise,” 564; Broer, 2:1258) would apply 
also to Luke’s Gospel. But along with numerous other scholars (see n119 and n133 above), we reject 
Marcus’ implication that this denies Jesus’ Davidic sonship.  
Unfortunately, we do not have space to explore here Johansson’s thoughts about the relevance of 
the quotation of the Shema (Deut 6:4) in Mark 12:29 to the relationship between the Davidssohnfrage and 
Jewish monotheism (118-119). We do note that “in Mark’s eyes, … the picture of the figure enthroned at 
God’s right hand does not refute the statement that God is one” (Marcus, Way, 145). Nor can we 
investigate Donahue and Harrington’s interesting contention that “in the Roman empire kyrios was also 
used as a title for the emperor. And so for early Christians to proclaim Jesus as ‘Lord’ could be taken to 
suggest that the emperor is not” (361). 
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The Perlocution 
The intended perlocution is a disruption of the beliefs of the implied audiences (both 
Jesus’ audiences and the implied readers of the Gospels) concerning the identity of the 
Messiah. Jesus’ questions, which do not cast doubt on a messianic hope, make it plain 
that the Messiah is not to be as expected, that is, the Messiah is to be more than an 
earthly king who would assume David’s throne.  
The implied hearers at the episode level of each Gospel would be aware that a 
key element of the religious belief system was now in flux. A transformation of Story, 
lifeworld and theology has been initiated, although not completed, and mutual context is 
altered. The same is true at the discourse level. The implied readers of the Gospels 
would have understood this SAC to intend the transformation of the existing 
understanding of the Story of Israel’s coming messiah. In each Gospel, this SAC 
prepares the way for further lifeworld/worldview transformation. This is therefore a 
critical point in the transformation of the Story of God’s work among God’s people and 
in creation through Jesus Christ. The Envisaging empirical reader prepares to continue 
to be transformed as Story and theology evolve.143 
The “Son of Man” Seated at the Right Hand of God 
The Davidssohnfrage episode is not complete in itself. Whether “Jesus’ concluding 
question implies an answer to the problem he poses,”144 the “solution” continues to 
develop in subsequent events, beginning with Jesus’ speech before the Sanhedrin (Matt 
26:64, Mark 14:62, Luke 22:69). In each Gospel, a religious authority (in Matthew and 
Mark, the high priest; in Luke, the Sanhedrin) asks Jesus whether he is the Messiah and 
Jesus’ response includes an obviously tellable Assertive (a Predictive)145 that his 
audience will see him, i.e., the “Son of Man,” seated at the right hand of (the) power 
(τῆς δυνάµεως).146 Although not a marked quotation, the Gospel authors no doubt intend 
their “readers to see Psalm 110 in Jesus’ response.”147  
                                                           
143 The same options are available to modern readers. Although not the original addressees, by 
choosing to read, they become side participants and can be Envisaging readers. 
144 Juel, “Origin,” 455, referring to Mark’s gospel.  
145 This is not a promise, since promises are “acts of obligating oneself” (Bach and Harnish, 50). 
That the Assertive is tellable can be seen in the reaction of the hearers, who charge blasphemy, condemn 
Jesus as deserving death, have him beaten and turn him over to the Roman authorities. It therefore is odd 
that Moloney does not include Mark 14:62 among the “significant turning points in the story” (16). 
146 Luke adds τοῦ θεοῦ to τῆς δυνάµεως, making the source of honor and messiahship explicit. 
A. Y. Collins’ argument that Jesus did not identify himself as the Son of Man but rather understood the 
one like a son of man “as a heavenly being, perhaps an angel, and associated his own teaching and 
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To describe “the Christ” in the query concerning Jesus’ identity, Matthew and 
Luke append “Son of God” and Mark includes “Son of the Blessed One” (Matt 26:63; 
Luke 22:67, 70; Mark 14:61).148 Earlier in each Gospel, Jesus is identified as Son of 
God by the narrator (Mark 1:1, Luke 3:38), an angel (Luke 1:35), the devil (Matt 4:3, 6; 
Luke 4:3, 9) and certain demons (Matt 8:29; Mark 3:11; Luke 4:41, 8:28). But, except 
for Matthew 14:43 and 16:16, this is the first time Jesus is named “Son of God” by the 
religious authorities or so names himself. However, contra Marcus and Witherington, 
the title “Son of God” does not necessarily imply Jesus’ divinity.149 Witherington 
                                                                                                                                                                          
activity with that being” (“The Influence of Daniel on the New Testament,” in Daniel: A Commentary on 
the Book of Daniel by J. J. Collins [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993], 105) is not compelling. Nor is Shaw’s 
contention that “in referring to the Son of Man, Jesus is … outrageously introducing himself at God’s 
right hand. If it was a reference to the prophecy in Daniel (7.13), it would only be a platitude of Jewish 
expectation. What makes it blasphemy is precisely its self-reference” (197). Not only has the Son of Man 
language already appeared in all three gospels, Jesus has already at least implicitly “introduced himself at 
God’s right hand” in the Davidssohnfrage. 
147 T. J. Geddert, “The Use of Psalms in Mark,” Baptistic Theologies 1, no. 2 (Autumn 2009): 
116, http://www.ibts.eu/files/research/baptistic-theologies-1-2.pdf (accessed July 19, 2013), with regard 
to Mark. M. Bird notes that the OT “formed the interpretive grid through which the story of Jesus’s 
passion was interpreted, rather than comprising the creative pool from which the story was created” (75). 
148 The wording differs in each case. Because “the trial scenes are regarded as historically 
dubious and loaded with Christian theology, and Jesus’s reply to Caiaphas is markedly different in all 
four Gospels … the historicity of the scene in Mark 14:61-64 is disputed” (M. Bird, 136). See M. Bird 
(137-140) for arguments in favor of the authenticity of the passage. One of the most telling is that it is 
Jesus’ opponents who raise the issue of Jesus’ messiahship at his trial (cf. J. Collins, Scepter, 204). 
149 Marcus contends that in Mark 14:62, where “the title ‘Son of God’ is brought into close 
connection with Ps. 110:1, … the title is thus seen as implying commensurability with God” and Mark 
thereby implies Jesus’ “participation in the divine majesty” (Way, 143, 144). Although he does admit 
“Mark stops short of taking such stories to their logical conclusion and calling Jesus God” (Ibid., 145), 
both he and Bullock feel that the declaration of Jesus as God is the “logical deduction” (Bullock, 185). D. 
A. Brueggemann goes further in arguing that “anyone actually claiming to be called ‘lord’ (kyrios) with 
‘right hand’ status in the heavenly throne room could fairly be claiming divinity” (“The Evangelists and 
the Psalms,” in Firth and Johnston, 268). All of these overreach. Similarly, although R. V. G. Tasker is 
correct that “Jesus seems to be saying in effect ‘I am not the kind of Messiah that you suppose Me to be, 
… but nevertheless I am the Messiah,’” we disagree with his conclusion that Jesus is claiming, “This 
exaltation will be the prelude to My coming as the divine Judge in the role depicted by Daniel” (The 
Gospel According to St. Matthew: An Introduction and Commentary [Leicester: Inter-Varsity; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961], 254; cf. Witherington, Mark, 384).  
We also do not find compelling S. J. Gathercole’s argument that as early as the Davidssohnfrage 
episodes, “the clear implication … is that Jesus is not so much son of David as Son of God. … The 
principal reason for this is that just as the Jesus of the Gospels supplies Ps. 110.1 as support for the idea 
that the Messiah cannot be David’s son—and therefore can lay claim to being Son of God—so also Ps. 
110.3 and 4 would have been understood by the readers of the Gospels in much the same way and would 
have been taken to imply the preexistence of the Messiah” (The Preexistent Son: Recovering the 
Christologies of Matthew, Mark, and Luke [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006], 236; cf. 294). As we have 
noted, Ps 110:3 (Ps 109:3 LXX) is not quoted in the NT and there is no way to know how this verse was 
read in the first century CE. Gathercole bases his assumption that Ps 109:3 LXX is in view in the 
quotation of the prior two verses on the argument that “since the Psalms were sung as part of Jewish 
worship, they would most likely be known as wholes: the first line cited in the Gospels would be very 
likely to suggest the rest of this short Psalm” (238). If Jesus or the Gospel authors had intended to evoke v 
3, there would have been no reason not to include it in their quotations. 
Rather, although “to be ‘Son of God’ is an exalted status and relationship to God experienced by 
the messiah (cf. at [Luke] 3:22; 1:26-38), … the words should be taken as no more than a synonym for 
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himself points out that “one source for messianic thinking about Messiah as God’s Son 
was Ps. 2, perhaps coupled with 2 Sam. 7:14” and these “texts do not really imply the 
divinity of the person in question.”150 
Matthew and Mark add that the Son of Man will be seen coming “on” (Matt: 
ἐπί) or “with” (Mark: µετά) the clouds of heaven.151 “Coming with the clouds of 
heaven” is a clear link to Daniel 7:13 and the presentation of “one like a son of man” 
before the Ancient of Days.152 Although we cannot undertake a full evaluation of Daniel 
7:13, we note that a connection between the Son of Man and the Messiah has already 
been placed into mutual context in all three Gospels via Peter’s reference to Jesus as the 
Messiah and Jesus’ subsequent self-reference as the Son of Man (Matt 16:13-16, Mark 
8:29-38, Luke 9:18-21).153 And in Matthew 24:30 and Mark 13:26, Jesus alludes to 
Daniel 7:13 to contrast the Son of Man with false messiahs.154 Whether this comparison 
                                                                                                                                                                          
‘messiah’” (Nolland, Luke 18, 1111, referring to Luke 22:70). This is supported by I. Knohl, who looks at 
several pre-Christian examples and concludes that in those cases “the claim to be the ‘son of God’ … was 
a political tool for supporting a ruler in his struggle with his enemies” (“Religion and Politics in Psalm 2,” 
in S. Paul et al., 726; cf. J. J. Collins, for whom a messianic reading of the “Son of God” text [4Q246] 
would present “the Davidic/royal messiah … as a warrior to subdue the Gentiles” [“Jesus, Messianism 
and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Charlesworth, Lichtenberger, and Oegema, 111]). This is highly 
reminiscent of what is said of “my lord” in Ps 109:1c-2b LXX.  
L. W. Hurtado helpfully points out that in “biblical and Jewish traditions … divine sonship did 
not necessarily connote divinity. In these traditions divine sonship language was applied to the divinely 
chosen king, the devout, righteous individual, and to Israel collectively, particularly in the Second 
Temple period; in these cases divine sonship connoted special favor and relationship with God” (Lord 
Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 22).  
150 Witherington, Mark, 384; cf. J. Collins, “Jesus,” 110-111. 
151 Although Luke does not use “clouds” language here (which Moyise feels “makes the link 
with Daniel 7:13 much less explicit” [Jesus, 64]), all three Synoptics have previously referred to the Son 
of Man coming in the clouds (Matt 24:30 [ἐπί]; Mark 13:26 and Luke 21:27 [ἐν]). Whether there is 
christological significance to ἐπί vs. µετά is debated (see J. E. Goldingay, Daniel [Dallas: Word, 2002], 
171, and Bock, “Blasphemy,” 76). However, since the “preposition םע, ‘with,’ is variously rendered” in 
the versions of Dan 7:13 and “the OG has the ‘one like a son of man’ come on rather than with the 
c1ouds” (J. Collins, Daniel, 311, 8), it seems likely the gospels simply reflect different Greek readings of 
the OT. In any event, it is unwarranted to say that “since elsewhere it is only God who travels on the 
clouds … the Son of Man is portrayed as a divine being as he approaches the Ancient of Days’ throne” 
(Beale, T Theology, 192; cf. Witherington, Mark, 385). Nor is Donahue and Harrington’s argument 
compelling that the description of “this figure … as being ‘like’ a human being suggests that it is 
something else—most likely an angel, probably Michael (see Dan 12:1)” (374, where they do see that “in 
the Markan context, … the Son of Man is Jesus”). We agree with Ahearne-Kroll that “the one like a son 
of man is not God, but he receives the authority to reign in the same way as God reigns” (165n81).  
152 It is not clear whether “the figure is ascending or descending or moving horizontally” (J. 
Collins, Daniel, 311; cf. Marcus, Mark, 1008). Contra Goldingay (Daniel, 190), it cannot be determined 
that “the humanlike figure … comes unequivocally from heaven.” We know only that the one like a son 
of man, now certainly Jesus (see Donahue and Harrington, 27), ends up in Yahweh’s presence. 
153 Witherington suggests “the interesting prospect that Jesus, who repeatedly identified himself 
as the Son of Man, read his own destiny out of some of the stories in Daniel” (Mark, 269). 
154 Luke 21:27 contains a similar allusion to Dan 7:13 without the contrast between false 
messiahs and the true messiah. Bock’s argument that Luke removes the reference to Dan 7 in Luke 22 in 
order to “stress the present session of Jesus, not to the exclusion of the parousia, but as a guarantee of it 
(Luke 21.27; Acts 1.9-11; 3.19-21)” (Proclamation, 142) is not compelling. 
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was initiated by Jesus is uncertain.155 In any event, as was the case earlier in each 
Gospel with regard to the quotation from Psalm 110:1 as it connected the Son of David 
to the “more than” Messiah, in both Matthew’s and Mark’s gospels it is Jesus who links 
the one exalted to God’s right hand (Psalm 110:1), the Son of Man coming on/in the 
clouds (Dan 7:13) and the Messiah.156 As also was true earlier, Jesus’ self-definition as 
the “Son of Man” qualifies Davidic messianism but does not necessarily supersede it.157 
Jesus’ audience’s understanding of his identity is enhanced through this episode, 
and the meaning of “Messiah” is clarified for the implied readers of the Gospels. That 
the high priest takes Jesus’ words as blasphemy indicates that with “the quoted material 
from Dan 7:13 and the allusion to Ps 110:2,” Jesus is portrayed as “more than the 
Messiah as a merely human agent.”158 In Jesus’ claim to be Son of Man and in his 
acclaim as Son of God, the implied audiences on both levels see a clearer picture of 
                                                           
155 Some argue for a first-century messianic interpretation of “Son of Man” (cf. Marcus, Mark, 
1007; A. Collins, “Influence,” 96). M. Bird argues that “the son of man figure of Dan. 7 … was 
occasionally interpreted as messianic in pockets of pre-Christian Judaism, and Jesus’s employment of the 
phrase taps into this background” (84; cf. his chapter 4). J. T. Pennington believes “Second Temple 
Judaism was already reading this text [Dan 7:13] messianically (e.g., 1 Enoch; 4 Ezra; 4Q246 2.1-10; 
4Q174, 4Q252)” and that it thus “was easy for early Christianity to do the same, applied to the person of 
Jesus” (“Refractions of Daniel in the Gospel of Matthew,” in Thematic Studies, ed. C. A. Evans and H. D. 
Zacharias, vol. 1 of Early Christian Literature and Intertextuality [London: T&T Clark, 2009], 72).  
We find the counter-arguments more compelling. According to Goldingay, “the grounds for 
identifying the humanlike figure as the Davidic anointed are circumstantial” (Daniel, 169). Aune points 
out that “in pre-Christian Judaism there was no concept of ‘the Son of man’ as an eschatological heavenly 
redeemer figure. The Jewish and Christian texts which use the Son of man designation in a titular sense 
all date from the last half of the first century C. E.” (410; cf. Hurtado, 19). For Hengel, “leider wissen wir 
nichts über die Auslegung von Ps 110 und Dan 7 in Qumran” (160). Attridge finds “the only clear case of 
the Jewish use of the title Son of Man for God’s eschatological agent is the parable section of Enoch. … 
It remains problematic whether these passages, which are probably to be dated in the first century CE, 
provide any evidence for the background of the NT use of the title” (Hebrews, 73n45). Thus, J. Collins’ 
finding that “the two earliest Jewish interpretations of Daniel 7 are found in the Similitudes of Enoch and 
4 Ezra 13” (Scepter, 188) is not strong evidence, and his conclusion that “the Son of God text [4Q246] 
suggests that the messianic interpretation of Daniel 7 had begun already in the Hasmonean period” 
(Scepter, 188; cf. M. Bird, 91) is speculative. Rather, Stein’s conclusion that “the title ‘Son of Man’ was 
almost certainly not a popular ‘messianic’ title in first-century Judaism” (49) appears correct.  
156 M. Bird believes Jesus may have originated the linking of these texts (139; cf. Evans, Mark, 
451). Whether Jesus’ prediction refers to the exaltation or the second coming is debated. For the former, 
see Aune, 422. For the latter, see J. Collins, Daniel, 307, and Bock, Proclamation, 141-142.We adopt 
Eskola’s position that these themes may be related since it is “logical to conclude that a heavenly 
dominion of Christ was considered as a necessary premise for an idea of parousia” (281). 
157 For this, see Evans, Mark, 274. Whether the one like a son of man in Daniel is a symbol for 
or representative of faithful Israel is much debated (cf. Marcus, Way, 169, 171; Beale, T Theology, 193; 
Koester, 215) but our analysis is consistent with either understanding.  
158 Hagner, 800. For the idea that “the word δυνάµεως, ‘Power,’” in Mark 14:62 may have been 
“suggested by LXX Ps 109:2,” see Evans, Mark, 452. For the idea that Jesus is accusing his opponents 
“of being Yahweh’s enemies,” see R. E. Watts, “The Psalms,” 41, and “The Lord’s House and David’s 
Lord: The Psalms and Mark’s Perspective on Jesus and the Temple,” BibInt 15 [2007]: 320. 
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what his “more than” messiahship looks like.159 Combining the metaphors from Psalm 
110 and Daniel 7 both activates in mutual context and emphasizes the honor and 
authority given to the Messiah, Jesus. 
The perlocutionary intent of the allusions to the core metaphor of Psalm 110:1 
and to Daniel 7:13 is that the belief system of the Envisaging hearers/readers be 
transformed to understand the nature of the messiahship of Jesus, i.e., that he is the 
climactic and ultimate fulfillment of Yahweh’s promises to David and the people of 
Israel.160 In turn, this modifies the Story of the people of God and their lifeworld/ 
worldview and theology. We see some results of this plus further development of Jesus’ 
identity as we move to Luke’s report of Peter’s quotation of Psalm 110:1 in Acts 2.161 
Psalm 110:1 as Quoted by Peter and Reported in Acts 2:34-35 
In Acts 2:34-35, Luke reports that Peter quoted the entirety of Psalm 110:1 in his 
Pentecost speech (a speech event). Some scholars call this “simple Scripture proof” or 
“a direct prophecy fulfilled,”162 but we find this quotation to be a key element of the 
transformation of Story as it pertains to Jesus’ messiahship. 
                                                           
159 Contra Nolland who finds that “Jesus has stopped short of directly claiming to be the Son of 
Man who is to be exalted to royal dignity in heaven” (Luke 18, 1110; cf. Matthew, 1132), we believe 
Jesus’ words do have that import (and Nolland agrees Jesus’ “words are more than suggestive of this 
possibility” [Luke 18, 1110]). R. Watts points out that in “his first public affirmation of messianic identity 
(Mark 14:62), Jesus’ second reference to Ps. 110:1 reaffirms his divinely mandated status as the Davidic 
heir who shares in God’s rule” (“Lord’s House,” 320). This is not the same, however, as calling Jesus 
“divine” (see n149). 
160 Although it is not clear that Matthew or Mark’s implied audience had familiarity with the co-
text of Dan 7:13, Dan 7:14 is highly reminiscent of the first oracle of Ps 110 in that the one like a son of 
man receives from Yahweh the honor and privilege of a ruler. “The humanlike figure comes in order to 
be invested as king (v 14). … He is, then, a symbol for some entity given authority by God” (Goldingay, 
Daniel, 168; contra Roth, 58). Marcus agrees that “although the phrase ‘sitting at the right hand’ in 14:62 
is most directly an allusion to Ps. 110:1, it is also consonant with the picture in Dan. 7:13-14 of the 
humanlike figure being presented to the Ancient of Days and made his co-regent” (Way, 165). For 
Witherington, “the roles assigned to the Son of Man in Dan. 7:13-14 are in fact royal roles—he will have 
dominion, glory, and kingship. In other words, Mark does not see Son of Man terminology as an 
alternative to royal phrases being used of Jesus, but as another way of putting the point about Jesus’ 
kingship” (Mark, 51). In addition to “enthronement with God,” M. Bird finds a second possible link in 
that “both Ps. 110 and Dan. 7 have to do with the subjugation of enemies” (138). Furthermore, Dan 7:14 
makes it clear that the dominion of this ruler is everlasting (םלע ןטלשׁ/ἐξουσία αἰώνιος), a conclusion that 
is also reached by reading together the two oracles of Ps 110 (see p. 146 above). 
161 Although A. Collins correctly considers Mark 14:62 to be “the climax of the theme of Jesus’ 
identity” in Mark (“Influence,” 98; cf. Hengel, 151), Jesus’ identity continues to be developed in post-
resurrection events (see below). 
162 Bock attributes the former to M. Rese (Bock, Proclamation, 180; cf. 40). Similarly, according 
to P. Doble, in Acts 2:16-36, Peter is “portrayed quarrying scriptural material” in order “to prove that 
‘Jesus is the Christ’” (“The Psalms in Luke-Acts,” in Moyise and Menken, 88). On the other hand, Bock 
himself considers that “a clearer presentation of a direct prophecy fulfilled could not exist. Lindars is 
correct to say that the exegesis here is messianic and literal” (Proclamation, 180; emphasis added; 
referring to Lindars, 41). 
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The Locution 
We present NA27 and the NRSV of Acts 2:33-36 in Appendix B§5, splitting this SAC 
into four Assertives.163 The quotation in the third SA, vv 34b-35, reproduces Psalm 
109:1 LXX verbatim.164 It is introduced by λέγει δὲ αὐτός·, where “he” is clearly David.  
In the first SA (v 33), Peter introduces Jesus’ exaltation. Whether Jesus has been 
exalted “to” or “by” God’s right hand is not clear. Either seems possible. “To” would 
cohere with the metaphor presented in v 34b; “by” would mean that Peter was giving 
additional details as to how God raised Jesus, which is the subject of v 24.165 That 
different metaphors about “the right hand” can exist in close proximity is demonstrated 
by Psalm 110:1 and 5 and is also seen in Acts 2:25, where Peter quotes Psalm 15:8 
LXX concerning God being at David’s right hand, and Acts 2:34b, where the exalted 
one is seated at God’s right hand.166 
The Illocution 
At the episode level, Peter is the implied speaker of the Pentecost speech (Acts 2:14-
40). His implied audience is devout Jews in Jerusalem for Pentecost who have 
witnessed either the coming of the Holy Spirit or its aftermath and are confused or 
doubting (Acts 2:1-13). The implied author of Acts is the implied author of Luke. In 
Acts, as for Luke’s Gospel, the implied audience is the Greek “Theophilus.”167 
                                                           
163 M. Turner refers to the assertions of 2:33-36 as “climactic” (Power from on High: The Spirit 
in Israel’s Restoration and Witness in Luke-Acts (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 267. 
Although one could argue this SAC begins with v 29, it is more logical to include vv 29-32 with the 
preceding SAC since it is in v 33 that Peter turns to Jesus’ exaltation. However, we do include elements 
of the entire speech event in our analysis. 
164 Some LXX manuscripts omit ὁ before κύριος. 
165 H. Conzelmann’s argument that “despite Ps 118 (117):16 and Odes Sol. 25.9, τῇ δεξιᾷ should 
be understood as local (‘to the right hand’) rather than instrumental (cf. vss 30-36; 5:31; Odes Sol. 8.21)” 
(Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, trans. J. Limburg, A. T. Kraabel, and D. 
H. Juel, ed. E. J. Epp and C. R. Matthews [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987], 21) actually provides good 
reasons to consider v 33 as instrumental. The latter argument is also made by F. F. Bruce (The Acts of the 
Apostles: The Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary. 3rd ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; 
Leicester: Apollos, 1990], 126); and D. J. Williams, (Acts [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1990], 53).  
166 As Keener points out, “Since one can hardly be at another’s right hand and have that person 
at one’s own right hand (unless each faces the other, not the usual arrangement of thrones), the language 
of the ‘right hand’ is metaphor in both psalms (Pss 16:8, 11; 110:1, 5)” (1:947). His idea that the “right 
hand” language of Acts 2:25 (Ps 16:8) is linked by gezerah shevah with Acts 2:34 (Ps 110:1) seems 
unlikely since different metaphors are used in the two verses. However, there may be an implicit 
connection between Acts 2:34 (Ps 110:1) and the right hand language in the unquoted portion of Ps 16:11 
(cf. 1:944-945). 
167 See p. 161 and n110 above. If Luke’s Gentile Christian audience had been “God fearers,” as 
the name Theophilus implies, it is likely they would have been familiar with the Psalms. Certainly, if they 
had previously read Luke’s gospel, they would have encountered Ps 110. 
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According to Luke, Peter’s speech includes multiple quotations from and 
allusions to the OT.168 For these Assertives to be tellable at both the level of Peter’s 
Jewish audience and Luke’s presumably predominantly Gentile Christian audience, 
both Peter’s use of these OT quotations and allusions and Luke’s relating of this 
episode must either create or activate mutual context about Jesus. We consider both the 
episode and discourse levels below, beginning with the episode level. 
Because this SAC occurs near the end of the speech event, it is helpful to set it 
within the context of Peter’s argument. At the beginning of Peter’s speech, there is a 
lengthy quotation from Joel which ends with the words “Then everyone who calls on 
the name of the Lord shall be saved” (Acts 2:21 quoting Joel 3:5 LXX). In Acts 2:25a, 
Peter introduces a quotation from Psalm 15:8-11 LXX169 with the claim that David 
spoke these words concerning Jesus, who has been raised by God and freed from death 
(cf. vv 22-24).170 Then in v 31, Peter again attributes Psalm 15:10 LXX to David as 
prophecy of the resurrection of the Messiah.171 Since there is no evidence that Psalm 
                                                           
168 Juel believes that “the speech … represents a developed, sophisticated midrashic argument 
that cannot be classified as early or typical” (Messianic Exegesis, 147) and Hurtado reminds us that “we 
have to be very careful about reading the narratives without taking account of the author’s own literary 
purposes, and we should not take the speeches as records of what was said by the characters to whom 
they are attributed” (177). However, although Luke included the Pentecost speech in his narrative for a 
purpose, that does not mean that he invented that speech and attributed it to Peter. In any event, the 
implied audience for Peter’s speech is different from Luke’s own implied audience. 
169 See chapter 4 for an analysis of Paul’s quotations of Ps 15 LXX, Ps 2 and Isa 55 in Acts 13. 
170 In Ps 15 LXX, the psalmist (from the superscription, possibly David) speaks of his rescue 
from difficulty (vv 5-6) and of his confidence that his life will be long and prosperous thanks to 
Yahweh’s protection. Eaton notes that “a common interpretation is that the reference here is to 
deliverance from a current danger; he [the psalmist] is not to die on this occasion. This would suit the 
usual trend of Old Testament thought” (98). 
171 Much has been written about the relationship between Ps 16 [15 LXX] and the resurrection of 
the Messiah. Schenck’s conclusion that “Acts 2:25-31 understands similar words in Psalm 16 (15:8-11 
LXX) as Jesus’ confidence that God would raise him from the dead” (531) outstrips Peter’s claim, which 
concerns David’s knowledge, not Jesus’. Bock finds significant the substitution in v 31 of ἡ σὰρξ αὐτοῦ 
(used in Ps 15:9 LXX and Acts 2:26b for resting in hope) for τὸν ὅσιόν σου (used in Ps 15:10 LXX and 
Acts 2:27b in connection with avoidance of decay). But his conclusion that “the substitution guarantees 
that the point of the passage is not mere spiritual translation, bodily preservation, or terminal illness, but 
bodily resurrection” (Proclamation, 178) is too strong. Other scholars distinguish between τὴν ψυχήν µου 
in Acts 2:27a (Ps 15:10a LXX) and τὸν ὅσιόν σου in Acts 2:27b (Ps 15:10b LXX). For example, Polhill 
believes that “‘Holy One’ could apply to David as the anointed king, but for Peter it was even more 
appropriate as a designation for Christ” (113; cf. I. H. Marshall, The Acts of the Apostles: An Introduction 
and Commentary [1980; repr., Leicester: Inter-Varsity; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 76). See D. P. 
Moessner (“Two Lords ‘at the Right Hand’? The Psalms and an Intertextual Reading of Peter’s Pentecost 
Speech (Acts 2:14-36),” in Literary Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays in Honor of Joseph B. Tyson, ed. R. P. 
Thompson and T. E. Phillips [Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1998], 221n7) for a list of scholars 
who believe Acts 2:27b=Ps 15:10b foretells Jesus’ resurrection. We consider instead that, although in 
Acts 2 the Psalm is “attributed to David who is understood to have a prophetic role” (Koester, 177), 
Litwak is correct that this does not mean David made a “straightforward prophecy of the Messiah rising 
from the dead” (179). We also reject Eskola’s thought that “Psalm 16 was perfectly suitable for the 
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15:10 LXX was considered “messianic” in or by the first century,172 it appears this 
interpretation originated with Jesus’ original followers and possibly Peter himself. 
Acts 2:30 is another key element of the speech event. In it, Peter claims that 
David’s prophetic gift allowed him to understand that God’s promise to seat a 
descendant on his (David’s) throne (an allusion to Ps 132:11-12)173 would have 
fulfillment beyond David’s immediate successors. Thus, not only does Psalm 15 LXX 
describe David’s own situation,174 it would also be applicable to those of his line who, 
according to Yahweh’s promise, would also receive Yahweh’s anointing.175 This 
promise culminates in Messiah Jesus, for whom what was said about David in a 
particular situation—that he would not then be given over to the grave and would not 
experience decay—is true eternally.176  
It is this dynastic promise to David, plus the affirmation of Jesus’ resurrection 
(vv 24, 32), that permits the conclusion in v 33 that Jesus has been exalted to the right 
hand of God,177 from which position Jesus pours out the Holy Spirit (v 33c).178 To 
                                                                                                                                                                          
purposes of the writer, since there the exaltation terminology was connected with the idea of resurrection” 
(163). There is no explicit “exaltation terminology” in Ps 16 and Ps 16:11c is not quoted in Acts 2. 
172 See D. J. Williams, 52. This does not, however, require considering Ps 15:8-11 LXX to be 
either “some obscure text which Christians allegedly mined from the Scriptures in order to find proof for 
the resurrection or … a text which simply makes one point, namely that Messiah’s resurrection was 
already foretold by David, or both” (Moessner, 221). 
173 In Ps 132:11-12, Yahweh’s dynastic promise concerns the succession to David’s throne, not 
Yahweh’s. However, “the idea that the throne is ultimately God’s is certainly correct” (Strauss, 138). 
174 Contra Moyise, who sees Luke’s argument to be “that David could not have been speaking 
about himself but was speaking as a prophet” (Writings, 19), David knew he was anointed and loved by 
Yahweh. He also knew he would die (cf. Ps 39:13). Furthermore, to say that “David did not ascend into 
heaven, so he could not have been speaking of himself” as exalted to God’s right hand (Polhill, 115; cf. 
Bruce, 124, 127) misses the point that the seat at God’s right hand is a metaphor of being granted 
authority and power. As Gourgues points out, “la session à la droite n’entre pas dans la catégorie des 
événements historiques observables mais constitue plutôt l’expression métaphorique d’une réalité 
théologique” (202).  
175 Hebrew thought “saw a close link between individuals and their descendants. The Greek [of 
Acts 2:30] expresses this concept quite graphically with the phrase ‘from the fruit of his loins’ (‘one of 
his descendants,’ NIV)” (Polhill, 114). Contra Polhill (114), Aloisi (122) and Keener (1:951), rather than 
speaking only of one descendant, i.e., Messiah Jesus, David’s words about Yahweh’s protection would 
apply to all his successors. D. Williams argues “it was of a line of kings that the psalmist wrote and not of 
any one king in particular, as [Ps 132] verse 12 clearly shows” (52). Rendtorff points out that in Ps 132 
(alluded to in Acts 2:30), the “transition from David to his successors and back again shows the focus to 
be … that the name David represents the Davidic dynasty through the centuries” (63). However, if, as 
Marshall proposes, Ps 132 was “understood in the same way” as 4QFlorilegium, which “clearly interprets 
2 Samuel 7:10-16 as a reference to the Messiah,” Peter and his hearers may have “shared a belief that the 
passages about David’s descendants included a reference to the Messiah in particular” (77). 
176 “Through Jesus God fulfilled his promise to David of a kingdom without end” (Doble, 
“Psalms,” 117). See also Moyise, Writings, 16.  
177 Cf. Turner, Power, 275. 
178 We agree with Eskola against Hay that the theme of Peter’s speech is “the work of the exalted 
Christ” rather than “‘the vindication implied by his exaltation’” (Eskola, 173n49, quoting Hay, Glory, 
72). As Bock points out, “The point of the passage is that Jesus is now doing the work of the Father while 
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support this point, Peter quotes all of Psalm 109:1 LXX in vv 34b-35, evoking with 
regard to Jesus the Story of one who received the honor, authority and power 
represented by a seat at Yahweh’s right hand. In v 34a, Peter leads into this quotation 
by re-stating a point he made in v 29: οὐ γὰρ ∆αυὶδ ἀνέβη εἰς τοὺς οὐρανούς, thus 
continuing the comparison between David and Jesus that he began in v 25.179 Peter is 
contrasting David’s burial and eventual decay with Jesus’ ascension (reported in Acts 
1:9)180 and exaltation (vv 33a and 34b).  
Although Psalm 110 may not have been understood messianically prior to the 
Davidssohnfrage, there Jesus implicitly identified the Messiah with David’s Lord. After 
Jesus’ resurrection and ascension, the disciples, NT authors and early Christians would 
have had no doubt that Jesus’ earlier reference was to himself.181 In Acts 2:36, Peter 
makes this identification explicit: Jesus is “both Lord and Messiah” (καὶ κύριον … καὶ 
Χριστόν).182 Furthermore, Jesus is the eternal Messiah and Lord.183 “In Acts, Ps 110:1 
                                                                                                                                                                          
being seated at his side. Jesus now acts for the Father with his power and authority. He is the mediating 
dispenser of the Spirit” (Proclamation, 183). 
179 As Jesus did in the Synoptics, Peter clearly connects Ps 110 and David. Some consider the 
comparison to include the suffering and vindication of Jesus and David. J. F. D. Creach finds that “in 
Acts 2, Peter appeals to the suffering of David in the Psalms and to God’s vindication of David to explain 
the suffering and resurrection of Jesus” (“The Destiny of the Righteous and the Theology of the Psalms,” 
in Soundings in the Theology of Psalms: Perspectives and Methods in Contemporary Scholarship, ed. R. 
A. Jacobson [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2011], 60-61; cf. Litwak, 179). But even if one uses the co-text of 
the psalm to make an argument about the suffering of Jesus, it is clear (contra Creach and perhaps also 
Moessner) that Jesus’ passion is not the focal issue of Peter’s speech.  
180 The ascension account in Acts 1:9 “appears to be a reflection of Dan. 7:10, 13-14” (Beale, T 
Theology, 246), although Luke does not allude to the Daniel passage in his gospel.  
181 This explains the otherwise abrupt reference to Χριστός in 2:31. As Moessner points out, “it 
is curious that Peter uses the term ‘the Messiah’ since χριστός occurs neither in Psalm 15 nor in his 
speech thus far. In fact, Acts 2:31a is the first use of χριστός in the book of Acts” (228).  
182 In chapter 7, we saw another example of the importance to the early church of the confession 
“Jesus is Lord.” Some find Jesus’ lordship more important than his messiahship (see Bock, who speaks of 
a “christology which moves from Messiah-Servant to Lord” [Proclamation, 268]; M. Bird, 150; and 
Donahue and Harrington, 27, who believe the title “Lord” is superior to both “Messiah/Christ” and “Son 
of David”). We believe instead that “in three key texts expressing Jesus’ salvation-historical significance 
(Lk. 2.11; Acts 2.36; 10.36) κύριος appears together with χριστός, suggesting that the two titles are 
complementary (in these contexts); together they express the status and authority of Jesus” (Strauss, 27, 
where he adds that “Luke uses ‘Lord’ primarily as an expression of Jesus’ authority”). Further, “in Acts 
2.36 ‘Christ’ and ‘Lord’ stand parallel to one another, suggesting they are integrally related in the context 
of Jesus’ exaltation glory. One is not subordinated to the other” (Ibid., 30). 
We cannot take up here the timing of Jesus’ being “made … both Lord and Messiah” beyond 
noting that the angels announcing Jesus’ birth inform the shepherds ὅτι ἐτέχθη ὑµῖν σήµερον σωτὴρ ὅς 
ἐστιν χριστὸς κύριος (Luke 2:11). This argues against the idea that Jesus became Messiah only at his 
resurrection and also makes adoptionism unlikely (see Eskola, 160-176, and Kraus, Theology, 187, for a 
presentation of some of these arguments). Conzelmann correctly notes that “for Luke Jesus was certainly 
Messiah during his lifetime ([Acts] 10:38; Luke 4:18), and he makes no essential distinction between 
κύριος and χριστός” (21). This negates Loader’s theory that Acts 2, where “Jesus is made Lord at the 
exaltation,” is a more primitive use of Ps 110:1 and that Mark 12:35ff. “is the product of later 
christological reflection” since in it “Jesus is Lord already on earth” (215; emphasis added). We also 
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becomes part of an argument according to which God’s promise to David of a ‘seed’ to 
sit on his throne forever (2 Sam 7:12-14, Ps 89:3-4) is fulfilled only with the 
installation of the risen Christ in heaven.”184 As is true for David and others to whom 
the metaphors of Psalm 110:1 would apply,185 Jesus reigns over the earth. However, 
unlike an earthly monarch, Jesus does not reign only from or over the earth. He both 
reigns from heaven and over heaven;186 “exalted to the right hand of God,” Jesus has 
“poured out” God’s Spirit (v 33c, a link to the quotations of Joel 3:1, 2 LXX in vv 17 
and 18).187 And he does so eternally in his own person rather than dynastically. 
“The remarkable statement in 2.33,”188 in which the authority of the exalted 
Jesus is shown to surpass that of Israel’s earthly kings, furthers the resolution of the 
“more than messiah” tension.189 We expand on this below in discussing the perlocution. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
disagree with Juel’s conclusion that “it is as the enthroned ‘Lord’ that Jesus is Son of David” (“Origin,” 
455). Jesus was called “Son of David” during his incarnation. 
Nor can we address the question of when Jesus’ reign began or will begin. Strauss, for example 
believes that “Jesus begins his messianic reign already at his exaltation-enthronement” (264; cf. Keener, 
1:956) while Hay argues that “in a major way Luke seems to imply that Jesus’ kingdom will begin only 
with the parousia (22.29-30; Acts 1.6-7)” (Glory, 71). The former argument seems more plausible. 
183 Cf. Strauss, 317. Moessner believes the psalms alluded to in 2:30 all “characterize David as 
the Lord’s anointed whose offspring will ‘sit upon his throne’ ‘forever’” (228; emphasis added). 
184 Juel, “Origin,” 455; emphasis added. Also see Strauss, 65, and Bateman, Hermeneutics, 234. 
As noted above, the allusion to Ps 132 in v 30 evokes Yahweh’s promise of an eternal dynasty.  
185 Kraus is incorrect in saying that “David was not the one who carried out the striking 
command to sit at God’s right hand and to reign there” (Theology, 187). As Israel’s king, David was 
granted the honor and authority of the metaphoric seat at the right hand of God. And David was exalted 
(2 Sam 33:49, 23:1), as was Solomon (1 Chr 29:25). Nor are we convinced the identification of Jesus as 
David’s Lord in Acts 2 means “the dialogue in the psalm is between God and Jesus” (Moyise, Writings, 
18), although Jesus would be included in the dialog as David’s descendant. 
186 Cf. Matt 28:18. “For Jesus to take David’s throne in heaven … redefines the traditional 
Jewish expectation of Davidic rule” (Keener, 1:954; cf. Bock, Proclamation, 155; Strauss, 30). “In 
essence Acts 2.33 answers to the hopes of Lk. l.32-33, and … the kingdom of God comes in greater than 
hitherto experienced power and presence in Israel through Jesus’ attainment of the eternal throne of 
David to rule over Jacob” (Turner, Power, 268). At Pentecost, “the throne and power Jesus is given … 
transcend even the expectations of the infancy narratives” since “Jesus now fully enters the promise to 
David, sits on the throne at God’s right hand, and receives Lordship over the Spirit” (Ibid., 296, 306).  
187 Strauss notes that there is also a link “to the words of Jesus in Lk. 24.49 and Acts 1.4, where 
the pouring out of the Spirit is likewise referred to as the ‘promise of the Father’ (ἐπαγγελία τοῦ πατρός)” 
(141). Turner makes the important point that “it is doubtful whether in a Jewish context a human figure 
exalted to God’s right hand would readily be ‘called on’ for salvation in the way implied by the 
association of baptism ‘in the name of Jesus Christ’ with Joel 3.5 [2.32]. The presupposition which allows 
this surprising claim is to be found in 2.33b, c; the one exalted at God’s right hand has ‘received the 
promise of the Holy Spirit’ from the Father, and himself (in God’s own place, cf. 2.17b, c) ‘pours out this 
which you see and hear’” (Power, 276; cf. Bock, Proclamation, 183-185). We discuss this further below.  
188 Turner, Power, 267.  
189 Although for Strauss, the “‘more than messiah’ … tension is resolved in Acts when Jesus is 
openly declared to be Lord (Acts 2.36; 10.43)” (28; cf. 18, 317; Doble, “Psalms,” 88; and Moyise, 
Writings, 18), we believe critical elements in resolving the tension are (i) the dynastic promise referred to 
in 2:30 and (ii) Jesus pouring out the Holy Spirit in 2:33, i.e., the demonstration that Jesus reigns over 
heaven. Whether Pao is correct that “lordship of the risen Jesus” is a theme “developed throughout the 
New Exodus program” (212) cannot be explored here. We do note that Mallen, who finds “the outpouring 
of the Spirit at Pentecost in Acts 2” to be “a key event … interpreted through reference to Joel 3.1-5 LXX 
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The Perlocution 
Building on the “more than” connections Jesus made between “messiah,” “David’s 
son,” and “Lord” as reported in the Synoptic Gospels, Peter combines quotations from 
or allusions to Joel 2 and Psalms 16, 132 and 110 to paint a more detailed picture of 
“this Jesus, whom you crucified” (Acts 2:36; cf. 2:23). Peter’s Story includes the 
synthesis of messiahship and lordship already implied by Jesus in the Davidssohnfrage. 
This mutual context is activated and strengthened by a quotation of Psalm 110:1, a 
verse Jesus quoted and alluded to earlier.  
Taken with Jesus’ Predictive Assertive in the Synoptic passion narratives,190 
Peter’s quotation of Psalm 110:1 in Acts 2 focuses on the unparalleled honor, power 
and authority that inures to the exalted Jesus. In his exaltation, as well as in his 
messiahship and lordship (v 36), Jesus is seen to be “more than” the expectation of his 
Jewish contemporaries. Peter calls his audience not only to understand this but to live 
into the lifeworld where the exalted Jesus rules on earth and in heaven forever. 
In the Directive in 2:38, Peter tells his empirical audience what he wants them 
to do: “Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the 
forgiveness of your sins.” The Envisaging audience will do the same. Envisaging 
readers will incorporate the information contained in these Assertives into their 
theological worldview, responding positively to the Directive to “repent and be 
baptized” and moving into or establishing themselves more firmly in a lifeworld in 
which the exalted Jesus is eternally Messiah and Lord.  
Clearly, Peter’s use of Psalm 110:1 incorporates Jesus’ intervening 
interpretation as revealed by the Davidssohnfrage and the passion narrative as well as 
the subsequent events of Jesus’ death, resurrection and exaltation.191 But does this 
justify a claim that Peter’s naming Jesus “Lord” in 2:36 is an explicit ascription of 
divinity?192 Not in and of itself. The title “Lord” comes from Psalm 110:1, in which the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and the Davidic psalms” (62), makes no mention of Isaiah. Moyise adds that “Luke’s primary source for 
understanding Jesus is the Psalms” (Moyise, Writings, 22; cf. 39; and Doble, “Psalms,” 104, 117). 
190 See p. 168 above. 
191 For Tharel, “Peter’s understanding of the psalm’s language is more complete than the 
psalmist’s because Peter has witnessed the advent of Christ. Peter’s interpretation of the psalm, however, 
is not inconsistent with the psalm’s original meaning. Jesus is the ultimate Davidic king and the recipient 
of God’s promise” (84). 
192 J. D. G. Dunn provides a helpful summary of scholarship on this question in “ΚΥΡΙΟΣ in 
Acts,” in Christology, vol. 1 of The Christ and the Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). He does not 
mention Bock, who finds “Lord” to be a “title which shows Jesus in his task and person to be equal with 
God” (Proclamation, 184; cf. Eskola, 172).  
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authority of the ruler is derivative.193 And if Peter quoted, as seems likely, the Hebrew 
psalm, then “the first word translated ‘Lord’ is YHWH, the name of God, and the 
second word is ʼaḏôn which can be used of human lords and masters.”194 From this, 
Marshall concludes that in vv 34-35 “it is simply the attribute of lordship which is 
given to Jesus; he is not equated with Yahweh.”195  
But if one considers the Pentecost speech as a whole at the episode level and 
within in its literary context at the discourse level, there is other evidence which points 
to Jesus’ “more than” messiahship encompassing his divinity. Most immediately, as 
Keener points out, Jesus “is the one who pours out the Spirit (2:33; Luke 3:16), a divine 
role (Acts 2:17).”196 Additionally, the prophet Joel’s words concerning salvation for 
those who call on the name of the Lord (Yahweh in the original context) are applied to 
Jesus.197 Jesus is now presented as the “Lord upon whose name one must call for 
salvation, even as Joel envisaged one would call on God’s name.”198  
                                                           
193 Yahweh effects Jesus’ resurrection (v 32), exalts Jesus to/by His right hand and gives Jesus 
the Holy Spirit (v 33), invites Jesus to sit at His right hand (vv 34-35), and “makes” Jesus both Lord and 
Christ/Messiah (καὶ κύριον αὐτὸν καὶ χριστὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, v 36). Brawley concludes that “the Lucan 
appropriation of scripture is primarily theocentric” (59). Dunn believes Ps 110:1 “made clear the 
relationship of the two lordships: … the lordship of Jesus was a derivative lordship, but as derived from 
the Lord God it was in effect an expression of God’s lordship” (“ΚΥΡΙΟΣ,” 252-253). Further, that 
“Luke clearly thought of both God and Jesus as κύριος … does not mean that he thought of them as two 
equal κύριοι, or casually mixed them up, or saw them in some sophisticated pretrinitarian way as 
expressions of the one θεός καὶ κύριος” (Ibid., 252).  
194 Marshall, 79. Turner points out that J. C. O’Neill denies that Jesus was preached as the Lord 
worshiped by the Jews on the basis that “the earliest Aramaic speaking community … could not fail to 
distinguish the two Lords in that verse [Ps 110:1]: the first was הוהע, the second ינדא. This is true for any 
attempt to derive Christology from Ps. 110.1 alone; but it is not clear that ינדא need necessarily mean less 
than הוהי, and if the earliest community had other reasons for using God-talk of Jesus it would have read 
the two titles as equivalents” (Power, 278n28, with reference to O’Neill, The Theology of Acts in its 
Historical Setting [London: SPCK, 1961, 1970], 131). Further, Hurtado believes that “Adonay was 
widely used as a reverential oral substitute for Yahweh by Hebrew-speaking readers of the Bible” (183) 
and “the Aramaic term maryah (definite form of marêh) was used similarly” (109). So Peter may have 
used one of these words twice in his quotation. If so, the LXX would translate accurately what he said. 
195 Marshall, 80; cf. 25. 
196 Keener, 1:502; cf. Bock, Proclamation, 184. Gathercole avers that the giving of the Spirit 
“presupposes divine identity” (73). More emphatically, M. Turner argues that “there is simply O 
analogy for an exalted human (or any other creature) becoming so integrated with God that such a person 
may be said to ‘commission’ God’s Spirit, and through that to extend that exalted person’s own 
‘presence’ and activity to people on earth. For the Jew, such relationship to, and activity in or through, 
the Spirit appears to be necessarily, inalienably, and so distinctively, God’s” (“The Spirit of Christ and 
‘Divine’ Christology,” in Jesus of azareth: Lord and Christ: Essays on the Historical Jesus and ew 
Testament Christology, ed. J. B. Green and M. Turner [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 
1994], 423). Keener contrasts this to J. D. G. Dunn’s thought that “Luke presents Jesus only as ‘a 
plenipotentiary representative of God’” (1:923, quoting Dunn, The Acts of the Apostles [Valley Forge, 
PA: Trinity Press International, 1996], 29; cf. Strauss, 144). 
197 For Bock, “Jesus now mediates God’s salvation as a ‘co-regent’” (Proclamation, 264).  
198 Turner, Power, 267; cf. 273. Hurtado adds that “it is surely remarkable enough to identify 
‘the great and notable day of the Lord’ as the future coming of Jesus (2:20, citing Joel 2:31 [3:4 Heb.]), 
for in the Old Testament ‘the day of the Lord’ consistently refers to a time of God’s own special action of 
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At the discourse level, Luke develops Jesus’ divine identity further as Acts 
progresses. Notable examples include 5:31, which may echo Psalm 110:1, and where, 
like 2:38, “God offers Israel and others forgiveness … in Jesus’s name”199; 7:55-56, 
which clearly alludes to Psalm 110:1; and 8:16 and 19:5, where “it is in his [Jesus’] 
name that those turning to God must be baptized.”200 Extremely significant is Acts 
10:36. Although in the OT only Yahweh is referred to as “the Lord of all the earth,”201 
in 10:36, Jesus reigns over both heaven and earth and is πάντων κύριος—“everything is 
now under his control.”202 
Another distinction between the episode and discourse levels concerns the 
implied reader. At the episode level, Peter’s implied readers are Jews (cf. vv 14, 22, 29, 
and 36).203 At the discourse level, Luke recounts the events of Pentecost to an implied 
audience who are Greek and presumably Gentile. For such an implied audience, terms 
like “everyone” (πᾶς ὃς, 2:21; ὅσους, 2:39) and “all who are far away” (πᾶσιν τοῖς εíς 
µακράν, 2:39) indicate that the OT promises of God as they are fulfilled by the “more 
than” Messiah, Jesus, were intended for the Gentiles as well as the Jews.204  
As a result of hearing/reading this speech event, and especially the climactic 
SAC that includes the quotation from Psalm 110:1, our understanding of Jesus’ “more 
                                                                                                                                                                          
deliverance or judgment. … It is, however, an absolutely more stunning move still for early Christians to 
have taken the biblical expression that means the cultic worship of God, to ‘call upon the name of the 
Lord [Yahweh],’ as referring also to cultic acclamation/invocation of Jesus (Acts 2:21, citing Joel 2:32 
[3:5 Heb.])” (181; cf. Bock, Proclamation, 184). 
Hurtado makes the interesting point that “the crucial line from Joel cited in the Acts account of 
Peter’s speech (Acts 2:21), ‘Everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord shall be saved,’ is also cited 
… by Paul in Romans 10:13, in a context … that indicates that Paul means the biblical phrase to refer to 
the ritual act of ‘confessing [homologeō]’ the Lord Jesus (10:9). … This ritual use of Jesus’ name reflects 
an explicit identification of Jesus as an appropriate recipient of such cultic devotion” (198). We cannot 
explore here how the events of Pentecost, the writing of Romans and the writing of Acts are related. 
199 Keener, 1:502.; cf. Bock, Proclamation, 184. 
200 Keener, 1:502. This injunction is also found in 2:38. Keener gives numerous other examples 
from other parts of Acts which point to Luke’s affirming Jesus’ divine nature (Ibid.).  
201 References to ץראה לכ ןודא  appear in Jos 3:11, 13; Ps 97:5, Mic 4:13, and Zech 4:14. 
202 Pao, 210n83; emphasis added. Although Pao believes the quotation from Ps 109 LXX at the 
end of the Pentecost speech indicates “the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus are understood as his 
enthronement as Lord of all” (210), in Acts 10:36 it is made explicit that Jesus is πάντων κύριος. Strauss 
makes the comparison to David: “While Jesus is indeed David’s son and the heir to his throne, his 
universal dominion and authority far exceeds that of David. He is Lord of all (Acts 10.36)” (317).  
203 Peter addresses ἄνδρες Ἰουδαῖοι in 2:14, ἄνδρες Ἰσραηλῖται in 2:22, ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί in 2:29 
and refers to οἶκος Ἰσραήλ in 2:36. 
204 Moyise points out that “with Peter’s speeches in Acts 2 and 3, the issue is not so much about 
the difference between the Greek and Hebrew texts but the different contexts: Peter is preaching to Jews 
in Jerusalem and Luke is writing to Gentiles like Theophilus. … The issue … is more a debate about what 
Luke wanted Theophilus to deduce from these speeches. Did he want him to assume that Peter and James 
would have meant the same thing that he, as a Gentile, would have understood by these texts? Or was he 
expecting a little more sophistication; that texts that were ambiguous when quoted in Jerusalem have 
become clear now that the gospel has been preached to the Gentiles?” (Writings, 11-12; cf. Litwak, 
although he attributes the prominence given to the Gentiles in Acts 2 to Peter’s reading of Joel 3 [159]). 
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than” messiahship has evolved. At the episode level, the derived authority of the 
exalted Jesus—eternally reigning over both earth and heaven at the right hand of 
God—is presented as greater than that of any earthly monarch. To the exalted Jesus 
also belong certain prerogatives of divinity, namely the forgiveness of sins, the gift of 
the Holy Spirit and the power to save. Moreover, at the discourse level, this episode 
promotes a fuller understanding both of Jesus’ divine identity and of the inclusion of 
the Gentiles in the divine promises. Thus, at both the episode and discourse levels, in 
adhering to these Assertives, the empirical audience transforms its theology, Story and 
lifeworld/worldview. 
Peter’s quotation of Psalm 110:1 includes its final clause concerning the 
submission of all things under the feet, perhaps to warn his listeners of the perils of 
being numbered as among Jesus’ enemies.205 Although Acts 2:40 also may refer to 
Jesus’ enemies, this metaphor is more fully developed in 1 Corinthians 15, where Paul 
refers to Psalm 110:1c. 
Psalm 110:1 as Quoted in 1 Corinthians 15:25206 
The Locution 
A comparison of 1 Corinthians 15:25 and Psalm 109:1c LXX appears in Appendix 
B§6a, where double underlining shows matching words and single underlining indicates 
the same word in different forms.207 There are no significant locutionary issues.208 
                                                           
205 Contra Mack’s contention that “reasons why Jews would have wanted to repent and be 
forgiven are not evident” (91). 
206 1 Corinthians is an undisputed Pauline letter and is generally dated about 55 CE—earlier than 
Ephesians, Colossians or Hebrews. Although D.-A. Koch points out that, if one assumes Ps 109:1 LXX is 
quoted in 1 Cor 15:25 (which he does not), “es läge dann hier die früheste Verwendung dieses später 
häufig zitierten Textes vor” (Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchungen zur Verwendung 
und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus [Tübingen: Mohr, 1986], 19). Although this letter may have 
been written before the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, we believe oral accounts of earlier events (later 
recorded in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts) were part of the mutual context of Paul and those he taught. 
Although we follow NA27 in treating Ps 110:1 in 1 Cor 15:25 as a quotation, others do not. For 
this, see Hay, Glory, 36; Stanley, Paul, 206n85. Koch argues quite forcefully that “liegt in 1 Kor 15,25 
überhaupt kein Zitat von Ψ 109,1b (und erst recht nicht von V 1a) vor” (244). He adds that “ein Zitat von 
Ψ 109,1b kann man hier nur annehmen, wenn man voraussetzt, daβ Ψ 109,1 insgesamt ein im 
Urchristentum derart bekanntes Schriftwort war, daβ Paulus dessen Kenntnis bei seinen Lesern als 
selbstverständlich voraussetzen konnte” (19). However, the assumption he rejects is not unreasonable, 
given the use of Ps 110:1 by Jesus and in Peter’s Pentecost speech. In any event, Paul “expects his 
audience to recognize the scriptural authority of 1 Cor 15:25, whether considered as a quotation or an 
allusion to Ps 110:1” (Heil, 206n4; cf. 207 for details of Paul’s adaptation). 
207 Both texts contain the verb τίθηµι and references to enemies (ἐχθρός) and feet (πούς). In 1 
Cor 15:25, the enemies are put under the feet (ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας) rather than made a footstool (LXX 
ὑποπόδιον). 
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Appendix B§6b presents the SAC (1 Cor 15:24-28) divided into seven SAs, with NA27 
and the NRSV in parallel columns. 
The Illocution 
“Messiah/Christ Jesus” appears eight times in 1 Corinthians 1:1-10. So, from the outset, 
it is clear the belief that Jesus is the Messiah forms part of the mutual context the 
implied author shares with his implied readers.209 By chapter 15, we know that the 
empirical audience is fractured (1:10-11; 3:3; 10:18), spiritually immature and immoral 
(3:2; 5:1, 11; 11:29-30), as well as arrogant (4:18; 5:2). The Corinthians are in danger of 
being diverted from the good news Paul has taught them of Messiah Jesus, in whom 
they have been sanctified (1:2). The goals of the implied author are for the readers to 
become united (καταρτίζω, 1:10) and blameless (ἀνέγκλητος, 1:8).  
This SAC consists of a series of Assertives and is part of a speech event which 
includes all or most of 1 Corinthians 15.210 The topic of the speech event is victory over 
death; this SAC addresses what happens at “the end.” Many Corinthians held a Greek 
worldview of life after death without a resurrection of the dead (15:1-58), and thus 
“they failed to comprehend how an earthly body that is physical and perishable could be 
made suitable for a heavenly realm that is spiritual and imperishable.”211 Since the 
bodily resurrection of Messiah Jesus and of believers is a central concept in Paul’s 
lifeworld and theology, he addresses this misconception in order to restore or maintain 
correct belief in his readers.212 
                                                                                                                                                                          
208 G. D. Fee points out that in v 28a “most MSS have a καί following τότε (=even the Son 
himself)” (The First Epistle to the Corinthians [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987], 746n2). The addition of 
καί does not alter the basic meaning of the verse. 
209 J. Collins pithily puts it this way: “Jesus is called Christos, anointed, the Greek equivalent of 
messiah, 270 times in the Pauline corpus. If this is not ample testimony that Paul regarded Jesus as 
messiah, then words have no meaning” (Scepter, 2). Of course, this does not answer the question of how 
Paul understood the term “messiah” in connection with Jesus. 
210 1 Cor 15 is one of the four speech events introduced by 1 Cor 7:1 which together comprise 
the last part of the letter body. Whether Paul’s summary of the gospel message in 1 Cor 15:1-11 is a 
separate (fifth) speech event does not bear on our discussion. 
211 D. E. Garland, “1 Corinthians,” in Theological Interpretation of the ew Testament: A Book-
by-Book Survey, ed. K. J. Vanhoozer, D. J. Treier, and N. T. Wright (London: SPCK; Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2008), 106. According to Amador, A. C. Wire uses Paul’s rhetoric to reconstruct the 
Corinthians’ theological position: “They reject the emphasis upon the future resurrection of the dead, 
stressing instead the experience of the living resurrection in the life of the believer through participation 
in the dying and rising of christ [sic] in baptism” (230, with reference to Wire, The Corinthian Women 
Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990], 167-168). 
212 “There is no suggestion that Paul is here addressing cultured scoffers outside the Christian 
community, as Acts represents him doing at Athens. The criticism is coming from the faithful 
themselves, from those who have been baptized, and the implication of this is very destructive of those 
accounts of the earliest Christian churches which see them as resurrection creations. Here is a very early 
community in which certainly some elements felt able to repudiate resurrection while expecting to retain 
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A crucial step in determining the illocution is to identify the referents of the 
various third person masculine singular pronouns in the first two SAs, vv 24 and 25. 
The opening event is the destruction or overthrow of all earthly institutions, following 
which is “the end” when “he,” i.e., the Messiah, hands the kingdom over to God the 
Father (v 24a). In light of Psalm 110, the “he” who has accomplished the destruction (v 
24b) is God the Father since, according to the psalm, Yahweh vanquishes the enemies. 
In v 25a, the “he” who reigns is the Messiah.213 The enemies (also described in v 24) are 
the Messiah’s and they are to be put under the Messiah’s feet. The “he” in v 25b who 
puts the enemies under the Messiah’s feet is God the Father, the agent of subjection.214 
The Messiah’s reign will last until that happens. Via this metaphor of subjection under 
the feet, Paul evokes a Story-line of Psalm 110:1—that Yahweh has promised victory 
over his enemies to the one invited to sit at Yahweh’s right hand, i.e. the one who 
reigns (cf. Ps 110:2). As in Psalm 110, where “although the king is the actual ruler, it is 
God who exercises his power through the king,” in this segment of 1 Corinthians “the 
same idea is expressed: Jesus is the one who reigns, but God acts through Jesus.”215 
Paul uses the Commissive from the oracle reported in the psalm—the fate Yahweh 
promises for the enemies of Yahweh’s Anointed—as the centerpiece of his argument.  
The third SA, v 26, repeats the key ideas of destruction/overthrow (καταργέω) 
and enemies (ἐχθρός) and adds to tellability the important information that the last 
enemy to suffer destruction is death. In the final verses of the SAC, vv 27-28, the 
masculine singular third person pronouns all have as referent the Messiah—“he” who is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a Christian identity” (Shaw, 95). 
213 Thiselton reminds us that in 1 Cor 15 “Christ remains God’s righteous agent of salvation” 
(First Epistle, 1228). 
214 Fee is among those who argue that Christ is the subject of θῇ in v 25. He bases his argument 
on two factors: (i) the “natural antecedent is the subject of the preceding ‘he must reign,’ referring to 
Christ,” and (ii) this verse serves to explain v 24 “where Christ is the subject of the clause ‘when he 
destroys all dominion, etc.’” (First Epistle, 755; cf. 754n40, 756, and Thiselton, First Epistle, 1234). 
Neither argument is compelling. First, Christ is not the subject of “he has destroyed” in v 24. The 
“natural” antecedent of καταργήσῃ is the immediately preceding noun, τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί. Second, it is 
more logical that the actor be the same as in the first-person Commissive reported in the psalm verse 
quoted, i.e., Yahweh, especially since v 25 uses the same verbiage (τίθηµι, ἐχθρός and ὐπὸ τοὺς πόδας 
[ὑποπόδιον]) as Ps 110:1c. Fee acknowledges that many scholars favor the position that God is the 
subject of “until he has put” in 1 Cor 15:25b (First Epistle, 755n49). Two of these are Hengel (144) and 
Heil (207n8). Heil follows J. Holleman, who argues “there is a change of subjects, from Jesus to God, 
between verses 25a (δεῖ βασιλεύειν) and 25b (θῇ), where Paul quotes or refers to Ps. 110 (109):1” on the 
basis of v 28 in which “the Son will subject hmself [sic] to ‘the one who put all things in subjection under 
him.’ The ‘one who put all things in subjection’ (τῷ ὑποτάξαντι) can only be God. Since God is the 
subject in verse 28, he must also be the subject of the same action described in verse 27 (ὑπέταξεν, 
ὑποταξαντος [sic]) and 25b (θῇ)” (Heil, 207n8, quoting Holleman, Resurrection and Parousia: A 
Traditio-Historical Study of Paul’s Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 [Leiden: Brill, 1996], 59 and 59n4). 
215 M. H. de Lang, “Psalm 110 in the New Testament,” MelT 59, no. 2 (2008): 45n5. 
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reigning and the one to whom the enemies are being made subject. Both references to 
“the one who put all things in subjection” (vv 27b, 28a) are to God the Father.  
The last four SAs are connected to the first three by the repetition of ὑπὸ τοὺς 
πόδας in vv 25 and 27a. Additionally, a form of ὑποτάσσω appears six times in vv 27-
28; subjection is heavily emphasized in these SAs via repetition.216 Since ὑπὸ τοὺς 
πόδας and ὑποτάσσω also appear in Psalm 8 LXX, many consider v 27a to refer to 
Psalm 8:6, where it is clear that God the Father is the agent of subjection, although there 
is no direct mention of enemies.217 The climactic conclusion of this SAC is v 28b: ᾖ ὁ 
θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν (v 28b).218 This SAC is tellable because if Paul’s audience denies 
the resurrection of believers, they deny the ability of God to subject all things, including 
death, to the “more than” Messiah. In that case, God would not be all in all.219 
It is clear the Story evoked here by the quotation of Psalm 110 includes aspects 
of the Jesus-event. 1 Corinthians 15 assumes as mutual context the Story of the 
resurrection, ascension, exaltation and eternal reign of Christ; this mutual context is 
activated by the quotation. In 1 Corinthians 15, “every ruler and every authority and 
power” (v 24), including death (v 26) will be subjected to Jesus, ὁ υἱός (v 28) and 
Χριστός (v 23). This expanded role and authority are those equated with the Messiah’s 
eternal reign in and over heaven as this has evolved in events later reported by the 
Synoptics and Acts.220 The Analytic reader understands this. 
                                                           
216 The verb in vv 24 and 26 is καταργέω (I destroy, put down, make powerless) rather than 
ὑποτάσσω (I put under, subject) which appears in vv 27-28. For J. Lambrecht, “the verb καταργέω, here 
in vv. 26 and 24 with the meaning ‘to destroy’, would seem to be the typically Pauline word. The other 
two verbs ‘to put (under his feet)’ (v. 25) and ‘to subject’ (vv. 27-28) are given by the psalms, and by 
themselves they do not point to destruction” (“Paul’s Christological Use of Scripture in I Cor. 15.20-28,” 
TS 28, no. 4 [October 1982]: 519n24). But “destroy” in the sense of “causing something to no longer 
exist” (cf. BDAG, s.v. “καταργέω” §3) may not be the lexical meaning of this word in vv 24 and 26. 
Rather, καταργέω may have its sense of “to cause someth. to lose its power or effectiveness, … make 
powerless” (BDAG, s.v. “καταργέω” §2). Lambrecht himself speaks of Christ handing “over the kingdom 
to God after having overthrown all inimical powers” (“Use,” 505; emphasis added). This would cohere 
with ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας in vv 25 and 27 and ὑποτάσσω in the later verses.  
217 Cf. Koch, 13 and 13n11. For B. Tanner, the connection between Pss 8 and 110 “further 
solidifies the claim of kingship for Christ, tying the ‘adam’ of Psalm 8 with the royal motif of Psalm 110” 
(64). H. Williams points out that when Pss 110:1 and 8:7 “are considered together, they provide a double 
grounding for the total reign of Christ over every ruler, power and authority” (171). In addition, since “his 
feet” in Ps 8:4 refers to the feet of “the son of man” (NASBupd) and because in 1 Cor 15, “all things” are 
to be subjected to Christ the Son (vv 27 and 28), this passage links the Son and the Son of Man.  
218 This argument is not subordinationist. Rather, “Paul is pointing out that God is responsible 
for that subjection [of all things] through Christ” (Fee, First Epistle, 759). “As in 3:22-23 and 11:3, the 
language of the subordination of the Son to the Father is functional, referring to his ‘work’ of redemption, 
not ontological, referring to his being as such” (760). 
219 See Garland, 106. Thiselton points out that “the emphasis lies in πάντα” (First Epistle, 1236).  
220 A. Chester argues convincingly that “the fact that Paul can assume his allusions to a citation 
of Ps. 110.1 will be understood in both Corinth and Rome suggests that the underlying tradition goes back 
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The Perlocution 
The desired perlocutionary effect of an Assertive is adherence. In this case, adherence 
takes the form of realigning lifeworld around the reaffirmation of truths Paul previously 
taught (cf. 1 Cor 15:12). In broad terms, the quotation supports what Paul has taught 
concerning Yahweh’s nature and character and Yahweh’s relationship to Yahweh’s 
people and the world. Envisaging readers reaffirm the validity of Paul’s earlier teaching 
and reorient their worldview/lifeworld around the truths of the resurrection of believers; 
the subjection of all things, including death, to the Messiah; and Yahweh as “all in all.” 
One or both of the metaphors of Psalm 110:1 concerning the seat at Yahweh’s 
right hand and the subjection of enemies under the feet are found elsewhere in the 
NT.221 However, their use in Hebrews can be considered their fullest development. We 
center our discussion on the explicit quotation in Hebrews 1:13. 
Psalm 110:1 as Quoted in Hebrews 1:13 
The Locution 
Hebrews 1:4 begins a speech event which extends through 2:18.222 Immediately after 
introducing the topic of the relationship of God’s Son to the angels, the author launches 
into a series of seven OT (LXX) quotations,223 five of which come from five different 
                                                                                                                                                                          
very early, probably to the Jerusalem community” (Messiah and Exaltation: Jewish Messianic and 
Visionary Traditions and ew Testament Christology [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007]), 37). Hays also 
finds in 1 Cor 15:25-27 “further evidence for an established pre-Pauline tradition of messianic psalm 
interpretation” (“Christ Prays,” 109).  
221 The metaphor of being seated at Yahweh’s right hand is found in Rom 8:34, Eph 1:20-21, 
Col 3:1 and 1 Pet. 3:22. Of these, only Eph 1 (v 22) alludes to the second metaphor—the placing of all 
things under the feet in submission. (See B. Tanner, 64-65, for a discussion of Eph 1).  
For D. A. Campbell, Satan’s future subjection under the feet of Christians in Rom 16:20 “echoes 
both 1 Corinthians 15:25-27 and underlying messianic readings of Psalms 8 and 110 (8:6 and 110:1)” 
(“An Echo of Scripture in Paul, and Its Implications,” in Wagner, Rowe and Grieb, 384). However, “the 
inclusion of Ps. 8 among the messianic texts of the OT is disputed” (R. Gheorghita, The Role of the 
Septuagint in Hebrews: An Investigation of its Influence with Special Consideration to the Use of Hab 
2:3-4 in Heb 10:37-38 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 143-144). Koch confirms “eine messianische 
Auslegung von Ps 8 ist in der jüdischen Lit. bislang überhaupt nicht nachgewiesen” (245; cf. Gheorghita, 
144). Hebrews’ messianic reading of Ps 8 (see G. de Villiers, “Reflections on Creation and Humankind in 
Psalm 8, the Septuagint and Hebrews,” in Psalms and Hebrews: Studies in Reception, ed. D. J. Human 
and G. J. Steyn [New York: T&T Clark, 2010], 80), was likely developed by the early church.  
222 These boundaries approximate G. Guthrie’s first “main movement,” which he titles “The 
Position of the Son in Relation to the Angels” (1:5-2:18) (Structure, 116).  
223 “The writer of Hebrews has a remarkable knowledge of the LXX and used it exclusively” (W. 
L. Lane, Hebrews 1-8 [Dallas: Word Books, 1991], lxxi; cf. Ellingworth, 27). The quotations in this 
series are introduced with a form of λέγω, i.e., “as the direct speaking of God” (Lane, cxvii), which is the 
most common introduction in Hebrews. This reduces the likelihood of it being a “traditional collection” 
(contra Attridge, Hebrews, 24). For an overview of various suggestions for the hermeneutic behind the 
OT quotations in Hebrews, see S. Motyer, “The Psalm Quotations of Hebrews 1: A Hermeneutic-Free 
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Psalms.224 In Hebrews 1:13, Psalm 109:1b-c LXX is quoted verbatim. The SAC which 
includes this quotation is Hebrews 1:13-14, each verse of which is a SA. For 
convenience, NA27 and the NRSV, divided into the two SAs, are presented in Appendix 
B§7. There are no major issues of locution. 
The Illocution 
To identify the implied author and audience, we focus on this first speech event. From 
the reference to God having spoken τοῖς πατράσιν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις (1:1), we learn the 
implied author is someone who acknowledges the value of Jewish tradition, and 
especially prophecy.225 Similarly, the implied reader has “a detailed knowledge of the 
OT” and “assumes on the part of his audience a deep familiarity with their [sic] 
contents.”226 In v 2a, we learn that God has spoken to us (ἡµῖν) through the son (ἐν υἱῷ); 
thus, the implied author is a follower of Jesus Christ, as is the implied audience. 
Further, the identification of Jesus as Son (of God, v 5) is part of the mutual context of 
the implied author and implied audience (2:9). In 2:1 the author states his purpose for 
writing: So “we” (ἡµᾶς) do not drift away from what we have heard.227 “What we have 
heard” includes the quotations in 1:5-13, which are part of how God has previously 
spoken through the prophets (1:1). 
The empirical audience is experiencing “loss of confidence in the viability of 
their convictions. They display lack of interest in the message of salvation they had 
embraced (2:1–4), which formerly had given them a sense of identity as the new 
covenant people of God. The writer implies that they are no longer listening to the voice 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Zone?,” TynBul 50, no.1 (1999): 3-22; and S. E. Docherty, The Use of the Old Testament in Hebrews: A 
Case Study in Early Jewish Bible Interpretation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 61-82. 
224 For the reliance of the implied author of Hebrews on the Psalms for his christology, see S. J. 
Kistemaker, The Psalm Citations in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Amsterdam: Wed. G. Van Soest, 1961), 
12; Lane, cxvi; and R. N. Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans; Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1999), 149. Ellingworth calls attention to the “curious 
fact that, of the quotations for which divine authority is specifically claimed, all but one (Je. 31[LXX 
38]:33f.=Heb. 10:16f.) are from the Psalms, and none from the Torah” (38-39). However, Eskola’s notion 
that Hebrews “appears to be really a commentary on Psalm 110” is without warrant (Eskola, 258; cf. G. J. 
C. Jordaan and P. Nel, “From Priest-King to King-Priest: Psalm 110 and the Basic Structure of Hebrews,” 
in Human and Steyn, 230-231, 240). Eskola (258n26), Jordaan and Nel (229), Ellingworth (90, 130) and 
Attridge (Hebrews, 23n188, 46n138) all attribute the idea that Hebrews is a commentary/midrash on Ps 
110 to G. Buchanan’s 1972 Anchor Bible commentary. 
225 Although the title Hebrews suggests the implied author is a Jew writing to Jews, Ellingworth 
makes a strong case for a mixed community of readers from Jewish and Gentile backgrounds (25). 
226 Lane, cxv. As we noted in chapter 7, presumably more informed empirical readers mediated 
their knowledge to their less-informed counterparts. 
227 This is reiterated throughout the remainder of the book (cf. chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12). 
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of God in Scripture and preaching (2:1; 3:7b–4:13, 5:11; 12:25).”228 Both as a group and 
individually, the readers have need of this message of exhortation (13:22).229 
That both SAs of this SAC are Assertives is seen when we transpose them: 
(v 13) God has not said to any angel, “Sit at my right hand until I make your 
enemies a footstool for your feet.” 
(v 14) All angels are spirits in the divine service, sent to serve those who are to 
inherit salvation. 
Taking the negative Assertive in v 13 with the positive Assertive in v 14 
brackets the role of angels in the divine economy. Angels are not rulers—heavenly or 
earthly—but rather servants of Yahweh who minister to “those who are to inherit 
salvation” (1:14) in part by bringing messages (2:2).230 
The transposition of v 13 makes it clear that although Yahweh has not said what 
is quoted from Psalm 110 to an angel, Yahweh has said it to someone.231 From the co-
text and especially the introductory verses, it appears it was said to the Son, through 
whom “in these last days he [God] has spoken to us” (1:2a).232 Since the verb in v 13 
appears in the perfect (εἴρηκεν), there is an emphasis on the present consequences of 
what Yahweh previously spoke.233 The SAC (vv 13-14) is christological since it clarifies 
what is true about Jesus as compared to the angels.234  
                                                           
228 Lane, lxi. Apparently “the listeners had not actually fallen away, since the author can assume 
that they still affirmed basic Christian beliefs. For example, he does not try to convince the listeners that 
Jesus died and was exalted to God’s right hand, but assumes that they will grant these points as the basis 
for his argument (1:1-4)” (Koester, 71). 
229 “For listeners who remain committed to God and Christ, Hebrews … maintains the values 
they already hold. For those tending to drift away from the faith, Hebrews … seeks to dissuade them from 
apostasy and move them toward a clearer faith commitment” (Koester, 82). 
230 J. Collins points out that “angels are never anointed” (“Jesus,” 115). 
231 This is also true of the quotations in v 5, which are introduced by the same phrase. 
Ellingworth believes “the author of Hebrews assumes that his readers would respond to the rhetorical 
question: ‘to which of the angels did God ever say …?’ with the answer: ‘to no angel, but to the one 
whom the psalmist calls “my Lord.”’ … It now emerges that his main interest in this chapter is not 
negatively to demote angels in his readers’ eyes, but positively to reaffirm and strengthen their existing 
faith in the one who is now exalted to sit at God’s right hand” (130).  
232 Contra Docherty, this does not imply “the words of scripture are to be assumed to be literally 
true” and that “there really is conversation in heaven between the exalted Jesus and God” (181). 
233 “The perfect emphasizes a decisive event in the Son’s life which has continuing 
ramifications. We might even say that the climax of the catena occurs with Psalm 110:1b which speaks of 
the Son’s present situation as well as the Son’s future expectations” (Bateman, Hermeneutics, 233; cf. 
Attridge, Hebrews, 61). 
234 Although Ἰησοῦς and χριστός do not appear until 2:9 and 3:6, respectively, according to R. 
Longenecker, all six OT passages quoted in Hebrews 1:5-13 “are interpreted christologically as referring 
to Jesus” (156). When Motyer classifies Ps 109:1 LXX in Heb 1:13 as “certainly understood as 
messianic,” he is referring to “the early church,” since he agrees “the evidence that this was read 
messianically in Judaism is very slight” and that “it may well be that its prominent use in the New 
Testament derives from Jesus himself (Mk. 12:35-37 par.)” (16).  
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However, this does not mean “the invitation to be enthroned at God’s right hand 
was addressed to the Son alone.”235 Verse 13 may refer to Yahweh’s offer to David and 
his descendants to be seated at Yahweh’s right hand.236 In that case, the quotation is a 
reminder that no angel has been offered this position of honor and authority. Under this 
scenario, “to which of the angels did God ever say” in v 13, which parallels the similar 
phrase in v 5, introduces a new argument consisting of 1:13-14 and 2:5b-9.237 This 
argument explains the relationship between the angels and David and the kings of his 
line, a line which culminates in the incarnate Christ.  
The Assertive in v 13 is thus tellable as the introduction to an argument 
concerning Jesus’ non-subordination to the angels even during his earthly existence. It 
serves as the link between the current position of Messiah Jesus “at the right hand of the 
Majesty on high” (1:3) and his status during his incarnation (2:9). Although in his 
earthly incarnation, Jesus was made “lower than” the angels and even submitted to 
death (2:7, 9),238 his incarnation was not only temporary but was designed to serve “the 
descendants of Abraham” (2:16) rather than angels.239 
This reading makes better sense of v 14, which tells us angels are not the rulers 
but rather the servants of humanity, i.e., “those who are to inherit salvation.” In contrast 
“to the Son, who is invited to share the divine presence and splendor, angels are sent 
forth on a mission of assistance to those who find themselves oppressed and confused in 
a hostile world.”240 Angels serve humanity, including the incarnate Christ. Thus, for the 
                                                           
235 Contra Lane, 45.  
236 The seating of the Son at God’s right hand (1:3) may not be the only such seating referred to 
by v 13 since vv 13-14 have no explicit reference to the Son, lord, messiah, Last Days, etc. Regarding v 
1:5b, Ellingworth finds it “not surprising that God’s promise to David should have been understood as 
extending beyond Solomon to an ideal king of Davidic descent, known as the Messiah” (115). 
237 For G. Guthrie, 1:5 and 1:13 form an inclusio (Structure, 77; cf. Bateman, Hermeneutics, 
241). But since only the phrase “to which of the angels has God ever said” is repeated and the content of 
God’s speech in the two verses is quite different, Guthrie’s Parallel Introductions category (cf. Structure, 
104) seems as likely. Gourgues believes “1:3 lance un développement qui vient aboutir en 1:13, lequel, 
après en avoir récapitulé les éléments majeurs, relance à son tour un nouveau développement” in 2:5 (94; 
cf. Lane, 45).  
238 Cf. Lane, 46. Although we cannot explore in detail what being “made lower” might mean, 
Koester believes the author of Hebrews correlates being made lower “with Christ’s suffering and death” 
(217, referring to Heb 5:7, 12:2 and 13:12; cf. Moyise, Writings, 89). If this is the case, Heb 2:9 makes it 
clear that “Jesus’ suffering is not incompatible with his glory and honor” (McCann, 63).  
239 According to Gheorghita, most commentators choose “the temporal sense” rather than that of 
degree because of “the adverbial particle νῦν” in 2:8 (106; cf. Lane, 43; and Koester, 34 and 116).  
240 Lane, 32. “In Hebrews 1:7 angels serve the Davidic king, and in Hebrews 1:14 that service 
involves serving the saints. … Thus, while waiting for the future consummation of the Son’s rule, angels 
serve the Son by serving the subjects of the Son” (Bateman, Hermeneutics, 235; cf. Attridge, Hebrews, 
62). For Ellingworth, also, “better sense is made of the verse as a whole … if it is paraphrased as follows: 
‘All these angels, as we have been showing from scripture, are subordinate to God and therefore to Christ 
as Son. They live to worship God in heaven, and serve him by being sent … on earthly missions for the 
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Messiah, being “lower than the angels” is not a matter of subjection to them.241 
Ultimately, “all things”—presumably including angels— are “put in subjection under 
his feet” (Heb 2:8 NASBupd quoting Ps 8:6).242 Both the world to come and this world 
are subjected not to angels, but to the “more than” Messiah Jesus.  
The quotation from Psalm 110:1 evokes for the implied reader the Story-lines of 
Yahweh giving the Anointed the honor and authority of a seat at Yahweh’s right hand 
and of Yahweh’s active engagement in subjecting the enemies to the rule of the eternal 
Messiah.243 These Story-lines have been refracted through the lens of the Jesus-event; 
only Jesus is now referred to as Messiah.  
How does this SAC fit into the illocution of the speech event? William Lane 
argues that in Hebrews “argumentation serves exhortation. … The primary function of 
exhortation is to motivate the community to appropriate action.”244 Using our 
terminology, we conclude that the Assertives in 1:5-14 support the Directive in 2:1 to 
“pay greater attention to what we have heard, so that we do not drift away from it.”245 
The Assertives in 2:2-4 also support this Directive. The return to exposition in 2:5, also 
an Assertive, looks back to 1:13 (and 1:3), thus linking the citations in 1:5-13 with those 
in 2:6-13 and creating discourse cohesion. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
benefit of those to whom God is to give salvation’” (133). Heb 1:14 marks “the beginning of a change 
from (a) the sharp contrast between angels and the Son, which dominated 1:5-13, to (b) a more positive 
assessment of the subordinate role of angels, suggested in 1:14 and developed in 2:2” (Ibid., 134). Note 
that there is “no indication of any enmity” between Christ and the angels (Attridge, Hebrews, 62). Jesus’ 
victory is over “the one who has the power of death” (2:14). 
241 Contra Attridge, Hebrews, 69.  
242 We use NASBupd here because the NRSV takes “man” (Ps 8:4 MT: שׁובא; Ps 8:5 LXX: 
ἄνθρωπος) as “human beings” and translates the possessive pronoun in Ps 8:6 as plural, i.e., “their feet,” 
which is misleading (cf. Moyise, Writings, 88). Interestingly, W. B. Wallis notes a parallel between Heb 1 
and 2 and 1 Cor 15:25-27: “The thought of Psalm 110:1 is advanced first and then confirmed by the 
climactic parallel from Psalm 8” (“The Use of Psalms 8 and 110 in 1 Corinthians 15:25-27 and Hebrews 
1 and 2,” JETS 15, no. 1 [Winter 1972]: 27; cf. 29).  
243 For Loader, 1:3 and 1:13 “are clearly associated with present rule” (205). This dovetails with 
the presentations in Acts 2 and 1 Cor 15. “Many scholars … believe … ἕως ἄν here indicates a period 
extending indefinitely beyond the action of the main verb; that is, that the Son will continue to ‘sit’ even 
after his enemies have been defeated” (Ellingworth, 131). This mirrors our earlier discussion of דע/ἕως in 
the psalm (see n9). As with the other quotations of Ps 110:1 we have analyzed, here also “to sit at God’s 
right hand is therefore to share his power without limitation, though always with the subordination 
implied in the fact that it is God who gives, and the Son who receives, this supreme status” (Ibid., 103). 
244 Lane, c, adding that “Hebrews was written to arouse, urge, encourage, and exhort those 
addressed to maintain their Christian confession and to dissuade them from a course of action that the 
writer believed would be catastrophic. He calls them to fidelity and obedience and seeks to prepare them 
for suffering.”  
245 According to Westfall, “1:5-14 is marked as support material by the gar (for) and contains 
supportive quotations, and it has correspondingly lower prominence than the surrounding co-text. 
However, … the passage is contoured by a marked perfect for the speaking verb (eijrhken in v. 13) and 
the marked use of rhetorical questions (vv. 5, 13, 14) which places a moderate emphasis on the partial 
summary in 1:14 at the end of the list” (97). 
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The Perlocution 
Overall, the desired perlocutionary effect of the opening chapters of Hebrews is that the 
audience complete the action called for by the Directive in 2:1; this will lead to 
transformation of the current behavior of the community.  
The SAC which contains the quotation (1:13-14) is composed of Assertives 
recounting things that God has “said”; it therefore presents elements of the content of 
what “we have heard.” The desired perlocutionary effect of an Assertive is that the 
audience respond not only with understanding but with adherence. In order to obey the 
Directive, Envisaging readers must adhere to the Assertives presented in connection 
with the Directive, including those of the SAC in 1:13-14. Specifically, they will 
reaffirm their belief that the Son not only rules over the angels at the present time but 
was not subject to them during his incarnation. If they have abandoned that belief, they 
will revert to it. The Story told by Psalm 110:1, and specifically Yahweh’s granting 
honor and authority to Yahweh’s Anointed by offering a seat at the right hand (an honor 
not granted to any angel), thus becomes an important part of the theological argument 
for the role of the Son, Messiah Jesus, as compared to the angels. 
 “A Priest Forever” 
Although we cannot explore the use of Psalm 110:4 in Hebrews in detail, we want to 
highlight its contribution to Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview. It is in the 
opening verses of Hebrews that the reader learns that when God’s Son “had made 
purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high” (1:3c). Some 
see an allusion to Psalm 110:1b in the second clause.246 Not to be overlooked, however, 
is that the Son “made purification for sins” (1:3c) points to the priestly nature of Jesus’ 
messiahship.247 In addition to 1:3c, allusions to Psalm 110:1 and 4 are found in Hebrews 
8:1 and 10:12-13.248 These passages, taken with other quotations of and allusions to 
Psalm 110:1 and 4,249 triumphally present Jesus, the Son and Messiah, as not only the 
exalted Lord of all but also the eternal high priest and once-for-all sacrifice. 
                                                           
246 Cf. Hay, Glory, 164. Hebrews follows the wording of Ps 109:1 LXX (ἐκ δεξιῶν) only in 1:13, 
perhaps because it is an explicit quotation. Elsewhere, “the right hand” is expressed by ἐν δεξιᾷ. Whether 
the author of Hebrews uses a hymn in 1:3 (see Koester, 178-179) is not material to our argument.  
247 Cf. Attridge, Hebrews, 95. 
248 In Heb 10:12-13, the thought that the Messiah has offered a “single sacrifice for sins” (v 12) 
is linked to Ps 110:1 via two allusions to the final two clauses of that verse. 
249 Ps 110:1 is also alluded to in Heb 12:2. There are three other direct quotations (5:6; 7:15-17, 
21) of Ps 110:4 and seven allusions (5:10; 6:20; 7:3, 8, 11, 24-25, 28) (Hay, Glory, 165-166). 
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Radu Gheorghita rightly calls the development of “Christ as the High Priest, one 
of the theological tours de force of the epistle.”250 But he is not entirely correct that it 
was the author of Hebrews who “combined into one person the twofold office of the 
Messiah, the Son who was made the High Priest.”251 Although Hebrews is the only NT 
book to quote or allude to Psalm 110:4, there is evidence of a priestly function for 
Messiah Jesus in the co-texts of both our non-Synoptic examples of the use of Psalm 
110:1 (Acts 2:21, 38-39; 1 Cor 15:3, 17).252 
However, as we said in our discussion of the Davidssohnfrage, the 
unwillingness of Jesus’ audience to engage with him concerning Psalm 110 may have 
been due to their discomfort with the priestly references in the second oracle. Since only 
Hebrews makes explicit use of Psalm 110:4, it is possible that “the connection with 
Psalm 110:4 was invented by the author of Hebrews.”253 In developing explicitly a 
theological connection that may have been only implicit previously, the author of 
Hebrews uses Psalm 110:1 and 4 in a manner congruent with their original co-texts. 254 
Conclusion 
Hatina suggests this query: “If the story world serves as the point of departure, what 
then is the cohesive feature within the story to which the quotations and allusions 
contribute?”255 Asking this question helps summarize our analyses of these quotations of 
Psalm 110:1 by various NT speakers/authors. First, the metaphor well-known in the 
                                                           
250 Gheorghita, 145. 
251 Ibid. In the Document of Damascus, “les deux ‘messies d’Aaron et d’Israël’ sont devenus 
l’unique ‘messie d’Aaron et d’Israël’. … Un passage tiré de la partie législative de D nous assure que le 
Messie sera bien le futur grand prêtre, car c’est lui qui ‘expiera (ykpr) leurs fautes’” (Starcky, 495-496).  
252 Cf. Rom 8:34, which refers to the intercession of the exalted Christ and where the metaphor 
of a seat at the right hand is also found. If the author of Hebrews was familiar with Romans, that author is 
developing an existing connection (as per de Lang, 47, and contra Loader, 206; Westfall, 105; and 
Koester, 22). M. Bird points to a merger of the “royal and redemptive roles of Jesus” as early as Mark 
8:27-9:1 (144). R. Watts looks back further—to Mark’s opening sentence—to connect Jesus with the 
Temple as “Lord of the house” (“Lord’s House,” 320). But this does not necessarily mean “the image of 
Christ as a heavenly High Priest was traditional within the early Christian community addressed by 
Hebrews” (Attridge, Hebrews, 102; cf. 26, 103) 
253 De Lang, 48, calls this “probable.” This is contra Hengel, for whom “aufgrund der 
Verwandtschaft von Rö 8,34 mit verschiedenen Hebräer-Texten scheint es mir wahrscheinlich zu sein, 
daβ die Verbindung von Ps 110,1 und 4 nicht erst auf den Verfasser dieses relativ späten Briefes 
zurückgeht, sondern schon wesentlich älter ist und bereits Paulus vertraut war” (130). 
254 Ellingworth calls “the author’s general theological position … the opposite of atomistic 
exposition” (41; cf. 109, 147-148). Gheorghita adds that “current opinion now swings more towards 
admitting that the Author quotes from the OT with full awareness of the texts’ original contexts, 
evidenced in the way the quotations frequently align themselves with ideas from the passage in which 
they originate” (57). For him, “it seems extremely likely that … the context itself played a significant role 
in shaping the use of the quotations” (69). 
255 Hatina, Search, 3. 
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ancient world of being invited to sit at the right hand of the deity, i.e., an offer of honor 
and authority, is either explicitly referred to or obviously part of the mutual context of 
all the quotations. Additionally, all the quotations explicitly reproduce Yahweh’s offer 
to subject the enemies as a footstool/under the feet. Both metaphors are part of the Story 
evoked with each quotation. 
By quoting Psalm 110:1 and evoking these OT Story-lines, the implied NT 
speakers/authors, as Envisagers, activate or create mutual context to guide their 
hearers/readers in realigning or subverting/re-creating their understanding of Yahweh 
and Yahweh’s relationships with His people.256 However, the NT speakers/authors do 
not simply retell the OT Story. Story evolves. The Davidssohnfrage, Jesus’ allusion at 
his trial to the metaphor of the seat at the right hand, and the events of his crucifixion, 
resurrection and ascension all become part of mutual context and Story for other NT 
speakers/authors.257 In addition, the events of Pentecost, including the content of Peter’s 
speech, are or become part of the mutual context of the implied author and audience of 
Acts 2, 1 Corinthians 15 and Hebrews 1-2. 258  
From Jesus’ first use in the Davidssohnfrage, the quotation of Psalm 110:1 
reveals Jesus as “more than” messiah and helps shed light on what it means to say that 
Jesus is Son of David, Messiah, Lord and Son of God.259 And, at Pentecost and after, 
Psalm 110:1 is a critical text in witnessing to and describing Jesus’ exaltation, providing 
a deeper understanding of his “more than” messiahship.260  
Envisaging hearers/readers of the NT are those who realign or subvert/recreate 
their theological perspective and Story according to the perlocutionary intentions of the 
various implied NT speakers/authors. Considering the totality of these quoting texts, the 
implied reader understands that Messiah Jesus is seated in the position of power and 
authority at the right hand of God, where his enemies are being put under his feet. Jesus 
                                                           
256 As Dodd argues with regard to Pss 2, 8 and 110, “I believe reflection will show that the 
development of meaning is a living growth within the given environment, and that the doctrines 
associated with these passages by New Testament writers gain in depth and significance when we have 
regard to the original, historical intention of the psalms they cite” (133). 
257 Hengel is correct that the “unsagbar kühne und zugleich anstöβige Schritt” of placing the 
ignominiously-executed Jesus “in die Throngemeinschaft mit Gott nach Ps 110,1” must be grounded “in 
Lehre und Verhalten Jesus selbst” (177). 
258 Koester believes “many similarities between Hebrews and the Pauline writings may result 
from each writer’s reliance on a common pool of early Christian ideas,” including “the use of Ps 110:1 as 
a principal witness to Christ’s exaltation” (56; cf. H. W. Attridge, “The Psalms in Hebrews,” in Moyise 
and Menken,” 197). 
259 In Hebrews, references to Ps 110:4 speak to priestly elements of Jesus’ messiahship. 
260 We disagree with Attridge’s claim that the “use” of Ps 110 in the Davidssohnfrage accounts 
is different from its “use” in Acts 2, Rom 8, 1 Cor 15, Eph 1, Col 3 (“The Psalms,” 198 and 198n4).  
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“pours out” the Spirit, forgives sins and is to be called on for salvation. All things, 
including angels and the ultimate enemy, death, are subject to him. Ultimately 
Envisaging readers come to live in the lifeworld established by the recontextualized 
Story of the people of God, in which Messiah Jesus reigns eternally over all things of 
earth and heaven.
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CHAPTER 9 
COCLUSIO 
The Development and Use of Our Methodology 
In the first part of our study, we created a model to explore how OT quotation serves as 
a transformational call to live into the lifeworld of the people of God and adopt the 
corresponding worldview. Rejecting both the idea that either the quoted or quoting 
author “controls” the other and the claim that quoting is necessarily manipulative, we 
adopted a hermeneutics of author-reader cooperation through the medium of the text. 
Our first step was to evaluate the proposed functions of quotation. Making the 
determination that quotation can evoke tradition led us to explore the relationship 
between the source and receptor contexts of a quotation and the interaction between 
author and reader generally. We developed the concept of “Story” (narrative plus non-
narrative textual tradition) as our link between quotation and lifeworld/worldview 
transformation. The theological positions (basic questions and answers) of the elements 
of textual tradition evoked via quotation we term its “Story-lines.” 
Transformation of lifeworld/worldview and Story is necessary in response to 
tension, such as the reinforcement or interposition of a Story via quotation. When Story 
is evoked and mutual context is created and/or activated, transformation is in view. 
Adapting communication theorist Walter Fisher’s categorization of the functions of 
stories, we consider transformation to be one of two basic types, realignment or 
subversion/re-creation. 
Finally, we created an “action model” of communicative interaction based in 
SAT. The inclusion of not only illocution but also perlocution (in each case, both acts 
and effects) in our action model allows us to delineate three reader roles: the locutionary 
role of “Independent,” the illocutionary role of “Analyst” and the perlocutionary role of 
“Envisager.” Our study focuses on the Envisager, a reader who not only understands the 
illocutionary act but also responds with the perlocutionary effect (belief and/or action) 
of the implied reader corresponding to the perlocutionary act of the implied author. The 
intended perlocutionary response of the implied reader points to the implied author’s 
desired future transformation of Story, theology and lifeworld/worldview. By including 
perlocution, incorporating the construct of the implied author/reader, and considering 
Envisagers as distinct from Analysts, our action model holds the author, reader and text 
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in creative tension, providing a bridge across the chasm between meaning as authorial 
intention versus reader response. Only at the perlocutionary level is communicative 
interaction fully successful, i.e., does an empirical reader move beyond understanding 
to adherence and transformation.  
In quoting, the Envisaging NT speaker/author, who is a reader of the source text, 
evokes the theological Story-lines of the OT Story and/or an intervening interpretive 
tradition in order to give guidance and direction to the potentially Envisaging empirical 
NT audience. Via quotation and through the implied author and reader, the NT author 
calls for a response of belief and/or action which is intended to realign or subvert/re-
create the current Story and the related theological lifeworld/worldview of the empirical 
NT audience. Using our action model, we can evaluate what theological elements of 
Story (tradition) are evoked by a quotation, what lifeworld/worldview transformation is 
in view and whether the NT speaker/author read as an Envisager. 
In our first case study, Paul’s quotation of Psalm 115:1a LXX in 2 Corinthians 
4:13, we concluded that Paul evokes the Story of the psalmist, who believes, speaks, 
suffers, is rescued, and gives thanks, in order to link the Corinthians to the lifeworld of 
the people of Yahweh and encourage a transformation of his readers’ beliefs and 
behaviors. Via the illocutionary and perlocutionary responses of the implied reader, an 
Envisaging NT reader adheres to the idea that Paul’s faith impels his speech and that 
neither his ministry nor his message is compromised by his suffering. Rather, Paul’s 
suffering demonstrates solidarity with Messiah Jesus and the truth of his message.  
Additionally, Paul’s Envisaging readers adhere to the notion that all believers 
can be confident of Yahweh’s protection, and that ultimately, all will be brought into 
Yahweh’s presence with Messiah Jesus. Not only what they know but what they do is to 
be transformed; thanksgiving is to be increased to the glory of God. Envisaging readers 
join Paul, himself an Envisaging reader, in the lifeworld he inhabits. 
In our second case study, we examined some purportedly divergent uses of 
Psalm 110:1 by NT authors, applying our methodology to see what transformation of 
belief or action is in view in each instance. The metaphor of being invited to sit at the 
right hand of the deity, i.e., an offer of honor and authority, is explicitly referred to in 
five of the six quotations we examined.1 Additionally, all six quotations explicitly 
reproduce Yahweh’s guarantee of victory via the subjection of the enemies as a 
                                                           
1 If we include the allusions in the accounts of Jesus’ trial, the count rises to eight out of nine. 
This aspect of Ps 110:1 is part of the mutual context of 1 Cor 15:25 but is not referred to explicitly. 
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footstool for or under the feet.2 Thus, one or both of these elements are part of the 
evoked Story in every instance.  
In terms of the theological import, from Jesus’ first use in the Davidssohnfrage, 
the quotation of Psalm 110:1 substantiates and develops Jesus’ “more than” 
messiahship. Jesus’ speech at his trial, which has roots in the Davidssohnfrage, is part 
of the mutual context—along with Jesus’ crucifixion, resurrection, ascension and 
exaltation—when Peter evokes the Story at Pentecost. And Peter’s Pentecost speech 
becomes part of mutual context for the implied author and audience of Acts, 1 
Corinthians 15 and Hebrews 1-2. 
Although the quotation is used in a variety of settings, each NT speaker/author 
appears to read the OT text as an Envisager. That does not mean that by quoting Psalm 
110:1, they simply retell the OT Story. The Story of the people of God now 
encompasses the events of the life, death, resurrection and exaltation of Messiah Jesus. 
As Story evolves, theology and lifeworld/worldview evolve as well. Envisaging 
empirical readers transform their theological perspective and Story according to the 
perlocutionary intention of the implied NT speakers/authors and inhabit the lifeworld in 
which Messiah Jesus reigns eternally over earth and heaven at the right hand of God. 
Looking Ahead 
As Booth laments, “since everything is in one way or another related to everything else, 
… to write a book at all—any book—one must rule out almost everything that is 
potentially interesting.”3 We have only scratched the surface of exploring NT quotation 
of the OT with our methodology.4 Investigation of other OT quotations would be 
profitable. There may also be value in modifying the methodology to investigate 
allusion or even echo.5 Other interesting studies would be of quotations used ironically 
                                                           
2 The allusions in the trial narratives do not reproduce this element. 
3 Booth, Fiction, 404. 
4 We have not, for example, considered any quotations from Johannine literature. Given the 
exchange between G. K. Beale (John’s Use of the Old Testament in Revelation [Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1998] and “Questions of Authorial Intent, Epistemology, and Presuppositions and Their 
Bearing on the Study of the Old Testament in the New: A Rejoinder to Steve Moyise,” IBS 21, no. 4 
[1999]: 152-180) and Moyise (“Intertextuality and the Study”), our methodology might be of value there. 
5 For allusion and echo, see Hays, Echoes. The construct of the implied author/reader obviates 
Wilk’s concern that “one can only assume a communicative function of scriptural connections on the 
basis of explicitly marked citations” (”Paul,” 85). 
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or in parody or punning or in which the NT author appears to read the OT as an 
Independent.6  
Additionally, because our methodology involves evoking Story to call readers to 
the transformation necessary to inhabit a lifeworld, an interesting topic to explore would 
be how evoking Story helps form and sustain identity.7 For the NT, this would involve 
investigating both how individuals become and grow as followers of Jesus and how the 
identity of the NT communities as the people of Yahweh is established. A natural 
follow-on to this would be how ethical standards are established and sustained.8 Of 
additional interest might be the relaxing of our implied assumption of the equality of 
participants to add to our model the consideration of what Pratt calls “affective 
relations, power relations, and the question of shared goals.”9 
Thus, the model we have developed here, which uses SAT—notably 
perlocution—to link quotation as the evoking of Story (textual tradition) to 
lifeworld/worldview transformation, may provide additional opportunities to gain 
insights into the purposes of NT authors and readers in communicative interaction.
                                                           
6 An example would be to explore whether J. A. Fitzmyer’s four classes (“Literal or Historical,” 
“Modernized Texts,” “Accommodated Texts” [“wrested from its original context or modified somehow 
to suit the new situation”], and “Eschatological”) capture meaningful distinctions (see “The Use of 
Explicit Old Testament Quotations in Qumran Literature and in the New Testament,” TS 7 [October 
1960-July 1961]: 305-330; quote is from p. 316). Other fruitful explorations would be the examples in S. 
Moyise, “Does Paul Respect the Context of His Quotations?,” in Stanley; and “How Does Paul Read 
Scripture?,” in Evans and Zacharias. 
7 We saw in chapter 4 that many scholars (including Keesmaat, R. Watts, Pao, Horrell, J. Green, 
and Crites) tie tradition/story to social identity. See also Hays, Faith, 221. M. Bird concludes that “the 
messianic Christology … of the early church was the central means through which it related its own 
claims to be the people of God in continuity with and as the climax to Israel’s sacred traditions” (151; cf. 
Crafton, 437; and J. Punt, “Identity, Memory, and Scriptural Warrant: Arguing Paul’s Case,” in Stanley). 
8 Hays points out that “some contemporary ethicists have emphasized the importance of stories 
as the medium through which character is formed and values are sustained” (Faith, 221). 
9 Pratt, “Ideology,” 67.  
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APPEDIX A 
WORKS WHICH USE SPEECH-ACT THEORY 
For the Exegesis of Biblical Texts or to Explore Religious Concepts 
Donald D. Evans, whose 1963 work focused on NT speeches, was apparently the first to 
use SAT to analyze biblical texts or religious concepts (The Logic of Self-Involvement: 
A Philosophical Study of Everyday Language with Special Reference to the Christian 
Use of Language about God as Creator [London: SCM, 1963]).  
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APPEDIX B 
THE SPEECH-ACT COMPLEXES OF PSALMS 115:1-3 AD 109:1 LXX  
AD THEIR QUOTIG T TEXTS 
1. A Comparison of Psalm 115:1-3 LXX and the NETS Translation 
LXX NETS 
1 Αλληλουια.  
1a Ἐπίστευσα, I believed,  
1b διὸ ἐλάλησα· and so I spoke; 
1c ἐγὼ δὲ ἐταπεινώθην σφόδρα. but I was brought very low. 
2 ἐγὼ εἶπα ἐν τῇ ἐκστάσει µου 
Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης.1 
I said in my alarm,  
“Every person is a liar.” 
3 τί ἀνταποδώσω τῷ κυρίῳ περὶ πάντων, ὧν 
ἀνταπέδωκέν µοι; 
What shall I return to the Lord for all he returned 
to me? 
 
2. The Quotation of Psalm 115:1 LXX in 2 Corinthians 4:13-14 (NA27 and NRSV) 
NA27 NRSV 
13a Ἔχοντες δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦµα τῆς πίστεως κατὰ 
τὸ γεγραµµένον· ἐπίστευσα διὸ ἐλάλησα,  
But just as we have the same spirit of faith that is 
in accordance with scripture — “I believed, and 
so I spoke” — 
13b καὶ ἡµεῖς πιστεύοµεν,  we also believe, 
13c διὸ καὶ λαλοῦµεν, and so we speak, 
14 εἰδότες ὅτι ὁ ἐγείρας τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν καὶ 
ἡµᾶς σὺν Ἰησοῦ ἐγερεῖ καὶ παραστήσει σὺν ὑµῖν. 
because we know that the one who raised the 
Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus, and will 
bring us with you into his presence. 
 
3. A Comparison of Psalm 109:1-3 LXX and the NETS and NRSV Translations 
 
                                                           
1 Ps 115:2 LXX contains a direct self-quotation (introduced by the Greek verb λέγω rather than 
the verb λαλέω as in 1b). As a result, we consider it one SA.  
LXX NETS NRSV 
1 Τῷ ∆αυιδ ψαλµός.  
Εἶπεν ὁ κύριος τῷ κυρίῳ µου 
Κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν µου, ἕως ἂν 
θῶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς σου 
ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου. 
Pertaining to Dauid. A Psalm. 
The Lord said to my lord, “Sit at 
my right hand until I make your 
enemies a footstool for your 
feet.” 
Of David. A Psalm. 
The LORD says to my lord, “Sit 
at my right hand until I make 
your enemies your footstool.” 
2a ῥάβδον δυνάµεώς σου 
ἐξαποστελεῖ κύριος ἐκ Σιων, 
The Lord will send out from 
Sion your powerful rod. 
The LORD sends out from Zion 
your mighty scepter.  
2b καὶ κατακυρίευε ἐν µέσῳ 
τῶν ἐχθρῶν σου. 
So have dominion in the midst 
of your enemies. 
Rule in the midst of your foes. 
3a µετὰ σοῦ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡµέρᾳ 
τῆς δυνάµεώς σου ἐν ταῖς 
λαµπρότησιν τῶν ἁγίων· 
Rule is yours on the day of your 
power among the splendor of 
the holy ones. 
Your people will offer 
themselves willingly on the day 
you lead your forces on the holy 
mountains. 
3b ἐκ γαστρὸς πρὸ ἑωσφόρου 
ἐξεγέννησά σε. 
From the womb, before the 
morning star, I brought you 
forth. 
From the womb of the morning, 
like dew, your youth will come 
to you. 
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4. The Synoptic Texts of the Davidssohnfrage (NA27 and NRSV) 
Matthew 22:41-45 Mark 12:35b-37a Luke 20:41-44 
41 Συνηγµένων δὲ 
τῶν Φαρισαίων 
ἐπηρώτησεν αὐτοὺς 
ὁ Ἰησοῦς 42aλέγων· 
τί ὑµῖν δοκεῖ περὶ 
τοῦ χριστοῦ; τίνος 
υἱός ἐστιν;  
Now while the 
Pharisees were 
gathered 
together, Jesus 
asked them this 
question: “What 
do you think of 
the Messiah? 
Whose son is 
he?”  
    
42b λέγουσιν αὐτῷ· 
τοῦ ∆αυίδ. 
They said to 
him, “The son 
of David.” 
35 Καὶ 
ἀποκριθεὶς 
ὁ Ἰησοῦς 
ἔλεγεν 
διδάσκων 
ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ· 
πῶς 
λέγουσιν οἱ 
γραµµατεῖς 
ὅτι ὁ 
χριστὸς υἱὸς 
∆αυίδ 
ἐστιν; 
While Jesus 
was 
teaching in 
the temple, 
he said, 
“How can 
the scribes 
say that the 
Messiah is 
the son of 
David?  
41 Εἶπεν δὲ 
πρὸς 
αὐτούς· πῶς 
λέγουσιν 
τὸν χριστὸν 
εἶναι ∆αυὶδ 
υἱόν; 
Then he 
said to 
them, “How 
can they say 
that the 
Messiah is 
David’s 
son? 
43 λέγει αὐτοῖς· πῶς 
οὖν ∆αυὶδ ἐν 
πνεύµατι καλεῖ 
αὐτὸν κύριον 
λέγων· 44εἶπεν 
κύριος τῷ κυρίῳ µου· 
κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν 
µου, ἕως ἂν θῶ τοὺς 
ἐχθρούς σου 
ὑποκάτω τῶν ποδῶν 
σου; 
 
He said to them, 
“How is it then 
that David by 
the Spirit calls 
him Lord, 
saying, ‘The 
Lord said to my 
Lord, “Sit at my 
right hand, until 
I put your 
enemies under 
your feet”’? 
36 αὐτὸς 
∆αυὶδ εἶπεν 
ἐν τῷ 
πνεύµατι τῷ 
ἁγίῳ · εἶπεν 
κύριος τῷ 
κυρίῳ µου· 
κάθου ἐκ 
δεξιῶν µου, 
ἕως ἂν θῶ 
τοὺς 
ἐχθρούς σου 
ὑποκάτω 
τῶν ποδῶν 
σου. 
David 
himself, by 
the Holy 
Spirit, 
declared, 
 ‘The Lord 
said to my 
Lord, “Sit at 
my right 
hand, until I 
put your 
enemies 
under your 
feet.”’  
42 αὐτὸς γὰρ 
∆αυὶδ λέγει 
ἐν βίβλῳ 
ψαλµῶν· 
εἶπεν κύριος 
τῷ κυρίῳ 
µου· κάθου 
ἐκ δεξιῶν 
µου, 43ἕως 
ἂν θῶ τοὺς 
ἐχθρούς σου 
ὑποπόδιον 
τῶν ποδῶν 
σου. 
For David 
himself 
says in the 
book of 
Psalms, 
‘The Lord 
said to my 
Lord, “Sit at 
my right 
hand, until I 
make your 
enemies 
your 
footstool.”’ 
45 εἰ οὖν ∆αυὶδ καλεῖ 
αὐτὸν κύριον, πῶς 
υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστιν;  
If David thus 
calls him Lord, 
how can he be 
his son?” 
37a αὐτὸς 
∆αυὶδ λέγει 
αὐτὸν 
κύριον, kαὶ 
πόθεν 
αὐτοῦ ἐστιν 
υἱός; 
David 
himself 
calls him 
Lord; so 
how can he 
be his son?” 
44 ∆αυὶδ οὖν 
κύριον 
αὐτὸν 
καλεῖ, καὶ 
πῶς αὐτοῦ 
υἱός ἐστιν; 
David thus 
calls him 
Lord; so 
how can he 
be his son?” 
46 καὶ οὐδεὶς 
ἐδύνατο 
ἀποκριθῆναι αὐτῷ 
λόγον οὐδὲ 
ἐτόλµησέν τις ἀπ’ 
ἐκείνης τῆς ἡµέρας 
ἐπερωτῆσαι αὐτὸν 
οὐκέτι. 
No one was able 
to give him an 
answer, nor 
from that day 
did anyone dare 
to ask him any 
more questions. 
37b καὶ [ὁ] 
πολὺς ὄχλος 
ἤκουεν 
αὐτοῦ 
ἡδέως. 
And the 
large crowd 
was 
listening to 
him with 
delight. 
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5. The Quotation of Psalm 110:1 in Peter’s Pentecost Speech 
Acts 2:33-36 (NA27) Acts 2:33-36 (NRSV) 
33 τῇ δεξιᾷ οὖν τοῦ θεοῦ ὑψωθείς, τήν τε 
ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύµατος τοῦ ἁγίου λαβὼν 
παρὰ τοῦ πατρός, ἐξέχεεν τοῦτο ὃ ὑµεῖς [καὶ] 
βλέπετε καὶ ἀκούετε. 
{Peter said} “Being therefore exalted at {by} the 
right hand of God, and having received from the 
Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he has 
poured out this that you both see and hear.  
34a οὐ γάρ ∆αυὶδ ἀνέβη εἰς τοὺς οὐρανούς,  For David did not ascend into the heavens,  
34b λέγει δὲ αὐτός· εἶπεν [ὁ] κύριος τῷ κυρίῳ 
µου· κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν µου, 35ἕως ἂν θῶ τοὺς 
ἐχθρούς σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου. 
but he himself says, ‘The Lord said to my Lord, 
“Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies 
your footstool.”’ 
36 ἀσφαλῶς οὖν γινωσκέτω πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσραὴλ 
ὅτι καὶ κύριον αὐτὸν καὶ χριστὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ 
θεός, τοῦτον τὸν Ἰησοῦν ὃν ὑµεῖς 
ἐσταυρώσατε. 
Therefore let the entire house of Israel know with 
certainty that God has made him both Lord and 
Messiah, this Jesus whom you crucified.” 
 
6a. A Comparison of Psalm 110:1c [109:1c LXX] and 1 Corinthians 15:252 
Psalm 109:1c LXX 1 Corinthians 15:25 (NA27) 
… ἕως ἂν θῶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς σου ὑποπόδιον 
τῶν ποδῶν σου. 
… ἄχρι οὗ θῇ πάντας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας 
αὐτοῦ. 
 
6b. The Quotation of Psalm 110:1 [109:1c LXX] in 1 Corinthians 15:24-28 
NA27 NRSV 
24 εἶτα τὸ τέλος, ὅταν παραδιδῷ τὴν βασιλείαν 
τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί, ὅταν καταργήσῃ πᾶσαν 
ἀρχὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐξουςίαν καὶ δύναµιν.  
Then comes the end, when he hands over the 
kingdom to God the Father, after he has destroyed 
every ruler and every authority and power.  
25 δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν βασιλεύειν ἄρχι οὗ θῇ πάντας 
τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ.   
For he must reign until he has put all his enemies 
under his feet  
26 ἔσχατος ἐχθρὸς καταργεῖται ὁ θάνατος· The last enemy to be destroyed is death  
27a πάντα γὰρ ὑπέταξεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ. For “God has put all things in subjection under his 
feet.”  
27b ὅταν δὲ εἴπῃ ὅτι πάντα ὑποτέτακται, δῆλον 
ὅτι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὑποτάξαντος αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα. 
But when it says, “All things are put in 
subjection,” it is plain that this does not include 
the one who put all things in subjection under him. 
28a ὅταν δὲ ὐποταγῇ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, τότε [καὶ] 
αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς ὑποταγήσεται τῷ ὑποτάξαντι 
αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, 
When all things are subjected to him, then the Son 
himself will also be subjected to the one who put 
all things in subjection under him,  
28b ἵνα ᾖ ὁ θεὸς [τὰ] πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν. so that God may be all in all. 
 
7. The Quotation of Psalm 110:1b-c [109:1b-c LXX] in Hebrews 1:13-14 
NA27 NRSV 
13 πρὸς τίνα δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων εἴρηκέν ποτε· 
κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν µου, ἕως ἂν θῶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς 
σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου; 
But to which of the angels has he {God} ever said, 
“Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a 
footstool for your feet”? 
14 οὐχὶ πάντες εἰσὶν λειτουργικὰ πνεύµατα εἰς 
διακονίαν ἀποστελλόµενα διὰ τοὺς µέλλοντας 
κληρονοµεῖν σωτηρίαν; 
Are not all angels spirits in the divine service, sent to 
serve for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation? 
                                                           
2 The double underlined worlds are identical in each text; the single underlined words are 
different forms of the same word. 
  
 205 
APPEDIX C 
A EVALUATIO OF POTETIAL PRE-CHRISTIA MESSIAIC 
REFERECES TO PSALM 110 
Messianic references to Psalm 110 have been seen in the OT books of Daniel and 
Zechariah, as well as in 1 Maccabees, Assumption of Moses, Jubilees, Testament of 
Levi, Rabbi Akiba, the Similitudes of 1 Enoch and 11QMelchizedek.  
As an example, Hay finds it “distinctly possible” that the author of Daniel 7 was 
“thinking of Ps 110:1 (the only scriptural text which explicitly speaks of someone 
enthroned beside God).”1 For Michael Rydelnik also, “Daniel 7, with its glorious vision 
of the Ancient of Days and the Son of Man, appears to be a reference to the seating of 
the messianic King at the right hand of God (Ps 110:1).”2 He believes that not only the 
book of Daniel but also the book of Zechariah provides “a clear messianic hope by 
relying on the words and images contained in Psalm 110. Plainly, these later writers 
understood Psalm 110 to refer to the Messiah of Israel.”3 But finding “references” to 
Psalm 110 in Daniel and Zechariah is far from certain. As Collins puts it, the Son of 
Man in Daniel “is not a Davidic messiah in any conventional sense.”4 
In intertestamental literature, Hay finds Hasmonean usage of Psalm 110:4 in 1 
Maccabees 14:41, which refers to Simon’s appointment as “leader” (ἡγούµενον) as well 
as priest “forever” (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα) and is thus taken to justify the Hasmonean claims to 
royal as well as priestly prerogatives.5 However, chapters 14-16 may have been a post-
70 CE addition to 1 Maccabees.6 In any event, it is unlikely the psalm was composed by 
or for the Hasmoneans, since “the psalm ascribes priesthood to a king (vs 4), whereas 
the Hasmoneans were priests by birth and required legitimation of their kingly office. 
So the psalm, while filling their propaganda needs, did not fit them exactly; it seems to 
have been written for other monarchs.”7 Roth concludes that “bleibt es eine reine 
Hypothese auch in 1 Makk 14,41 einen Bezug zu Ps 110 zu sehen.”8  
Hay also finds applications of Psalm 110 to Hasmonean rulers in Assumption of 
Moses 6:1; Jubilees 32:1, 36:16; and portions of Testament of Levi, including 8:3, which 
                                                           
1 Hay, Glory, 26; cf. R. Watts, “The Psalms,” 38. 
2 Rydelnik, 182. 
3 Ibid., 183. 
4 J. Collins, Scepter, 205. 
5 Hay, Glory, 24. 
6 See Tharel, 29 and 29n20. 
7 Hay, Glory, 24n22; cf. de Lang, 43 and 43n1. 
8 Roth, 51. 
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“recalls the phraseology of Psalm 110:2,” and chapter 18, which he believes contains 
allusions to Ps 110:1c and 110:3.9 However, Assumption of Moses and Jubilees do not 
allude to Psalm 110 except for a link to Melchizedek via the reference to “Most High 
God” in Genesis 14:18-20. And, not only are any connections in Testament of Levi 
extremely faint, Marinus de Jonge argues convincingly that in Testament of Levi its 
“Jewish and patently Christian elements are connected so closely that they cannot be 
separated by literary critical means.”10 Similarly, Michael Knibb avers “there is nothing 
in the Aramaic Levi Document that can be regarded as messianic. … It is clear that the 
material in T Lev 18 has been thoroughly reworked by the Christian author of the 
Testament of Levi.”11 Karen Jobes and Moisés Silva also believe that  
although the pseudepigraphic work known as Testaments of the Twelve 
Patriarchs probably originated in the Hellenistic Judaism of the second century 
B.C.E., it may have also experienced Christian interpolations during its history 
of scribal transmission. The text is extant in only five medieval manuscripts, the 
earliest dating to the tenth century, making it notoriously difficult to use in LXX 
studies.12  
Therefore, Testament of Levi also is not, for us, an authoritative source. 
Hay finds other potential pre-Christian interpretations of Psalm 110 in 
Testament of Job 33, the Similitudes of 1 Enoch, and 11QMelchizedek. Although the 
latter is clearly pre-Christian, by Hay’s own admission, it “never plainly alludes to 
either the psalm or Gen 14.18-20.”13 Similarly, while James Charlesworth feels “1 
Enoch 37-71 antedates the Palestinian Jesus Movement”14 and others assert its value for 
NT studies,15 it remains “extremely tenuous to assert that anyone in pre-Christian 
Judaism … equated ‘sit at my right hand’ of Ps 110:1 with ‘sitting on the throne of 
glory’ in the Similitudes of Enoch.”16 We do not base our argument on such uncertain 
evidence. 
                                                           
9 Hay, Glory, 24-25. 
10 M. de Jonge, Jewish Eschatology, Early Christian Christology and the Testaments of the 
Twelve Patriarchs (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 234. 
11 Knibb, 13. 
12 Jobes and Silva, 300. 
13 Hay, Glory, 27; contra Witherington, Mark, 333; J. C. VanderKam, The Dead Sea Scrolls and 
the Bible (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 47; and Eskola’s minimally supported assertion that 
“11QMelch. may be regarded as one of the earliest examples of exploiting Psalm 110 in an apocalyptic 
Jewish writing” (130). 
14 Charlesworth, “Messianology,” 40.  
15 See M. Bird, 93-94. 
16 R. Longenecker, 157n50. 
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As to Testament of Job 33, for Craig Keener, “one of the few obvious allusions 
to Ps 110 in extant non-Christian Jewish literature from before about 200 C.E. is the 
Testament of Job (Test. Job. 33:3), where it is applied to Job’s exaltation (in a nondivine 
way).”17 Although Testament of Job does refer to being seated at Yahweh’s right hand, 
others doubt it is pre-Christian. According to Martin Hengel, “Man kann daher nicht 
aufgrund von TestHiob 33 behaupten, daβ die sessio ad dexteram Christi auf einer von 
Ps 110,1 unabhängigen auch sonst in jüdischen Quellen angedeuteten Tradition beruhe. 
Eine solche vorchristliche jüdische Überlieferung läβt sicht nicht nachweisen.”18 In any 
event, it is clear Job is not the messiah first-century Jews anticipated. 
In general, we agree with Jobes and Silva that “in the study of the history of the 
messianic idea, one must be able to identify texts that were understood in this way by 
the Jews before the time of Jesus. This is not always easy or straightforward to do, 
because most of the extant manuscripts have been preserved by the Christian 
tradition.”19 There are some interpretations of Psalm 110:1 in rabbinic writings (notably 
the Babylonian Talmud and several Amoraic midrashic writings) and the Targum 
Psalms. Although none of these sources is dated earlier than the third century CE, some 
argue they report rabbinic teaching from earlier periods.20 However, it is probable these 
writings contain at least some reaction to Christian interpretation of the OT. For 
example, Evans believes the reference to David in Targum Psalm 110:1 may be “in 
reaction to Christian interpretation.”21 Warren Heard points to “the danger of drawing 
conclusions about Jewish traditions in the NT era from sources written after the 
destruction of Jerusalem,”22 and Harold Attridge finds that, in general, “in Jewish 
tradition attestations of a messianic interpretation of the text [Ps 110(109):1] are 
weak.”23 It is doubtful that any of these texts reflect “pure” pre-Christian Jewish 
interpretation. 
                                                           
17 Keener, 1:961; cf. Bateman, Hermeneutics, 181, who also believes Ps 110 “is at least alluded 
to in … 11QMelchizedek.” For Hay, the “allusion to Ps 110.1 in T Job 33.3 seems patent,” although he 
does not confine its potential date to the pre-Christian era (Glory, 23; cf. 22). 
18 Hengel, 180; cf. Evans, Ancient Texts, 42. 
19 Jobes and Silva, 300. 
20 See, for example, Evans, Ancient Texts, 197, regarding Targum Psalms, which is only known 
since the 11th century. Similarly, Charlesworth recognizes that the Similitudes of 1 Enoch “is extant only 
in Ethiopic” (“Messianology,” 39). 
21 C. A. Evans, “Prophecy and Polemic: Jews in Luke’s Scriptural Apologetic,” in Luke and 
Scripture: The Function of Sacred Tradition in Luke-Acts, ed. C. A. Evans and J. A. Sanders 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 189 n75. 
22 W. Heard, “New Testament Background,” in McKnight, 24. 
23 Attridge, Hebrews, 61. 
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